Transcription
About a month on the ground, uh, in our time in Ramadi, a new unit came in from the Ready First Brigade Combat Team. Uh, brought in a bunch of tanks and and and and armor vehicles, uh, but also brought in a new strategy to be able to take the city back neighborhood by neighborhood. And we realized that the only success that we were going to have is supporting that strategy. So we shifted a lot of the, we still did those nighttime capture, uh, uh, kill raids when there were bad guys. We knew where they existed and we did a number of those, uh, and captured a bunch of bad guys and got them off the the streets, uh, and gathered intelligence and and and did that again. But we focused our efforts on supporting the soldiers and Marines that were moving into those neighborhoods to take the the neighborhoods back, um, and and just block by block.
>> Hello, sir. Thanks for coming.
>> Dr. Arn, it's an honor to be here with you. Thanks for having me.
>> So now I'll introduce you to people. Uh, you have won the Silver Star and two Bronze Stars and a Purple Heart, and you have been a leader in the SEAL teams, and you have written two best-selling books. I'm going sharply down the order of honor now, starting with the civil, uh, Silver Star and ending with the New York Times bestsellers because that's a very good thing to do. But while these other things, so, uh, you have taken your experience in the SEALs and, uh, become not just how to lead, how to live, and so I want to talk about that. Uh, I think it would be good if we got sort of a base of information. Tell us about the SEALs. What are they and how do they work?
>> Yes, sir. Uh, it was an honor of my lifetime to to spend nine years in the SEAL teams. Uh, 13 years total in the Navy. Uh, and it was the best job in the world. And, uh, by the way, the Silver Star just means that, uh, we had a terrible day, uh, in combat. Um, and, uh, and that was an award that I look at, uh, recognizing not something that I did, but the the valor, uh, and courage of of my SEAL platoon that I had the honor of leading and what they were able to accomplish. Um, it was, uh, it was just an amazing job. I, I think, uh, the, I never wanted to be anything other than a combat leader from the time that I was a young kid growing up in Southeast Texas playing with G.I. Joe figures in my sandbox. I tried to read every book I could about combat and and watch movies. Um, and when I started learning about the SEAL program, um, I forget what, what first book I actually came across, but very soon I saw Dick Marcinko's Rogue Warrior and and several other books about Vietnam SEALs that I'd read. And so I was really interested in in this, this, this program. And, uh, so I went to the Naval Academy to pursue that dream. I did not get selected out of the SEAL program. Um, but, uh, I, I spent two years in the fleet before I, I finally made it into the SEALs. And, uh, very, very thankful for the my time on Navy ships.
>> You kept trying.
>> Yes, sir. And it gave me some great perspective once I got there, um, to, I think, have an appreciation for the opportunity just to be there. Um, the SEAL program is is amazing. We're, we're the maritime component of of the, the Special Operations Command. Uh, and so our focus is the water, but SEAL is an acronym for Sea, Air, Land. So that means that we operate in, in all of those mediums. And, uh, it, it was an organization that was born out of the Underwater Demolition Teams, uh, the World War II frogmen, and frogmen from Korea. Uh, and, uh, back in the early days of the Vietnam War and the Kennedy administration, uh, they realized there was a need for unconventional, uh, forces and, and so shortly after the Green Berets were, uh, were stood up, uh, they, they pulled, uh, these units out of the Underwater Demolition Teams and created the the SEAL program.
H, uh, I can tell you because I know a little about it that both George Washington and Winston Churchill were big advocates of unconventional units, operate fast, highly trained. There's a guy named Wingate who helped to invent the British special forces, and Churchill sort of fell in love with him in the middle of World War II and took him around all over the world with him to talk to people. Deployed a lot of them in, Wingate did in under Churchill's sponsorship in Southeast Asia in World War II. So there was some belief in that. And, uh, I, my own view is it's a cultural thing. Um, Americans are a people, a kind of people. The British are too. A free people. They're used to running things in their lives. And so these unconventional units, they get out there and do things on their own initiative. Is that true? Is that a thing?
>> That's, it's very true. There's a, uh, there's a great book about the formation of the SEAL teams. Um, and, uh, it's, it's, uh, it's, uh, by, uh, a friend of mine who served in the SEAL teams, uh, Ben Milligan, who researched this book for like seven years. It's called "By Water Beneath the Walls." Uh, this thing that, that shouldn't exist in, in the Navy. Why does this special operations unit exist? Uh, by all rights, it should have been under the Marine Corps or, uh, or, uh, come, come from the Army. Um, but, uh, they had stood up special operations units and then they would stand down after a conflict. Um, and the Navy saw this, this, this need, uh, for this, uh, unconventional unit. And, uh, it's, it's a fantastic book and it talks about just what you're saying, this, this entrepreneurial spirit of these, uh, these SEALs that they would send out to areas. Uh, the history of it in, in, in World War II in China, these, these Underwater Demolition Team units that would go in and, and, and basically raise these, uh, work with the, the local, uh, partner forces, create an army. Uh, and they did all kinds of, uh, damage to Japanese forces, um, during World War II, um, in China. And I, I had very little knowledge or understanding of this till, till I read that book, "By Water Beneath the Walls."
So, uh, I, uh, used to teach before I went into the college business at the Naval Postgraduate School. Uh, and I would go up there and teach a week or two at a time, uh, several years. And, uh, somebody running the Navy started the Seaman to Admiral program, and there was an exam you took and, uh, competitive, and they were getting a chance to to move. Well, uh, at the Naval Postgraduate School, they teach engineering. Uh, I used to laugh about them. I'm the only one here who knows how to read. They can all add and subtract. So, they needed me because if you're going to be an officer, you need a bachelor's degree. And so, the guys who would win this exam were overwhelmingly SEALs. SEALs are a tiny minority of the Navy. But in this program, three-quarters of the students I taught were SEALs, and they were extremely interesting to me. The first thing that happened was I had to teach them that a question in the, in class from the teacher is not the same thing as an order. I would say, "Okay, you don't know. Of course, you don't know. That's why I ask. You're supposed to speculate now." They would, you know, they were kind of shy about the classroom setting. And of course, on the other hand, they were very lethal people, and they, you know, I would take them out to dinner. They were all married to shy, pregnant girls, and they were, you know, they were, and they, many times they hadn't really been out to dinner very much. But it was, I, I will tell you, I fell in love with them. And, uh, they, they were dutiful, they were smart, they write good papers. Uh, uh, and somehow, because what, there's not, how many SEALs are there?
>> I think the numbers are still, uh, about 3,500 active duty SEALs and about 500 reservists.
>> And that's a tiny minority of the whole population of the Navy. And so these guys would win. They're smart. Um, so they, they, because as I, as I say, nearly everybody that, that won this competitive examination to become an officer that by this route was a SEAL. And, uh, that was, I, I would talk to him about that, and they, they weren't the kind that took pride in being smart, uh, but they were, and they, and, uh, so that's interesting. I, the training is famous, but I want you to tell us about a little bit. Uh, how long does it last and how many make it and what's Hell Week?
>> The training is, is a great program and it's, it's been around since the Underwater Demolition Team days, uh, that started at, at Fort Pierce, Florida, um, back in World War II. Uh, and, and, um, there was a guy named Draper Kauffman who, uh, had, uh, he, he had been in France, um, as, and learned about disarming bombs. He'd been in England, uh, uh, during the, uh, uh, the, the German air campaigns against, uh, against Britain, uh, disarming bombs. So he, he had this kind of explosive knowledge, and they brought him in to, to, to run that training program, and, and he, he created this, this program, and they needed guys who were going to be able to to be the first in the first wave of invasion beaches. Um, they had both Naval Combat Demolition Units, which were the, the guys, the, in the first wave at the Normandy invasion, for instance, and, uh, they, they, there was a demand signal to try to create combat, the chaos and difficulties of combat. They wanted people that were physically tough, that were going to have to endure the kind of onslaught, uh, that, uh, a first, first wave units were going to, you know, that, that were hitting these, these German-occupied beaches in Europe, were going to have to endure. And so they, they create a very difficult training program. Um, and, uh, they, there was a need to push them out there. So they condensed a bunch of training down into a short period of time. And that's where Hell Week was born. Um, and so it was, it's five continuous 24-hour days of of non-stop physical activity.
>> For, for five days.
>> They give you like an hour or hour and a half, uh, you know, uh, nap basically, like 72 hours into it. Um, and that's, and that's more torture than anything else. Uh, it, it's, uh, it's, it's been, because you feel like when you go to sleep, you feel like it's, you know, you close your eyes for a second, and the instructors are in your face telling you to get back up, and now your muscles are all stiff. Um, so it's a great training program. Uh, the training program works. We have about a, in the, in the, it's about seven months or so. Um, and, and the, the modern program is called BUDs, Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL, training, and we have a, about a 70 to 80% attrition rate.
>> Uh, during that. So we started my class.
>> These are tough people who've gotten admitted on a competitive basis.
>> Yes, sir. These are young men who, that's this is what they wanted to do their whole lives. They have to train and prepare for years. Many of them have told their families that they're not going to quit training, and that this is what they're going to do is go achieve their dream. And 70 to 80% of them quit the program. Uh, and it's, it's a great program because, you know, the, so the sleep deprivation and, and, and, you know, the physical hardships, you're constantly wet and sandy, uh, particularly in that first, uh, first phase, uh, uh, and then, then you go into a dive phase, and there's a land warfare phase, uh, at the end of that. But most people end up quitting the program, uh, or, or some of them get injured or, you know, sick or things like that, and roll back. Uh, but most people end up quitting during the, um, during Hell Week, that those five continuous 24-hour days, that's a few, few weeks into the first phase of training. The reason the program, I think, that the standards, uh, have remained high is because the program works, and, and it produces people that are physically tough, that are outside-the-box thinkers, that, that are, that are team-oriented, um, that, that are disciplined, and, and can prepare and push through hardship. And, uh, and I think that's, that's super necessary for, uh, actual combat because some people are surprised to hear that I was way more physically exhausted and sleep-deprived on actual combat operations than I ever was going through, through BUDs, our SEAL training.
>> So that's an interesting problem, isn't it? Um, I've said that the ones that I've met are smart, and I have a kind of academic observation. You know, I know a lot of smart kids. I didn't know as many back then as I know now, but I can compare the ones I know now to them. And there's a thing being good at school, and it's intellectual. Mind's got to work fast. Got to see the ladder and what's high and what's low. Uh, this grueling physical thing, which, you know, I mean, it is amazing to me, by the way, that people who pass that test to get to try, and 70, 80% don't make it. Uh, so there's a combination going on there: intellect and character and physical endurance and ability. How are those things related?
>> I think they're very related. Uh, and, and I think with any team, you know, you're going to have some people that are that are highly intelligent, right? Or that, that can rapidly respond, um, uh, to things. You have people that are more oriented toward the physical side. Um, but I've certainly seen that, uh, that those things are absolutely not mutually exclusive. And you, you, you sometimes you think about the, the warriors, uh, particular, you know, academics might think of of warriors as being the, the meatheads, right? Who are the, the focus on physical fitness. Um, but I, I think a lot of the best SEALs I worked with, that were the most physically talented people, are also the smartest, and, uh, uh, definitely extremely well-read. Even if they didn't have a, a college education, extremely well-read people, um, who, uh, were, were, were highly intelligent, highly smart. I think probably the best example of that is the SEAL platoon that I led. Um, there was a young man who had a high school degree, uh, who joined the SEAL program, made it through training, went to, uh, went and became a, uh, a SEAL, uh, corpsman, hospital corpsman, which is our, our combat medics. Went through the, uh, the Green Berets, uh, course, um, their 18 Delta Special Forces Medic course, um, and then joined our platoon as a, uh, a medic. His name was Johnny Kim. He went through the Seaman to Admiral program after a couple of deployments, very, uh, heavy combat deployments. He was with us in the Battle of Ramadi. He was with us in, in, he was in Baghdad in the Battle of Al Fallujah. Um, I was proud to write him a letter of recommendation for that Seaman to Admiral program. Uh, and he went into the, the medical corps. So he got a college degree, uh, went to school, he went on and, and got a, uh, uh, a medical degree from Harvard, became a doctor, uh, and is, uh, currently now a, uh, a NASA astronaut. So that, that is the, uh, that is the caliber, I think, of of the, the quality of people, and, and, and Johnny certainly is an incredible person, um, that I'm proud and honored to have served with. But it's just, that's just a small look into the caliber of people that are joining the SEAL team straight out of high school. Um, and, uh, regardless of what their academic, you know, pedigree is, they're highly talented, uh, capable, and very smart people. Way smarter than me, that's for sure.
So there's an argument in Victor Davis Hanson, and the same argument is in Aristotle, uh, in what I think is probably my favorite book of Victor Hanson, who's a buddy of mine. It's called "Carnage and Culture," and it's about some generals. Epaminondas, Epaminondas. Uh,
>> I've mispronounced that one for years.
>> Me too. And I, you know, I read, I read a little Greek, and I find that one hard. Um, he was a Theban, defeated Spartans. Uh, General Sherman, General Patton. And one of his recurrent points is they were all very well-read men. They could, uh, think. And, uh, uh, Aristotle says that, because you write about leadership.
>> Yes, sir.
>> And, uh, leadership is something we all do every time we make a choice, especially a hard choice. But leadership is doing it with and for others. And Aristotle says that requires to be good at that, that that requires all the virtues. It's, uh, one of four virtues in Aristotle's ethics that are said to require all the others. And that means it requires courage and moderation and justice, as well as this intellectual capacity. Uh, uh, leading the SEALs and being a SEAL would then require, that's why it, it's always seemed to me not counterintuitive that the SEALs that I met would be intelligent.
>> They need to be. Yes, sir. I think you find that throughout the, the military. I'm, I'm a huge Victor Davis Hanson fan, by the way, and I had, um, I, I definitely remember, uh, bringing, particularly "Carnage and Culture," his book, with me on my 2006 deployment to Ramadi. Um, and, uh, I just recently read "The End of Everything." Those are fantastic books. I think the, uh, the study of of classical history, um, I, I think is something that's that's super important. And from a military history perspective, I, I think that it's, uh, it's essential that, you know, if, if you want to, uh, certainly actual experience is great, but, but you don't want to repeat the same mistakes that the others have made. So, one of the reasons that Jock and I wrote the book "Extreme Ownership," and our follow-on book "Dichotomy of Leadership," is to is to try to capture the lessons that we learned the hard way, uh, lessons that were written in blood in combat, so that those are preserved. And, uh, and, and I think, uh, that is super essential for anyone that's serving in a, uh, a military capacity, anyone that wants to just better improve themselves as a leader, is, is to learn the, the leadership lessons from history. There's so much that we can learn from, uh, and I love particularly reading from some of the primary sources. Uh, I recently started, uh, Josephus, um, "The War of the Jews," and, and here, just hearing some of the, his perspectives, are, it's fascinating to read the first, first-person accounts.
>> Have you been to Masada?
>> I have. Yes, sir.
>> Isn't that something? I, uh, through Martin Gilbert, one of my teachers, who was a great historian. He was a close friend of Yigael Yadin, and he was, he should have been a Navy SEAL. He's Israeli, but he was, uh, the commander of the troops that took Jerusalem in the '67 war. He was one of the leading archaeologists in the world, and he's the excavator of both the Dead Sea Scrolls and of Masada. And, uh, I had dinner with him one time with Martin Gilbert, and at that moment, he was the acting prime minister of Israel. Interesting guy, you know, he, one of, he's like you. He's one of these guys that's done everything, you know. And, uh, uh, we got to talking about Masada and the way the Romans took it because you can't, you know, it's a, it's a big old chimney rock sticking way up above the Dead Sea, and you can't get up there. Narrow path. They had it heavily defended. And the Romans bring an army down there. And with the army, they bring the fellow citizens, neighbors, friends, and family of the people at the top of Masada, and they make them build a ramp up to the top. So those guys who fought with that, Josephus records fighting the Romans, those guys were really tough. So were the Romans. And they couldn't really stop the building of the ramp because they'd be killing their own, and the Romans figured that out.
>> I think I found it to be so fascinating standing up there. I, I think everyone should, uh, should go and visit. Um, not only just, it's just such a desolate, you know, eerie place as you, you kind of stare out over the, the, the Dead Sea there. Um, you could see how, how paranoid Herod the Great, you know, was to, to build something like that, um, as a fortress that was so, uh, uh, impregnable. And I think that, but to be able to, I, I don't know that I've ever stood anywhere and seen the, the Roman breastworks that you can still, uh, that are, was clearly visible with, with the ramp. I found that to be fascinating to be able to see and, and experience that.
>> Now, when you went there, did you think, "How would I take this place?" And did you have a plan?
>> I, I thought, "This is this is an incredible feat." Uh, but you can see that the, I don't think there was anyone better. Uh, siege warfare was, was, uh, something the Romans were extremely good at, and, and I think, uh, you could see that in their, the Gaul campaign against Vercingetorix, and, uh, and, uh, it is, I, I, I think getting, getting on the other side of of Rome when they were determined to to wipe everybody out, um, you have to feel for for those held out, you know, particularly the women and children and those, you know, families that were there and part of that, uh, that defense in, in Masada. Um, and, uh, I think being captured by the Romans at that time would be not a fun thing.
>> No, no, it wasn't. Uh, they were, uh, their empire lasted in part because it was relatively mild, but, uh, you didn't want to fight them. That was, that was a mistake for 6, 800 years. They were pretty tough. Um, what do you learn about leadership in the SEALs? What do you teach now? What do you teach the rest of us who don't get to be in the SEALs?
>> I, I teach leadership lessons that, uh, I learned the hard way on the battlefield. And I think what qualifies me to talk about leadership more than anything is that I've made just about every mistake that you can make as a leader.
>> And I've had to learn from those mistakes. And I got a chance to lead, I got a chance to lead an incredible group of warriors on the battlefield in 2006 in what's now called the Battle of Ramadi. And I was a platoon commander.
>> That's in western Iraq.
>> Yes, sir. Uh, Ramadi was the capital. It's still was the capital of Anbar province. Uh, at the time, it was a city of about 300,000 people, and, um, it's greatly reduced today, sadly, but, but, uh, it's the largest province. Anbar province is, is the largest province in Iraq, and it was a pivotal city. Um, and at the time that we deployed there in the spring of 2006, it was a violent terrorist stronghold. Zarqawi, who was the head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the precursor organization to what became ISIS, um, had had declared that Ramadi was, was going to be the capital of his caliphate. And, uh, and so there were thousands of hardcore jihadi fighters there. And my SEAL task unit, about 40 SEALs and 50 support personnel, of which I was the, the SEAL platoon commander for a 60-man SEAL platoon. Um, um, my good friend, uh, Jocko, was the platoon commander in Delta platoon, and, and then Jocko was the commander. Jocko Willink was our task unit commander, who's my co-author in "Extreme Ownership" and "Dichotomy of Leadership," and my business partner in our, our leadership consulting company, Echelon Front. We've worked together for, for 20 years now. And, uh, he has, uh, taught me to be the leader that I needed to be. And, uh, we landed on the ground there in April of 2006, um, in, in this violent, dangerous place. And we got to serve alongside some extraordinary soldiers and Marines who had, many of them had been on the ground for a year at that point. Um, learned some tremendous lessons from them. They passed on tactics, uh, both best practices and lessons learned, you know, from, from the hard way. All of those units had had.
>> So 40 or 50 of you?
>> Up against thousands of them, and then Marines and Army units.
>> There. There were, uh, over 5,000, uh, soldiers and Marines, a National Guard unit that was on the ground when we first arrived there. Um, and these were, you know, part-time soldiers in the National Guard that maybe don't have as much, um, of a budget or training, you know, when they arrive, and yet they were hardened combat warriors after a year on the ground in this fight. Um, and they were, it was an, an incredible group that we learned so much from. Uh, there was, there was a Marine battalion, uh, uh, that had been on the ground for about six weeks prior to us arriving. They taught us a ton as well and passed on a ton of lessons, particularly for their sniper teams.
What did the SEALs do, and what did they do? What was, how did you fight together? What was your division of labor?
>> Yes, sir. It's a great question. Uh, typically what SEALs and special operations had done prior to that time was nighttime capture-kill raids, and we would go out with just SEALs and target bad guys, you know, high-level terrorists, uh, and, and, and try to make an impact on the battlefield by capturing bad guys and, and getting them off the battlefield, disrupting their attacks in that way. The problem with that is that you had, uh, special operations units like SEALs and others that were that were conducting a, what's essentially a counterterrorism mission, and then you had the Army and Marines that were out conducting, uh, a, a counterinsurgency mission. So they were out during the daytime trying to build relationships with the local populace, conducting census operations, uh, and, and trying to to push back the, the enemy out of areas where they controlled, you know, neighborhoods like most of the, the area of the city of Ramadi was completely controlled. And Jocko, who always had tremendous strategic vision, when we arrived in Ramadi in April 2006, recognized that if US forces in Ramadi didn't win, that none of us were going to win. It didn't matter how many operations we conducted. That was a lot of what our measure of success had been beforehand was, "Hey, we conducted, uh, 75 combat missions, and the previous team that we turned over with only conducted 55. So we did more than them," you know, so we had more impact on the battlefield. Uh, and, and that was just not an accurate measure of success. The only really measure of success is our US forces and our coalition partners, Iraqi forces, winning. And, uh, in Ramadi at that time, I, I, I, I don't think anyone could answer, uh, in the affirmative. Uh, we had some very valiant soldiers and Marines that were keeping the roads open and beating back enemy attacks, um, and, and preventing their bases from being attacked.
But about a month on the ground, uh, in our time in Ramadi, a new unit came in from the Ready First Brigade Combat Team. Uh, brought in a bunch of tanks and and and and armor vehicles. Uh, but also brought in a new strategy to be able to take the city back neighborhood by neighborhood. And we realized that the only success that we were going to have is supporting that strategy. So, we shifted a lot of the, we still did those nighttime capture, uh, uh, kill raids when there were bad guys and we knew where they existed, and we did a number of those, uh, and captured a bunch of bad guys and got them off the the streets, uh, and gathered intelligence and and and did that again. But we focused our efforts on supporting the soldiers and Marines that were moving into those neighborhoods to take the the neighborhoods back, um, and and just block by block.
And so, uh, we conducted sniper operations to protect those soldiers and Marines and the Iraqi soldiers. We, we conducted, um, we conducted, uh, combat advising to Iraqi soldiers and went out and patrolled with them in the daytime because they didn't have, uh, they didn't have night vision or couldn't use that night vision. Well, many of them didn't even have flashlights. They were very poorly trained with, with, uh, and poorly equipped. Uh, and so, uh, and we, we tried to, uh, to, to support that effort. What, what the Ready First Brigade Combat Team, those US soldiers called "Seize, Clear, Hold, and Build" in that counterinsurgency fight. And, and we, we watched that neighborhood, those neighborhoods slowly get taken back and, and, and the, the thousands of insurgents that controlled them pushed out. Um, and ultimately, what that, what that resulted in was called the Anbar Awakening, where the local people, uh, who didn't necessarily love America, they hated Al-Qaeda, um, and what later became the Islamic State of Iraq, a lot, a lot more. Um, and so they were, they were willing to side with us and the government of Iraq against, uh, against Al-Qaeda and their insurgent allies and, and push them out. And we saw a tremendous turnaround that took place. Um, and that was a, that was a, a victory that was achieved by, uh, in, in the, in the Battle of Ramadi, as it's called, which lasted probably about nine months or so. Victory achieved by those soldiers and Marines that, uh, our small unit of SEALs was just proud and honored to support in that effort.
>> It means you took the town, right? You could, you got Al-Qaeda or you got those terrorist forces out of there. Is, is that what happened?
>> Yes, sir. They were, they were pushed out, uh, by both, uh, both US forces' efforts, um, that, that reduced the enemy's capability, and then the local people that rose up once they were strong enough, um, and, and the, the, the insurgent military capability was reduced enough, um, to, to be able to, um, to, to push them out of their, their neighborhoods.
>> Uh, here's a hard question. Uh, William Manchester, who wrote a good book about Winston Churchill, although it contains some important errors I point out. He served as a Marine in the Second World War in the Pacific, and he was at Guadalcanal, among other places, and he wrote a book about MacArthur. It's a pretty good book too, "American Caesar," I think it's called. And, uh, it's a very interesting book, and he says about MacArthur and the Korean War that MacArthur didn't like the adjustment to something other than total war. That is to say, if you're going to fight them, destroy them, take them, change them, undo them. Uh, and he had trouble with Harry Truman of various kinds. And, uh, MacArthur was obviously a very great man, and a tremendous military commander, but he didn't like this thing, what you know, war. If the Chinese come, we got to take them, got to go into China if need be. So we're in this situation now where there's a kind of limit on war, posed in part by the destructiveness of war by nuclear weapons, and then Iraq. You know, what is victory in Iraq? We cleared that town and lost lives, and people demonstrated real excellence. Uh, is Iraq going to be like Japan? A long-term friend, a free country? It's hard to know, isn't it? And, and, you know, North Korea is still North Korea. South Korea was saved. So the point is, this problem of limited war puts a burden on, uh, because we fought magnificently in Iraq and Afghanistan. I, I think in Afghanistan, I think the only nation outside the Afghans that ever operated successfully in the, in those hard valleys is the United States military. There's a really good book written about that by Sebastian Co. Is that his name? Sebastian Younger. Sebastian Co was a runner called "War." And the truth is, the performance of the soldiers was, you know, world-beating. I mean, the best ever. Ramadi, Ramadi, I think is the same thing. Nobody thought when, uh, when, after 9/11 happened and we go to Iraq, and we're going to go into urban warfare in hostile places. We hadn't done that for a long time. Nobody thought we could. We probably did it better than anybody. I mean, it is an amazing tribute to the American soldier, but what does victory look like?
>> That's a fantastic question, Dr. Arn. I, I think, uh, I, I would say in Iraq, from my experience there, I, I think we won the war and we lost the peace.
>> I think that's the best way to describe that. And I think that comes from,
>> Mission creep.
>> Because I think you have to define very clearly what are you actually trying to do. And we learned a lot of very tough and humbling leadership lessons on the battlefield in Ramadi. Um, humility, ownership, teamwork. We learned that leadership is the most important thing on the battlefield. And by leadership, I'm not just talking about the senior person in charge, but by the, every, everyone in the organization, right down to the frontline trooper who wasn't in charge of anybody else, but just themselves and their piece of the mission. And I think when, when you have leaders at every level that understand what the goal is, and they can move forward toward that goal, and they're empowered to lead their team and overcome obstacles and come up with innovative ways to solve problems, you're going to have an effective team that, that can accomplish the mission to win. And we definitely saw that at the Battle of Ramadi. Um, not only with Tasking Bruiser, like my SEAL unit of 40 SEALs and 50 support personnel, but 5,600 mostly soldiers and Marines, um, that, that won that battle, that we were honored and proud to support in that effort. But I, I think you have to clearly define what, what the mission is. Uh, we, we have four laws of combat that we talk about: Cover and Move, Simple, Prioritize and Execute, Decentralized Command. That every team has to utilize. And, and that second one, Simple, is you have to define what that mission is in, in a very simple, clear, concise way that people can understand. And in the Battle of Ramadi, our mission was pretty simple. We, we, we needed to, uh, and by the way, it wasn't dictated from the White House. It wasn't dictated from the Pentagon. It wasn't even dictated from the generals in Baghdad. Um, the, the Colonel, uh, his name was Sean McFarland, and his staff that was in charge of the Ready First Brigade Combat Team of the, of the US Army's First Armor Division. He understood that what we needed to do in Ramadi was to stabilize the city, secure the local populace, and lower the level of violence. Those were the three things that we needed to do, and that was all focused on that effort. We understood that all the supporting assets that, uh, that were aligned behind that mission, and we were highly successful in that mission. After the Battle of Ramadi, Ramadi became, it went from the most dangerous city in Iraq to the safest city, one of the safest cities in Iraq, and probably the safest city outside of the Kurdish areas in the north for more than seven years after that battle. So, uh, that's what I mean when we won the war, and then we lost the peace. But the mission creep that happened there was, I, I think we got in this idea that we were going to create little America there, that, that somehow they were going to be, uh, a westernized country that was going to be technologically advanced, that was closely aligned with the United States, um, and, uh, things that, uh, this booming economy there was. So when you put people in charge, they tend to want to empire-build. And I think that's a, a function of, of, of people asking for more, people asking for more until that mission creep starts. And I, I think that, uh, if, you know, I, if, we saw that the US military is great at, at, at eliminating threats. Uh, I, I think that we've shown that nation-building is a lot harder thing, and, uh, and the will to be able to do that, uh, takes a long time. And, you know, you mentioned Afghanistan. I had a, I had a, uh, a SEAL Chief who sent me a text in, I think it was 2012, um, that said, you know, so we're talking almost a decade before, you know, this disastrous pullout from Afghanistan. And he said, "We're not going to win here. We've already lost this thing. There's no political will to win." Uh, and so this is, you know, the troops on the ground can actually see that. They, they can understand what's actually happening. And I think sometimes those things don't trickle up to the, because they're screened out, you know, uh, in reports that go up the chain of command. Um, but, but I think understanding, uh, we have a tremendous military that knows how to solve problems, that can, that can defeat our nation's enemies. And I think when we have a carefully defined mission, and we're focused on that mission, and it has to be a realistic mission. I, I think, uh, probably the biggest lesson for me in the Iraq War, um, there's no question for me that we were fighting a just war against an evil enemy. The, the insurgents that we were fighting in Ramadi, they tortured, they murdered, uh, they, they, they ruled through fear and intimidation. The local people were terrified of them. They did not want to live under that brutal reign of terror and fear. Um, and, uh, even when ISIS moved back in, uh, to those areas and took over those areas before they were eventually pushed out again, um, you know, years later, the local people were asking for American support to come in and help them, which we did not give them, sadly, uh, during that time under the Obama administration. But I think what we should have done in Iraq was, uh, was be realistic about what we can accomplish in the world.
>> I, uh, so know a little bit about Winston Churchill, and what's not known about him. He's, everything's controversial today, and he's controversial. And we're at war right now. I'm about to ask you a question about that. But, um, he, for most of his life, twisted himself into a pretzel trying to avoid and limit war. He became afraid of it in 1898 when he saw machine guns used on a battlefield for the first time down in the Sudan, and he saw what it meant. So he said, once, in the middle of the First World War, where he was trying to find a way away from the trench warfare, he started the experiments that resulted in the invention of the tank. He's the inventor of the tank, and he tried to devise a strategy to go all the way around the trenches down to Turkey, to the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, and all that. Was he, he, and it didn't work. The tank worked eventually and dominated the Second World War, but not, not the First. It, it worked when it was used in the First, but they had to figure it out and get more and all that. One day he's losing in the cabinet, and he erupts. Later said this on the floor of the House of Commons too. He said to them, put his fist down on the table, and he wasn't a man who lost his temper very much, and he said, "Those brave young men that you're sending out there," he said, "they, they don't need a cause from you. They already know what that is. You're supposed to give them a plan. What's the plan here? Is it merely exchanging a life for a life until one of us runs out?" So that, you see, up at the high level, that's, you got to get the goals right. Yeah. I'll say one thing that's different about what's going on right now. And I don't think anybody knows how what's going on right now is going to turn out. But there is a difference so far, and that is, uh, in the Iraq War, in which you fought, uh, both of the two Iraq Wars, it was a common thing for leaders to say, high leaders to say, "If you break it, you own it." Trump is not saying that. He's saying, "They've broken some things. We can make them stop." And that's our goal. And that is a more limited goal. It's not certain that we can achieve that goal. Right now, things are happening every minute while we're talking. But it's a more limited goal. Uh, and where you've lived your life, you're out there at the point of that sphere. And as I say, I, I think, uh, it's a very, extremely important fact in the world that the American soldier has shown over and over again, including lately, to be the best soldier. But we're going to have to have a level of statesmanship to match it, because otherwise we'll ask the soldiers to do things that are not practical.
>> Yes, sir. I, I, I think the, uh, I, I vehemently disagree with the, "You break it, you own it" mentality.
>> I think we're really good at breaking things.
>> Um, we're not really good at owning things, and, and, and nor do we need to own things. I, I think the, which is the, what I was trying to say about about, you know, had I been in charge of the Iraq War, I would have, I would have put the same goals that we talked about on Ramadi would have been the, the thing to do, which, which is, you know, which is, secure the country, or, or stabilize the country, secure the local populace, lower level of violence, and, and establish security there. And I, and I think if, if you, if you limit the goal to that, it's a lot different than, you know, trying to, uh, disband the entire government and reestablish the government and, and, uh, and all of those problems that we kind of created for ourselves there, and that mission creep that just took place over time. I think that, um, I think we are, uh, exceptional at breaking things, not so exceptional at owning things. We certainly should shape the, the, the world to make it the safest and most secure world that, that we can. Um, I think, you know, some of the people that think that Iran was not a threat to us, I think is is crazy. I, I mean, I've just, if they have operated with almost total impunity for almost half a century, and killed thousands of Americans, um, with very little, uh, very little, they've, they've never paid the price for doing that under, uh, under any administration. And, and so those are things that, uh, that, that I think, you know, do we want to live in a world with Iran with nuclear, nuclear weapons? I, I don't think so. Long-range ballistic missiles.
>> I think that's a major problem for us. So, uh, but what you just said is really important. I think there are a lot of people are talking about this conflict like they know exactly what's going to happen. Uh, they're predicting disaster, they're predicting victory, you know, uh, and, and it can go a lot of different ways. And I think one of the most important things that you can have as a leader in any situation is an open mind, so that you, you are not fixed. You don't have an emotional attachment to plans. You, you are, from a detached position, you can carefully and thoughtfully and realistically evaluate what's happening as you make decisions. Things are not always going to go the way, in fact, they're, they're almost never going to go the way that you think they are. So, you're going to have to make decisions and re-evaluate, uh, you know, based on the current information and make adjustments to your plan.
>> And you helped reorganize the SEALs in various ways. You're a big leader.
>> Yeah. I wouldn't say reorganize, Dr. I, I would say more than anything, I, what I got to do is is create SEAL leadership training and, and really, uh, try to create some doctrine around what we taught SEAL leaders. I got a chance to run, uh, for two years. I taught every single SEAL officer graduating from our training pipeline. Uh, I think it was 134 officers total. Also put some of our NATO partner allies and some of Air Force Special Operations, uh, officers through through training as well, uh, that were a part of those courses. But I tried to, it was a four-week, uh, classroom and a
week-long field training exercise, what we called a junior officer training course. And I got a chance to try to teach those officers everything I wish someone had taught me before I went into some really tough, difficult urban combat. Um, and I got to teach them uh lessons like humility. It it is so much harder than you think it's going to be. Uh because if you ask young Lieutenant Lef bad before I deployed into a situation like that uh like in the Battle of Armati if we were going to get in a friendly fire situation meaning we're going to get in in US forces shooting at US forces I would have told you not a chance that happens to losers who don't know how to plan execute missions and that is chapter one of extreme ownership our very first major combat engagement massive friendly fire situation that we found ourselves in and we realized quickly just how easily that could happen and that it going to happen if we didn't take extreme measures to mitigate the risk of it happening.
So, >> so yeah, that but you see, so you in humility, you corrected my question, but I reassert it. Thousands of people have gone through the experiences you've gone through. For some reason, you were picked to teach others how to do it. In other words, and remember what I said, uh there's every virtuous act is a combination of thinking and doing and desiring. And so somehow you were able to think right now. You use the word simplicity. Uh simple.
>> Yes, sir.
>> Uh Winston Churchill loved that term. He he uh one of his best speeches in the 30s about the appeasers. Uh he one of his condemnations was this plan has no simplicity. Uh I'm going to suggest one to you. If the purpose of the government of the United States is to protect the people of the United States, then it might be that the mission, if we have to go so far away as Iran to fight, is to reduce them to a place where they're not a danger to us. And then you're done. Uh, and that might mean, and see this is painful to me to say because it's valuable to the American people. It's valuable to the world to know that we can fight because we're rich and powerful and resented and we may have to fight. We do have to fight all the time. On the other hand, did we have to, this is the painful part, did we have to pacify Rammani? Uh, I don't know. Uh I know we didn't for the long term, we did for the intermediate term, which is by the way an incredible achievement of arms. And the people who won medals there deserve them, you know, and it's not impossible that we I I predict we won't try to do that in Iran, and I hope not. uh although we might send some boots there for short periods of time to do specific things.
Anyway, these questions of strategy uh that's a I know a story about the current president. Uh I know him a little bit. I don't know him very well, but I know him. Uh I know that when he runs a company, he he's fond of saying this. He liked to talk to people who work in the company. If he's going to buy a company, he goes to the company and uh talks to people who work in the company. If he's got a business not doing very well, he goes and talks to the people who work there. And I know that he said, I'm told that he said to a secretary of defense, you know, this is how I've always done my business about Afghanistan. I only talk to generals. He said, "Are there can I talk to some people who fight there?" Uh, I guess my point of that story is I hope he's talking to you that uh you know something about it. Uh, and I wouldn't be surprised if he's not talking to people like you at least.
Um, okay. Let's uh let's talk about uh America's position in the world and how we sustain it. Uh, you were in the Navy. elite part of the navy. China has a much bigger navy than we have now and a larger ship building capacity than we have. How are we going to maintain ourselves in the world? I think I think China's uh no question our our number one adversary uh and they have planned uh and trained to fight us for decades. Um and we've kind of been in denial about that for a long time. But I I think that we are starting to to see that uh um that they're they're our adversary. I mean, I I I would argue that uh the action in Venezuela, the action in Iran probably has something to do with with shaping that battlefield um uh to our advantage against China, hopefully preventing, you know, a much wider and more costly war. Uh that that potentially could even be World War II. Um I think we don't want to have to fight wars. uh is seeing the cost of war as as you know we're we're talking about um I think that's one of the greatest things about the US military is the stronger that we are the more capable that we are the greater our deterrence capability and I think just just from a practical perspective you know no matter where you stand in in on on the the the political aisle uh you know the the Biden administration I think we we had lost our deterrent capability in a way that that probably is unprecedented in our history um and so I I think being able to regain that under the current administration is is super important. We don't want to have to fight costly wars, particularly wars that kill hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. Um that is not something that we want to do and and certainly uh you know Church Hill saw that and and uh and tried to prevent that and everything that that that he was doing. Um uh which is incredibly admirable. Uh but also understanding that that there are bad actors in the world. And so we want >> He failed by the way. We we want to we want to try to shape the world as best we can, but uh uh but sometimes that we we are going to have to fight and there certainly are things that are worth fighting for. I think some Americans have forgotten that. Um and uh and and America is worth fighting for. Uh and our opportunities and uh and freedoms and security are certainly worth fighting for. Uh and I think most of America certainly still understands that. Uh even if that's not necessarily apparent in the news media or social media, you know, with some of the loudest voices that are out there. I think for China, we we are starting to wake up. I think we're starting to become more innovative. Uh we're starting to recognize that that they have such a massive advantage against us. Um uh a massive advantage over us in numbers uh in production capacity. I mean something like 350 times our ship building capacity. Um and and so that is something that that we have to we have to recognize. And while we have the best technology in the world, is that technology decisive when you're coming up against numbers that are, you know, 10x what we have, right? Or 15 or 25x what we have. I mean, those uh and and so at what point does, you know, do the numbers uh uh, you know, uh, get thrown out. And so I think we have to recognize um, you know, you mentioned before we talked about this Palmer Lucky and and Andrew, what what they're doing. There's a number of innovative companies uh out there uh as well that that are um that that are looking at these problems and and and trying to actually uh be able to produce things uh in in in mass quantity that it's not just a technological advantage that we have to have. We have to have speed and we have to have numbers that that we can get out there in order to deter our enemy's capabilities because I think once if they have an advantage that is so lopsided, this is where enemies start to to make moves. Uh just as as Hitler did in World War II to, you know, he he took a few iterative steps into Czechoslovakia and then into Poland and and and saw what people were going to do. Um and and so if there isn't some kind of a a a deterrent capability that only encourages bad actors uh to to do more and that means that we have to fight extremely costly wars.
>> Yeah. I think uh there's a so I posited to you already. See if you agree with it. Um I think there's a relationship between the SEALs and figures like Palmer Lucky and Alex Karp and these tech gurus who are going into war. Uh, and the relationship is I don't think China is friendly to people like that. I asked you earlier, does does China have SEALs? And we don't really know. They haven't fought a lot by the way. We fight a lot. I wish we didn't fight so much, but uh I'm sure they have some kind of a maritime special operations capability. There's no question. I don't know what the name of that unit is.
>> Um, but it's something I should know. I'll have to research that. But the thing is like uh modern Germany is born in 1877 and the Prussians and they'd been wonderful fighters before that and through two world wars hardly anybody could ever stand up and fight him straight up and you know even casualty advantage against them. Patton had a casualty advantage against the Germans. The Germans had a two to one casualty advantage against all opponents in both world wars. Uh how'd they do that? Well, they were warriors, right? How did we offset that? Uh I have a theory. It's partly from Victor Hansen has the same theory. Uh we got it from the same place. Uh it has to do with the nature of a regime. America is uh very competitive and very cooperative both and it starts at the bottom and goes up. You know war is the greatest scene of conflict on earth and also the greatest scene of cooperation on earth. I've listened to you quite a lot now. Every time you say five words about the enemy, you say 500 words about your brothers because you love them and you cooperate with them and you've developed a whole theory of life and learning and living around the cooperation you had with them. You see, giving your lives for each other. So the point is American society when it works is like that. Our neighbors are our our suppliers to our businesses, our customers and our businesses. We have a kind of friendship with them and we treat them like equals. And so when an American army gets in the field, its nature is to make decisions close to the scene of action. And it's not a top- down thing. I mean, it's very, in one way, it's the most top- down thing. In another way, like uh uh I've read a lot about the SEALs. You guys are not as uh rigid about uh chain of command and saluting.
Definitely definitely the case, Dr. We uh professionalism and uh uh is is is probably not our best. Seals usually want to wear the the least military like uniform. You know, they want to have long hair and beards and people, you know, love to be able to do that uh where grooming standards weren't appropriate. It's one of the the units that uh in Task Bruiser was different for us because we worked very closely with soldiers and marines. So, you know, for Joo, our commander was like shaved heads, squared away uniforms, you know, uh uh we we looked squared away. We blouseed our boots. that that was uh what we did in order to in order to build good relationships with the soldiers and marines that we had to work alongside.
>> I think what you're saying though is true and there were obviously those doubters prior to World War II whether or not uh that that US troops could possibly defeat, you know, the these victorious armies of Japan and and Germany that had been war at war for years. Um and and you know, could uh could Americans do that? Obviously, it was proven successful. I think the my theory uh is and this is something that Jock and I have talked about deeply and and that he postulated a while back and I agree with is that America has won the wars that we had to win. We have won the wars that we had to win. We had to win World War II. We we had to win the Civil War. We we had to win the Revolutionary War. Um and the wars that we have not had to win uh we have not we have not been successful because I think the it takes will it takes will you know you talked about trading a life for a life earlier and our enemies are often willing to trade way more of their their lives uh you know for every one American and uh and yet that that still is is not a decisive factor. Uh, you know, that was one of the major failings in Vietnam was this idea of the the body count and the kill counts that um and yet Ho Chi Minh said that you can kill, you know, 10 of of of mine for every every one of yours that we kill and we'll still at those odds we will still win and you'll lose. Um, and he was proven correct. So, I think that uh that this is this is something that if you look at the wars that we actually had to win, uh Rick Atinson wrote a fantastic book, World War II, about army, it's called Army at Dawn, about North Africa. And when when you read about some of the the early Churchill, I I was always puzzled how Churchill was able to talk Roosevelt into after the uproar in America, the the attacks on Pearl Harbor. uh how was Churchill able to talk uh Roosevelt into a war in North Africa against the Germans for for US entry into the war? Uh and I think it was a brilliant brilliant influence in relation to >> he's a really good talker >> on on Churchill. But had we not done that, I think Churchill understood that we were not ready to fight the Vermacht in in uh in Western Europe. you know, if you if you put together the details of all that, which I happen to have done, and you know, it's the kind of thing takes some years to do. And I work for this man, Martin Gilbert, who's the official biographer of Churchill, and he was the best. And um >> uh you know, first of all, here's what happened. Japan attacked us and Germany declared war on us. And Franklin Roosevelt was a big reader of Alfred theer Maym, the guru of the Navy. And he he actually is a late 19th early 20th century guy, taught at the Naval Institute, uh wrote the influence of sea power on history, which by the way became the sort of commanding book for the British Navy too after it had been the greatest navy in the world for 200. >> Still deeply studied the Naval Academy. >> Oh yeah, it's awesome. Right. And it's and Franklin Roosevelt uh you know who's the what nephew of Teddy Roosevelt who was a friend of Mayhem and and Franklin Roosevelt absorbed the doctrines of Maym and he even spoke with and corresponded with Maym a little bit and when when they first took up with each other uh Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill uh Roosevelt had been assistants Secretary of the Navy and Churchill had been first lord of the admiral te twice and Roosevelt writes him and addresses him former naval person. Uh he sorry he signed the letter off former naval person Franklin Roosevelt and they addressed each other throughout the war as former naval person. And so Roosevelt, who by the way had many principles that I object to and think have been disastrous for our country, understood about choke points and land masses and populations and the ability to project power all over the world. And so he and Churchill came to agree that the worst problem was in Europe and they should deal with that first and that was a big deal. Here here's another thing. Uh, Australia and New Zealand came to agree with that. Uh, British Empire was all over the world. It was mostly a Commonwealth by Churchill's time. almost all of it was self-governing. Uh uh they went to North Africa first because that's where they could go. It's the only place they could come to grips with them. Uh toward the end of the war, there are big differences of strategy that arise between Roosevelt and and uh Churchill, but not differences about whether you win in Europe first, hold the line in Japan was the B. I mean, you know, we were so productive back then that the war effort in both realms was huge, but uh but uh so so in after they won the battle of Alamagne and they've they're going to win in North Africa, the prime minister of New Zealand, I've held this letter in my hand, uh is a man named Peter Frasier, and he writes and says, "We've got four divisions, and the Japanese are looming out here and you've got the best one. Now that we're winning in North Africa, we'd like them back. And Churchill answers the letter. And he says, you know, I think we can hold the Japanese, but the big battle is here and we got to win this first. I pray that you let them stay. He didn't have power to command that. And so then a week passes and Peter Fraser says, "We've talked about it in the cabinet and we've had a full day's day in the New Zealand House of Commons and we have resolved that they may stay." Half the casualties uh of Britain and its empire in both world wars was from imperial nations and Britain had no power to conscript anybody from any of them. India they had rough power over the Indian government. India had a all volunteer army. And so the truth is uh like Churchill was never able to explain this to Roosevelt. He he kept saying the British Empire is a union of sentiment and love. Well, it functioned that way in the war and and because they couldn't make them do it. Um, and that you see that I'm talking too much, but uh cuz you're the you're the wise man here, but I'll just close with this.
>> That that's fascinating. I've never thought about that before. It's >> Yeah. No, that's a big deal, right? and and like we we have to understand uh you know I've studied history and political philosophy in my life and uh in the study of political philosophy the first thing is the regime or the polus or the city or the country what makes such a thing right and and because every community aims for some good why are the seals so tight simple We know what we're there for. There's something coming from above and it may be unclear. It's not our business to question that till later. But we love this thing. We and and because of that and because we suffer for it together, we love each other. You see, that's a community. Humans are most given to community of all the beings on earth. more Aristotle rights than horses and bees. So a nation is a community and it has to have something that it loves to make it into that. Nations get confused when that's up in the air as now. What do we love? What is our purpose? What is our principle? This is the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. Declaration of Independence is a controversial document now. uh the current president wants to celebrate it with a whole heart. His opponent would not have did not. Uh so the point is when you go to war it's a conflict between regimes and the regimes fight according to their convictions and even in the manner of their convictions. I actually think that the seals on the Deltas, you know, I told you earlier, I ran across a YouTube of a Delta guy, retired Delta guy, and what he said was, "Yeah, he said, "Those seals, they're just a bunch of showoffs and weenies."
>> In some cases, that could be true. Certainly only the only Adelta could say that you know it uh but um uh and that means that at the top we have to understand that uh you know my own view was my view at the time that you were fighting in Rammani. Praise the Lord for you doing it and you my view was democracy is not something you can do for somebody else. I think that's 100% correct and that's kind of that's a much more articulate way of saying what I was trying to say earlier of like being realistic about what we can accomplish in the world and u and so a stable Iraq I think was is is um is something very different right than trying to establish um establish a democratic government there. Um I would argue that we partnered with the wrong side. I was there in 2010 uh during an election where um we the the uh party of Ian Alawi was elected. Um he was a secular Shiite. He was a friend of he'd been uh schooled in in London. He was a friend of of America and the West. Um and uh the the Obama administration sent um they sent uh then Vice President Joe Biden to broker a deal to keep uh the Malaki government in power, the Dawa party power, which was closely aligned with Iran. Um I think it was a disastrous decision. And uh so that that was part of what what I meant by winning, you know, winning winning the war, losing the peace.
>> I I fascinating to hear what you you talked about relationships. I I really uh I've been to Australia a couple times. You know, I've seen the the the the ANZAC memorials and and you know, the the loss of life is staggering and I didn't realize that that was uh that that was not something that the British government could mandate. Um and so I think understand we talk about the power of relationships when it comes to that first law of combat, cover move, which is teamwork. It's all based on the power of relationships. And I think that's a fascinating look at uh at uh at cover move you know nation to nation across the world uh across the commonwealth. Um and you back to to the point that I was uh uh speaking to about America's won the wars that we've had to win. I think it's always based on leadership. We we've had leaders who have stepped up and made the difference. uh from Washington who is the pivotal leader in the revolution world that probably uh the singular leader that without him the the revolution probably goes a completely different direction um and maybe is not successful um and and we've seen leaders that have stepped up uh and you can see that in Roosevelt even if we can disagree with some of his uh you know uh political uh alignment or or decisions that he was the leader that we needed in World War II. And what I liked about that that book Army at Dawn was this idea that we the senior leaders in the military they got they got their butts handed to them initially by the the the Germans and Raml and the North Africa Corps uh and in fact you know Raml's letters of of these guys are a joke uh they they stand no chance against us. So those senior leaders were fired and we we brought in very junior people like Patton and Bradley who rose to the top. um in the Pacific Theater, Nimmits. I I forget where he was. He was something like 23 down the uh >> 23 people down the the seniority list, I think, if I remember correctly. >> Yeah. And he's from a little town in the middle of Texas. He was >> not far from where I live now. >> Before he ever saw the ocean. >> Yes, sir. Uh and is certainly the, you know, the hero of the Pacific War. But we we skipped over two dozen admirals and picked a junior guy because uh Roosevelt turned to King and said who who can win this thing and he said Nimmitz. So we put the leaders in charge that we knew could win and I think that makes all the difference.
>> I think the political leadership I mean first of all >> uh generalship is really great generalship is very rare. uh really great political leadership is probably more rare and and I know I was I was on the board of the Army War College for one term then Obama didn't reappoint me but I loved it and uh I I noticed something I noticed that uh there's rank everything's rank you know and then beside that there's shadow rank and the shadow rank is in some ways more important who has actually fought And the ones who had because the army war college is full of colonels and it's run by generals and and the colonels, you know, there there was a guy there who led a tank charge in Iraq, a colonel, and he was just treated with immense respect by everybody and all he was was a colonel just like all the rest of the students. Right? So the point is uh war focuses the mind and uh you know Abe Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt had something in common. They needed to go find somebody who could fight because enough about credentials. We're going to have to fight now. And uh you know the ability of a political system to adjust to that in an emergency. It's one reason why I think, you know, if you just look at article one, section 8 of the constitution, it's actually true that a majority of the things that the federal government is named to do, the congress is to have the power to do, the majority of the things have to do with war and national security. So, we're supposed to be really good at that. And we're trying to be good at everything. and uh we do so much now most everything in the economy and the in life is federal. So I think there's a weakness in that and I think by the way I going to let you say a final word but I'll just say my final word to you to thank you because I think you demonstrate something. I think the country is still healthy and we can see it in your life and in your friends. Thank you for that.
>> I appreciate that Dr. And uh it's an honor to be here with you. And I think one of the reasons that the uh that the country is healthy uh is for what you and your team are doing here at Hillsdale, which which is uh talking about our history. Uh an America that we can be proud of. We're certainly not perfect. No nation is, but uh but we have inherited a tremendous legacy uh from our our forefathers that uh that founded this country and and from the the millions of people that that have died um to to hand the current and future generations uh such an incredible opportunity in in the world and uh and so love the mission of Hillsdale and and what you're doing here uh and appreciate your leadership and I think I think that leadership we as as I said leadership is the most important thing on the battlefield. field and it is not surprising to hear you when you're talking about leaders who have experienced combat we say that humility is the most important quality in a leader because without it you can't keep an open mind I talked about how important that was earlier without it you can't take extreme ownership of problems you blame things on other people instead of looking at yourself to think what you could have done better to actually fix a problem or solve a problem or building better relationships or more effectively communicating uh w with people and I think that leadership makes all the difference and and I think when You talk to someone who hasn't uh I if they've served in the military, no matter what their accolades are, if they aren't uh if they're not humble, you know, if they're if there's chess beating bravado, uh you can tell that they've never been truly tested because I think the people who have actually been in some some significant combat are the most humble people you're ever going to beat. They're they're the most humble people you're ever going to meet because they've been beaten. They've been outmaneuvered. They know how quickly things can go south. Uh, and there's nothing more humbling than, you know, for me as a leader to come home, uh, received a minor wound in combat, and yet I lost two two of my men, two of the Ryan Job, and Mark Lee, two of the most extraordinary humans you could you could ever, uh, want to meet in your entire life, incredible teammates, incredible friends, and um, you know, for for for them to have lost their lives and and for me to to carry on, it's it's the most humbling thing possible. So, I think that humility is something that every leader should have to keep an open mind, to let their leaders step up and lead. Um, and I think when you do that, that's that's what good leadership looks like is taking the lessons that you learned the hard way and sharing them with others um so that they maybe don't have to repeat some of those same mistakes and and and can excel um and and carry on with the next generation.
>> Pleasure to know you, sir, and an honor. Thank you for your service.
>> Thank you for having me, Dr.