Transcription
So what happens? You have a hotel, and the hotel has a doorman. Okay? And then they bring in like Accenture or somebody, and Accenture go, "How much do you pay a doorman?" You go, "Costs, you know, X thousand a year." "We're going to define the role of the doorman as opening the door, and we're going to replace him with an automatic door opening mechanism. So we've effectively automated the process, and therefore you're going to be saving £60,000 a year once you've paid for our custom automatic door opening mechanism."
And what we're doing all over the world is we're practicing micro-efficiencies which lead to macro-inefficiencies. Let me explain, because the actual role of the doorman goes way beyond opening the door. It's recognition, it's status, it's security. It's sharing gossip with other doormen about dodgy things that have been happening. It's hailing taxis, it's, you know, opening taxi doors. It's doing loads and loads of things. In fact, opening the door is a relatively trivial part of the doorman's job.
That's Rory Sutherland. It's difficult to define Rory. He's part adman, part marketer, part philosopher, part author. But one common thread along all of those definitions is creativity. Rory comes up with creative ideas, and he builds creative teams. So I asked him, "How does he do it?"
Well, first point I'd make is that it worries me enormously that almost outside of a few R&D departments and a few think tanks and so forth, the only people who are paid to generate ideas are working in creative departments. Okay? The only people whose specialism is ideation and original thought, outside the field of art and music and so forth, okay, in the business world and in the governmental world. It also frightens me that these people are usually left to the end of the process.
Because the value of creativity is partly in solving unknown problems, okay? But the greater part of the value of creativity is in actually spotting out opportunities. And if you're only allowed to work to a brief, which is how we currently work in an advertising agency, the opportunity-spotting role of creativity is completely missed. Okay? Because your problems are a very small subset of solving known and visible problems. Is a very small subset of available opportunities.
Most companies ask for creative marketing and advertising, but only at the end of the process. It's rare to come across a product that applies creativity earlier in the process. Sony Walkman, for example, sold their waterproof headphones in a bottle of water. That's pretty rare. Or Kiwi brewer, Montif, sold their cider in cans packed with apple tree twigs with a message saying, "Sorry for the twigs," to showcase how fresh the cider was. That's pretty rare as well. That type of upstream creativity hardly happens.
And Rory thinks he knows why. Let me explain. Okay, one of the worst things that's happened since the invention of the spreadsheet is that employees are not just accountable as teams or as groups, as departments. They're accountable as individuals. Now, you'd say that's a good thing, wouldn't you? And mostly it possibly is. I don't know, depends what kind of work you're doing. But if you want those individuals to be creative, it's a catastrophe.
Now, let me explain why. Okay, let's say you're a plumber and you want to try a different way of marketing your plumbing company. Okay? And it has a possible upside, let's say a 20% upside of 50% in earnings if it succeeds. And the downside is a, let's say, a 20% chance of a 20% downside in earnings, right? You're not going to take that risk, right? Are you? Why not? Because 20% of the time, you'd basically be on the breadline for a year.
Now, let's imagine you're a plumbing company. Okay? And you say, "What you do intelligently?" Bees do the same thing with the waggle dance. And ignoring the waggle, they, they have the same effect of sort of risk profile. Okay? What you say is, "Okay, one of the plumbers will try that experiment." Right? In the 20% chance that he fails, we'll all share the downside, which means that we'll each take a hit of 2%, which is easily affordable. Okay? Right.
Now, in the event that the plumber succeeds, we'll all copy his methodology. And that means actually, it's not just a 20% increase in earnings across the 10 of us, it's, it's effectively two salaries for a plumber. Okay? The upside, because we all follow this thing the following year, and we're all 20% richer, that is 20% uptimes 10. Whereas the downside is 20% downtimes 1. Now, that is a massive asymmetry which only works if you have risk pooling. And I think this demand of the nerds and the finance people and the accountants and the calculators that every single person washes their own face is completely at odds with the ability to exploit that fundamental asymmetry.
Now, if you look at it in terms of bees, you have... I'm really sorry to people who listened to me before because I always end up telling the story, but it's important because bees have been around for 20 million years, so they presumably know what they're doing if we don't up for them, okay? Now, before Rory shares this lesson on bees and creativity, I'll just explain the waggle dance, as it's a term Rory uses a lot. The waggle dance is a figure-of-eight dance that honeybees do when they find new flowers containing nectar and pollen. By performing this dance, the bees can share information about the flowers with the rest of the colony. Crucially, however, the colony relies on some bees who ignore this waggle dance and go off on their own path.
Here's why. 20% of bees, hugely varies, but let's just take that, ignore the waggle dance, right? And their purpose is to have a high chance of a failed journey, but a small chance of a massive, wait for it, sharable upside. Now, you can only tolerate the rogue bees, the 20% of bees who don't, the bees who obey the waggle dance. The algorithm is pretty simple, okay? You optimize pollen, you optimize, you minimize energy expenditure, maximize collection of pollen, nectar, and some other resin. I think they collect, they may collect water as well, but, okay, maximize value of collection, minimize energy expended in doing so. Very, very simple algorithm, okay? And it's very simple to quantify and so forth. And if you had kind of bee accountants, they get that bit of the hive right, okay? If bees had accountants, which mercifully they don't, which is probably why they've survived for 20 million years, okay? They get that 80% right. They get, they basically get a formula. And it would be, "Hey, what are you doing? You know, the waggle clearly said you should go over here."
It's actually very clever, by the way, because the bees, if they've discovered, if they have information about a better pollen find, they do the waggle dance for longer. Now, that's not because the bees notice how long the waggle dance is. They don't have to stand there with a stopwatch. It's simply, if you dance for a long time, a lot of bees notice your dance. And if you dance for a short time, only a few bees notice your dance. So they have this relationship between length of dance and quality of, um, of nectar source, okay? Really clever, the automatic sort of correcting feedback loop, if what I mean, okay?
Now, the reason you need the, the waggle bees is for adaptability, resilience, and the chance of getting lucky, okay? All lots of other reasons other than optimizing instantaneous efficiency, which is what accountants try and do. Optimize short-term efficiency as if it's a proxy for effectiveness. It's not, okay? It's a proxy for effectiveness in one part of the hive, but it's not a very good proxy for the random bees, because their value is in requiring dependent on them occasionally making major and significant discoveries of new sources on maybe 1% of journeys. And that's, and in capital letters, and when they do so, sharing that information with the rest of the hive. So the explore information makes its way to the exploit bees. It's known in, in an algorithm as the explore-exploit trade-off. It occurs in animal foraging, it occurs in algorithm design. It's almost a kind of law of life that there is a trade-off between discovering what you don't know and exploiting what you do, what you already do, okay?
Now, I think what we've done is, by saying that every bee has to justify every journey, we've actually destroyed a large part of the resilience and the growth capacity of companies. Now, having said that, it's absolutely vital that, it's absolutely no use if the explore bees go off and keep it to themselves. Now, the problem is, is that marketing is really the, a large part of marketing, along with R&D and a few other functions, are the explore part of the organization. But they're downstream from the decisions made elsewhere, just as they are in government, okay? Do, do, do governments often say, "Okay, we've got a problem with pensions. Let's call in a load of marketing guys. We've got a problem with setting the tax rate. Let's talk to some people who work in retail." They do not do that. They talk to economists, they talk to lawyers, and they talk to nobody else. And then eventually, the marketing person or the R&D person or the inventor is presented with a fait accompli, okay? Because the problem's been defined in economic terms, so it can only be solved in economic terms. And the marketer gets to add a little bit of magic fairy dust, a little bit of icing on the cake. And that's all they're allowed to do. They're not allowed to design the fundamental program because that's not how it works. The accountants and the lawyers get there first. And that's a fundamental problem because what you're doing is you're effectively taking away the potency of the random bees, which is actually to suggest things upwards, not to take briefs downwards. And that's probably 80% of the value actually comes from that.
The problem, according to Rory, is that too few of us in organizations are explorers. Too few of us are ignoring the waggle dance and attempting to find new opportunities. And this isn't just a marketing problem. He thinks it's an issue for all individuals within a business, including customer-facing staff.
This is, by the way, what has happened with the very bad optimization of customer service. Customer-facing staff are now so individually monitored, okay? They're incapable of using any initiative. All they can do is follow rules. And so conversations with customer-facing staff are often useless because the value of customer service is in the ability to extemporize.
I'll give you an example of this, okay? So I had two successive failures of delivery to an Amazon locker. And I'm certainly not criticizing Amazon, they're very good at this by and large, okay? So when they, when the second time they tried to deliver to my local locker and said that they couldn't gain access to it, they then said, "We're going to try again tomorrow." And I said, "I don't want you to try again tomorrow because the same shit is going to happen all over again, and I'm getting sick of this. Can you just deliver to one of seven other lockers or five other pickup points in Sevenoaks? Because I don't care what I pick it up from, right? I just chose this locker arbitrarily. Go and deliver it to another locker." "No, we can't do that." Okay? So customer service is deteriorating because the constraints within which the people are operating are insufficient to handle any unusual requests.
And, you know, great hotels, you know, understand this. And you've got to be a pretty expensive hotel, but they actually allow the staff to extemporize and solve problems in a way that's specific to the situation. And the urge to turn every flaming thing into an algorithm is actually destroying businesses. You know, because I, I mean, I had, I had an insurance claim. I had a detached retina in Switzerland, had to claim on my credit card insurance, health insurance, this sort of premium credit card, okay, for overseas eye operation. Okay? The act of getting the insurer to pay the hospital in Switzerland, I delegated this, I have to confess, not for sexist reasons, because I hate bureaucracy, I delegated to my wife, who's better at it. Getting the claim paid probably involved 36 hours of work on our part. The reason it turned out, after 36 hours of back and forth, okay, was that the insurer couldn't pay the hospital unless the hospital invoiced the insurer, and the hospital was currently invoicing us. Now, that could have been solved in a 20-second phone call, practically. Okay? But because, because, because of these utterly stupid bureaucracies we're creating. So we, we create these businesses, okay, which are huge, optimized to do one thing. Now, the problem is, that most things aren't, don't follow the absolutely strict opt, or at least frequently things do not follow the optimal path that's been designed by the process designers. And the second you deviate from that process in one way, because something goes slightly wrong, okay, it's, you know, it's not just that you go off-piece, you hit a tree. And what, what this is, it's a consequence of the same thing, which is of dividing a person and a role and applying the two. You know, you know, my thing about the, what I call the, um, the doorman fallacy, do you, which I mentioned just in passing as kind of offhand, off-the-cuff remark when I was writing my book, and it kind of went viral. And I'll just explain it, if to the poor listeners who have heard this before, you can press forward 30 seconds or four, six seconds.
So what happens? You have a hotel, and the hotel has a doorman. Okay? And then they bring in like Accenture or somebody, and Accenture go, "How much do you pay a doorman?" You go, "Costs, you know, X thousand a year." And actually, we've got to have three of them because they work on shifts, or two of them, or something like that, right? Okay, right. Well, we're going to define the role of the doorman as opening the door, and we're going to replace him with an automatic door opening mechanism. So we've effectively automated the process, and therefore you're going to be saving £60,000 a year once you've paid for our custom automatic door opening mechanism, which is probably a partnership between the consulting firm and the hardware manufacturer, in which some other money changes hands, but we'll, we'll, we'll, we'll, we'll kind of, we'll kind of forget about that, shall we, for the moment. What you've done, okay, is that great, because it's short-term, it's, it's micro-efficient, but macro-inefficient. And what we're doing all over the world is we're practicing micro-efficiencies which lead to macro-inefficiencies. Let me explain, because the actual role of the doorman, as not narrowly defined, is goes way beyond the value of a doorman. He's a Chesterton's fence. Goes way beyond opening the door. It's recognition, its status, its security. It's sharing gossip with other doormen about dodgy things that have been happening. It's hailing taxis, it's, you know, opening taxi doors. It's doing loads and loads of things. In fact, opening the door is a relatively trivial part of the doorman's job.
But what you want is you want a doorman who can extemporize, a doorman with agency, who can make judgments. And what you do in defining the role to make it effectively susceptible to automation, which is what most tech people do, they define every person's function in a way that makes it most, um, uh, readily amenable to being automated or being reduced to an algorithm or being reduced to code. Okay? And as a consequence of that, what you destroy is 70% of the value of the doorman is his ability to make judgments as to what he should be doing at any given moment. And so you get rid of the doorman and you replace him with an automatic door. You think that's a brilliant cost saving. Everybody pats themselves on the back. And then two years later, the hotel rack rate's fallen out of, you know, fallen off a cliff. There's a vagrant asleep in the doorway. And your most regular customers who really liked Bob don't feel the same compulsion to stay at your hotel that they did when Bob said, "Hello, Mr. Sutherland, how are you doing?"
By optimizing for micro-efficiencies, we're gaining macro-inefficiencies. To make a flight cheaper, we pack it with more passengers, but this makes it more uncomfortable and worse than a slightly more expensive yet roomier plane. To increase speed of service, we replace supermarket checkout staff with touchscreens, but we now pack our own bags, we forget to swipe our loyalty card, and we wait far longer to prove our age when buying alcohol. Any improvements in speed are probably offset by a worsening experience. Wherever you look, you see Rory's finding playing out: micro-efficiencies leading to macro-inefficiencies. And I asked him why he thinks this is happening.
The point there is that we're trying, in attempting to do a kind of Ian McGilchrist left-brain reductionist, reduce everything to its constituent parts job for the purposes of looking scientific and quantifiable, we're destroying the value that's actually created by the whole. So the ultimate, if you take behavioral science, I think the ultimate, or one of the ultimate, kind of "who's the daddy?" question answers the daddy is to some extent Ian McGilchrist. Because you have the, the two parts of the brain, the left part is absolutely, doesn't really understand wholes. It reduces everything to individual components. And it's a necessary part of the brain for us to function. But what's happened is that the left side of the brain has been boosted by technology in its influence and in its ability to make confident decisions at the expense of the right part of the brain, which tends to be holistic, poetic, you know, metaphorical, etcetera. Okay? The right part of the brain is also, also the bit that actually imagines things, whereas the left part of the brain derives things from what already is. It's the right part of the brain that does the "what if?" and it's the left part of the brain that does the "what is?" Broadly speaking, you could say that the McGilchrist problem doesn't just exist within the human brain itself, but actually also exists that there's a kind of collective version of it.
Rory's point is that organizations have become left-brain focused. They care solely about data, numbers, metrics, KPIs, and they largely ignore creativity. This, of course, has some benefits, but Rory reckons companies would be better off by balancing analytical thinking with creative thinking. And one way he thinks companies could do this is by embracing failures.
You have to tolerate, you have to understand. A book I'd recommend here is "Thinking in Bets" by Annie Duke. What's the potential upside? What's the asymmetric upside? What's the downside? Now, I mentioned with the plumber experiment that, look, if that, if the plumber's discovery is specific to him, the 20% up, 20% down risk isn't worth taking. If, on the other hand, the upside is transferable and the downside only applies to a single year and to a single plumber, then you should definitely do that experiment. And his plumber colleagues should basically underwrite the costs of his experiment. Right? That's a clear asymmetry which we can spot.
Now, you might argue, okay, case of asymmetry is, if I'm Procter & Gamble, and I'm doing some advertising or doing a marketing idea or a new product development idea for Tide, which is 70% of the US detergents market. It's, it's, it's the Colgate of the American laundry world, okay? Right. I, I'm going to be pretty effing cautious because the downside is a hell of a lot bigger than the upside, okay? You need a pretty major, because, you know, there's a limit to often people going to wash their clothes. In fact, what I'd probably concentrate there on, if I were them, is actually category growth. There's a rumor, not necessarily true, that it was Unilever or possibly P&G which introduced dress-down Fridays in the UK because they realized that if people wore chinos and like, uh, sweatshirts rather than suits, they'd end up doing more laundry because you dry-clean suits and you launder chinos or jeans, okay? There's always been a rumor that it was a, I doubt it personally, but, um, nonetheless, it's, it's an interesting kind of, uh, urban myth. You know, you might concentrate just on getting category growth. How can we get people to launder more clothes? Or indeed, environmental subjects like getting people to wash at a lower temperature.
On the other hand, you have Old Spice. Right? Now, Old Spice is a sort of great brand which everybody remembers, but it's dying now. There, you could say, well, actually, the worst thing we could do with Old Spice is incremental 3% improvement, right? Because all it does is it keeps this brand alive below the level at which it's worth giving it major support, and it just basically prolongs the inevitable, you know, the inevitable demise in seven years' time. So with Old Spice, you want to do a high-variance thing, kill or cure.
So doctors would understand this instinctively, right? If you've got a patient who might die, you try anything, okay? Because what's the worst that happens? They die a little bit earlier, okay? Maybe they die a little bit less painfully, okay? What's the best thing that can happen? They survive. So you try everything, right? Big asymmetric outcome. On the other hand, if you have a patient, now, if you're doing a tendon operation on, on Lewis Hamilton, okay, or on that Dutch guy who seems to be winning everything, Verstappen, isn't it? Yeah, right, okay? You don't want to, you don't want to make a mistake, right? That is not the time to try experimental surgery.
So the other thing we need to understand, and I think bees probably understand it, is that you need to have, it'd be very interesting to study this in more depth, actually, you know, the extent to which you experiment depends on the upside, the downside, and the chronological commitment involved.
Now, I'm going to share with you a great phrase from Jeff Bezos because I've got some friends who work at Amazon, and I always slightly milk them for Amazon oddities because Amazon has a very eccentric, I would imagine actually seriously bloody annoying, but very interesting internal culture. So that every meeting starts with a one or two-page document, and before anybody speaks, you have to sit down and read that document front to back before anybody can start talking about what they saw on TV last night. Drives me insane, say, okay, I'm not good at silence. You know, they're best of times. Jeff has a phrase which they use on Amazon, it's a two-way door. And a two-way door is a door that you can walk back through if you don't like what you saw at the other side. And a one-way door is a commitment which is irreversible. And what Jeff Bezos noticed is that people don't really distinguish between the two, and they demand the same level of analytical proof, justification, market research, business plan, business case proof for a two-way door as they do for a one-way door.
Now, a one-way door, you need a hell of a lot of evidence because that's irreversible, okay? A two-way door is something which, it's not, there's no point in arguing it to death because you might as well try it and see what happens, because if it doesn't work, you just stop doing it. Now, a plumber might have a two-way door, which is, I can try this thing, not for a whole year, I can try it for three weeks. Now, a plumber could afford to lose 20% of three weeks' salary in discovering it. If, in the event of the success, the upside, he actually had 49 weeks of remaining upside to profit from the remaining upside. So that's, that's a chronological asymmetry, right? Okay.
Now, the most interesting thing I heard on the street, okay, is that Amazon Web Services basically came out of the two-way door argument. Which is, someone had the idea, the business case wasn't that brilliant, and everyone was arguing it to death. And Jeff, or someone similar, said, "I don't understand why we're arguing about this. It's a two-way door. We've got to invest in server capacity, we've got to invest in bandwidth, right? We've got to spend this money anyway, just to be Amazon. So if we can sell this to somebody else, all well and good. And if we can't, well, we've just bought a load of kit we need anyway. So what's the downside? It's a two-way door. Go with it." It's, of course, the most profitable thing they do.
There are two types of failures: one-way door failures that can't be undone, and two-way door failures that can be undone. These are very different, yet rarely distinguished between. We often don't ask ourselves if an opportunity is a two-way door or not, but we should. Marketers should test a radical new strategy for a month because if it fails, they can just switch back. Pubs should try offering daytime co-working spaces to boost daytime revenues. If it fails, they can simply remove the offer. And Amazon should create a cloud service platform because even if no one buys it, they'll just use it themselves. If you find a two-way opportunity, you should probably take it.
The problem is, too few companies feel comfortable making these decisions, partly due to a psychological bias that Rory introduced me to: the Abilene paradox.
One of them would be what's called the Abilene paradox, where people go along with something that they don't want to go along with themselves because they believe falsely that everybody else wants to do it. Okay? So you could actually get a kind of collective delusion that's called the Abilene paradox. And by the way, I thought that was a reason for Brexit, okay? Which is that it was perfectly possible that the European Union would go, "Ugh," in defense of the people who voted. I voted Remain, okay, just so I can keep my job, okay? But I did not think the people who voted Leave were irrational for a very simple reason which no one factored in. Okay? Which is they believed, I think correctly, that this was the only opportunity you would ever get in your entire lifetime for Britain to leave the EU, because it was so heavily contested and the political and bureaucratic class were disproportionately in favor of the European project. They spotted the fact there was a disconnect between the governmental class who tend to love those kind of international things and have absolutely naive faith in things like gains to scale, which I'm very skeptical about. I think gains to scale are actually only apply in particular circumstances. And there are also losses to scale which don't get an autonomy, which don't get factored in. Most company mergers fail, let's be honest. So let's, let's not be absolutely naive about the, um, benefits of scale. But if you believe that there was a, that we'd end up signing up to the Euro or committing to something irreversible, and that this was the only chance. So the people weren't voting to leave the European Union in 2016, they were voting to avoid being in what the European Union might have become by 2035, let's imagine.
Okay, you've got a load of, um, friends, and you're, you're planning to go on holiday with them. You know, you're all going on a big family holiday. We're going to rent a big villa. And it turns out that nine of your 12 friends are massive fans of Bavarian Oompah music, okay? And they have plans to turn the villa, the villa holiday into, you know, a massive kind of poker fest. All right? Six months before you go on that holiday, when it comes time to pay the deposit, in other words, your only chance of getting out, you're going to go, "Yeah, okay." You could have got a Remain vote very simply by simply saying that there's an absolute guarantee that if, you know, that if, basically, 50% of the population for a certain period of time in opinion polls want to leave the European Union, we'll have another referendum. The reason 5, 10, 15, 20% of people voted Leave was on the precautionary principle. It wasn't because they wanted to leave the European Union as it was in 2016. It was because they were terrified of what it could become by 2032, okay? And by the way, the reason old people were likely to do that was not all that surprising, because I'm old enough to remember the first referendum in which it was absolutely stated that this was not a political project. It was purely involving the trade of goods. And we're told it's just a market. There's nothing political about it. Okay? And then that was basically a lie, okay?
Now, if you've been lied to once, okay, the idea that this project, like all bureaucracies, might actually take on a life of its own and effectively just feed on the public, something that, you know, bureaucracies are highly self-interested organizations. So being, you know, I mean, yeah, 90% of, I was joking about this in advertising, 90% of account people, advertising account people voted Remain. And I go, "Well, that's really surprising, isn't it? That account people are in favor of large, um, uh, you know, multi-level extractive bureaucracies, because it's pretty much your stock in trade if you're an advertising account person." So my point is that, that once you get into collective decision-making, all signs of things appear.
Now, there's the famous Daniel Kahneman story, which I think is in "Thinking, Fast and Slow," which is one of the most interesting things in the book, and nobody ever talks about it. And it's about that he goes to a very large multinational, which we suspect might be GE, but we're not quite sure. And he goes around the boardroom table and he talks to the, to all of the heads of the eight separate GE divisions. And he says, "I can offer you a decision which, if you take it, has a 50% chance of increasing your profits and revenue by 50% next year, and a 30% chance of reducing your profits and revenue by 30% next year. Would you take those odds?" And all but two of the eight people said no. And he said, "Well, average, it's a good decision." And I said, "Yeah, I know, but 30% of the time, I'd lose my job. So I'm not going to take that decision." And then the chief executive, of course, is sitting at the end of the table. He goes, "What do you mean? I'd want all of you to take those odds, because in aggregate, okay, in aggregate, four of you would be 50% up, okay? Um, what I say 30%? Okay, two or three of you would be 30% down, and the rest would be the same. We make an absolute fortune next year in total. Admittedly, the shape of the company would be different, but, you know, my bonus would be sensational. If you all took those odds, when you spread risk widely, if, if you don't do it, well, you don't make it thinner."
Now, in the case of the plumber, what you're doing is you're making that risk thinner, because it's only a 2% downside, not a 20% downside, because the risk is shared amongst 10 people. When you make the risk fall exclusively on the plumber, okay, and you do the same for every other plumber, that any experiment you have, you have to suffer the downside costs. What you've done is you've destroyed teamwork. You've destroyed the very purpose of having a team in the first place. And you, you've spread the risk wider without making it thinner, which means that risk aversion basically increases.
Rory, in his typical style, has covered an awful lot today. We have heard the simple way we could have avoided Brexit. We've heard how doormen were undervalued. We've figured out what bees can teach us about creativity, and we've learned about Amazon's two-way door policy. It is always wonderful to hear Rory walk through the topics, but we weren't done. We did record one short bonus episode covering much, much more, including how to boost productivity, whether working from home works, and the effect of women joining the workforce. To get access to this bonus episode, all you have to do is click the link in the show notes and enter your email address. Once you do, you'll be sent straight to the bonus episode. So if you are keen to hear more from Rory and want to hear his fairly surprising thoughts on working from home, you can do so by clicking the link in today's show notes and adding your email.