Transcription
Can China rise peacefully? And the simple answer is yes. With regard to the question whether can whether China can rise peacefully, I think the answer is no. And the end result will be that you'll get this intense security competition with a serious chance of war.
What you just heard was the opening exchange from a virtual debate held in May of 2020 between two intellectual heavyweights, Keshor Mabubani and John Mirshimer. 5 years later, as the reality of great power competition becomes ever more severe, we revisiting this debate is like opening a time capsule. It perfectly preserves two fundamentally opposed worldviews on the future of US-China relations.
In the content that follows, Professor Machbubani will argue from the perspective of Asian history and culture, explaining why China can rise peacefully. Professor Mirshimer, however, will counter with his signature cold-blooded realism, explaining why the US and China are inevitably headed for an intense security competition with a serious chance of war. This confrontation will extend from grand theories all the way to the real-world dilemma of Australia, the strategy of containment, and the dangerous flashpoint of Taiwan. This is a top-tier dialogue on the central conflict of our time. Let's continue.
Thank you very much. It's such a pleasure to be back with uh John and you uh in this discussion. Let me quickly answer your your two questions. Your first one is, can China rise peacefully? And the simple answer is yes. Because one point I emphasize in my book, Has China Won, is that we are entering a new era of world history. 200 years of Western domination of world history is coming to an end, and we're returning to the norm of the first 1800 years. From the year one to the year 1820, our two largest economies were always those of China and India. So we're going back to a different world. And remember that when China was dominant, uh, the number one power for most of 1800 years, China didn't conquer the world. China didn't go out like the British, the the French, uh, the Dutch, and the Spanish conquering colonies all over the world. Indeed, in the, I believe in the 15th century, they had the largest, most powerful navy under Admiral Chenhur. They went around the world. They didn't conquer any countries. So I think that's a very critical point to bear in mind. With just one minor qualification, and this is an important for an Australian audience: as China is rising and returning, it's important that we try to work with China rather than try to provoke China, and that's why managing the rise of China, uh, is very critical.
Your second question is, uh, can China win? And the question is, win what? So clearly, if you mean in terms of, can China become the world's largest economy, uh, I can confidently say yes. And you know, all that the Chinese have to do is achieve half the per capita income of the United States, and they will have an economy twice the size of the United States. Simple mathematics. But of course, if by "can China win," do you mean that China will step in and take over the role of the United States and try and dominate the world? Uh, I don't think China wants to do that. And as, as John Mirshimer, who's going to speak next, has brilliantly documented in his book, *The Great Delusion*, America fought a lot of unnecessary wars in the Middle East and elsewhere. This is something that China, I'm reasonably confident, is not interested in doing. It wants to focus on making China a great power, but not take over America's role in terms of managing the world.
Keshaw. Thank you, John. Welcome back to CIS and over to you. Thank you, Tom, for inviting me to be on the show. Uh, it's great to be back with you and also with my old friend Keshaw. Uh, I have very different views on these two questions than Keshor does. With regard to the question whether can whether China can rise peacefully, I think the answer is no. My basic view is that what China is going to do as it continues to rise economically is that it's going to translate that economic might into military might, and it's going to try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It's going to try to become a regional hegemon the way the United States is a regional hegemon here in the Western Hemisphere. My view is that China would be crazy not to try to dominate Asia because in a world where there is no policeman, no night watchman, it makes eminently good sense for a state to want to completely dominate its region. So I think that China will set out to do that. Of course, the United States does not tolerate peer competitors. The United States wants to remain the only regional hegemon in the world, and it therefore will go to great lengths to prevent China from dominating Asia. And the end result will be that you'll get this intense security competition with a serious chance of war.
With regard to the second question, we're very early in this competition. So it is hard to predict who's ultimately going to prevail. I think when you read Keshor's excellent book and you listen to him over the years, he thinks that the Chinese have the wind behind their back and that the United States is kind of like a dinosaur. Uh, I would not bet on that, Keshore. If I had to bet, I'd bet on the United States. The United States has taken on four potential peer competitors in its history: Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. The United States played a key role in putting all four countries, all four of those countries, on the scrap heap of history. The United States will go to great lengths to compete with China and to prevent it from dominating Asia. And when you look at, uh, the demographics of China and the United States, and you look at the economies of the two countries, I think that the United States is in better shape than China is. And for that reason, if I had to bet, I'd bet on the United States.
Well, John, thank you so much for that. And as you can tell here, John Mirshimer and Keshaw Mulbani clearly take different views on this question about whether China can rise peacefully and whether it's on the process of, uh, replacing America in terms of primacy in East Asia. Keshaw Mulbani, surely China's so-called wolf warrior diplomacy, that's no way to win allies to its cause.
Keshaw. Well, you know, Tom, I, I'm trying, I'll try to speak to you as a friend of Australia. Uh, at the same time, I'm aware of how politically charged the atmosphere in Australia is, how strong the feelings against China. And, and so it's very difficult, uh, now to speak up frankly, uh, on these things. But as a friend of Australia, I think it's important for Australians to grasp a few critical points. Number one, as I said, the, the era of Western domination of world history is over. And you're going to see the return of Asia. Now, Australia is not in Canada. Australia is in Asia. Now, as if all your neighbors have become to carefully, gradually adjust to this new world that is emerging, and you insist on not changing or adapting to your new geopolitical environment, you will be creating problems, uh, for yourself. And you know, there are some iron laws of geopolitics. In fact, many of them are spelled out in John Mirshimer's book, *The Great Delusion*. And I would say one of the iron laws of geopolitics is never pull the tail of a tiger. And at a time when the tiger is already angry, and lots of people are throwing stones at this tiger, you decide at that point in time to pull the, the tail of the tiger. So there, there's, there's some geopolitical wisdom in handling great powers carefully. This is, by the way, equally true, uh, of the United States too. If you're a neighbor of the United States, you just got to be careful in how you manage the United States. And, and as I think I read somewhere recently, John Mirshimer was saying in the book, how would the United States feel if suddenly Russians came in and established bases in Mexico and in, uh, Canada? And, and, and John wisely said that, of course, the United States will get very upset. So every country, and I agree with John here, that every country will worry about what's happening in its neighborhood. So, so Australia has got to be aware it's in the neighborhood and has got to develop a certain degree of geopolitical sensitivity, uh, to this new environment. And so that, so I, to put it very simply and very succinctly, Australia's got to reboot its entire strategic thinking and decide how it's going to adapt to a new world.
Well, following on from that, Keshaw, John Mirshimer, I mean, doesn't Keshaw have a point that we need to be geopolitically sensitive to the rising power of China? It is our largest trading partner. It accounts for nearly 40% of our export wealth. We are in Australia probably heading into our worst recession since certainly the Great Depression in the 1930s. Aren't we vulnerable to China's economic coercion? I mean, what can we do to push back against these kind of Chinese threats? Should we become more diplomatic and move slowly but surely into the Chinese sphere of influence?
John. Well, I have a different view of what's happening, uh, in Asia and in the world more generally than Keshaw. Keshaw tends to see the situation in what I would call civilizational terms. He, he sounds a lot like Sam Huntington, right? He talks about Asia rising and the West declining. And it's as if Asia were this unified entity. And that's just not the case at all. The Japanese live in mortal fear of the Chinese. And both the Japanese and the Chinese, the last time I checked, are in Asia. The Indians are worried silly about the rise of China. So within Asia, you have all these cleavages, and you have a large number of countries in Asia that are economically tied to China in all sorts of ways, as you described to Australia, but they also are strategically tied to the United States, and they're very fearful of China. I would say for those states, and this of course includes Australia, yes, you have economic interests that will push you to side with China, but you also have strategic interests that will push you to side with the United States. And the $64,000 question is, which way are you going to go? And the answer is, you're going to go with the United States. You're going to go with the Japanese, and you're going to do everything you can to contain China because it is big, and it is powerful, and it is threatening.
Well, uh, in other words, security trumps prosperity. Keshaw, how would you respond to John Mirshimer?
Keshaw. Security trumps prosperity. Uh, uh, by the way, uh, you know that John will be very surprised to discover that I agree with him, uh, quite a lot. And I certainly agree with you, John, that Asia is this large and diverse place. And I agree with you, John, that countries like Japan and India, South Korea, are all very worried about China's rise. In fact, I mean, certainly I'd be very, of course, if there was a, a small cat next to me that suddenly became a tiger, I'd be very worried too, you know, natural. So, but at the same time, I, I, I, I would encourage Australia to watch how other Asians deal with China. For a simp, simple example, which I think George Cannon would have endorsed: the first thing you do is don't insult a great power. Right. The Japanese are very concerned, but at the same time, you notice how the Japanese are trying to make sure that their relations with China remain on an even keel. Modi and Xi Jinping have spent more time with each other talking face to face than any two leaders have in recent times. So, everybody, yes, we have to deal with the new China. And Australia unfortunately has not accepted the fact that this is a different China that you have to deal with. And since every, and, and these adjustments, by the way, in Asia are very subtle, you know, very, very subtle changes going on. And I also want to emphasize, I agree with John that most of the countries in this region want the US to stay in this region. They would like to see a strong US presence, but they would like to see a very tactful, diplomatic US presence that doesn't force countries to choose. So you, it is possible actually to work out arrangements whereby you, China can rise, uh, peacefully, and we can all live in a relatively secure and stable environment.
And doesn't the Trump administration, John, complicate matters? As you well know, the United States have five security allies in the region: Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. It has security networks based throughout the Asia-Pacific. Um, and the US alliance has been very much the centerpiece of Australian foreign policy. Uh, but John Mirshimer, how does Australia respond to an ally that is, in the words of a mutual friend of all three of ours, Owen Harries, the distinguished foreign policy thinker who used to be a senior fellow here at CIS, how does Australia respond to an ally that is quote, inconsistent, chaotic, and championing insularity?
John. Well, let's take those words one by one. Championing insularity, that sort of implies isolationism, like the United States wants to leave the region. And I know from when I was in Australia in August of last year, this is August 2019, there are a number of Australian strategists who think the United States is not going to be there for Australia, that we're going home. That is not happening. There is absolutely no evidence that the United States is leaving East Asia. Uh, we're building up our military capabilities in northern Australia. We're increasing our patrols in the South China Sea. We're deploying more and more military forces to the region. We're not going away. The United States is bent on containing China. So on that dimension, there's no problem at all. The United States does behave in a quite ham-fisted way in foreign policy these days. And when you look at how the United States manages its relations, you look at the micro level at how the United States operates in East Asia today, it's quite clear that we're not doing a very good job. And I blame this mainly on the Trump administration. I think that will change as time goes by for two reasons: one, I think that Trump will not be president forever. And number two, I think as the Chinese threat becomes greater and greater, it will give the United States more and more incentives to behave in strategically smart ways. The problem we faced, Tom, and Keshaw, is that during the unipolar moment, we were so powerful compared to all the other states in the system that we could afford to behave in reckless ways because there were no real consequences because we were by far the most powerful great power in modern history. Well, that world has gone away. I think this is a point that Keshar and I agree on. With the rise of China, the United States is facing a potential peer competitor, and that will cause us, Tom, I think, to focus our minds and will begin to behave better or smarter at the micro level.
My guest is John Mirshimer from the University of Chicago. He's the author of, among other books, *The History of Great Power Politics*, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, published in 2001, revised issue came out in 2014. And Keshaw Mabulani, who joins us from Singapore. He's the author of *Has China Won or Has China Won?* and that is available at all good bookstores later in the month. Uh, Keshaw, let me follow on from John and his point there about American preeminence in the region. I think there's a, a consensus here between the two of you, uh, that the United States has badly mishandled relations with Russia and Europe more generally in the post-Cold War era. A ditto the Middle East in the post-9/11 era. It's badly damaged American credibility and prestige, but you both agree that America will remain a very powerful presence in East Asia. Keshaw, how do you respond to those folks, and they're not just the hawks in Washington or in Canberra? It's increasingly felt across Japan and South Korea, even in Europe, that China increasingly represents the number one strategic danger to the world. And moreover, the rest of the world must be less dependent on China for supply chains.
Keshaw. Uh, yes, I, I think it's, um, it's very reasonable to say, uh, you know, it's an old proverb: don't put all your eggs in one basket. And I would say yes, you have to certainly, uh, maybe reduce your reliance on China for, for economic production. I think that that's quite reasonable. But I want to emphasize, let's say, for example, take Japan. Japan is, as you know, Prime Minister Abe is spending some money to move Japanese investments outside China to ensure Japan. And then so where, where will he, where will your investment move? They'll move to, to ASEAN countries, to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand. But guess what? This Japanese investment will boost, uh, ASEAN's growth, and as ASEAN's economy grows, they will trade more with China. So it's not a zero-sum game that we are playing at the end of the day, uh, uh, on this, uh, economic sphere. And here I just want to, uh, come back to a critical point that, uh, John was, uh, making earlier about how you manage China in this transition process. And I actually want to recommend a book that John wrote called *American Diplomacy*, with a new foreword. And, you know, George Cannon gave very, very good advice. And John, correct me if I got the advice right, for how to manage China.
John. Sorry, Keshaw. I was just explaining for everyone that George Kennan, the intellectual architect of the Cold War doctrine of containment.
Keshaw. Yep, that's right. So, uh, you know, just very quickly, four pieces of advice: Number one, uh, your, your, your success will depend on your domestic spiritual vitality, what you do at home. Number two, cultivate friends and allies. Uh, number three, don't insult the Soviet Union because you got to deal with the Soviet Union. Number four, be humble. So, you know, frankly, if the United States of America applied George Kennan's advice at the beginning of the Cold War in the management of China, we would have a very different world, and we could manage the rise of China in such a way that our interests, whatever, whatever you call your interests, are not necessarily jeopardized. You can actually find ways and means of working with each other, and that's what we should be striving to do. I'm not saying you should court out China or jump at China's behest, but what you need to do is find intelligent ways and means of dealing with the new rising power.
Well, John Mirshimer, I mean, all the available public opinion polling evidence indicates that the Americans are increasingly anxious about China. Anti-China sentiments are rising. This is bipartisan, both Democrats and Republicans. Why, why can't America take Keshaw's advice and be humble and be, be more sensitive about China's, uh, uh, enhancing regional profile?
John. Because the United States cannot tolerate a situation where any great power dominates all of Asia or any great power dominates all of Europe. The United States has a rich history of contesting any country that tries to dominate its region of the world and become a peer competitor of the United States. From a realist point of view, and as you both know, I'm a realist par excellence. In an anarchic system where there's no higher authority, it's very important to be powerful. It's very important to be more powerful than the other states in the system because that's the best way to survive. The Chinese understand this intuitively. They understand it explicitly. They understand that during the century of national humiliation, the biggest problem was that they were weak. They didn't have much power. They intend to have lots of power. They want to dominate Asia. But we don't want them to dominate Asia. One thing that I think that Keshor and I disagree on is I think international politics is very much a zero-sum game. As China gains, we lose. As we gain, China loses. And this is one of the reasons I think the competition is so intense. Now, if I can just make one more point, Keshor, you keep talking about George Kennan. George Kennan was the father of containment. He was interested in containing the Soviet Union. I'm interested in containing China. George Kennan is at odds with you, and George Kennan and I are in the same way.
Keshaw. Well, I, I, I, I, I don't know. I mean, I'm sure you know him better than I do, but I, knowing him and his writings, he was also very shrewd and very realistic, as you know. He opposed the Iraq War, uh, that the US, uh, uh, blundered into. And I think he was, if he was alive today, if he's a, if he's a realist, and if you are a realist, you got to consider the first question is, is it realistic to think that you can contain China in the same way that you can that you contained the Soviet Union? Because China is an exact opposite, uh, of the Soviet Union. Because China actually, in anticipation, you're absolutely right, the Chinese, uh, want to want to become strong and dominant. They anticipated this containment strategy even 20, 30 years ago, and therefore made sure that all their neighbors traded more with China than they did with the United States. So you mentioned the five allies, uh, of the United States in in East Asia: South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Philippines, Australia. Unless I'm wrong, all five do more trade, uh, with China than they do with, uh, the United States. So it is, it is an absolute mistake to think that you can take, uh, some of the assumptions of the Soviet Union and apply them to, to China. Because China is, in many ways, and this is, of course, John will completely disagree with me on this, is a much more careful strategic player. So, for example, I agree that China will try to become the dominant power, but China will try to become the dominant power without using military means. It, the, the, and Henry Kissinger in his book on China describes how the Chinese believe that the best way to win a war, as Sun Tzu said, is without fighting it. So the Chinese will become more assertive, their influence will grow. But the thing to note about China is that as it is rising as a great power, it hasn't fought a major war in 40 years. It hasn't fired a bullet across its border in 30 years. So it's a very different animal that you're competing with than when you're dealing with the Soviet Union. So it's important to discard some of the previous methods if you want to deal with an assertive China.
If you just tuned in, you're at the Center for Independent Studies with me, Tom Switzer, and my guests are Keshaw Mabulani in Singapore and John M. Mirshimer in Chicago. Uh, and remember, if you'd like to ask a question to our esteemed guests, simply type your questions into the chat section. Speaking of which, we have a question here from Jennifer Lind in Illinois in the United States. Thanks, Jennifer, for tuning in. Uh, question for John Mirshimer: What spark would likely provoke hostilities with China? Can you please address the issue of Taiwan? Will China and the US go to war over Taiwan? One glance at the map would favor China in that question.
John. Well, I think there are three main, uh, hotspots in East Asia. One is the South China Sea, uh, where the Chinese are, uh, engaging in building, uh, islands and turning, uh, those small, uh, mounds of territory in the South China Sea into military bases. Uh, the second is Taiwan, and the third is the East China Sea, where there are these rocks that are contested between Japan on one side, uh, and China on the other. Those are the three hotspots in East Asia. I think the most likely place where you would get a war, uh, between the United States and China, where you would actually have shooting, is over the South China Sea. Uh, I think that, uh, it's also possible that you could have a war over those other two, uh, contingencies: one being Taiwan, two being the East China Sea. With regard to Taiwan, there's no question, uh, as Jennifer said in her question, that Taiwan is physically very close to the Chinese mainland, and it is roughly 6,000 miles from the California coast. So, as time goes by, it becomes more and more difficult for the United States to defend Taiwan. It's a very tough contingency. I think that if you look at the military balance in Asia, Tom, it favors the United States now, and this is true with regard to defending Taiwan. But as time goes by, and China becomes economically and militarily more powerful, it becomes increasingly difficult for the United States to defend Taiwan, to fight a conflict in the South China Sea or the East China Sea.
Keshaw. On that note, in Taiwan, last January, the pro-independence leaning Democratic Progressive Party of President Tsai Ing-wen, it was returned with an overwhelming landslide election, 58% of the vote, which is just astonishing. And most people believe that was widely seen as a repudiation of Beijing. Um, shouldn't Beijing take into account the widespread views of the Taiwanese people when they address this question of Taiwan, formerly known as Formosa?
Keshaw. Well, uh, you know, um, to answer that question, you have to know the history of how Taiwan became separated from China. And earlier on, John referred to the century of humiliation that China suffered. And as you know, during the century of humiliation, from 1842 to 1949, uh, the British came, forced China to accept opium, seized Hong Kong, seized territories in, in China, had settlements, and then, of course, the Japanese came and defeated the Chinese in 1895 and seized Taiwan. So Taiwan, the most important thing as far as the Chinese are concerned, is the last symbol of the century of humiliation that China has suffered. So I can tell you that if any, you, you talk of the people's sentiments, any Chinese leader who appears in the eyes of 1.4 billion people to be weak on Taiwan is toast because it's seen as the last symbol of what's happening. So you want to factor in the sentiments of people, be careful what you are doing to the sentiments of 1.4 billion people. But having said that, I also believe that there can be a peaceful solution, uh, to the Taiwan issue. And it's a simple case of live and let live. And as you know, paradoxically, the geopolitical space of Taiwan under President Ma Ying-jeou, they were allowed to participate in the World Health Organization, increase when the Taiwanese didn't have a government that wants to push for any kind of independence. But the minute the Taiwanese government tries to push for independence, its geopolitical space shrinks. So if you really want to help the people of Taiwan, and I want to help the people of Taiwan, at the end of the day, the Taiwanese have got to be realistic and realize that there are, you know, 193 countries in the world, right? Apart from a few states that recognize Taiwan, none of the major states are going to recognize Taiwan. And you know, Taiwan's fate was sealed in 1979 when the United States derecognized Taiwan and recognized China as the government. So once that happened, that's when history turned the corner. So it's a difficult issue, but the, the, the best way we can help the people of Taiwan is try not to politicize the issue, and that will give them more space in the geopolitical environment.
What we have just witnessed is a profoundly deep head-on collision between two worldviews on the future of the US and China. Professor Machbubani's core thesis is that China is fundamentally a civilization that prefers to win a war without fighting it, and that its rise can be managed peacefully through wiser and more culturally sensitive diplomacy. Professor Mirshimer, however, mercilessly rebuts that international politics is a zero-sum game. He argues that any rising great power will inevitably seek hegemony, and the incumbent power will inevitably seek to contain it at all costs because security always trumps prosperity.
This debate took place in May of 2020. 5 years later, as we look back on this exchange, it leaves us with several even more urgent questions to reflect on. First, have the past 5 years validated Makbubani's belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence through diplomatic wisdom, or have they instead confirmed Mirheimer's prophecy of an inescapable tragic destiny of great power conflict? Second, for countries like Australia, caught between the US and China, is there truly a middle path of not choosing sides, or is Mirheimer's assertion, "you're going to go with the United States," the only realistic outcome? And finally, and most critically, in the face of this increasingly tense world, should we trust in what Machbubani represents: a faith in human reason and cultural difference? Or must we accept the cold reality that Mirsheimer reveals: a world governed by power and fear?
We are eager to hear your thoughts in the comments below. If you believe this top-tier intellectual exchange has provided valuable insight into the central conflict of our era, please like this video and subscribe to our channel. Thank you for watching.