Transcription
Individual performances are happening in different cities, but in large cities, the following picture emerges: drones are circling, identifying: "What if someone has gathered somewhere, and forces of order, so-called, are being thrown there for suppression." And demonstrations in support of the regime are also being organized. People are brought by bus, everything as it should be, and slogans as they should be. That is, in principle, this movement has been crushed. For a while, everything in Iran calmed down, everything returned to normal. And the fact that the Crown Prince of Iran, he suddenly appealed again with, well, such a request to all the population of the country on Saturday, Sunday, and Monday after 8:00 PM to go out, well, onto the roofs, onto the balconies, onto the streets and start chanting, as he put it, national slogans. This is such a form of protest, a form of resistance. No other form is foreseen now. >> Mikhail Ivanovich, I want to quote a post by military expert Sergey Oslender on the situation in Iran. Whatever Trump's multi-move strategy is, if it exists, it no longer matters to the Iranians who were counting on him. The uprising has been suppressed, the number of victims is beyond counting due to the lack of information sources, but there are very many of them. No comparison to previous rounds of protests. And now a wave of terrible repressions will sweep through Iran. and executions. Is this something to expect, unfortunately? >> Well, of course, I agree with Sergey 100%. This is exactly how it happens in Iran after очередные social protests, economic protests, and so on. But what attracts attention now is that a kind of united front has formed in support of preserving this Iranian regime, that is, the regime of the ayatollahs, which, well, from the perspective of a normal person, is a cancerous tumor in the Middle East. It is a source of terrorism, encouragement of terrorism. From the perspective of all surrounding countries. It is also a nest of Shiism. And all the others there, the majority of the population in all other countries and regions are Sunnis, not Shiites. Shiites are religious opponents for them, I would say. Not just enemies, although they are Muslims, but still opponents. And suddenly a united front appears, which calls for: "Guys, don't touch the state structure of the Islamic Republic." And in this front, we see, well, from the Arab side, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and from the north, Turkey with Azerbaijan, and naturally, the Russian regime. That is, everyone is shouting, persuading Trump: "No strikes, please, do not deliver." Do not help any demonstrators. What if the regime collapses? What does that mean? What is the logic here? Well, the logic is very simple. But imagine that after the fall of this religious regime, after people are hanged on poles in chals and turbans, a state emerges that refuses what? from imposing its so-called Islamic revolution on the entire region. And the most terrible thing for all the states that are now forming this united front is that it will be like in the time of the overthrown Shah. It will be a strategic partner of Israel, it will be a powerful state. That is, sanctions will stop, sanctions will stop, that is, the revival of the Iranian economy is starting again. And suddenly, as it was with the Shah, these two states actually ensured stability in the region. They were two pillars with a powerful army, the Shah's Iran, which was friends with everyone from the Soviet Union to the United States, and Israel, which also repelled all extremists and so on. And the alliance of these two greatly frightens the listed countries of this new front. They would, of course, prefer it to be a weak country with a collapsing economy. Yes, to hell with them. Let the country be weakened as a result of the absolutely idiotic actions, ideologically driven actions of these ayatollahs. It no longer plays any role in the region. That's what's needed. And everyone else is terribly afraid that a new strong player might suddenly appear, and moreover, in alliance with Israel. As for the promises of the Iranian leadership not to carry out any repressions, Donald Trump even thanked the Iranian leadership for abandoning this idea. Well, it's understandable that it's difficult to predict anything, but one can imagine that indeed there will be no consequences for the protesters, and within Iran, within this old regime, the very regime which, well, it's understandable that since 1979 many players have changed, but is there any new generation, a different generation, which, perhaps, holds different views. >> Well, Iran has changed so much since the Shah was overthrown. Then the population was 35-36 million, now it's 92 million. These are completely new people, new generations. The majority of the people are under 30 years old. This is truly a new generation. And the new young generation, well, first of all, we understand that they are extremely dissatisfied with this Islamic leadership, which, in the name of the ideology of spreading Islam, has sacrificed the economic and social stability of the country and the development of the country. And they blame this regime for it. And not just the regime, but the Islamic regime. Among the new generation, there are not just some nostalgic feelings; they haven't seen what Shah's Iran was like, what life was like there. And therefore, this is an idealized image of the Shah's monarchy. But towards Islam, there is an acute rejection, acute dissatisfaction. This is a completely new generation. And a generation that, first of all, wants a return to ancient, to ancient, to the values of old ancient Iran, even before Islam. This is very interesting to watch how it is being revived there. But, in principle, I think that the regime will still resort to the first part of the question. Arrests continue. We even see footage that has leaked, video sketches, where security forces are simply storming houses, shops, stores, arresting people who participated in the protests, and the number of arrested people is growing and growing. The Prosecutor General of Iran and the head of religious justice, Ayatollah Ejei, I would say, are calling for death sentences, quite unambiguously. And I think that if they have support, it will be support from the Supreme Leader, then the executions will continue. Mikhail Ivanovich, the last topic about Iran is quite unexpected. As we understand, Elon Musk's Starlink company supplied equipment to Iran so that people would have internet. Well, experts say that in Iran, compared to Ukraine, where the internet is uninterrupted, it is more difficult to provide this signal, because jamming devices can be installed almost everywhere. What do you know about this situation? Well, I know that, well, according to Starlink's own estimates, there might be up to 50,000 of these devices in Iran. This is small for a country of this size, with a population of 92 million people. So, and then there are indeed reports from those who used this Starlink network that jamming is occurring. How, what equipment they use. Rumors circulated that such equipment was supplied from Russia. I don't understand these technical solutions to such problems, but the fact that they are jamming, yes, the owners of these systems themselves report this. These systems are illegal, meaning if they find the device, they break in and arrest the owner. These are terrible punishments. This is punished, it is punished in Iran. But from time to time, some signals penetrate through the jamming. >> And, moving on to the oil topic, how realistic is it to assess the volume of Iranian oil exports? And are there any changes in this regard? >> No. Iranian exports continue, mainly to China. About 92, 93 percent of all oil exported by Iran is sent to China. If earlier all this was disguised, then they would turn off the tanker tracking systems, transfer oil from tanker to tanker at sea, disguise it with documents as if it were oil from Malaysia. Now all this has been abandoned and it goes directly. They have even stopped hiding their location at sea. And tankers simply go in that direction. Well, they export somewhere around, maybe one and a half, sometimes 1.8 million barrels per day. Well, sometimes more, sometimes less. There are interruptions, of course. But as much as Iran can export, it exports, mainly to China. There are no problems with this. The same Trump, who, it seems, is at war with the shadow fleet. Well, this fleet can be called a shadow fleet, because some of the tankers he arrests were involved, including in the transportation of oil from Iran. Well, even the tanker that was chased, chased, chased, and finally caught somewhere in the northern part of the Atlantic, was going to Venezuela from Iran. That was its starting point. But, arrests of tankers, punishments of tankers that operate for the transportation of Iranian oil, Russian oil, we haven't heard about this yet. Maybe there were one or two cases in Europe, but it must be said that Ukraine is best at fighting these, in quotes, shadow tankers. Damaged tankers in the Black Sea make oil market participants seriously think about whether things will get worse and whether this route of obtaining oil from Novorossiysk will disappear. >> Mikhail Ivanovich, at the same time, it became known a couple of days ago that Germany refused entry into the Baltic Sea to a tanker from the Russian so-called shadow fleet. It seems this is the first time this has happened. We see it on the map. What does this mean for Russia, for this shadow fleet? And what will happen next, in your opinion? >> Yes, nothing, you can't draw conclusions from one case. About a thousand and a half tankers with oil and petroleum products leave Russia annually for export. And when one of them, and it turned out that its flag is unknown, from some fairy-tale country, and it was exposed everywhere possible. And it's old and rusty, some vessel from God knows when. It was simply not allowed through German territorial waters for numerous reasons. "No, we will not allow it," they said. And it headed somewhere to the northern waters of Russia. If it wants to load oil there, then it has one option - the Varandey port, owned by Lukoil in the Barents Sea. It can get a certain batch of oil there and then deliver it to some buyer. And it is known that the European Union will lower the price cap on Russian oil to $44 per barrel on February 1st. This follows from the decision of the Council of the EU. How much can this new reduction affect Russia, since it seems that the sanctions regime is separate, but this really hits the economy? No, this is an imitation of sanctions, of course, these are not real sanctions, just like it was. Well, Russian oil is already trading below that now, because oil that leaves, for example, from Primorsk on the Baltic, and, well, we see, it's already around $32-33 per barrel, according to the prices shown so far. And therefore, to impose some kind of cap of 41 and a bit dollars per barrel, well, it's pointless and ineffective. And we also read the news. The collapse of oil prices could cost Russia up to 2 trillion rubles in 2026. Estimates vary. And these are calculations at a price of $34-36 per barrel. Please tell me, do you have any expectations of how much the Russian budget will not receive, based on what is written now at the beginning of the year? We want this. >> No, I know that the deficit will be large, that's for sure. We see that a lot is recorded to receive for this, but we see a trend that in December, compared to December of last year, oil and gas revenues have collapsed by almost half, and for the whole year, for 2025 compared to 2024, by a quarter, that is, 24, well, almost 24% of oil and gas revenues have collapsed. And further, we should expect their even greater reduction. Firstly, indeed, world prices are falling, and falling quite significantly. I am reading completely fresh forecasts for the current year from various American analytical centers. Well, they say $53 could be the world price this year. $58 is the maximum. Yes, it can jump above the average for the year for a barrel of Brent crude, and next year even less. Some analysts predict that it will be $33, yes, even for this, if nothing catastrophic happens, if a large, large oil consumer suddenly appears, well, how can it be? I can't imagine that any country would suddenly start buying surplus oil from the market. No, there is no such country. And new oil keeps coming. And this year, the biggest inflow of new oil to the market is not even from OPEC, OPEC+ countries, but from America, Guyana, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina. In these countries, oil production and export are planned and are already increasing. And therefore, supply will grow, and demand, while it is growing, is growing very uncertainly. And if there is a lot of oil, then prices fall. And prices are expected to fall throughout 2026-2027. Further, they say, analysts say, already in 2028, due to the development of petrochemical industries worldwide, demand for oil may increase, and then the price of this oil may rise, perhaps even to $68 or even a little more. We need to consider inflation by then, what the dollar will be. It's already $68. In 2027, 2028, it will be about $55, which we see now. Therefore, we see no rosy prospects for oil prices ahead. >> Mikhail Ivanovich, such a question. We saw sanctions against Lukoil. We understand that Vagita Alikperov, yes, he was such a key figure. We see other pressure on the heads of other companies, on companies. Tell me, have all these recent actions changed the balance of power, have these decisions changed it? I don't know, is Sechin still the main one, are people around him, or is a restructuring underway? >> Well, well, yes. No, there, it seems, nothing has changed. Sechin is not only the head of Rosneft, the largest oil company in Russia, he is also the executive secretary of the Presidential Commission on Fuel and Energy. This is a commission that makes strategic decisions for the oil industry, which we are talking about now. And Sechin plays, well, I would say, a leading role there. That is, he and Putin make such decisions, and no one has displaced him. We don't see any movements yet for further consolidation of this Rosneft, because earlier it was greatly consolidated by acquiring other companies. But now I don't see that even within, well, maybe some Lukoil assets, but Lukoil is not going to sell its internal assets to anyone within Russia. Abroad, it has to lose these assets, but within Russia, there is no such redistribution yet. Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, and Tatneft exist, operate, and no one is going to absorb them yet. >> And it is known that Azerbaijan has started gas supplies to Germany and Austria. How physically possible is further expansion of Azerbaijani gas, and how much does this change the situation for Russia? >> No, it is limited only by production capabilities. The second stage of the Shah Deniz field development in Azerbaijan is underway successfully, as planned. And in principle, well, they are focusing on supplies to Europe through, first, this pipeline they have, which goes to Turkey, the South Caspian, so-called South Caucasus pipeline. Then through Turkey runs TANAP, the Trans-Anatolian pipeline. And from there, branches go through Bulgaria to the EU, through Greece to the EU, and further through Albania, the TAP pipeline goes to southern Italy. And from there through Italy they can pump more, but everything is limited by production capacity. According to the plans, well, I don't see any serious increase. When the Azerbaijanis talk to European officials, they say: "You understand, we could increase production, but then arrange to increase the capacity of the oil and gas pipelines in your territory. Do something to develop the infrastructure." But we see that all these pipelines I'm talking about, starting from Baku and further, are fully loaded to their maximum capacity. And there is no serious expansion in sight yet.