Transcription
I think this was a major mistake by the Israeli regime because bombing another capital unprovoked and the image, you know, bombing the Ministry of Defense on while and people saw it happen live, it just shows the world that that the Israeli regime is this outlaw and rogue regime that it is. It further reinforces that. I don't think this is good for for the regime. And it shows that countries like Turkey, who've never done anything to hurt Israel, and and ISIS and al-Qaeda, which have never hurt Israel and have always been friendly to the Israelis, that they are never going to be treated any differently than the real resistance.
What you're laying out here is the strategic backfire of an unrestrained strike. It doesn't intimidate. It groups everyone, neutral, opportunistic, or opposed, into one psychological camp that feels equally vulnerable. History shows that when a state's actions erase the distinction between active adversaries and fence-sitters, it accelerates alignment against itself. We saw shades of this with coalition dynamics in the 2000s. That reputational cost is hard to unwind once cemented.
The Israeli regime doesn't, and and of course the forces that support it in the West. They're never going to allow anyone to have any sense of security in this region if it does not conform entirely with Israeli regime interests. So no matter what, I mean, Turkey under Erdogan has really done huge favors for Netanyahu because, for example, if Turkey had broken off ties with the Israeli regime, that would have made it, that would have helped create an incentive for others or strengthen the will of others to also boycott the Israelis or to cut off ties or to decrease increase ties. But when Turkey is doing business as usual, exporting goods, exporting fuel, how can one expect African countries or Latin American countries or Asian countries to take any action against the regime when the Emirates is doing business as usual? I mean, these countries have played a huge role in strengthening Netanyahu's hand during the last 21 months.
Leverage accumulates quietly when logistics, trade flows, and energy links keep humming. It buys political time for any embattled leadership. Material continuity often matters more than loud condemnations because it preserves strategic optionality. But despite that, and despite the fact that ISIS and al-Qaeda have never targeted Israel, they've targeted Russia, they've targeted Iran, they've targeted Syria, they've targeted Iraq, they but they never target Israel. And rarely in the West have they targeted anyone else but, you know, any these people, but those were most probably rogue elements, but anyway, so but they never targeted Israel or if they were not rogue elements, they never targeted Israel. So but in any case, uh, the Israeli regime has done itself no favors, but because it has shown itself to be ro, but it has also shown that Turkey and and and Golani have they are not going to be treated any differently. But I don't believe that under Erdogan, Turkey has any incentive to get into any direct conflict with the Israeli regime.
Anchora has consistently balanced rhetoric with hedging. Domestic political narratives can sound confrontational. Yet the underlying calculus, NATO position, economic recovery needs, energy corridors, steers policy back to pragmatism over escalation. Because the priority of Turkey of under Erdogan, it has never been Palestine. It has never been the Palestinian issue. For for Turkey is for Erdogan is to expand to become more audit, and that is why he and Netanyahu have had similar interests, and that is to weaken the resistance. So destroying Syria, weakening Hezbollah, that is all good for Erdogan. Weakening Yemen. That's all good for. In Yemen, Erdogan has been supporting forces that are opposed and the and the uh, the Yemeni government. The only place where Erdogan has had a supportive role is with Hamas, but he's never provided them with ammunition or to help them build the military infrastructure that they have.
Symbolic political hospitality, offices, scholarships costs less and carries lower external risk than transferring capabilities. It lets a government project solidarity to domestic and regional audiences without triggering the thresholds that invite sanctions or reprisals. As we speak, Iran is continuing to support Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In Gaza, the person who was in charge was one of the people who was murdered by the Israelis, uh, General Eizadi. Uh, but he's of course been replaced by someone else who's doing. But the point is that Turkey, what it has been doing under Erdogan is that it gives Palestinian scholarships. It gives, you know, space for Hamas to have offices there. But it doesn't do anything against Israel. And I have no doubt in the case of Gat, for example, if the Americans told ATA to shut down Alazer, they'll shut it down.
That illustrates dependency leverage. Hosting critical foreign infrastructure inevitably narrows strategic autonomy. When a state's core security partner signals a preference, media latitude tends to contract quickly. I mean, Qatar is where Sentcom is based, and Sentcom is the base is funded by Qatar. So I don't see a scenario where the Israelis, the the Erdogan is going to come into direct conflict with the with the Israeli regime. There are differences of interests, but there has always been a lot of mutual interests. And, you know, at the end of the day, if anyone really says no, this is not the case, they have to answer why is it that we have direct, we've had direct flights during this holocaust between Istanbul and Tel Aviv. We've had oil in uh, oil the flow of oil continue. We've had trade. It's clear as day that, um, and of course, both of them were part of this timber sycamore project that evolved into something very huge. It's it's clear as day that the Turkish government under Erdogan is very much in the NATO camp. Despite periodic tensions, procurement disputes, rhetoric over regional operations, Turkey's institutional intelligence and defense interoperability still anchor it westward. Structural commitments outlast episodic diplomatic flare-ups.
It is. And he is not going to do anything that is going to create a real wedge between the United States and Turkey, as he has never done so in the past. Whenever he has made some small moves, uh, the United States has punished him, and uh, he he pulled back. But, um, but his interests there, the interests of Netanyahu and Erdogan are largely in parallel with each other. And so there are certain conic notes, but there's no doubt that if push comes to shove in in those areas, the West is going to be behind Israel, not Turkey, and Erdogan is not going to stand up to Israel on in those areas. So, I think that he's going to continue to be very cautious, and he's going to preserve his ties with Nitting.
We're left with a picture of calculated restraint, rhetorical distance paired with preserved strategic links. The takeaway is that durable regional influence often comes less from headline gestures and more from maintaining the corridors, energy, trade, intelligence that others quietly rely on. Unless those structural incentives change, expect continuity cloaked in episodic criticism rather than a clean strategic break.
You know, a number of things have happened over the ca the last couple of days which I find interesting in Iran and in Lebanon. And I want to sort of respond to you first by going through through these two. In Iran, there has always been this camp that says that, you know, if we just did a deal with Americans, and I mean, look at Syria. That's what they've been saying for months. Look at Syria. Now that they've struck a deal, now that they overthrow Armenia al-Qaeda and ISIS is true, horrible people, and uh, the the worst of the worst, very similar to Zionists themselves. If they could, you know, get their hands on us, they cut off our heads. But they did a deal with the West, and uh, the sanctions have been removed. So maybe if we did a deal with the West, the sanctions would be removed. That has been a narrative that has been going on since the fall of the previous Syrian government.
People looked at, you know, their TV, and these people were have saw that doing a deal is not enough. They'll still come after you. You can tell, you know, Golani has been, you know, shaving his beard, wearing ties, uh, you know, uh, dealing with the devil, going to, you know, place after place and telling the Israelis, you know, we're friends, and our enemy, we have, our enemies are the same enemies. And they'll still bomb him. They'll still bomb his people. They'll still bomb the people who they've been funding and supporting. You can't do a deal with Israeli machine. This has reinforced the position of Ayatam and all those who've been saying that the United States, the Israeli regime, the collective West, you cannot deal with them.
When a constituency interprets selective strikes as proof that negotiation yields little insulation, hardline narratives gain credibility. Perception of futility is a powerful recruitment tool for more entrenched postures. In in Lebanon, it has strengthened Hezbollah because people are now saying, more people, some of the, some of many of the people who were saying, and this I I know because I've been speaking to people in Lebanon during the last couple of days. Many people who have been saying that Hezbollah has to give up its weapons are now saying, we need these weapons. We need because this, you know, you have Golani slaughtering the Druze, and the Israelis bombing Damascus unprovoked. So if we are dis, if if the resistance is disarmed in Lebanon, nothing is there to protect.
Security vacuums rarely stay neutral. Disarming one actor without parallel enforcement mechanisms often invites more radical entrance rather than stability. The lesson many communities internalize from the Salafi techis or the Zionist the the genocidal Zionists. And so that has strengthened the resistance in Lebanon among the Druze, among uh, moderate Sunnis because remember Salafist and Wahhabi Wahhabism, as I said earlier, they are new on the scene. They only came in since the, it really began in Afghanistan where the Americans started using in the, they use Saudi Arabia and and the Emirates back then to fund the extremists to fight the Soviet Union, but also to contain the revolution in Iran. Revolution in Iran was anti-imperialist, you know, calling for uh, you know, the the Americans to leave the region, anti-colonialist. And so they they started funding these groups to to create hatred for Shia. So it was like dual purpose. But the first books that were published takiriti books that were being taught at school or in and majuses for children in Afghan children and children in parts of Pakistan, uh, were published in the United States.
External sponsorship of ideological material decades ago still pays geopolitical dividends. An example of how short-term proxy logic can sow long-term fragmentation that outlives its original purpose. Again, the Druze are the Israelis are trying to do their best to turn the Druze to have them turn to the Israeli regime. And this is very dangerous. Syria, the the Balkanization of Syria is exactly what the Israeli regime wants. And that is why under no circumstances should it be Balkanized. I mean, that's one reason. The the other reason is Syria is Syria. People should live together. But I think that this is not going to go well for the Israeli regime. I've argued this from the beginning, as you know, that this 21 months has been one catastrophe for Israel after another. They have destroyed some much of our region. They've destroyed country after country. They've destroyed it, carried out a holocaust, are destroying. They're slaughtering people in Iran and Syria and Lebanon and elsewhere. But I think that this is all catastrophic for the Israeli regime. And in fact, I think is because of the stupidity of the Israelis, and here you some may disagree, but I think if if Israel had not done what it has done over the past 21 months, this whole Epstein issue that's now becoming big in the United States would not have become like this. The issue of Musad. I mean, it would have been an issue, but not like this when so many people in the United States are turning against Israel and seeing what they're just bombing Damascus unprovoked and carrying out this genocide.
International opinion often shifts not from abstract legal arguments, but from cumulative visuals and timing. High-profile strikes juxtaposed with domestic scandals can erode formerly steadfast external support. And at the same time, this piece of garbage, Epstein and his friends and allies are cooperating with this regime and carrying out such great corruption in the United States and capturing the the the political order through through the donors and through others who who were involved with Epsen made it the other epsen. I have no doubt that there are many other epsenes out there who are who are busy doing their work. I mean, the the girls that were given out to Epstein were given out to other people, too. And I'm sure it's continued. But in any case, I think that what Netanyahu is doing, him and his coalition, is that they're further uh making the Israeli regime hated. And I think they are legitimizing [Music] uh or should I say they're reinforcing the resistance and that they're telling the world that the resistance was right. You have to bear arms against the Israeli regime. You can never trust it. They'll never let you live. No matter how much you help them in killing their enemies or undermining the resistance, they will still not treat you as human beings.
Once a population internalizes that concessions don't yield status or security, escalation ladders shorten. Rebuilding trust later requires disproportionate diplomatic capital. And so ultimately, what I think is that uh, what's h what will happen in Syria is that people will say, well, under Hezbollah was a lot, Iran, Hezbollah, they were right. The resistance was right. What happened to Syria during the last 15 years has only made things worse for us, and um, we're not going to be protected because Israelis will never treat us as equal. So I think that this is not going to work well for Israel at all. I'm not saying that Golani is going to be undermined tomorrow. I'm not saying that these takiti monsters, especially those from Central Asia and China and elsewhere, really awful or like the worst of the worst among them, thousands of people who will be who are, you know, the plan is to keep them as tools for NATO later on when they want to undermine Asia and Asian growth, but, um, but I think it's not going to end well for it's not this is not good news for them.
And so while the Israeli regime is, and I think one reason why Netanyahu may be doing this now is that there is a possibility for a ceasefire in Gaza, and this may help him to be strong. And you do know that his trial was delayed again. Every time the trial comes up, there's some sort of war that's carried out. So I think that maybe this could help him have the ceasefire and preserve his coalition at the same time. But I don't think it's end of uh Netanyahu aggression.
After all these layers, regional hedging, proxy dynamics, shifting public sentiment, the core pattern stands. Tactical strikes can buy time, but they also accumulate reputational liabilities and harden adversary cohesion. Without a credible political framework, each new action narrows off-ramps and elevates long-term strategic risk over short-term gain. The strategic ledger is trending negative, even if the operational tempo appears sustained.