Transcription
In recent years, military analysts have been sounding the alarm about the rising threat China poses to the U.S. concerning dominance at sea. It’s certainly true that, in many respects, China has rapidly closed a previously cavernous gap in naval power. By leveraging its oversized manufacturing capacity, China’s Navy, the PLAN, now has more hulls on the water than the U.S. and is out-producing the U.S. by a significant distance.
But there’s one maritime area where there’s no debate about who has an unassailable advantage. Submarines. And the winner in that category: the U.S. Let’s take a look at why the status quo in the ocean depths remains so heavily tilted in the U.S.’s favor, and why that ultimately makes China powerless against the U.S. Navy.
For starters, the U.S. still holds a significant numerical advantage in this category. As of early 2026, the U.S. fields a total of 66 submarines, all of which are nuclear-powered. China only has 12 nuclear-powered submarines, plus at least 46 conventionally powered diesel-electric submarines. Nuclear-powered submarines are, of course, vastly more capable than diesel-electric submarines, operating with far greater range, stealth, and offensive power. So, while China may have almost as many submarines, the U.S.’s nuclear fleet offers a much broader mission profile and – as we’ll see shortly – infinitely greater destructive power. On top of that, the U.S.’s submarines combined have around 1,168 vertical launch systems, or VLS, for launching missiles.
But as we mentioned earlier, the gap between the two fleets is closing. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China surpassed the U.S. in annual production of nuclear-powered submarines between 2021 and 2025 for the first time. During this period, China launched 10 nuclear-powered submarines totaling 79,000 tons, compared to the U.S. launching seven submarines totaling 55,000 tons. In the previous four-year period from 2016-2020, the U.S. produced seven, while the PLAN only produced three, underscoring the size of the swing in production volumes.
But the baseline numbers don’t tell the whole story. They rarely do. Of the U.S.’s 66 active submarines, 14 are Ship Submersible Ballistic Missile Nuclear submarines, or SSBNs, and 51 are a combination of Ship Submersible Guided Missile Nuclear submarines, or SSGNs, and Ship Submersible Nuclear attack submarines, or SSNs. China has just six SSBNs and six SSNs. If we ever arrive at the catastrophic eventuality of a full-blown nuclear war, that difference will prove crucial.
For true nuclear deterrence, long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMS, are what are required. By placing nuclear-armed ICBMs on SSBNs in strategic locations anywhere in the world, a nation can ensure the ability to launch devastating retaliatory strikes, even if everything on the mainland has been destroyed. The thing is, China’s six SSNs can’t fire ICBMs, or rather, SLBMs, the submarine-launched equivalent. SSNs are designed for tactical, not strategic, missions and are primarily equipped with conventional cruise missiles and torpedoes, not ultra-long-range, ultra-heavy nuclear missiles. That severely limits their range and usefulness as nuclear deterrents compared to SSBNs. And China’s six SSBNs simply aren’t enough to cover all the world’s oceans, even if they were on a par with the U.S.’s SSBNs, which, as we’ll see shortly, they aren’t.
Submarines – especially large, technologically complex SSBNs like the U.S.’s Ohio-class – require extensive maintenance and ongoing mechanical finesse. Of the U.S.’s 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, 10 to 12 are typically operationally available at any time. Each has two crews – Blue and Gold – that rotate on 77-day patrols, followed by 35 days in-port. The fact that the U.S. has 14 at its disposal allows practically continuous at-sea deterrence, with 4–6 SSBNs usually deployed globally at any given moment. China’s submarines face the same requirement for lengthy dock times in between deployments. So, it likely only has two to three submarines operationally active at any moment. Take them out, and China’s undersea nuclear deterrence is a thing of the past.
In addition to the two-fold advantage it has in numbers of SSBNs at sea, the U.S. also has one or two of its Ohio-class SSGNs at sea at any given time. These have the remarkable ability to remain at sea for extended periods. One SSGN, the USS Florida, famously remained at sea for 727 days – just short of two years – via crew rotations and overseas resupply.
Now, the difference in numbers doesn’t just give the U.S. a substantial advantage over China in the number of locations from which it is able to surreptitiously attack. U.S. attack submarines also wield far greater firepower. China’s six Type-094, or Jin-class, SSBNs can carry up to 12 SLBMs each, giving a total capacity of 72 simultaneously launched SLBMs. Each SLBM is estimated to carry three to five nuclear warheads per missile. That gives China a total SLBM payload of between 216 and 360 nuclear warheads.
By contrast, the U.S.’s 14 Ohio-class SSBNs can carry up to 20 Trident II D5 SLBMs each. They were originally intended to carry 24 SLBMs with multiple, independently targeted warheads, but the number was reduced under the terms of the new START treaty. That treaty was controversially allowed to expire by President Donald Trump’s administration, despite attempts by Russia to extend it while a new deal could be thrashed out. With the U.S. under Trump seemingly having ditched the notion of arms control altogether, perhaps we’ll see the SLBM-carrying capacity of the U.S.’s SSBNs increase in the near future. However, for now, the subs can carry 20 Tridents each. Each Trident II D5 missile can carry up to eight independently maneuverable nuclear warheads. However, current loadouts are estimated at four to five warheads per missile for operational and treaty compliance reasons. That means the U.S. is fielding between 1,120 and 1,400 nuclear warheads at any given time – three to four times more than China.
So, just in terms of the numbers, China would have to double its SSBN fleet and quadruple its firepower to match the U.S. Which means they’d need to greatly increase their number of nuclear warheads. China’s stockpile of nuclear warheads is estimated to be 600 to 700. Experts predict that number will rise to around 1,000 by the end of the decade, but that’s still way short of the U.S.’s stockpile. The U.S. has an estimated 3,700 nuclear warheads available for use. Discounting the 1,477 that are in the process of being dismantled, the U.S. has an estimated 1,770 nuclear warheads deployed and a further 1,930 in reserve. Only Russia has more, and not by much. It’s a very big gap for China to catch up. But they’re trying.
Some experts predict that, given its great advantage in shipbuilding capacity, China will achieve numerical parity or even superiority in this regard within the next decade. China is estimated to currently have 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the U.S., with the gap widening by the year. But just because you can build more submarines, it doesn’t mean they can compete. You can’t buy experience, and the U.S. simply has much more of it. The current fleet reflects decades of engineering prowess and strategic foresight, anchored by an all-nuclear-powered arsenal that dominates the underwater domain. The fleet today consists of cutting-edge Virginia-class SSNs, aging but still world-beating Ohio-class SSBNs, alongside a small number of the exceptionally advanced Seawolf-class, and a large force of aging Los Angeles-class boats. Brand new state-of-the-art Columbia-class SSBNs are in development, with the lead boat now expected to be delivered later this decade.
As we’ve discussed, the Ohio-class subs carry up to 20 Trident II D5 missiles, each with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, capable of striking targets 7,500 miles away. The Virginia-class, now rolling out its Block V configuration, integrates a 84-foot Virginia Payload Module, boosting its Tomahawk capacity to 40 missiles per boat. That’s an immense amount of heavy-duty firepower.
But it’s their unrivaled technology that really sets them apart, particularly with respect to stealth and acoustics. The Virginia-class employs pump-jet propulsors and anechoic – or echo-free – hull coatings to achieve noise levels below 100 decibels. That’s practically ambient ocean-level background noise. That makes it a ghost to even the most sensitive hydrophones. But on the other side, it boasts an AN/BQQ-10(V) sonar suite, paired with large-aperture bow arrays and the TB-29A towed array. It can process acoustic data with such fidelity that it can distinguish a submarine’s shaft-rate tones from whale calls at ranges exceeding 50 nautical miles. China’s submarines simply can’t match their U.S. counterparts’ level of performance. And that’s not likely to change soon.
But they’re trying. China’s Type 093B submarines have progressed from their noisy 091 Han-class predecessors, incorporating shaft dampening and a teardrop hull to dampen noise down to a respectable 120 decibels. The Yuan-class goes a step further, leveraging air-independent propulsion, or AIP, to achieve noise levels around 110 decibels. Its anechoic tiles, reverse-engineered from Russian Kilo-class designs, also dampen sonar returns somewhat more effectively than older models. The bottom line is that U.S. submarines can still detect even the quietest Chinese submarines at significant ranges, often before being detected themselves. China’s underwater detection capabilities, while improving, still lag behind in range and fidelity.
Now, in a clash of submarines, detectability is inversely proportional to survivability. Put more simply, if you can be heard, you can be hit, and vice versa. The U.S.’s technological superiority means the Chinese submarines are simply much easier to find and hit. And China is, at this point, powerless to do anything about it.
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The underwater advantage provided to the U.S. by superior sonar and sensors is compounded by the superior network interoperability of the U.S. fleet. The AN/BYG-1 combat system aboard Virginia-class boats fuses data from a wide range of sources, including satellites, MQ-4C Triton drones, and P-8 Poseidon aircraft, enabling more informed targeting and mission planning. This gives U.S. submarines a decisive edge, allowing them to operate with far greater situational awareness than their adversaries, even if real-time updates are constrained while fully submerged.
This deep connectivity extends to carrier strike groups, where submarines act as forward scouts. Here, their task is to relay encrypted radio-frequency communications via their OE-538 masts to cue surface assets like Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. In the South China Sea, this networked approach allows U.S. subs to coordinate with anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, helicopters dropping AN/SSQ-62 sonobuoys to triangulate Chinese submarine positions. In so doing, the U.S. Navy compensates for the region’s shallow, sonar-scattering waters, which might otherwise complicate submarine operations in shallower waters significantly. More about that shortly.
But this advanced level of interoperability and multi-domain dominance speaks to the U.S.’s incomparable experience in submarine warfare. While the U.S. has been refining these kinds of tactics and techniques for decades, nations like China are only starting to develop them for the first time now. Again, it’s a question of experience, which must be earned, not bought. The U.S. mastered anti-submarine warfare during the Cold War, decades during which China was gripped by extreme poverty and its military was in tatters. For the U.S., tracking threats from Soviet Alfa- and Akula-class submarines across the Atlantic’s GIUK Gap demanded innovations – like the SOSUS hydrophone network – and extensive training. Crew skills in interpreting faint tonal signals among dense thermal layers were honed at long-established facilities like the Naval Submarine School in Groton. The Groton School was established in 1916. That’s 110 years ago, highlighting just how long the U.S. has been a master of the submarine game.
Several other submarine training facilities have subsequently emerged, in particular the Naval Submarine Training Center Pacific, or NSTCP, in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; the Submarine Learning Facility Norfolk, or SLFN, in Norfolk, Virginia; and the Trident Training Facilities in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. A new Submarine Workforce Training Center is currently under development in Danville, Virginia. By contrast, China has one primary submarine training academy – the Naval Submarine Academy, or NSA, in Qingdao. It was established in 1953, almost four decades after the U.S.’s first submarine academy, although in recent years it has undergone major expansion, including a new campus opened around 2016. The net result is that China was very late to the game compared to the U.S., and is still very much playing catch-up. The average Chinese submariner today has around 10 years of experience, while in the U.S., it’s 15 to 20.
And that experience has added up. By the end of the Cold War, the U.S. had achieved more or less complete underwater dominance over the Soviets, a state of affairs that has existed with Russia until today. After the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, this subaquatic expertise pivoted to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR, missions. Los Angeles-class subs prowled the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, intercepting communications and launching Tomahawks. Later, Virginia-class boats shadowed Iranian submarines in the early 2020s. All the while, these combat missions have been continuously reinforced by rigorous training. Large-scale exercises like RIMPAC regularly see U.S. SSNs operating alongside allied navies in complex anti-submarine warfare scenarios, refining tactics for future Pacific littoral engagements against China. That might prove to be vital in a major kinetic confrontation with China.
Shallow-water and littoral operations are one area of submarine warfare where the gap between U.S. and Chinese capabilities isn’t quite as pronounced. In deep-sea or blue water operations, no Navy comes close to the U.S. Navy’s. In addition to its world-beating fleet of aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines, the U.S. also has a far greater network of military bases and installations distributed right across the planet. The U.S.’s estimated 750 to 800 bases don’t just leave all of today’s military powers in its dust. It’s the largest military network in human history, far exceeding any other nation’s overseas military footprint. The nearest rival is the UK, with around 145 overseas military installations. France and Turkey have around 30 to 50 each. Russia has an estimated 52, while China has 29. But Russia’s are primarily situated in neighboring Central Asian republics and to its south in Syria and Armenia. China’s forces are also concentrated in its vicinity, with only its bases in Djibouti and Cuba located in far-off parts of the world. By contrast, the U.S. is literally everywhere, in every corner of every continent on the globe. So, while practically all other navies have been built with local defense in mind, the U.S. Navy has been constructed to project power globally.
China, by most accounts, is actively seeking to expand its Navy into a blue water fleet that can challenge the U.S. Navy globally, or, at the very least, defend its massive cargo fleet anywhere if global shipping continues its current descent into lawlessness and piracy. However, this is a relatively new development in Chinese military doctrine, and it is unlikely to take less than a few decades to even start to catch up. Until recently, China’s fleet was very much prioritized towards defending its waters, denying the U.S. Navy superiority, and invading Taiwan, not projecting naval power globally. It’s only really in the last decade or two that China’s focus has shifted from coastal defense to power projection.
And in that goal of defending itself against possible U.S. aggression, China has shown many experts – and their wargames have demonstrated – that despite its inferiority, the Chinese submarine fleet may be pretty effective. In particular, while they lack the advanced acoustics and sensors and superior firepower of their nuclear-powered U.S. rivals, China’s diesel-electric submarines could create some nasty surprises for an attacking U.S. fleet. The weapons they wield may not be at the same level as the U.S.’s, but they still pack quite a punch. The YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile flies at Mach 3 – around 2,300 miles per hour – with a 335-mile range. Its sea-skimming terminal phase may well present a challenge for U.S. Aegis defenses. The Jin-class’s JL-3 SLBMs carry MIRVs, bolstering nuclear deterrence, while the Yu-6 torpedo – modeled on thew US Mk-48 torpedo – delivers a 450-pound warhead over 28 miles.
Of course, that firepower counts for nothing if the submarines carrying them are audible to the U.S.’s sonar. However, in the shallow waters of the South China Sea and surrounding the islands of the First and Second Island Chains, that equation changes. The region’s 230-foot shelves and reef-strewn littorals scatter sonar – picture SQS-53C pings bouncing off Spratly corals. These conditions favor the diesel-electric Yuan-class’s AIP-driven silence and 22-foot draft, making it ideal for lurking near disputed outposts like Fiery Cross. With an endurance of 8,000 nautical miles, it can stalk U.S. carriers for weeks, its YJ-18s primed for ambush. U.S. Virginia-class boats, on the other hand, are built for 2,000-foot dives and lose some edge in these shallows. Their 33-foot draft risks bottom scrapes in shallower waters, although their BQQ-10 sonar compensates by parsing cluttered signal returns where inferior Chinese sonars falter. However, beyond these shelves, in the deep water, there’s no competition.
In the 3.1-mile Luzon Strait, for example, U.S. nuclear subs have been shown to excel, with sustained 30-knot sprints and networked ISR with P-8 spotter planes enabling standoff strikes. Regular undersea warfare exercises, such as Black Widow 2025, held near Hawaii, and Sea Dragon 2025 and Exercise Malabar 2025, held near Guam, fine-tune tactics and coordination with allies. This standoff projection, blending precision and persistence, keeps U.S. dominance firmly intact where depth allows.
But what they lack in technological power, China hopes to make up for with sheer numbers. China is attempting to close the gap by boosting submarine production. A Yuan-class submarine costs around $200 million, while a Virginia-class submarine costs well over $3 billion, meaning not only is China out-producing the U.S., but it is doing it far more cost-effectively.
Another Chinese gambit in this regard is the development of submarine drones, or to be more precise, large unmanned underwater vehicles, or UUVs. It’s unclear how much of a game-changer these might be or whether China ever intends arming them with nuclear weapons to create and analog of Russia’s Poseidon UUV. They’re currently conventionally armed and appear to be primarily used for tasks like surveillance and mine-laying. But at least in the meantime, China does hold the advantage here.
In September 2025, the PLAN paraded its AJX002 and HSU100 Extra-Extra-Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles, or XXLUUVs, measuring 60 to 65 feet in length. Even larger models, measuring 135 to 150 feet have been spotted on satellite imagery under construction near Hainan. These massive platforms are intended to rival conventional diesel submarines in scale but operate without a crew. They are believed to be equipped for long-range missions, potentially carrying torpedoes, naval mines, or even launching smaller UUVs. Again, there’s no evidence China intends to arm them with nuclear weapons – at least for now. Smaller models like the Qilin ARV – a hybrid autonomous/remote-controlled vehicle capable of crawling on the seabed – and the Haishen 6000 AUV – capable of diving to 3.7 miles – demonstrate a broad spectrum of capabilities. And many of these UUVs are already active. China has already deployed its Sea Wing and HSU-001 UUVs for surveillance, mine warfare, and intelligence gathering, with deployments observed in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and even the Pacific.
Not to be outdone, the U.S. has its own XLUUV program, centered on the Boeing Orca. The Orca is an 85-foot, 85-ton autonomous diesel-electric submarine designed for long-range, months-long missions up to 6,500 nautical miles. Its 34-foot modular payload bay is capable of carrying up to eight tons, including mines like the planned Hammerhead, smaller UUVs, sensors, or electronic warfare systems. That’s more than a match for its Chinese counterparts. However, the Orca program has faced significant delays and cost overruns, to the tune of being three years behind schedule and $242 million over budget by late 2022. The first Orca was delivered in December 2023, with the second only scheduled for delivery in March 2026.
Ultimately, autonomous submarines may change the undersea equation as dramatically as autonomous aircraft, or drones, have transformed war in the skies and on land. Ukraine’s use of naval drones to terrorize the Russian Black Fleet in the Black Sea and the shadow tanker fleet more broadly is a case in point. But for now, the U.S. is the undisputed king of submarines. After all, a single Virginia-class SSN, loitering off Scarborough Shoal, could unleash 40 Tomahawks to gut a PLAN invasion fleet targeting Taiwan within minutes. And in a nuclear war, Chinese nuclear submarines would likely be fish food before they could fire their SLBMs. And there’s precious little China can do about it.
If nuclear war does break out, you’ll probably want to be as far from the fireballs and radiation as possible. Check out this video to discover the safest places in the U.S. to be if it happens. Thanks for watching.