Transcription
On the structural shifts. It's important to emphasize that the scale of structural shifts we are witnessing today among the greatest, possibly maybe even in 2,000 years of history. And it's important to understand that in our times, you must be prepared for some big surprises. So, what I'm going to do is mention two structural shifts and two recent short-term surprises that have been, in some ways, a shock to global geopolitics.
What you just heard was a masterful summary of our world in flux from veteran Singaporean diplomat Kishor Mahbubani, speaking in October 2025. In an increasingly complex and unpredictable world, where does India stand? As the global balance of power profoundly changes, this nation of 1.4 billion people is at a crucial crossroads. In the conversation that follows, we will continue to listen to this deep dialogue featuring Mr. Mahbubani and veteran Indian diplomat AJ Bisaria. From their respective viewpoints, they will analyze India's strategic situation in this multipolar chess game. Mr. Mahbubani, from a macro outsider's perspective, will use irrefutable data to paint the irreversible structural changes in the global power dynamic. Mr. Bisaria, from an Indian insider's viewpoint, will then interpret how India is positioning itself between a capricious America and a rising China. This is a deep dive into global shifts and Indian ambition. Let's continue.
The first structural shift, of course, let's say if you compare, um, let's look at the two biggest giants in Asia, China and then India. In the case of China, in the year 1980, the combined GMPP of the European Union was 10 times bigger than China. 1980. Today, the European Union and China are about the same size, and by 2050, the European Union will be half the size of China. So, in one human lifetime, the European Union goes from being 10 times bigger than China to becoming half the size of China. Just one structural shift. But the Europeans haven't woken up and realized that that's where they are today. They're on holiday in September. So, they, they, That's right. It's still on vacation.
Uh, in the case of India, I like to compare India to the United Kingdom, right? Because, I mean, that's a natural comparison. It's hard to believe that 100 years from now, 300 million of our ancestors from India were ruled by 100,000 Englishmen, right? 100 years ago, amazingly. And today, if you send 100,000 Englishmen to India, they'll be massacred. So, and even if you compare the British and UK and India, as recently as the year 2000, the British economy was close to four times bigger than India's, 3.6, six times bigger, year 2000. Today, UK is smaller than India, and by 2050, India will be four times bigger than UK. So, look at that. 2000, the British are four times bigger. 2050, India is four times bigger. That's a major structural shift, which is why I wrote a Financial Times article saying it's time for UK to give up its permanent seat in the Security Council to India. I mean, the British should be gracious about it, right? They got to rule India for 200 years. So, at least they can do is repay back India by giving their permanent seat to India. I'm surprised that that suggestion wasn't picked up in India by more people, you know. So, when you, those of you who have connections in Delhi, please call them and say, please echo that call. And, and I, and I, and I want to emphasize that this is not a frivolous point. This is actually a serious point. The one thing I learned after being ambassador to the UN for over 10 years is that the founders of the UN intended the veto to be given to the great powers of the day, and not the great powers of yesterday. Which is why the British have gone by their sell-by date already. And it's time for the British to give up their seat, their permanent seat. And I want to emphasize that the British are acutely aware that their seat is hard to justify, which is why they haven't used their veto for over 40 years, 50 years. They dare not use their veto. The minute they use their veto, I want to say, who are you? That's why they don't even dare to. So, they, they are internally aware that the sell-by date has come.
But so, that, that's these are the structural shifts. But at the same time, even in the last six months, I must say that if you had asked me about these two things in January, would these two surprises have happened in January? I would have said, no, not possible. But these two surprises have happened. The first surprise, right? You know, when Donald Trump first launched his trade war against China in his first term in 2018, the Chinese were defenseless. They didn't know what to do, and they were running around in circles trying to figure out how to respond to Donald Trump. And so they were just, they couldn't retaliate. They just had to take whatever Trump hurled at them. This time around, the Chinese are able to draw a red line in the sand and say, "Watch out. You touch me, I'm going to touch you equally painfully." And as you know, when they cut off the supply of rare earths and magnets, the pain was so excruciating, suddenly you notice that the Trump administration is so polite towards China. Now, you look at, look, look at the tone they adopt when they speak to China. So, in the last six months, the big shift is that suddenly the US has implicitly accepted China as its peer competitor. This just happened the last few months. Big shift.
And the other big surprise, if you had told me in January this year that, you know, India, which has been cultivated by president after president by the US, right from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush to Barack Obama to Donald Trump, to Joe Biden, that this 27 years of cultivation would be wiped out in a few weeks, I would have said impossible. This is a deep commitment on the part of the US to the US-India relationship. It's bipartisan, one of the few bipartisan things. It will hold steady regardless of what happens. But you've seen how damaged the relationship has become. And, and it's amazingly painful because there are lots of unnecessary slights and blows to India, like calling India a dead economy, right? Uh, calling, imposing additional tariffs on India for buying Russian oil. Excuse me, China buys more Russian oil. How much tariffs increased on China? Zero. See what I mean about China? And then look at the way Assem Moner was invited to the White House. Calculated insult. So, all these things show that sometimes in geopolitics, what you don't expect can also happen. Thank you. Thank you.
So, what, you know, building on your point on just in a few weeks, they also say what goes up very fast can also sort of unwind very fast. And I know that AJ, you've had, you've taken a stake in the ground and you've said that, uh, watch out for the next, I think, three months is what you've said. Um, so, so talk to us about, uh, the India, India's position and what do you foresee, uh, in, in the signaling that India is sending out in terms of its diplomatic postures, priorities, and finally, with a, with a hint, the business ecosystem.
Yeah, sure. Thanks. Thanks, Rajan. Thanks. Great to be here. Uh, great to be in the company of Kishor. That's an honor and a privilege to be part of this, uh, group conversation. Um, and, you know, congratulations on leveraging this group of 3,000, which is a living business bridge between India and, uh, Singapore, and actually having these conversations. So, so I would, I think, be speaking today as an IIM alumnus, who's just wandered into geopolitics for 35 years, but now I inhabit the dark space between the intersection of geopolitics and business. So, uh, I, I think to Kishor's last point, uh, about the shift, uh, in geopolitics, I would make the argument that the larger play remains the same. Uh, you know, these, uh, there are some shifts which are, uh, long-term and hugely significant. For instance, the, I would say, the, uh, US-China contestation perhaps began in Trump 1.0, when, uh, they declared a sort of new cold war between the US and, uh, China. But, on, on the US-India piece, again, I think what we are seeing in the Trumpian revolution of this year is a very capricious and volatile United States, which we, as the, as the governments, are trying to factor in, but the media and public doesn't. So, uh, we had a rough August in the relationship with the US, because the July was fine. In August, you suddenly had 25% duty, and then the pileup of 25% duty. So, this was, in what was in Trump's mind, in this Trumpian revolution? The art of the deal. So, there were the art of two deals that was happening. He was playing chicken with India, trying to get a better deal than the one we had negotiated in five rounds. And then he was trying to get a deal out of Putin in Russia, uh, and India became collateral damage. So, already things are changing in September, and part of the reason was India also made a short-term projection of optics in the picture of Modi in Tashkent with, uh, President Xi and President Putin, which gave a larger message that, look, if you push this relationship a little too much, then India will simply have to live in a world bypassing the United States, and India is capable of doing that. So, I think that messaging remained, and now September, we are in a more comfortable space. The, uh, new ambassador of the US to India is being confirmed, and we have a situation where Trump is making politer noises than he did. So, my prediction would be or speculation would be that in the next three months, we have a trade deal that will be done with the United States. And don't be surprised if Trump shows up in November in India for the Quad summit and signs the biggest deal of the century, as he will spin it, and, you know, all will be well, and this will be a little nightmare we had a couple of months. Just on, on the last point you made, what are India's priorities? India's now made a fairly clear statement of where it wants to be in the next two decades. 2047, we want to be a developed economy, 30 trillion dollars of GDP, maybe 15 to 20,000, you know, per capita. And that is the goal. Part of it, which remains understated or unstated, is that in this evolving global order, India would like to be a pole, like to be a rule setter, not a rule taker. And therefore, it is important for India to play that game and also play the geopolitics in a way. Uh, in, I think India's primary strategic partner will remain the United States in the foreseeable future, in the next three decades. Russia and the European Union will remain critical partners, and China, I think, will remain a strategic competitor. But the difference now is in the short-term politics is that the US is not a fully trusted partner, that it's a volatile country, and India will have its, you know, kind of hedging strategies there. And for China, it is important for India to do tactical adjustments, not strategic resets, because there would be a strategic competition, but the tactical adjustments, I think, of taking care of the $38 billion of trade and the dependence on multiple, you know, value chains. So, India will continue to look at, uh, adjusting with China, uh, and not just on the border and on the Pakistan question, but also on sort of ensuring that the trade goes on unmolested.
Got it. Got it. Thank you. Uh, what, what stood out from your sharing really was, it is by November that make sure your FDs and your other things are maturing because keep some liquidity. That might be a good time just before November to buy Indian stocks. Okay, cool. Um, so let's, let's actually build on that. What, what chips does India have because you spoke about the chips that China has created on the negotiating table, right, with the rare earth minerals and so on? So, what chips does India have, uh, to, to put on the table, uh, to get Donald Trump to act differently?
Well, you know, um, India's used some of the chips, uh, in, in terms of already, as we said, the optics of India saying that we could be aligning with a different set of countries if the US proves too volatile, and that had an impact in US domestic politics, where the question was being raised, has Trump lost India? And therefore, you see the better noises coming from Marco Rubio and others, and Trump's key aide coming as ambassador to India, and very explicitly and kind of simplistically saying that he said in his Senate confirmation hearing that, we don't want India to go too close to China, and we want to pull it back. So, you know, that is a chip. But what Kishor mentioned, China and India does not have the kind of leverage that China has, because, you know, it, China used that. China demonstrated its ability to weaponize trade and weaponize their dependence on the value chain, so by rare earth minerals, and we've seen that in the Indian context as well, you know, the Foxconn engineers being withdrawn, trade, magnet, and so on. So, I think the chips that India holds are not in the trade domain, but certainly in the domain of geopolitical alignments that India could change the emphasis it would place, uh, on the US relationship. And as, uh, Kishor mentioned, this is a relationship that is 27 years on a trajectory which has been positive, and Trump 1.0, himself took this forward in, you know, in giving the Quad, uh, content and raising it to summit level. So, I, I feel that once we review Trump 2.0, three years later, it won't be a, a story that will be as pessimistic as it appears, as it appeared in August. It might be a better story.
Okay. So, so then a peek into the future beyond November. Um, what, this is a question to both of you. Whoever chooses can go first. Is, um, what scenario is most plausible in the global world order? Is it alternative blocks? Is it, you know, India's tilt towards China being not just tactical, but a series of tactical which perhaps has a different future? Is it, is it a fundamental redrawing of India-US relationships? What are the scenarios that you think, uh, that might play out in this, in this world?
Well, I mean, it's, um, I, I want to emphasize that the current situation, the key word you've got to understand is complexity, and it's extremely complex because there are a lot of moving parts all the time, you know. So, for a start, clearly, and at the, at the highest strategic level, as you know, in the Cold War, it was bipolar. The Cold War ended, it became unipolar. And now we have, what you have is a strange combination of both a bipolar and multipolar world. Because clearly, now there's no doubt that China is effectively the number two power in the world, and the fact that they were able to, you know, uh, check President Trump so clearly shows that they are aware of their leverage and what they can do. And increasingly, people also recognize China as a peer competitor, uh, of the US. And I, I want to emphasize that the hold that China has over the US is not just in rare earths and minerals. That's just the first shot. But the Chinese have decided a long time ago that to ensure that the United States is strategically dependent on China, they must increase their share of global manufacturing. M. And as you know, China's share of global manufacturing in 2000 was 5 or 6%. But by 2030, it'll be 45%. And I have spoken to some American CEOs, you know, who told me that it is now the situation where if you want to manufacture almost anything in the world, in one way or another, you'll need some parts from China. And if those parts don't come, then the US is in trouble too. So, this, this CEO told me, if the Chinese just stop exporting everything, watch what happens to the American economy. And I think that realization means that the United States has to treat China with a far greater degree of caution than it did in the past. So, that's the bipolar dimension.
But at the same time, it's clear that other poles are also emerging and have to be accepted. Uh, clearly, India is going to be the third pole, and India is, you know, now in theory, the fifth largest economy. By 2030, it'll be the third largest economy. It'll overtake Japan and Germany without any doubt whatsoever. So, India has the capacity to be the third pole. But to function as a third pole, it's best for India to be like the animal on the seesaw, somewhere in the middle. So, if one side you have China, on the other side you have US, where India puts its foot determines where the seesaw goes, you know. So, that, that's an ideal position for India to be in, in, in that competition, which means that you want to have some degree of functioning relationship with both and the capacity to talk to both. But there are also other powers that are clearly changing the situation. Again, um, clearly Russia matters, right? And the biggest strategic mistake that the Europeans made in dealing with Russia is that they only looked at the size of its economy and didn't look at the overall national strength and their military capability. So, the Ukraine war could have been avoided if the Europeans had just shown some degree of respect for Russia's own long-term strategic interests. And the, the, the tra, and the, how do you say, the tragedy of the Europeans trying to punish the rest of the world for buying Russian oil is that they could have avoided this war with Russia if they had shown some strategic common sense in dealing with Russia.
And the last surprise, by the way, and this is something that is just happening again. If you had told me a year ago that we would live in a world where Israel could choose to bomb any country in its neighborhood and get away with it, and no one can stop it, I said, "No, no, there must be some restraints." But it's actually quite amazing what Israel has done. First, you know, in its bombing of Iran, incredibly successful. And the Israeli intelligence is absolutely amazing. How did they manage to kill the nuclear scientists in their bedrooms at night? What kind of intelligence is that? Right? And then now, I must say, when they started to bomb Qatar, that this bombing of Qatar, I think, is going to lead to some significant shifts also, because all along the Gulf countries thought that the number one threat is Iran, and maybe we should try and get closer to Israel. And now they suddenly realize, hey, wait, be careful. Israel now has the capacity to hurt us. So, that also is leading to new thinking that is going on. So, all these, you know, so that's what I mean about complexity. It's not a simple black and white chessboard, you know. It's extremely complex, and you've got to watch all the, uh, moving parts. And the people who can get the big picture are the ones who will succeed and thrive. And those who don't, like the Europeans, sadly, the Europeans live in a delusionary world, you know, uh, and I, and I mean that quite seriously, because they, they, you know, if you just look at the photograph of the European leaders sitting on sofas in front of the school teacher Donald Trump at his desk, lecturing these European leaders, they look like school children. I mean, the optics itself captured what had happened. And for a respected prime minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, whom I met, whom I, he's a very thoughtful, intelligent guy, by the way, for him to call Trump "daddy," I mean, it shows you that something has gone wrong. So, the, and this actually, I must tell you, in my last conversation with Kissinger, he told me candidly, he said, the quality of mind of these Europeans has gone down so much, they don't understand how much the world has changed. So, this is an example of where if you understand the world, you can navigate through it. But if you don't understand the world, like the Europeans don't, they seem, they're in trouble.
Got it. So, let me then, uh, before I come to you, just do a quick audience poll here. Um, so you spoke about complexity and the need to understand it so that you navigate it. So, raise your hand if you feel that your business, if you're a business leader, or if you're a government leader, then your, your day-to-day, your life, your world is, um, already being affected by these shifts, or is likely to get affected in the short term. So, raise your hand. Raise your hand. Okay. Now, keep that raised. Keep that raised. Keep that raised. Now, continue to keep that hand raised. If you believe that you and your teams have the mindsets to navigate this complexity, you're equipped with those mindsets, continue to keep that, um, raised, or else put it down. Okay. So, there's a sufficient number of people that actually put that down. So, now, again, that's a bit of a reflection for you that, uh, if this is the world that we are coming into, this is not just a spectator sport. We need to be doing something about our own mindsets and navigating that. So, thank you so much for pointing out that complexity. U, I do want to go to the India-Singapore, uh, partnership, uh, topic. Is there something that you might want to add about the multipolar nature or the scenarios of the world? And then I'd love to go to the India-Singapore partnership.
Sure. So, you know, I, I would agree with Kishor on much of what he said on Russia, for instance, and on Europe. And I would endorse your suggestion that the United Kingdom should give up its seat and offer it to India. I think it's a great idea because if you look at the global system now, there are, let's say, four major poles: the US, China, and Russia, and the European Union. And, you know, if they, you give them each a seat, the fifth candidate certainly becomes, uh, India. But, you know, just a quick comment on another issue that Kishor mentioned, which was China-US. The China-US contestation is here to stay. And if I was advising Trump today, I'd tell him to do the same thing India is doing, which means that you have a strategic contest with a rising China, which has an ambition to displace you in the next 30 years, but do your tactical adjustments with them. Don't get into a fistfight, uh, with, with China at this, uh, stage. And, uh, in the US, there are multiple strands of views, including one which says that we are an isolationist power. We are, uh, it's called the Monroe Doctrine Lite. We are a Western Hemispheric power, and elsewhere, we'll be an external balancer rather than a resident power. So, in the contest with the, with China, we are not really interested at this point. But, you know, that would be a reality they would face. From India's point of view, uh, both the extremes of a US-China contest are not good for us. A US-China, uh, G2, as it used to be called, a grand deal, uh, deal which Trump hopes to get, is not a great thing for us because that collusion doesn't help us. Nor is it, uh, very good for us to have a bipolar world again with contestation and needing to choose, because we lose our strategic autonomy in doing these tactical adjustments with China while continuing the relationship with the US. So, for India, the ideal world would be where India continues to be a pole, and the multilateralism that defined the world, which is becoming defunct, and Kishor has written about it extensively, is something that we reform for, for those institutions to recognize the world as it is, rather than as it used to be, in, in 1945. Which means this is more a G20 world, yes, than a P5, uh, UN world.
What we have just witnessed was a deeply insightful analysis of the world's new shifts and India's strategic situation, where Kishor Mahbubani's grand historical perspective met with AJ Bisaria's insider insights, together painting a complex geopolitical picture for us. In this dialogue, they presented several key insights. First, with the cases of Europe, China, and UK-India power reversal, Mr. Mahbubani showed us the grand backdrop of the eastward shift in the world's center of gravity, a reality no nation can afford to ignore. Next, both diplomats keenly identified the core variables of our time: a capricious and unpredictable America dealing with its internal issues, and a China that can now engage in peer-level competition. This forms the foundation upon which India must base all its foreign policy. Finally, Ambassador Bisaria clearly articulated India's core aspiration in an emerging multipolar world: India wishes to transform itself from a rule-taker into an independent rule-setter. This conversation was so brilliant because it not only revealed India's ambitions but also the real-world challenges on its path to achieving them. The dialogue itself also provokes further thought on the future order. For instance, first, in a world of intensifying US-China competition, India hopes to achieve its goal of strategic autonomy by acting as a swing power between the two giants. Is this India's best bet? Second, between the complex bipolar and multipolar world that Mr. Mahbubani described and the G20 world, not a P5 world, that Ambassador Bisaria aspires to, which do you think is more likely to become our future reality and why? We are eager to hear your thoughts in the comments below. If you found this episode valuable, please like, comment, share, and subscribe to our channel. Thank you for watching.