Transcription
Welcome back to ILV on the hour. I'm Ladar Lazi, coming to you live from Israel with all of the recent updates from out of the region. It's 2 PM here in Israel and 7 a.m. in New York. And these are the latest developments.
The United States has launched a new wave of air strikes against Iran after Tahhan was accused of violating the US Iran ceasefire by attacking shipping in the straight of Hormuz. US Central Command says American aircraft struck 10 Iranian military targets, including missile and drone storage sites, air defense positions, coastal radar facilities, communication systems, and naval mine lane capabilities in and around the straight of Hormuz. The Pentagon said the strikes were in retaliation for an Iranian drone attack on the Panama flagged oil tanker Kiku, which was carrying about 2 million barrels of crude oil. President Donald Trump accused Iran of again violating the ceasefire agreement, warning that if Tahhan continues its aggression, the United States would quote, "complete the job," adding that the Islamic Republic would no longer exist.
Iranian state media reported explosions in the Sik and Keshum areas of southern Iran. And the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responded by announcing joint missile and drone attacks against US military sites in Kuwait and Bahin, accusing Washington of breaking the ceasefire. Both Kuwait and Bahrain condemned the Iranian strikes. This latest exchange marks the most serious military confrontation between Washington and Tehran since last week's ceasefire understanding, raising new concerns that the agreement could collapse and the region could be drawn back into a broader conflict.
And on the northern front, the IDF announced today the death of another soldier in southern Lebanon. Captain David Hazut, aged 21, from Ashkalon, fell in an encounter with Kazbala terrorists overnight. Another soldier was also wounded in the incident. Overnight, the IDF says it eliminated several armed operatives in both southern Syria and southern Lebanon as Israeli forces continue operating inside security zones along the northern front. In southern Syria, the military says reservists from the Etsion brigade opened fire and killed a number of armed terrorists inside Israel's buffer zone. Meanwhile, in southern Lebanon, IDF troops identified several Kazbala terrorists armed with an RPG near Nabatier, close to the security zone where Israeli forces are operating. The IDF says the terrorists were eliminated and the structure they operated from was struck. And in a separate strike in the same area, troops also dismantled a Kazbala rocket launcher that posed an imminent threat to Israeli forces. The military says it will continue operating to remove threats against Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers.
And all of these exchanges, despite a new framework between Israel and Lebanon that was signed over the weekend. Under the deal, the IDF will withdraw only from two small areas captured during recent operations that lie beyond the original security zone. Israel will retain control of the main buffer area, including strategic positions such as the Bowfort ridge. Defense Minister Israel Katz said there is no timetable for a full withdrawal, adding that the IDF will remain in security zones in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza for as long as necessary. Prime Minister Binamo said the agreement represents a major strategic achievement. Let's listen to what he had to say.
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Iranian terror proxy Kazbala is rejecting the agreement outright, and the IDF warns that the terror group is already using the ceasefire to regroup. Kazbala leader Naim Kasim has rejected the new Israel Lebanon framework agreement, declaring it null and calling for it to be replaced by the US Iran memorandum of understanding. Kasim said any attempt to link an IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon to Kbala's disarmament crosses a red line, and he accused the Lebanese government of legitimizing what he called Israeli occupation, describing the agreement as a humiliating surrender of Lebanese sovereignty. The remarks highlight's continued opposition to any deal that would weaken its military presence or influence inside of Lebanon.
And so, joining us now to discuss all of these latest developments are Dan Fefferman, co-editor of Middle East 24, and Brigadier General Reelik Shafil, former Air Force Base Commander. Thank you both for joining us.
So, a lot of news happening over the weekend and today. Let's start, of course, with the Islamic Republic of Iran. So, in a surprise, really, to nobody, the Islamic regime has violated the ceasefire, President Trump and the US finally responding. So, Dan, let's start with you. What do you make of these latest escalation? And will this likely cause a return to war?
Yeah, I think as you said, you said it right. Nobody's surprised by this, and nobody should be surprised by this. The Islamic Republic in Iran is trying to get away with a deal that'll save its skin, that'll give it breathing space. It was under tremendous amount of military and economic pressure, which it refused to admit, but that's really what brought it to the table. And the key thing here is, you know, they thought, and they think there are elements within the regime that think that they can keep pushing back and raising the cost on President Trump. They sense a sort of a desperation to end this, to wrap this up. They know that the World Cup is happening in the United States as we speak. There was a lot of pressure on global oil prices. And so they sense a President Trump was desperate to climb out of this tree that he got himself into, and that if they can go back and press against the United States and against the Gulf Arab states, then President Trump will capitulate and kind of walk his way out of the deal. So here it's critical that the United States showed that it is willing to go back to a military conflict, whether a limited one or a fuller one. And essentially, the last thing I'll say on this is the entire conflict has essentially been that Iran has been willing to take more punishment than the United States has been willing to dish out. The United States and Israel, and the key is to not let Iran get confused that it holds the keys to the escalation ladder here.
Well, maybe more than the US is willing to dish out. Not sure if more than Israel is willing to dish out. Reelik, turning to you. You know, we just heard Dan's analysis. I mean, I want to understand from you as well what you make of this latest escalation and whether it could cause a return to war.
I think the Iranians, who, as President Trump said, had never won a war and never lost a negotiation, are actually following Henry Kissinger's strategy that was shown in Vietnam some, let's say, 50 years ago, that during the conversations and during the dialogue, there's fire, and each side is trying to armrest or rest out the other through different types of pressure. And so the Iranians want to improve their condition, and I think basically they may give in on the nuclear front as long as they don't have to give in on the proxy front, the ballistic missiles and supporting terror. So, they will try to tire the United States, knowing very well that the upcoming elections in November are crucial for President Trump, and he will not want a large-scale confrontation until that time. So, they will push as much as they can with this push-and-shove strategy. And Lebanon is part and parcel of that push and shove, as is Yemen. So, we're, I guess, we'll see that coming up, going up and down along the way, and we have to grit our teeth because Hezbollah are part of the game, and they will fire at will if they, when and if they can, in Lebanon, this in the southern part of Lebanon, and we should expect more of this at least until November.
And Dan, back to you. You know, President Trump in his truth social post once again making threats that he would finish the job, saying that the Islamic Republic would no longer exist. Now, it's interesting because it's almost an admittance that he's offering this regime a lifeline to salvage the regime and that technically he could go back and actually bring this regime down. Um, but, you know, these are just more threats coming from President Trump on the side of the Iranians. Are they even taking these threats seriously?
Uh, there are some people certainly taking the threats seriously, but they know that Trump is not going to demolish the country. They know that the Americans would not go after civilian infrastructure. That's what I meant when I said, you know, the Iranians are willing to take more punishment than the Americans are willing to dish out. America has the, you know, the strongest military in the world, can wipe out all of the state infrastructure, all of the economic infrastructure, the oil, the energy infrastructure, and it's unwilling to do so because at the end of the day, the United States does not seek Iran's destruction. It seeks at at most an end to this regime and at least a severe limitation to the nuclear program. And so there there is a mismatch in again how much Iran is willing to take here. There are also a lot of elements within this regime that are messianic, that thrive off of war and escalation, and that have this religious fanatical assuredness to their purpose. And they see every time that the Americans are willing to back down, that they're calling for negotiations as a sign of weakness rather than a sign of willingness to compromise, which is what it is. So there is a misreading of intentions here, and that is why it is important that the United States remain firm on showing that it is capable and still willing to use force, but that it is offering, you know, a ladder out of this tree, so to speak, for the Iranians to come down and accept a deal that that will at the very least, you know, limit the program, let the regime survive a little more. Um, and there's a trade-off in that, but that's the best it seems that the United States is going to be able to achieve at this time.
And Reik, you know, we saw the Islamic Republic also respond once again, firing missiles at Kuwait, at Bahin. This seems to have been normalized almost by the United States as well, that they have yet to respond to the Iranian response against Bahin and Kuwait. Has the US sort of abandoned its Gulf allies in this? I mean, what can you tell us about the situation with regards to the Gulf allies and their take in all of this?
Yes. Well, the the Gulf states have always been afraid of Iran. And Iran has always said that if attacked, they will hit US interests in the Gulf States. They haven't said they'll they'll close the straits off for moves, but they have prepared a series of sea mines that the commander of Sentcom, who previously was commander of the fifth fleet, which is in that area, knew well about. So they're weapons and they're weaponizing their their ability to terrorize those states, close the straits, raise the price of oil, and put the Gulf States in harm's way, or maybe you should use a pun, in the entire straits, and that applies a lot of pressure in the United States that while they attacked many of the assets of the US over 20 of them along the Gulf. So, the United States does not have a very good answer to these threats without going into serious war against Iran. And the other states are even more afraid that Iran will dissolve into a sovereign state that is not really governed by a central government and may even break up into different sects, and that may terrorize the area even more than it is right now, and there'll be nobody to talk to. Um, and that scares a lot of those states in even Turkey. Um, so in order to get this thing checked, it's a very, I would say, delicate balance between walk with a big stick and speak softly, which is the 1906 policy dictated at the time by President Roosevelt, not FDR, but Teddy Roosevelt, his uncle, um, who had this kind of a strategy against the southern America American uprising, and is that they're actually applying it right now to the Middle East, so far without great success.
And Dan, you know, back to you in this latest escalation, you know, after we saw the US strikes, where do we stand now with regards to the ongoing negotiations over the 60dayou?
Well, there's, you know, a 60-day period that was agreed on. We're about 50 days into it, and there's going to be a lot of pushing. Um, you know, the Iranians, as Reik here said, they they're very good at negotiation, and they're going to use every tool in their box, including raising the pressure. This is part of what these strikes are about to show that they're the boss, that they're raising the pressure to throw in red herrings into the negotiations, that that can be then taken out of the negotiations. Um, that's what control of the hormuz was something they can throw in that then they can bargain about and and and, um, you know, achieve a victory that was never supposed to be part of the original game. So they're going to be looking for ways to crash the negotiations, to raise the temperature around the region, to escalate against US allies such as in the Gulf States, um, in order to improve their bargaining position. And the the United States here has to be very careful with this and to understand that this is all part of the regime's negotiating ploy to keep the pressure up, and the United States has really a number of ways to do this, and it shouldn't release the money, um, without very achievable and definitive gains from the Iranians, concessions from the Iranians. Um, they need to keep the hormuz open. They need, they can bring back, you know, the the closure of the hormuz that put a lot of economic pressure on Iran. Um, and these occasional military threats with the threat of escalation is something that needs to be, um, you know, to keep the Iranians fire at their feet in order to make sure that they remain committed to this process of the negotiation, which even if it works out according to to what we understand from administration officials, is not going to be a whole lot better than the JCPOA. And so they they need to to keep focused to to at least at the very minimum achieve what they claimed they were going to achieve when this 60dayou was announced.
And you know, we've talked about the US, we've talked about Iran, but what is Israel's position in all of this? I think you mentioned Israelis here gritting their teeth. Prime Minister Netanyahu says striking Iran alone if necessary is not off the table. So where does Israel stand in all of this?
Well, um, Israel, of course, can strike Iran. I would say almost it will if it were not for the United States stopping it from doing so. But given the Iranian resoluteness and ability to withstand a lot of pressure, um, without hitting things like the electrical systems and shutting down light in Thran and East Wuhan and causing this kind of a dam of damage, um, there's not much chance that they would capitulate. So, um, with all due respect to ourselves, our ability to put pressure so that the Iranians will change their mind is very limited. Uh, and I would not wonder if they invite us to do so in order to create, uh, some kind of an emergency by firing a couple of U missiles or maybe sending, uh, the Yemen, the Houthis, to do so from the south in order to involve us in the picture and put pressure, uh, on us, uh, while we're trying to, uh, resolve solve our problems in, um, in Lebanon. So if we put too much pressure on Lebanon, I would expect some missiles to be flying over. This will continue certainly until November, um, or to put pressure on the United States, uh, as as they see that, uh, Israel and the United States maybe are, uh, are at some kind of a quarrel. So, u I would expect more trouble until something happens. Either President Trump is pre is pressed so hard that he has to strike really hard, uh, or we're through the, uh, November elections, and that would be a new game at that time.
And Dan, back to you. Turning now to Lebanon. So, Israel and Lebanon signed this, uh, framework agreement in Washington over the weekend. It's meant to leave and the Islamic regime out of the equation, out of the picture. Now, you know, there's been agreements similar, uh, signed like this in the past that have essentially amounted to nothing. You know, was supposed to remain above the Latani River. Of course, it clearly has not. But what is different this time around in this, uh, new agreement that's being hailed as sort of a gamecher here in Israel?
Yeah. Uh, there we we've had a number of these kinds of agreements. You're right. But there are a couple things that are that are very different here that are worth paying attention to. First of all, American leadership is one of them. And this is the first time that the Americans have taken a clear role. Notice the French, uh, are not involved in this. Um, secondly, this is a also a direct response to Iran's attempt to create linkage between the US Iran track and the Lebanon Israel track, and and it's very important for for both Israel and for the Americans, in this case, they're backing Israel, to to make sure that linkage is not created, um, so that his ballet doesn't get a break, um, based on what's happening between the US and Iran. And the biggest one, though, this the biggest difference that we have here is that Israel is not expected to withdraw from this security strip under the the yellow line, um, as it appears on the maps. This security strip that's a few kilometers into South Lebanon without a clear and capable replacement of LAF, Lebanese armed forces, coming in, taking over, and making sure that the area is clean from his. So, it's a phased approach that's contingent, at least it's supposed to be contingent, on the performance and the willingness of the Lebanese state and the Lebanese armed forces to ensure Hezbollah doesn't come back into those areas and not what we've had in the past where Israel is just supposed to withdraw and let's hope that everything goes well. I I'll I'll say just a couple two more kind of sentences about the bigger atmosphere which is different here. This is an atmosphere in which Iran is relatively weakened. Um, its entire proxy array has been, I don't want to say completely shattered, but severely weakened compared to previous rounds of escalation and fighting. Um, and secondly, you have here within the Lebanese political system, within Lebanese society, for the first time, the state itself and significant elements of the population are speaking out openly against Hisbala, the need for Hezbollah to disarm, the need to enact state sovereignty and authority, um, that only the state will control arms and the use of arms and force within the Lebanese state. And so, um, the the zones, the kind of, um, tying Israeli withdrawal to actual performance and not just, um, you know, a wish list, a nice to have list, but also the context, the regional context, the internal Lebanese context are are quite different than in previous agreements here.
And I mean, do we know what the capabilities of Hezbala are today? I mean, do we have any idea how many fighters they have left, uh, what their missile capacity is, and so on? I mean, do we have a picture, uh, of this now, nearly, I would say, three years since October 7th and since Israel has been at war with Kbala?
Are you asking me or a relic here?
Relic, I'm asking relic.
Well, it's, uh, I I would venture to say that this is almost irrelevant as long as they can fire, let's say, one missile per day, uh, and we will have, let's say, uh, one casualty, fatality per week or so, that is enough to put pressure on Israel, uh, for their purpose. So they don't really need a barrage of rockets and don't need they don't need to fire at Israel at all. They need to fire at our soldiers, uh, in South Lebanon in order to put pressure on the Israeli, uh, politicians in public. And, uh, uh, that pressure will translate, uh, into friction with the United States that wants to stay the to pacify the area, and the pressure on Netanyahu to, uh, go into military moves is going to mount even if there are just one or two rockets a day. So they don't need a large number of thousands, uh, because it's we're talking about terror rather than a war. So that ability will be maintained. Doesn't matter how much pressure we put on and how successful the the Lebanese army is. That will stay put that way. So, um, I I'm afraid we'll have to grit our teeth. And with the upcoming elections in Israel, it's going to play a major part in the quarrel between the political parties, uh, come October and obviously, uh, come November in the United States. So it's not a question of numbers. It's a question of the ability to irritate Israel so that it cannot really, uh, show that it was able to to overcome Hezbollah.
I want to go back to a point that you made. You talked about sort of this new phased approach, uh, with the Lebanese army, but, you know, I want to a to ask again how this is any different because, you know, we've heard for years that the Lebanese army or that many, um, you know, uh, people within the Lebanese army are sympathetic to bala, and the Lebanese army was essentially supposed to clear out southern Lebanon from, uh, this past decade or so, they clearly were unwilling or unccapable to do so. So, how is this going to work this time around? Or is this set up, you know, once again for failure?
It it's it's it's not a guaranteed success. I'll say that. Um, but it is in a better position for success, and success can be gradual here than than in previous in incidents. So, hisbal is definitely weaker than it once was. We saw over the last year between the end of 2025 and 2026 that it is capable of rebuilding itself quite quickly. Um, it is a very disciplined organization in that regard. Uh, by the way, you know, American, uh, economic and financial pressure on Iran greatly affects Hisbala's financial situation, its ability to pay fighters and recruit fighters, and it is having a hard time with it. Aum a number of fighters close to 3,000 of its fighters have been killed in this last few months of fighting. Um, its missile stores, a lot of its underground stores, but as Relic said, it has a lot of capability, and all it has to be able to do is even fire a few missiles and harass. Um, Hezbollah is weaker, um, but and the Lebanese army is still not strong enough, but that's why I think the phased approach has more potential, right? So, it's not expected to come in and take all of, um, South Lebanon in one swoop. It it's it and Israel is doing a lot of the work of weakening Hezbollah in the process, and so it's more of a Israel doing the dirty work and handing it over. Uh, I'm not sure how much sympathy there is within the LAF these days for hisbala. Uh, that said, it's also very hard for me to see it directly engaging in combat, u with Hisbala fighters, and it would be more of sort of a pressure and a negotiation and Israel weakening them at the same time rather than any kind of expectation that the LAF will come in and confront Hisbala forces directly. Uh, which would, you know, I hard for me to imagine them wanting to do it and and being really capable of doing that. Um, but as long as that pressure, the financial pressure on one side, the state pressure on the other side, the the entire, uh, Lebanese state system and a lot of the Shia actually in Lebanon are speaking out and blaming Hezbollah for their misery. Now add to that Israel degrading their actual capabilities in the south and pushing them up north. Um, and then if if you can create this phased approach with these pilot zones where Israel clears an area and then the LAF needs to come in under perhaps here American supervision and ensure that that Hezbollah doesn't come back in. It gives you a much better chance, but certainly this is no guarantee that that it will actually succeed. We have seen, um, in the past under UNIFIL that Hezbollah comes back in and reconstitutes itself right under the nose of international forces. So, so we have to be, uh, ever vigilant here. I do think this agreement is a step forward. I think the statements that were made and expressed towards a political track, um, towards what Lebanon is expected to do and what Lebanon intends to do within Lebanon are a a progression here. Um, and they need to be encouraged, but certainly nothing.
I'm gonna I'm gonna stop you there because we are out of time. I want to thank both you and for joining us, uh, on this edition of ILV. Thank you both so much.
Thank you.
And that's a wrap for this edition. I'm Larara Lazi. Thanks for watching.