Transcription
Trying to, you know, to to hit the tankers or ships that they were trying to use, you know, the the routes, different routes from the ones that Iran has defined for the region for this form. So, they were somehow attacked by drones and Donald Trump came out and tweeted on that. He said, "Four drones attacking one of the ships in in the strait of Hormuz." And this is the current situation.
With the case of Lebanon, we had a meeting between the two sides in Washington. There is a new agreement, it seems. I don't know what that means. It's because what was so interesting after the meeting Iran and the United States had in Switzerland, basically talking about the situation in southern Lebanon, you see the president of Lebanon coming out and saying, "So Israel has to withdraw totally from Lebanon." First time for the first time in, you know, they're somehow talking this way. And then you see the agreement in Washington in the United States between the two sides. And how do you see the two sides? One of them is the strait of Hormuz is so important, and the other one is the case of Lebanon. Is there any sort of hope for any of this, you know, being resolved?
"I hope so. Yes."
I mean, I think several things. I think the probability of us going back in are very remote, uh, in terms of military or kinetic, uh, engagement. Secondly, the what Larry Johnson and others have been reporting, Brandon Weiss shirt and others, uh, has now been confirmed, uh, by a range of media reports, which is that the various attacks by Iran on the US military bases, particularly the fifth, uh, the center of the fifth fleet in Bahrain, that many of these bases are utterly not only unoccupied now but seen as beyond meaningful repair. So that the beginning of the exit of the United States from the Middle East is probably already in progress at some level. And then the question becomes the strait of Hormuz and the Lebanon and Israel. And so I think the the probability, possibility of military kinetic conflict between the US and Iran is very remote at this stage. It is just diminishing by the day.
The, uh, I think the strait of Hormuz will be open at some level because the, the, there's only so much Iran, I think, can practically do, or I should say diplomatically do with the strait of Hormuz to leverage their power against, uh, Israel in particular. That you look at, I mean, one reason why Iran's efforts to get the economic pressure on the US, uh, at a higher rate than ultimately occurred over the last 100 days is because of its own ally, China. Uh, China has to put its own priorities first, and those priorities are stability in the global economic south, that where China depends on an export-driven economy to be able to be sustainable in their current economic environment. Uh, a range of reasons for that, partially the COVID lockdowns and the economic ramifications of that. Part of it, the global financial crisis freezing up liquidity markets and capital markets in ways that have never come back to pre-2008 levels globally. Part of it, an internal real estate problem where a real estate bubble popped in China, partially deliberately by the government's own work, but it still has had its negative ramifications and ripple effects in the Chinese economy. And you aggregate those factors, China was not in a position to afford a global economic collapse, even if it wanted to aid its ally, Iran. And the reason why oil and gas never hit that $150, $200 price that people thought it would, given the length of time this strait was closed, is because China was massively emptying its own strategic reserves, which are much higher than anywhere else in the world, because they bought up a lot of oil at dirt cheap prices when it hit $50, $60 a barrel the last half decade. And they helped the global south, and particularly Southeast Asia, uh, Korea, Japan, Australia, places that have not always been, and and still aren't really allied to China, because it just can't afford the economy to collapse.
What that means is, uh, Iran's not in a position where it can continuously completely close the strait just for any, uh, leverage reason it wants. Legally, it's better standing if it's being attacked or being blockaded. But diplomatically, does it want to risk its relationship with China, number one purchaser of its oil and gas during the sanctioned era over the past decade or so? I don't see that. One of its main strategic allies, one of its main military allies, one of its main allies in the United Nations against various resolutions that have been against Iran. The, the, but China has also good relations with most of the Gulf countries as well. So I think that puts a practical limit. And I think what we're going to see is people tease out and test out how much that can work. What some of us had been arguing to the administration was the blockade and the threat of kinetic conflict gives cover to Iran to close the strait. And even if China is providing some relief valve, that relief valve is going to run out sooner or later. And as President Trump himself admitted, that relief valve is going to go empty by by August. So the, and then we're in serious trouble. So I think that Iran can only use the, now that there's no real threat of a blockade, I don't think, given, I think we'll find out in the coming days and and week weeks or so, uh, that many of you'll start seeing. And the thing to watch is when do we start actually bringing US troops home? When do we start bringing the carrier ships and the battleships and the big boats back home to the US shores? When do you see some of the big planes and some of the military deployment there, about 50,000 plus troops or so? When do you see, above and beyond the normal baseline, when do you see that coming back home? Uh, do you see no real efforts to repair the bases, uh, that have been hit so hard? If you see that aggregation taking place, then the risk of US kinetic conflict with Iran goes way down. And that in turn means Iran can only do so much leverage with the strait of Hormuz. It can do a little bit here and a little bit there, but only so much can it do for Lebanon. At that point, its greater leverage as to Israel becomes its ability to attack Israel, especially to attack Israel without US backing, without US support.
What Vice President Vance, who's the entire architect of this deal, getting any deal that he was able to negotiate and navigate the treacherous terrain of Washington DC, the Israel lobby, President Trump's King Lear mindset. I don't know if you saw Iran had accepted the theory that Larry Johnson and I had presented, which was that Trump is not the same Trump. And that what from their perspective, according to published reports, what really improved their understanding of what was happening and their negotiation tactics and strategy was to hire a bunch of shrinks. I mean, who ever knew that? Yeah. Have bring in some shrink, uh, you know, Iran, of course, one of the most educated populations in the world. And tell us, okay, assume Trump has this mental health issue or this mental health issue. How do we translate what he's saying? And then how do we respond back in negotiation? Um, and the, and I think they did it very well and very adroitly in that respect. But I think they understand they got a King Lear situation in the in the American White House. And so they're going to navigate that carefully. Apparently, the Russians, according to Ambassador Lavrov, their foreign minister Lavrov, uh, who told Rick Sanchez, who told me, that that Trump, they'd figured that out back after December, when there was an attempted attack on Putin, uh, in Russia by the CIA in Ukraine, uh, against the, and and Trump was acting like he didn't remember what he negotiated in August, last August in Anchorage. So I think given that combination of circumstances, the X-factor becomes, does Israel and Iran start up their own war all over again without US involvement? And as the message got relayed, and to a degree, the last time is Iran hit Israel, the US did not defend him. At least that's what came through the military chain of command. Israel cannot win a war against Iran. Uh, its only hope was US protection at a minimum, uh, US defenses at a minimum. If, if they're getting the message that there won't be US defenses, Bibi can have all the braggadocious talk he wants. You know, Ben Gvir and all the lunatics can say, "We're going to make all the Lebanese mommies cry," because apparently being going full Nazi is the new ideology in parts of Israel. Uh, but practically speaking, Israel will get hammered, uh, in such a conflict. They're more vulnerable in their energy supply and their water supply to hits, just due to the size of the country. That, you know, the, I think someone said Iran is like 93 times bigger than the land of, uh, you know, so it's like, you just do the math. That's math. Ain't math. Uh, and consequently, I think maybe that's hope also.
Lebanon is such a proxy. These current political leaders in Lebanon, I should say, are such a proxy of the United States. That if you see them shifting position, it means the US has told them to shift position. I do know that Vice President Vance was reaching out to other groups in Israel, letting the message get relayed to Bibi that we may actually aggressively assist his opponents rather than him. That means, you know, if he loses the next election, he goes to prison with his wife in all likelihood. So, I think they're starting to play. But Vance knows how to play hardball, and he's learned this lesson the hard way through this, uh, unfortunate military adventure. The Trump has been erratic and sporadic, and I think that will continue to be the case. But if the advances side of the equation continues to exercise its leverage, uh, then and do so through its leverage on the Lebanese governing officials, who again, like you said, are, you know, quasi-elected officials, uh, but the nominal head of Lebanon currently, against Israel, rather than Israel's pocket, then that could lead to Israel having to withdraw from Lebanon, which some military officials within Israel think is a better idea anyway, because they're getting their rears whipped. Yeah, you can raise to the ground Gaza-style a whole bunch of homes and communities, but you can't hold it. You raise it to the ground and you still can't hold it, the, uh, from Hezbollah. And everybody knows they're not taking out Hezbollah. And Lebanon has been the cemetery of greater Israel projects now going on 40 years. Did it in the '80s, did it in the 2000s. It will be a, a sort of, you know, history rhymes kind of situation because the last time there was a meaningful, uh, US resistance on Israel's expansionistic politics in the Middle East was concerning Lebanon and was concerning President Reagan. It's what I've been urging the White House and urging people talking to President Trump to remind him of. The President Reagan strategy was get out and tell Israel to stand down. And that's what happened in Lebanon after our Marines died. He didn't use it as a pretext to double down. He realized that's stupid. We're getting the heck out of there. He realized he made a mistake by even sending them there. And the next thing he did is he realized to have peace, uh, in Lebanon, you needed to have Israel stand down. And he used languages like "holocaust." Uh, this is stuff the Mark Levens of the world pretend don't exist in the Reagan history. Uh, the Reagan history is not the fanciful, uh, the Mark Levan give war a chance kind of guy. Uh, it is the, "Get the heck out of the Middle East and tell Israel to stay, uh, in its borders and in its put Bibi back in a box." And if Trump, or if the, I should say the administration, because I'm not sure where Trump is on a given day, but if the administration is able to do that, then I think you can get some at least short-term manageable, uh, ceasefire in Lebanon and Israel, which two weeks ago I would have said was highly unlikely.
"Yeah."
One of the main problems, as it was mentioned by Marco Rubio during his visit of Bahrain, Kuwait, and UAE, said that there is no fee system or toll system in this trade of Hormuz. Which, by the way, Bloomberg today reported that the Omani government told Europeans that the situation is not going to get back the way it was before the war started. They're going to have to pay. This is the Omani government, and reported on Bloomberg. And here is the Iranian official, you know, the military advisor to Iran's supreme leader. Here is what he said about Israel.
"But regarding fees, there is a cost dimension to this matter. There is a tolls discussion, a fees discussion. Our current discussion is about service costs in the strait of Hormuz. Yes, we want to maintain the security of the strait of Hormuz. We want to protect the environment of the strait of Hormuz. We must establish insurance mechanisms so that if incidents occur, ships that encounter problems are covered to reduce their risk. And when we provide all of this, these costs cannot come out of the pockets of the Iranian people. These costs must be collected from those who are transporting oil through this strait."
"Yeah. Yeah. See, that, that's not a toll. That's an environmental fee, uh, an administrative fee, an insurance fee. They've been Iran has finally learned to study the West. You don't call it a tax, you don't call it a toll, you call it a service fee, which is great. The, uh, I get a kick out of it. But yeah, absolutely. They were going to go there. They're going to take, you know, the Straits of Bosphorus sort of and Danielle's, which people forget the Montreux Convention of, I think, in 1936, allowed Turkey to charge fees. Uh, they called it similarly administrative fees and management fees and all that jazz. Uh, but they've been charging fees for what was it, 90 years now? So all they got to do is borrow from that same template. I'd encourage the US to look at that template as a manageable template. Unfortunately, when Trump hears that, Trump goes, 'Oh, really? Yeah, right. We should charge fees. We should take it over.' In fact, we should take 20% of their oil. I mean, it's like, okay, so you want to charge fees like a hundred times higher than what Iran is talking about. How that's supposed to be manageable? But so I, I was like, don't tell Trump this, but everybody else can can, uh, utilize it as a template. The, but of course, it's going to happen. They understand the leverage that it provides. That it provides continuous leverage. There's limits on that leverage in terms of their diplomatic alliances, but there's not limits on that leverage. What they figured out in this war kinetically, uh, we, nothing we did could reopen that strait for normal traffic. Once Iran fully appreciated that, they weren't going to give that up. They're never going to give that up. Indeed, they can have it in lieu of an arms race of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, which they've never really wanted to do anyway. It was just an attempt at leverage against sanctions. They now have, oh, we got the ultimate leverage. We have control of 20% of the world's oil and gas supply, not to mention fertilizer and critical ingredients, uh, that critical components that go into the supply chain, like helium for semiconductors. So you add that together, they're absolutely going to keep strict control. And that control requires certain approved routes, certain approved fee structures, certain approved insurance structures. It's the way the US and the EU created these globalist style bureaucratic impositions to have surveillance state pos was through regulations and licenses and permits and special fees, all of that. They know that it's not so much about raising the money. It's about controlling the traffic so you can turn on or turn off that key anytime you want. You want to say you have to go through this exact route and you have to get our permission to get it so we know who you are, what you are, where you are. Then we can turn that off anytime we want. And so they're absolutely going to continue to do that. Vance knows they're going to continue to do that. He knows that ship has sailed, uh, quite literally. And so consequently, uh, it's just conceding to it. Trump will never, in his own mind, ever concede to it. Um, but it doesn't matter. The, that's why they cut, they said, well, let's just say you agreed not to charge tolls, uh, for 60 days in the, uh, they didn't say you can never charge fees related to management of the strait. And that's where that, that's going to end up."
"How do you see GCC countries today? And it seems that Saudi Arabia and they're somehow getting closer to the Iranian position, or they want to be to to form or reshape the relationship with Iran. On the other hand, you see these three countries that I mentioned, Bahrain, Kuwait, and UAE, they're not that much in the discussions. And Iran, honestly, from the Iranian media, I look at Iranian officials and their statements, you don't see any sort of importance for these countries when it comes to the region. They don't consider Kuwait as a great player or Bahrain as a great player in the region, or even UAE. They see and Saudi Arabia and Oman as the main players in the region. And do you think that is that how is that going to be perceived by Washington?"
"So two different things have happened. One of the things that has helped Vance get this, uh, potential peace deal and real more meaningful ceasefire on the table has been the shift of, uh, position of those in the Middle East in the Gulf, Gulf states particularly. The Saudis were the first to jump off the train with the Qataris, realizing the Iran war was a disaster. Then the Kuwaitis and Bahrain. Bahrain really kind of an extension or proxy of the Saudis, given they're a Sunni government of a Shia population. The, uh, the UAE was the last to come on board. Oman was never on board with any of the war, of course. But the, the last one to come on board was, uh, the UAE. Even the Emiratis decided that, you know, that was a smart tactic that the Iran used. Remember for a period of time, all they did is hit UAE, hit, hit. Well, finally, MBS discovered that his version of Call of Duty, Iran war style, he was ending up on the losing end of that game more often than not. And so finally, that's why they're releasing funds. They'll lie about this and try to cover it up, but they're part of getting the cash in. Now, some of that money is really coming through the US disguises from the UAE. You're going to have a lot of that gamesmanship just to hold up Trump's ego, not being compared to Obama. Um, but even Trump himself was like, 'Sanctions are stupid. It just undermines the US financial system. This is really Iran's money.' Things to be honest with you, I didn't think he would ever say. Um, but, you know, that gives you a sense of how much he realized we were about to hit the cliff, and they got him back leashed, uh, in a better direction, uh, despite his emotional instability and his decision-making quality decline. So at this point, the, uh, I think the second factor that was also motivating us actors on this, people like Elbridge Colby, who are hardcore realists, uh, in the geopolitical school, aligned with Mearsheimer and others, is that Pakistan, uh, what Larry Johnson has been talking about with you and others, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and the Saudis, who are the only people they don't really respect each other. They don't really respect. I mean, Iraq is kind of collapsed at the moment, same with Syria and Libya. Nobody really wants to get into bed with King Head Chopper, though the president, you know, though Trump himself keeps saying, "Oh, Lisa, the head chopper on Hezbollah," and that was funny. It was hear Israelis complain, "Oh my goodness, you want Al Qaeda to protect us?" It's like, who put that Al Qaeda in power in the first place? I think it might be some folks in Tel Aviv. Maybe you should have thought about that before you did it. But the, the net effect is Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are considered the real regional powers now. Everybody else is small. I mean, especially from a Persian perspective, you've got all these borders drawn arbitrarily by the Brits, you know, back in the 1920s and '30s to help the Brits manage the Straits of Hormuz and control it and manage the Suez Canal and control it. And they don't really respect these little small clans that have been sort of anointed to power, uh, by the West. And that, you know, they see us kind of decadent. They see as decaying. They see as not having democratic legitimacy. But most importantly, they see them as little Chihuahuas, uh, that are just yip and yip and yip and yip and yip. It's kind of like Russia having to listen to Lithuania go off and off. It's like, you know, we could get to your country could be gone in two hours if we want. So instead, I think you'll see an Islamic NATO form. And there's some people that in the, uh, Colby and other camps that aren't super enthused about that, uh, because they would like the US to still have a sub significant power presence, but without the military bases. So the, but it's, it's happening anyway because we failed so bad, so miserably in this war, that it has left no choice but for the Saudis and the Pakistanis and the Turks to consider aligning with rather than being adversarial to Iran. And they all increasingly see Greater Israel as their greater threat in the region. Um, and it didn't help that Netanyahu was running around saying, "Turkey next." Didn't help that you had a bunch of Israelis running around in the political commentary saying, "Then Egypt." It's amazing. He got a peace deal with Egypt that, uh, Sadat, you know, got murdered for. And here you are talking about going back in and invading it. You're telling the whole Middle East, no deal is honorable. No agreement is something we won't breach. No ceasefire means actually ceasefire as applies to us. And they're starting to see Israel is the problem. Israel is the is the rogue element in the region. And I think you will see an Islamic NATO effectively form practically to secure, have security guarantees for the entire Middle East with the political backstop no longer being the United States or Europe, but Russia and China. The situation is so critical between Israel and Turkey, and it's because of what's going on in Syria, basically. And you, you mentioned the Greater Israel and their plan. It's not just about Lebanon. It's about Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, West Bank, and name it because they want, they're talking even about Egypt, to go to Egypt and having some part of Egypt. And this is, Robert, this is the recipe for disaster for the foreign policy of the United States if they get trapped in these sort of wars for decades. You see the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and you had forces in Iraq, you know."
"So, right now, do you think that the new, you, you, you said JD Vance and this new sort of tone, this new sort of atmosphere coming along within the Trump administration, which they basically their main focus is 2028 and they want to get out of the Middle East because of this conflict is just spreading. It's not contracting. This is the way that Israel wants to be. Do you think that they're going to be able to do that with ongoing? We have two sections, remember 224 and 662, the military and intelligence. They want to merge the two, the United States and Israel when it comes to the military, when it comes to the intelligence. How do you see that? Is that going to be successful on the part of the, let's put it, the Vance faction of Washington?"
"I mean, I've advised and recommended folks in the administration that if Trump is serious, and that if Israel and Bibi continues to wander off the leash and go off the reservation, is a common phrase here in the US, then the net effect of that is that what Trump needs to do is to not just rhetorically critique Israel, which a lot of people are skeptical of his sincerity of his intentions in that, is to come out and say he will veto both of those provisions if they pass the Congress. That frankly will kill it in Congress itself. Congress not going to waste its time passing that when it doesn't have veto-proof majorities. And I think the president should do that. I know there are people in the Vance camp that are encouraging him to do so. Now, they haven't pulled the trigger on that because they're waiting to see if they can get Israel to cut a deal with Lebanon to stand down, to back off, and to get back back in its box. Problem for Bibi is he's got a hurdle. He needs the continuous nature of the conflict and its escalatory character has been what has sustained Bibi and delayed his criminal trial now for years. And if he could stay keep getting those continued and get reelected, he probably doesn't go to prison. If he can't get those continued and he doesn't get reelected, then he does go to prison and his wife goes to prison with him. Given the nature of those charges and the nature of the Israeli system being super strict, it's not apparent that he has many defenses available to him. The, so if you look at that, given how strict the Israeli laws are, then they may not have to pull the trigger on that provision. But I hope they do. The, because I agree with you, it's a disaster to have Israel right at the very foundation of our military technology, which is what the section 224, the National Defense Authorization Act is, or Tom Cotton, who still thinks the Israel lobby can make him president someday. That's how nuts that guy is. His proposal to merge the CIA and Mossad. The, I think I don't think either one is going to pass Congress anyway. Uh, Democrats are increasingly becoming aware. People like Dan Goldman. Dan Goldman was an up-and-coming Democratic congressman. A huge Trump critic, deep allies with the deep state, supported many of Trump's impeachments. Was in one of, I think, the most Jewish American congressional districts in the country, and he didn't, and he now just lost his primary. And he didn't just lose, he lost by 30 points. He got crushed, he got humiliated, uh, against a candidate whose main issue of difference was Israel. Said, "Let's divorce Israel. No more deals with Israel. No more aid to Israel. No more diplomatic cover to Israel. No more military engagement with Israel." And in fact, every single Mandani anti-Israel, Mamani-backed anti-Israel candidate in the New York City area, and again, this is the most Jewish area of America, won against their institutional incumbents or AIPAC-backed supporters. At the rally, they were chanting, you know, "Down with AIPAC. Death to AIPAC." I mean, that sounds like death to Israel, right? Out of an out of Iran. I was just waiting to hear the whole Iran chant out of a second. People forget they used to chant "Death to the Soviet Union." Uh, the, they dropped that after a little while. But the, but they had it there for a good cause, actually, or understandable cause, I should say. The, so you look at that, the politics are shifting, and it's shifting fast. The next Democratic nominee in 2028 will be, it will be whoever comes across as the most plausible, credible Israel critic. Joy Reid, you know, MSNBC conventional liberal, uh, kind of commentator, said she will not back any Democratic candidate that supports Israel. So this has been building up for a while. The whole Gaza thing had almost all Democrats off the Israel train to begin with. But this, the Iran thing, and the Lebanon thing, and the Syrian, all of it aggregating the Epstein files thing has made it so that, uh, that pretty much nobody in the Democratic party. They did a recent survey. 50% of Democrats will vote against a candidate just because they're supported by AIPAC. Only 5% will support a candidate because they're backed by AIPAC. So, and you already have thin margins in the House and the Senate. And Thomas Massie and others are, they have have been consistent on this for a while. But even what Vance has figured out is what Tom Cotton and Marco Rubio and John Ratcliffe and some of these other guys and the Mitch McConnell's and the, you know, Chuck Grassley's of the world have not, which is Israel is no longer an asset politically in the United States. It is a major liability. And Vance has figured this out. That's why he's saying, "We got to end the special relationship with Israel. They should be no different than say, our relationship with France." Uh, the, we should, that all this stuff about you can't be anti-Israel without being anti-Semitic is nonsense. That is, he pointed out his good friend Charlie Kirk was deeply concerned about the excessive influence of the Israel lobby in the United States. And this is the vice president of the United States saying that. And that gives you an idea for where the political winds are blowing. So, Israel might take one or two last gasps of political power as it begins to decline and recede. But there's already talk in some Israeli lobby camps that they need to recede and retract in order to ever have power down the road. That if they want to have power in the next generation of voters or the next generation of elected officials, they need to do what Israel did in the early '80s, what followed Ronald Reagan's advice, got out of Lebanon and, and kept a sort of low simmer in terms of its adventurism around the rest of the Middle East for a substantial time period, even recognized for a period of time Gaza and West Bank as independent sources of authority for the Palestinians. The, that's what Israel needs to do if it wants to be sustainable in having relationships and ties and support and defense of the United States. Because without the US defending it diplomatically in the UN, without the US providing it military aid, without the US providing it defense aid, without a bunch of US ships and US planes being ready to defend Israel, Iran could take them out in a month. So they have the ultimate deterrence in nuclear weapons. So nobody's going to try to crush Israel just to crush them. Uh, the, but it will only be to deter Israel when they go aggressive and they get too adventurous. And that's where this war has led to the geopolitics being a radical shift. The ultimate irony, Bibi Netanyahu gets his utopian dream of a war, and he ends up with a dystopian nightmare for the greater Israel project because of it."
"Yeah. Robert, do you think that what, how, what would be your response to those people who are arguing maybe after midterm elections Donald Trump going to get back to war? How do you see that possibility? Is that zero?"
"Zero. So the very rare I say zero, but there's two reasons for it. One, Trump has woken up to what a disaster this was. He doesn't want to revisit it. Despite his emotionally erratic decision-making, he has come to that recognition. You really saw that last week in the aggressivity of his statements. And I saw for a moment, we all saw for a moment, old Trump, because he could take an issue as complex as Israel, Lebanon, and distill it in ways any ordinary person could process, any, you know, somebody in a diner just sitting around doesn't have to have a PhD in geopolitics, uh, to get. He's like, 'Here's what happens. Some little drone drops in the desert and Bibi Netanyahu goes and takes out another apartment complex.' I was like, 'That's exactly right. That's exactly.' I was like, 'Well, why couldn't we be saying that for forever?' But that gives you an idea. Once he starts making those kind of shifts, he doesn't tend to go back. Vance has gone in heavy on this. So, everything is staked with it. The Defense Department people and the people who lined in the Vance camp never wanted this. All said, all so all their nightmare predictions come true. They will do everything possible to resist it. And just speaking practically, after the midterms, Democrats will have the House, Democrats will have the Senate. They're going to be launching investigation after investigation, impeachment after impeachment. Trump cannot be in the middle of a war while that's happening because the war won't defer it. The war will accelerate it. Uh, and so given that situation, that's why I say, uh, as close to zero as possible that we go back in kinetically, uh, at any time. But even after the, uh, midterm elections, I think what has happened with the war against Iran, Robert, is was huge because it was a huge dream for Israel to do regime change at least in Iran. It was totally that desire, that sort of wishful thinking that has been shattered as an outcome of this war. So what else can they do? And you mentioned the United States is just somehow backing down. And you don't see the United States coming back to the war anytime soon. At least let's put it this way. And I don't see any president in the future would do what Donald Trump has done in the Middle East. They say huge lesson, by the way. And that's why many presidents in the United States, they have avoided this sort of war. But the geography, as JD Vance said, geography matters. We've learned that geography. This is the outcome of the war. And in your opinion, what, how is Israel? Is Israel going to learn from what has happened so far, or they're going to double down? This is a big question in, in my opinion, for the whole region."
"No doubt. I mean, I think as a practical matter, without US backing, their their ability to be adventurous in the region is very restricted and limited. The, uh, so as long as the US, you know, exercises its leverage, as Joe Kent has pointed out, you can contain Israel. And this goes all the way back, uh, both the court of public opinion, the US, and US mil action that followed there too. Whenever Israel is perceived within the US as being the aggressor, as being the bully, and this goes way back to the Suez Canal, this goes back to multiple incidents in Lebanon, especially certain aspects of the West Bank. They have lost, uh, public support in the US and inevitably they have had to pull back. The other thing is, I think there's something about Lebanon that is like, uh, the nemesis to the Greater Israel Project's hubris, that, you know, this will be the third time they really kind of got defeated in Lebanon. Got defeated in the '80s, got defeated in the early 2000s, really got defeated here. You raise all that land to the ground, and you're still losing a couple of soldiers a day, which in Israel, they're not accustomed to at all. Uh, the, with by a group that you claimed just a year ago was completely decapitated and completely destroyed. The, I mean, it's an embarrassment. It's a humiliation, uh, for Israel. So I think there's things they can try to do. But for example, it because Vance is the guy they can't take out, you know, Trump, without taking out Vance. Well, they got to take out Vance before they try to take out Trump. Not an easy thing to do politically. The, they're losing power with Congress because Congress is reading the polls. I mean, you had the, the grandson of Jack Kennedy run. He, he got married into a very pro-Israeli family, and he ran for Congress in New York with $25 million, and he finished a distant third, almost fourth. He got like 10% of the vote. That, and he thought running on the pro-Israel ticket was a way to get elected, and it guaranteed his demise. Vance can see it on the Republican side. Pretty much everybody with an I.Q. over 50 can see it on the Democratic side. Not Chucky Schumer, but everybody else can see it. Graham Planter's running on it, the state of Maine. And this is also why I think there'll, there's zero chance practically we go in after the midterms. People are going to be even more shocked after the midterms when, uh, people like Maine will be a classic example, a long-standing Republican senator, been there for 30 years, deeply aligned with Israel, running against a person with personal baggage, but whose main campaign in part is running against Israel. What happens when Little Maine votes for the anti-Israel candidate over the longstanding well-established incumbent? It's going to keep, those messages are going to keep rippling out. And I mean, it happened, little glimpses of it happened in Europe, like the Dutch right-wing align deeply with Israel. What happened? They underperformed in the elections. The reform candidate, Matthew Goodwin, very smart guy, smart UK populist professor on populism, but for whatever reason, he decided that, you know, Israel was the cause. And I mean, Nigel Farage started acting this way when he could, he could smell number 10. He's like, "Oh, I'm going to be there. I'm going to be there." And all these guys have a tendency to start to reverse policies as soon as they can taste that power. Uh, but so Goodwin went on a pro-Israel ticket and way underperformed in an election cycle where Reform is generally way overperforming. So we see it all across the western world. Israel is a political pariah. Anybody who gets, and that limits practically Israel's act, it's its, its window of opportunity. Its, its, uh, opport, the, which options are realistically on the table? Because it needed the support of the court of public opinion in the US to have the unanimous defense of US public officials in order to be able to get US public support, military support, intelligence and financial and strategic support and diplomatic support in order to do the Greater Israel project. You remove the US foundation from the Greater Israel project, it collapses right away. And I think that's what you're going to see."
"Yeah. What is your assessment of the new movement within the Republican party? The movement that represented by people like Tucker Carlson, and they say we're not going to vote for Republican party anymore. We had that with Democrats. If you remember, they didn't want to vote for Kamala Harris because of her position on Israel, pro-Israeli position. And right now, that's coming to the Republican party. And what are the repercussions of what has happened in the Middle East in the upcoming election in the United States?"
"It will be twofold. It will be one, the Iran war was so, so catastrophic and so economically damaging and seen as such a political distraction, and by certain key voter groups, a betrayal of Trump's 10-year campaign to keep us out of regime change wars in the Middle East, that Democrats are highly likely, in my opinion, to take both the House and the Senate. The, uh, states like Ohio, Iowa, that were considered, Alaska, that are considered safe Republican seats, will be proven otherwise come the fall. The Republicans' own internal polls show them down in Ohio, down in Iowa, down in Alaska, down in Georgia, down in Michigan. Now, here's another example. Michigan candidate that's likely to be nominated by the Democratic party, a candidate with, you know, whose name is like something, something Al-Sayed, you know, doesn't take you a genius to guess what his views are on Israel. He is the is using the, uh, Israel skepticism to rise through the Democratic party. And public opinion polls by third-party organizations and those not tied to either campaign find him doing better than anyone else against Mike Rogers. If Mike Rogers, like, they think Rogers will get a bunch of Jewish votes in the suburbs of Detroit, and this will lead, in fact, to success for the, uh, for the Republican candidate, Mike Rogers. What happens if he underperforms and underachieves again, like he did in 2024? And but this time to an overtly anti-Israeli candidate? That there will be a lot of Israel-related elections in the November elections that will signal America wants a divorce from Israel. And then the success of a third-party or independent candidate, uh, in 2028 or going forward, will depend on the degree to which the Republican and Democratic parties choose to be responsive to their voters. Republican parties have been begging voters have been begging for a peace dividend since the since the wall fell in Berlin and the Cold War ended. They were promised that by Poppy Bush. He lied. He didn't deliver. Promised by George W. Bush, he didn't deliver. Promised by Trump in his first term, and he mostly delivered. But Trump in his second term has has done exactly the opposite. Worse than even George W. Bush in many respects. This war is going to cost us at least a trillion dollars once you factor in all the direct and indirect costs, uh, over the next decade plus. Exactly the kind of war Trump said he would never ever fight, and he said somebody should be impeached for fighting. So if you, you look at all of that, and it's the, can the Republicans deliver? Can the Democrats deliver? Here you have a Democratic party where Israel has like a single-digit level approval with Bibi Netanyahu, and yet Chuck Schumer can't kiss up more to the Israel lobby. The, uh, you know, John Fetterman can't, you know, can't wait to kiss up to the Israel. These people are way out of touch. Uh, we've got a sort of arrogant, aristocratic, oligarchic class of our own here in the US. And it's not just the tech bros, but it's the, the folks pretending to be end-stage Roman Empire Senate where their big focus is what awards will they get from the latest foreign military adventure and can they get a few more slaves to work on their farms, on their growing estates that they never visit. We've got the same mindset in aspects of the United States Senate. But I think the electoral ramifications are will continue to be rippled through in the United States. And if the Republican and Democratic parties don't deliver to their core voter groups, what is, and particularly on issues like Israel and on foreign war, there will be a major third-party and independent candidate surge in the United States. Like there was with Ross Perot in 1992, like there was with Ralph Nader in 2000, like, as I think a good number of people have kind of forgotten, Robert Kennedy in 2024 being an independent candidate made the Republican party adopt MAGA as part of their campaign platform. Go further back. George Corley Wallace in 1968, her, uh, the, blank on his name, uh, who the other Wallace that who ran in 1948 along with Strom Thurman. The, you go further back, Huey Long was going to run for president as an independent candidate, 1936. The, uh, there's a long history of independent third-party candidacies, not always winning, but often changing the dialogue, changing the discussion, as the institutional parties adapt to try to win over that voter group, or in this case, just deliver the voter groups they've been betraying. And then the US and the UK tend to parallel one another. So you can go all the way back. The, the labor movement in the UK's Labor Party starts to surge at the same time the labor movement takes over the Democratic Party in the United States in the early 1930s, late 1920s. Same thing, you know, Winston Churchill loses office right after World War II. Well, so did the Democratic Party under Harry Truman in 1946, lost the House and the Senate right after World War II. You get, you look at people like Harold Wilson, for example, in the UK, look a lot like the technocratic Jimmy Carter style Democrats in the US. Then you get Margaret Thatcher in London one year before you get Ronald Reagan in America. You get John Major in the UK at the same time you get Poppy Bush in the US. You get Tony Blair in the UK at the same time you get Bill Clinton in the US. Then you get like the David Cameron types that are a lot like the Paul Ryan types. Then you get Brexit, which looks a lot like Trump. You get Jeremy Corbyn, looks a lot like Bernie Sanders. And what's happening in the UK? Labor Party's going to be gone. Starmer's already out, uh, with the next elections. Tories gone, Liberal Democrats gone. It's going to be the Green populist on the left and the Reform and Restore populist parties on the right. The US, uh, is it really that likely we suddenly divorce from the UK in terms of our political parallels and trends when we haven't in more than 100 years? So I think what you're seeing from Tucker Carlson is this is the future, and that future looks independent and different than anything we've seen for the last century in American party politics."
"Yeah. Yeah. Interesting. Thank you, Robert, for being with us today."
"Great pleasure as always."
"Absolutely. Glad to be here."
"Yeah. See you soon. Take care. Take care."