التلفزيون العربي | وثائقي هزيمة 1967 الجزء الأول

[Music] [Music] 50 years have passed since the June War of '67. The June War of '67, one of the shortest wars in human history and the shortest ever among Arab-Israeli wars. But its results and repercussions still govern the course of life, not only in the region. 50 years, and a near end to the geopolitical situation it left behind does not seem to be on the horizon, as it has become more complex and convoluted. It marked a turning point in the history of the region's countries and their peoples, and placed the central issue of Palestine and the prospects for its resolution on a completely different path. This opportunity is parallel to what surrounds the occupying state and its project. The internal local situation resulting from the occupation and its continuation forms its central axis. The political situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at that time was not an organized situation, nor was it prepared for any event. Rather, people were wandering aimlessly, looking for the language of bread. The Arab countries were not concerned with developing the economic conditions of the people, whether in Palestine or outside Palestine. Life in the Golan was the life of farmers, peasants. But we interacted with the events happening in the region here as children of an area with constant tension, with a military presence, with the possibility of fighting, with that. This is how we interacted with events, but in our general life, we were farmers. [Music] Farmers. The Palestinian society in the 1948 Nakba collapsed, an unimaginable and significant collapse. In '47, a collapse also occurred. Jerusalem, over 19 years between '48 and '67, regained some of its status. Tourism flourished, trade flourished, and construction also flourished. There were also signs of a literary movement and a movement in fine arts. There was a cultural life, there was a social life. But when the defeat of '67 came, it destroyed all of this. Egyptian society gave the Nasserist regime at that time a degree of societal legitimacy. This legitimacy was based on the idea of presenting results, or that the regime achieved somewhat good economic and social results. At the same time, human dignity and human freedom were lacking in Egypt. The Egyptian citizen or the Egyptian people did not imagine that this great leader and this strong regime, with its philosophy based on supporting liberation movements and confronting colonialism and the Zionist project, would be defeated in this way. [Music] The Israeli public lives in its state, which has doubled its Jewish population twice in the first ten years, from 600,000 in '47. During the fifties, a million Jews came from Arab countries alone, including my family. This completely changed the image of Israel. More importantly, Israel assumed it would go to war again, so it mobilized all its capabilities to build a strong military apparatus. [Applause] [Music] [Music] The Zionist project cannot continue without expansion and without acquiring land. This war was prepared in advance, like the '48 war and like most wars. These are offensive wars, not defensive wars. This is contrary to what is common in Western literature and in the Zionist discourse, that this war was initiated by the Arabs at that time. The Israeli vision is that which Ze'ev Jabotinsky established. His intellectual foundations. Jabotinsky spoke of Israel as an iron wall behind which are enemies, but they cannot demolish it. [Music] The Zionist movement brings together different peoples, different ethnicities, different civilizations, within the framework of gathering them on the land of Palestine, within the framework of a state, so that the Zionist movement can gather and build a situation that also requires land without the population. The entire project is based on racist thinking, and therefore, by its nature, Zionism needs to bring people, needs space for them, needs more people, needs more land. This will provoke human rights, it will provoke a reaction, it will anger the Arabs, it will anger the Muslims. Israel must always be Zionist, superior to the combined armies of all Arab countries. It is known that the 1948 war ended against the will of the Zionist movement, which wanted to establish a Jewish state on the entire area of historical Palestine. Therefore, from 1949 to 1967, there was constant thinking about occupying more areas of Palestine so that the project would encompass all of historical Palestine. This is what distinguishes the fifties and sixties. Investing billions upon billions in armament, based on the premise of inevitable war. Even after this war, the parties still need strong armies. [Music] Very much. We want to tell you the truth in all the details that concern you, as we see them. As I told you, it is our duty, especially in matters related to war and peace. The whole world was listening to what Nasser wanted to say, what he wanted to say. The whole world was taking into account the Egyptian model that Gamal Abdel Nasser was able to create, to create a central state in this region that has its value and its stature and represents a difficult number on the regional and international map. This model had to be struck by the '56 war. Nasser, after '56, emerged stronger than he was before '56. He became an Arab case that transcended the individual country and the Egyptian state, and this case became popular and represented something to the Israeli and Zionist leaderships. Therefore, striking Nasser was one of the goals of the '67 war. He considered the conflict with Israel part of the conflict with imperialism and considered it a foreign and abnormal body in the region. He even rarely used the term "State of Israel," but mostly used the term "so-called Israel" or "the Zionist entity." He did not give any weight to Israel itself, and this also had an impact on his understanding of the war and what happened. The company's funds and rights were frozen in the Arab Republic of Egypt and abroad. He was the most prominent leader of anyone else, and many Arab leaders followed him, from Gaddafi to Salah Jadid in Syria. Nasser's political discourse was a mixture of blessing on the one hand and curse on the other. Why do I say curse? Because he became a prisoner of his words. Nasser was committed to comprehensive struggle against Israel in the sixties. The criticism he faced from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab parties was that he talked a lot about struggle against Israel but did nothing. The Arab situation was not pleasing. There were tensions and accusations. The military atmosphere was tense, and the political atmosphere was also tense. Political terms and phrases began to appear in the designations. Some called themselves "developed countries" and accused others of being backward and reactionary. This was particularly directed at monarchical regimes. There were two major currents in the Arab world at that time: a current represented by Nasser and the revolutionary and progressive forces that opposed colonialism, and another current represented by some other Arab countries, which Nasser called the reactionary current. There was a شبه cold war between these two currents. The progressive camp included countries whose regimes were primarily republican, meaning they were close to each other, even if there were misunderstandings between them at times. The camp they called "America's Arabs," meaning Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and the Kingdom of Morocco. This, of course, led to constant conflicts between the progressive camp and this camp associated with America. Jordan always had a state of anxiety about its pivotal position on the borders of the Zionist entity and the borders of old Palestine, and among a group of Arab countries, which kept it in a state of constant political anxiety. This pushed it to adopt some policies that might preserve its existence. The progressive camp was a camp that threatened their kingdoms, so they stood against it by all means. Egyptian intervention in Yemen to support the nascent Yemeni revolution in '62 would not have reached this magnitude and this protractedness, which lasted longer than it should have and took more effort, time, resources, and money than it should have, were it not for Saudi intervention against the Egyptian presence supporting the Yemeni revolution. King Faisal, fearing that this revolutionary tide led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Arab world would spread to the Kingdom, took the initiative to stand against the Egyptian presence or Egyptian aid to Yemen and cooperated with many international and regional intelligence agencies to resist or fight Egypt. But despite all these circumstances, the Israeli danger was what united the Arabs, despite their differences. Our armed forces are capable of carrying out their duty with honor, strength, and security. Both sides talked all the time about another round. The authentic side talked about an additional military confrontation, and the Arab side as well. The pace of this talk accelerated from the late fifties, specifically when His Majesty the late King Hussein bin Talal assumed his constitutional powers in 1953. This was preceded by a series of Israeli attacks on villages and sites in the West Bank, which was under Jordanian control. Many times, for example, Israelis would enter Palestinian villages and cities at night, just as they entered Qalqilya one day before the war and destroyed the artesian wells there, and no one objected. We didn't even know what Israel's strength was or what the Arabs' strength was since '48, since the establishment of Israel. There were clashes, sometimes with Israeli forces on Syrian positions, sometimes they met resistance, sometimes they didn't. With the end of the War of Independence, a demilitarized zone was established between Syria and Israel. This is an area where Israeli or Syrian military forces are prohibited from entering. But in this specific area, all confrontations occurred. There was constant friction with the Syrians, and therefore a strategic opinion emerged in Israel that it was necessary to control the Golan, as Syria is an enemy sitting above us, while we are below it in Galilee, and it threatens us all the time. Therefore, this situation must be ended. Israeli ambitions to seize the waters of the Jordan River through the national water project caused a series of military clashes between Israel and Syria in the fifties. In the late fifties, Israel began to think, and the thinking moved to implementation, to divert the course of the Jordan River, take Arab waters, store them in the Sea of Galilee, and then extend the Israeli national water pipeline that feeds the Jewish state and extends to the Negev region. When the project began to be implemented, President Nasser called for the first summit conference in '64 to take a counter-measure, an opposing measure, or to hinder or prevent Israel from implementing its project. This measure was taken at the summit meeting: diverting the tributaries of the Jordan towards Syria. [Music] And Lebanon. Israel's project to divert the course of the Jordan River constituted the central motive for Nasser's call to hold the Arab summit in Cairo in January '64, in addition to attempting to end Arab differences. Several resolutions were issued from this summit, the most prominent of which was the establishment of a special body for the exploitation of the Jordan River waters, whose task would be to plan, coordinate, and follow up on projects related to the exploitation of the Jordan River waters. Laying sound foundations for organizing the Palestinian people to support them in their project of liberating their homeland and determining their destiny, and entrusting Ahmed Al-Shuqairi with the task of organizing the Palestinian people. Establishing a unified command for the Arab armies, headquartered in Cairo. Considering the establishment of Israel a fundamental danger that must be countered politically, economically, and in the media. The Unified Arab Command was working to build an Arab front and was developing plans for purchasing weapons for confronting countries, especially non-affluent countries like Jordan, and also militarily strong countries that are not on the front lines, to be ready to send forces if the need arose. There was a feeling that the siege around Israel was tightening with time. Nasserism was at its peak. Syria hosted the Fatah movement, and Egypt hosted the Palestine Liberation Organization in what they called the "Meeting of Revolutions." They established a unified Arab command, organized military parades, and armed themselves with very deterrent Soviet weapons. The feeling in Israel was that the Arab world was uniting and that the state of Israel, in the eyes of its citizens, was not ready for confrontation. The Unified Arab Command, in light of the Arab summit resolutions, issued orders to the Arab armies to prevent any provocative action against Israel, so that Israel would not take this action as a pretext to launch an attack on the Arab fronts at a time when these fronts were not ready and not capable of defending the land. But let them know that this is not an ordinary street. However, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was established in haste and led by the late Ahmed Al-Shuqairi, was carrying out some attacks on secondary sites. Israel took these raids as a pretext to attack Arab lands, especially in the West Bank. The culmination of these attacks was on 11/13/1966, which was the large attack on Samu. The tension in the region continued to escalate. On November 12, 1966, a mine exploded in an Israeli patrol south of Hebron, killing three Israelis and wounding six others. In the early hours of the next day, Israel launched an attack on the village of Samu near the city of Hebron, demolishing all its houses and killing 21 Palestinians. This coincided with Israeli military attacks on the Syrian border in response to the start of the implementation of the Arab summit resolutions regarding Arab countries' use of the Jordan River waters, which would have hindered the Israeli national water project. As work began, Israel started shelling the equipment, and the Syrian army responded. When they shelled the land, they shelled from the air. So the air force came out, and a large air battle took place over Tiberias. Israel's life is water, and it considers it a red line. Therefore, the air battle took place. But unfortunately, I was informed by Ahmed Al-Suwaidani that Syria shot down four Israeli planes, and this was a lie. I held a press conference and announced that we shot down four Israeli planes. It later turned out that Israel shot down planes, not the other way around. Palestine was supported by Syria, Fatah, and other organizations later. Palestinians began to act, carrying out one operation here and another there in '64. In light of this, we had to do something. So the Russians said, "How will you do this? It harms us." For the Egyptian leadership at that time, it saw this as a commitment from Egypt to defend Syria. Therefore, when Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister of Israel, and at the same time the Minister of Defense, threatened that Israeli forces would enter Damascus, it means that, at least as a precaution, we must be ready to confront. [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] Then came Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and warned Syria, secretly and publicly, that if it continued to support Fatah, they would do everything necessary to overthrow the Syrian regime. This was a very dramatic statement. Syria and Egypt, in particular, had special relations with the Soviet Union at that time. The Soviet Union passed information to the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser that there was an imminent attack on Syria, and it could be a large or comprehensive attack. Nasser, to avoid being accused, did not dismiss this information. He sent a special envoy, the head of military intelligence, to the Syrian Golan to see for himself what was happening in Galilee, near the Sea of Galilee, and the military reinforcements. [Music] Nasser was not convinced by the report of the Chief of Staff of his armed forces. He turned a deaf ear to believing that there were no Israeli concentrations on the Syrian border. When he insisted on continuing the escalation, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer followed his friend Nasser, and this was a mistake. [Music] To know if there was anyone or not, air sorties had to be sent to photograph this area and examine it, and determine if these were real concentrations or not. Therefore, I believe that what Lieutenant General Fawzi and Lieutenant General Hikmat Al-Shihabi said was not accurate and they should not have said it at all, because they were not qualified to say whether these were concentrations or not. The concentration of Egyptian forces in Sinai came in response to various Israeli military movements. The beginning of 1967 witnessed several Israeli military activities to probe the region's pulse towards a major military operation. This included clashes with Syrian forces, and then Israeli clashes and attacks on the northern front were repeated. In light of this, Nasser decided, in what he believed to be calculated risks, that the Soviets would stand with him, to issue directives to raise the readiness level of the Egyptian armed forces to the highest state, along with the mobilization of the armed forces, which moved in a large parade that crossed the streets in cities leading to Sinai, under the watchful eyes of foreign intelligence agencies and global media. Nasser discussed with Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, the role of the international emergency forces in Egypt and their impact on the work of the Egyptian forces. It was agreed to request the termination of the work of the international emergency forces and their withdrawal from the border with Israel, without withdrawing them from the Gaza Strip. On May 2nd, specifically, Egypt decided to close the Straits of Tiran to ships flying the Israeli flag, which Israel considered a justification for launching the war. The problem we are all facing now is not the problem of the Straits of Tiran, nor the problem of withdrawing the emergency forces. These are all temporary symptoms of a larger and more dangerous problem, which is the problem of the aggression that occurred and continues to occur against one of the homelands of the Arab nation's peoples in Palestine. We said good will come for the liberation of Palestine. The Suez Canal revolution succeeded in the High Dam, so what remains is Palestine. The liberation of Palestine. Optimism was what prevailed over people's feelings and minds, especially since there was media mobilization and propaganda in the Arab media and radio, particularly from the Voice of the Arabs, where Ahmed Saeed's voice was prominent. We constantly heard the roar of Arab radio stations and the grand talk of Arab broadcasters. Amman brought tanks, cannons, and planes, and tomorrow they will be destroyed, or President Gamal Abdel Nasser is mobilizing the great Egyptian army, and we have the Cairo and Al-Zafer and Al-Nasser missiles. The Arab radio stations created illusions in our minds that victory would be 100% guaranteed. Of course, when there was Egyptian-Syrian cooperation, and there was apparent Arab cooperation in other areas, like Jordan, we had an abundance of morale. We also had the impression that Israel would be gone in a few hours, as Ahmed Saeed said, "The fish of Haifa Sea..." and so on. So, the reality was that optimism prevailed over all our feelings. The steps taken by Nasser in withdrawing the international emergency forces from Sinai and closing the Straits of Tiran were a manifestation of his desire to restore the situation to what it was before the tripartite aggression against Egypt in '56 and to confront Israeli threats to Arab countries, specifically Syria. There was an agreement after the '56 war, according to which Egypt committed to two things: first, not to allow the Egyptian army to enter Sinai, except for symbolic forces east of the canal, and second, to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. In those days, Israel depended on Iranian oil, and Iranian oil came through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aqaba, to Eilat, and then was pumped to the ports or for Israeli consumption. The United States of America requested a detailed report from Israel on the ships arriving at the port of Eilat. Israel tried to stall and refused to give it to them because Israel was not dependent on American ports at that time for its economy. The United States suggested to Israel that it provide economic support as an alternative to the ports until the problem was resolved. The Israeli military establishment strongly rejected this. These straits do not harm the Israeli economy, but the Israeli media campaign made this strait seem as if Israel was dying of hunger, as if they were on the verge of annihilation. They created the media environment. In '67, Israel constantly announced that any interference with the navigation route, what is known in international law as *casus belli*, would be a pretext for war. Even if the navigation route to the Gulf of Aqaba had not been closed, the war might not have broken out. When the Egyptians violated this agreement and entered Sinai, in addition to the fact that Israel intended to strike Syria, a situation arose that we could not accept. Israel devised a trap for President Nasser. The essence of the trap was how President Nasser could be embarrassed. There was a mutual defense treaty, and Israel said, "We will enter Damascus." They went to the end and achieved political results. They were waiting for him to do this and get the American green light to deliver a fatal blow. The Straits of Tiran are Egyptian territorial waters, and we have agreed on Egyptian sovereign rights. No force, no matter how great its power, and I say this clearly so that all parties know the position, can touch Egyptian sovereign rights or revolve around them. Any attempt of this kind will be an aggression against the Egyptian people and an aggression against the entire Arab nation, and the aggressors will suffer unimaginable harm. [Music] [Music] The Arab countries united with the goal of eliminating Israel and the desire to hold it accountable for the results of the '67 war. [Music] The talk in Israel was that the end was approaching and another war would occur. What increased the anxiety and panic among Israelis was the propaganda on the other side and the coverage of what was happening in Cairo and Damascus, where they were talking about throwing Jews into the sea, while Nasser spoke of putting an end to the state of Israel and the Zionists. The campaign of fear and exaggeration that preceded this war, which relied on a number of foundational myths of the Israeli entity created by the Zionist movement, played a significant role in spreading an atmosphere of fear and exaggeration about what the Arabs intended to do. We sent them sandbags and they said we are doing this and digging trenches because a war might break out and a catastrophe might occur where we are all annihilated. A feeling of intense terror. The measures taken in Israel on the ground, the fortifications, and the governmental changes, and the accompanying hesitant speech of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Levi Eshkol, all spread an atmosphere of anxiety and fear among the Israeli public, who believed, due to their lack of information, that Israel was not prepared for war. But these atmospheres quickly changed with the joining of General Moshe Dayan to the government as Minister of Defense and his enthusiastic push towards war. Dayan's contribution was primarily moral. The image of the revered general with one eye and a patch over his left eye. All of this gave the Israeli citizen a feeling that the army was in the hands of someone who knew what he wanted and what he was doing. Dayan's entry did not affect the army's performance in the war in any way. Everything was ready. But it did affect two things: first, the readiness of the Israeli government to make the decision to go to war, and second, the mood of the Israeli street. When Levi Eshkol took over the premiership, the military establishment, led by Rabin, developed the actual plans for expanding Israel's borders on all fronts. Rabin worked in a completely systematic way, preparing the army through exercises, equipment, and operational plans. As Chief of Staff, he was the one who pushed the government to decide to go to war. He saw the suffocating military encirclement around the state of Israel, and it was clear to him that our situation would be much worse if we did not take the initiative to launch a sudden preemptive strike. The military establishment did not intend only to solve the navigation crisis, but also to exploit it to deliver a strong military blow to Egypt and the Egyptian army, Israel's number one enemy. When there was talk of a peaceful solution to the issue of closing the Straits of Tiran, the military establishment rejected it outright. They shifted the discussion from a peaceful solution to the issue of closing the Straits of Tiran to the entry of the Egyptian army to obstruct any political solution. The political establishment believed that there was not enough political cover to launch the war, to the extent that some officers who thought of arresting Eshkol and launching the war by decision of the military establishment, and then releasing him after the war was over. Israel has exceeded the limit in its threats over the past years, and the threat of the Israeli Prime Minister to attack Syria and the threat of war. It was incumbent upon any Arab to respond to this threat. That is why I said, if Israel wants to threaten war, and it has threatened war, then welcome. When the Straits of Tiran were closed and the international emergency forces were withdrawn, King Hussein realized that war was inevitable. On May 20th, he arrived at the Al-Mazzeh Military Airport and met with President Nasser and the Egyptian leadership, and signed the mutual defense agreement that existed between Egypt and Syria. King Hussein, fearing that if he did not participate in that war, he would be accused of treason, entered the war knowing that the readiness of the armed forces was insufficient. King Hussein returned from Cairo with Ahmed Al-Shuqairi, and also with Lieutenant General Abdel Moneim Riyad, to be, as it was called at the time, the commander of the Eastern Front at the advanced command center in Amman. For us, King Hussein was a friend, even though there was no agreement between us. Therefore, we warned him against joining. Hussein found himself facing two options: if he did not enter the war, the Jordanian people, most of whom were Palestinian, would revolt, which could lead to the loss of his kingdom. On the other hand, he could not stand idly by in front of the Jordanian people. How could he face a large part of his army and say, "Why didn't we enter?" Faced with this Israeli attack, the tension in the region reached its peak, and the outbreak of war became a matter of time only. Israeli intelligence played the most important role in this, in terms of the information it gathered about the capabilities of the Arab armies and their readiness for war and their preparedness to receive the first blow. The truth is that the Arab armies, which were much larger, were surprised by a crushing surprise. The inadequacy and failure of Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian intelligence, as well as Soviet intelligence, became apparent. Israel has spies and agents in all Arab countries. They relied on information, not on speculation or guesswork. They had information, and they knew about the mismanagement in the Arab arena. They knew that no one was ready to confront Israel. There were no Egyptian, Syrian, or Jordanian military maneuvers. Israel possessed extraordinary intelligence information about the military capabilities of the Arab armies, especially the Egyptian army, its military divisions and locations. It knew the Egyptian war plans. We knew everything about the flight paths of the planes and the airports in Sinai. The intelligence of the Israeli Air Force eavesdropped on conversations between Egyptian and Syrian pilots while flying in the air. To have a strong intelligence agency, you must have agents and use aerial photography and surveillance, in addition to what agents photograph. If you use all of this with advanced technological support, you will be able to collect. Based on our awareness of the importance of intelligence, we have immortalized it by rejecting it with the best human resources, and this yields results. We were not developing at the same level as Israel was developing, unfortunately. We were not relying on the scientific aspect, the scientific competence, and the competence of the leaderships during the period before '67. Therefore, '67 was a defeat that would happen. It would happen. The real crisis at that time was that Egypt was run by two heads, each thinking in his own way regarding strategic issues. Nasser believed that he could manage the political battle globally and achieve great gains, provided that Egypt received the first blow, while Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer rejected this and leaned towards the position of military leaders who saw receiving the first blow as a catastrophe. I met with a group of Egyptian brothers, and I asked them where they were in '67. He said, "I was in President Nasser's office, and my rank was Major. I was part of the team sent to Sharm El Sheikh and the Straits of Tiran. We returned and submitted a report to President Nasser that the Egyptian army could not, could not carry out the order to close the Straits of Tiran if Israel decided to use force." When we returned and presented the report, his answer was, "This is a maneuver in front of the Americans. I will not fight." This was the result. The Egyptian army in '67 was not an army in the true sense of the word that we could rely on to engage in combat. There was no sufficient warning for the missile battalion to engage. There was no air support, only anti-aircraft artillery and missiles belonging to the Air Force in operations and to the administrations in the ground forces. So, when you have two leading commands, you are lost. In terms of armament, it was also not prepared because the Soviet Union was supplying Egypt with weapons, but they were not qualitative weapons that the Egyptian army could use to confront the Israeli air superiority at that time. The political leadership is responsible. President of the group, Nasser, he was not very attentive to what was happening in the army. Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer was 100% in control of the army, plus he promoted Field Marshal Amer from Major to Field Marshal and put him in charge of the armed forces. It is not possible for someone to go from Major to Field Marshal and lead an entire army. Some younger officers like Shams Badran got close to him. Shams Badran was Minister of War for a period, under the presence of Abdel Hakim Amer. So, when he got closer to him, perhaps the closest person to him, in terms of human connection, was President Nasser's trust in Abdel Hakim Amer. He left him to manage the movement of the armed forces, considering that Nasser had many battles on the Arab, regional, and international levels. [Music] Nasser personally informed me that he did not wish to wage a real war against Israel. When I inquired, he said, "We want to bluff with war only." Then I confirmed his intentions on more than one occasion. For example, when he asked the commander of the air force about his ability to withstand the first blow, he got angry at his response that his forces were not capable of withstanding such a blow. Sadqi Mahmoud, commander of the Air Force, said, "Sir, we cannot withstand the first blow. If we are hit by the first blow, we will be crippled." He said it in English: "We will be crippled." If we take the first blow. Nevertheless, he insisted that we take the first blow. There is no one in the world who takes the first blow and says they can withstand it. Exactly five days before the war, we were invited by the Soviet Union. They asked us to calm down, to reduce the media campaign a little, because Damascus is without protection. This is the opinion of Kaskine. Damascus needs anti-aircraft missiles, and we are currently manufacturing them, but their production requires a month. Perhaps we can postpone the war for a month until the missiles are ready. The 1949 armistice was based on preventing the Zionist entity from expanding and maintaining the armistice lines. This idea led to the army being stationed in trenches along the border. The war prevented the army from training. So the idea was to withdraw it from the front lines so it could be retrained and re-qualified. Israel, unfortunately, hurried before we achieved this plan to restructure the army and transform it into a mechanized army with modern weapons. The Jordanian army, unfortunately, lacked manpower, equipment, and old weapons. The rifle we fought with, the M1, was used by the American army in the '56 war. It is a heavy rifle, difficult to operate. The wireless devices are old. We only hear the wireless devices of the Israeli side. The manpower was insufficient. The conscription rate among Arabs in the '67 war was 10%, while the conscription rate among Jews was 10%. The Unified Arab Command warned the armies and Arab leaders that the Arab army, or the Arab armies, would not be ready for defense, not for offense, to defend Arab land before 1971. There is no parity between the Zionist and Arab forces, neither in aviation, nor in the quality of weapons, nor in the efficiency of training, nor in the soldier's awareness of the nature of the conflict he is leading. This awareness was weak because, until that day, our awareness was tribal, clan-based, a weak awareness. We had war plans to confront the Egyptians in Sinai, the Jordanians in the West Bank, and the Syrians in the Golan, and even to confront poor Lebanon. The Israeli army's advantage lies in its planning and training, and planning and training all the time, and its great ability to operate in changing, unexpected situations. [Music] Israel obtained modern Mirage aircraft from France, just as we obtained weapons, which made the Israeli army very strong and with great capabilities. The protocols that have finally been revealed regarding the June 1967 war, on the eve of the war, the most important of which are the sessions of the so-called Israeli Ministerial Committee for Political-Security Affairs, or the Cabinet, and the traveling security government. It is stated clearly that there is an intention to launch the first strike in the next few hours, which means that the 1967 war was an optional war, by all means. [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music] [Music]