Transcription
Herr Weber, and then immediately the question to Mr. Stegner: How, how do you view what is happening in Brussels when you meet? Was one prepared for this dimension? Or was one prepared for something that came at the end of Trump's first term? And then Jean-Claude Juncker goes to Washington, and then one sits together and talks about Harley Davidson and a few other things. And, uh, says, "Look, we will raise tariffs exactly where Republican voters are. Yes, Harley Davidson. I believe they produce in Missouri, I believe. That will really hurt you, and that will really hurt your voters." And that was Jean-Claude Juncker's argument to dissuade him. That now has a different dimension, completely different. And one must also say, fairly, because they had shown quotes from the election campaign, he also promised that in the election campaign, what he is now doing. He promised these tariffs as one of his central points; that's why he was elected. That must be acknowledged, the narrative he had there.
Mhm. Uh, we punish those who have profited from our market so far, and there he had us Germans very much in his sights, with Mercedes and all the premium brands that drive around on the FHT Avenue. That's his image, his idea. He announced it and is now pushing it through ruthlessly. And uh, uh, the crazy thing is also that it is factually incorrect regarding the trade deficits, because as Europeans we have a surplus in products, but when it comes to services that we buy today over our cell phones, uh, products that are on the internet today, software, and so on, or apps that you download, America has a massive trade surplus with Facebook, Apple, and Google to Europe. Europe is the largest foreign market for American corporations. And if you combine the latter two areas, trade and services, then the trade between the United States and Europe is practically balanced. So it's also factually incorrect. It's really factually incorrect, the whole discussion we're having now. Uh, and by the way, those who will pay the most, at least in the short term, are the Trump voters. Those are the, those are the pensioners. In America, pensions run very heavily through funds, through pension funds, so investments in stocks. If they get a statement next month saying their investment is 20% less valuable, or inflation. All experts assume that between 5 and 7, because he is spreading these tariffs all over the world. So the American who wants to buy a car also has no alternative in the short term but to buy a more expensive car that is imported. Uh, incidentally, for us, it's a bit of good news because there are no substitution effects in other markets because everyone is affected. So in the end, the ordinary worker in America, the pensioner, will pay, uh, in the short term. And the question that is now troubling us at the European level is, what does he actually want? A very simple question: What does he actually want? Because on the one hand, he philosophizes about the question: if I put high tariffs on it, then Mercedes will come, the pharmaceutical companies in Europe will come and invest with us. I create jobs. That's a logic one can only understand somewhere, you know, follow. The second argument is, he argues with, so to speak, market access to Europe that has nothing to do with money. For example, we don't want to eat hormone-treated meat in Europe. I don't want that. I want our consumers not to eat hormone-treated meat. In America, it's allowed. Uh, and Trump now says that this is a market access restriction, that we are not allowed in with our hormone meat. But for that, as a European politician, I will never change European laws. I want to maintain sanitary standards in the European Union, or with the digital laws we have made, famous and right up to the third question that is then in the room: Can the offer that von der Leyen has now formulated, that Musk formulated on Saturday in Italy, be a solution, that we simply reduce all tariffs on both sides to zero? That would be a dream for me, I must say. I would welcome it if we had TTIP again. So a trade agreement between Europe and America. But I tell you, at the moment everyone is speculating: What does he actually want to achieve? What is the bigger strategy behind it? And uh, and there we are groping around in the dark. One often hears, Mr. Stegner, from top politicians that they say, "In truth, he wants a deal," but I have the feeling that the topic is now finished, only he has already rejected it, incidentally. So that doesn't seem to be the topic anymore. I think he does want deals, but with the question of what he wants, one must perhaps also say that the mixture of megalomania and intellectual deficits might lead to him not even seeing that he is harming Americans the most. But how can that be? Because in competition, it will be so that the Americans will suffer the most. And then it will be interesting to see whether the voters stay with him or not. And that's why I'm sometimes a little surprised how quickly we are already writing off the transatlantic partnership here and songs of farewell are already being written. I believe the American voters will very carefully look at whether they have anything from the promise that everything will be better, bigger, more beautiful. And if he continues like this, he will endanger the American economy even more. The problem is only, if I don't do it with a demolition hammer, but with a demolition charge, as he is doing, and does it also in the foreign policy area, then it becomes extremely dangerous because there are side effects that affect everyone else. I believe the Europeans can answer this very reasonably by accommodating them in some areas. For some things, there is no market in Europe, no matter what the prices are. Americans certainly not, and it's not because of the prices. But I explicitly say this: If one now considers the escalation with China, we are now at 100% tariffs, Trump. So, if one sees this escalation now between two potent global powers, then our way, I think, is the right one. We decided, we react decisively. We have now presented a package of 26 billion in tariffs. It will be implemented next week. What is it about? It's about jeans, it's about Harley Davidson, this and that. And there are two categories for the selection: Republican voters should be affected. That's one criterion. We want to politically show that this is a bad deal for Trump voters. And the second, we are of course looking for product areas where European companies can easily substitute, where we are not dependent on America. What else? What else? Yes, so that's a very long list of very concrete, concrete interests. I think people are interested in that too. We have discussions, for example, to make it clear in the domestic area; we also have discussions about alcohol, about the Ben Cup, which is now off the list because we are afraid that it will be done as a counter-reaction. So, in short, a long list. I just want to make it clear, our answer is a sensible one. We are talking about 100 billion, 120 billion in tariffs that Trump has now implemented, and we are reacting with 28 billion. And I think it is explicitly right not to react fully immediately, but to show our decisiveness. Yesterday the trade ministers were together. I have spoken to many heads of state and government in recent days. We are internally united that we must react. Mhm. But we don't want to enter the spiral of escalation. First, we'll wait and see how the markets react. First, we'll wait and see what this also means in America, also wait for the political debate, and then possibly take further steps. And you know, the nuclear option, to stick with the red button, is of course the digital tax from our point of view, because if he wants to hit us with goods, then we hit him as a countermeasure, actually, with services, because that's where America is vulnerable. That means, how would you do that then? Yes, quite clearly, through a tax for the corporations. One must already say today that the Googles, Apples, and Facebooks of this world contribute comparatively little to the community in Europe. They have chosen favorable tax locations like Ireland and Luxembourg as locations, and therefore one should consider whether to put an additional tax on it. But will Ireland, for example, go along if it's about Europe? We have the legal possibilities to do that. That would not be a new tax in that sense. But that's the technology behind it. We are capable of acting in Europe. We have also learned from the Trump era. We have anchored a series of new trade policy laws at the European level that give us the possibility to react. And if one is allowed to say, if one is allowed to say briefly, I hope that everyone really understands how valuable Europe is now. If we did not react as a united continent, we would be at the mercy of these powers. As Germans, we would play no role at all in this global madness that we are experiencing. And then, today, Alice Weidel and the AfD and all those like them, or Orbán in Europe, the great friend of Putin, excuse me, of Trump and of Musk, then ask the question, where are they now? Where are they now? Alice Weidel was happy that she got a photo with Trump at the Munich Security Conference. Uh, and now she has already called him, has she already defended our German jobs against America? That shows the whole mendacity, the whole mendacity of this, you know. She said that she found it all great, she has once again shown her complete economic incompetence with that, said that she finds the tariffs understandable and that it is good that he is doing it that way. I mean, they are all currently saying that it's just some minor, small, finely dosed tax or tariff increase here and there. No, it's once again an atomic bomb on the world economic order and on our German prosperity. Clearly, with the EU, so to say. So I completely agree with you that it's good now that one doesn't fight alone, but it's also a bit like, so you can now arm yourself, as you describe, we'll do this and that. My impression in recent days was also that one particularly hopes for Giorgia Meloni, who is to travel to Washington on Palm Thursday, so Thursday in a week, and from my point of view, an attempt will be made there, from like-minded to like-minded, to try on a personal level, exactly, and to separate them, yes, but that it has not worked anywhere so far. Yes, it's something like the last bullet, it's often said, but that one somehow still tries to get to Trump in a different way than with well-considered tariffs, because in the end, it's clear, you just said it, it harms the German economy. In two days there will be an economic forecast, it will be minimal. The economy fears the third recession year in a row, these things are not even included yet. So that's a catastrophe for all consumers in Europe, in Germany, for the economy. So this idea that one says EU-wide, we react, but in the end, one simply has to hope that he might still be dissuaded from it, with weapons such as the digital tax. That also affects Trump's rich friends. So I mean, we are in the area where they will tell him that they don't like that. Well, we are not so good at that in Europe either, but in fact, it is of course a field that would have an immediate effect. He has already commented on it and said that these tariffs are as stupid as a sack of bricks. That shows that he is probably clever. So, in that sense, the point is, some weapons don't even have to be used, but to show that we would be able to. But for that, we do need European unity. By the way, I am decidedly of a different opinion on the matter. Will this America that we were used to as Germans and Europeans come back? I decidedly don't believe that. And therefore, the central point now is to begin with the new Europe. It is a historical turning point that we are experiencing, and we must now give our answers to it. I also think we must not only stick to the analysis of Trump, but we must now discuss much more what we have to do. Mr. Hüter, I would like to ask you a question on that point, because we have just seen Robert Habeck, the list, the arsenal of weapons, so to speak. Just open the door briefly, show what's in there. Export tax, I read and heard today, I found it a very interesting approach to say we levy taxes on products, ASML, for example, is such a case, yes, which are incredibly important, a Dutch manufacturer. It's about lithography, chip production, and at the highest level, what the Europeans, by the way, are no longer allowed to sell to China by the Americans because the Americans need these processors. So they need that and they have to buy it in Europe whether they want to or not, because their chip industry is completely dependent on it. There are more involved there. There is Trumpf, I believe, is in there, Zeiss is in there, and so on, laser technology, optical things, and so on. All European top technology that the American chip industry and the whole software industry needs to live, like air to breathe. Is that the idea? Is that a clever move, to use such a lever, to say, that's really a power play now? Well, the idea is that we are essentially getting the tariff payments to ourselves. So we make it more expensive for the Americans, but their tariff revenues don't increase, or maybe even increase on top of that, but here, well, at the end of the day, it always only leads to the consideration: Can I somehow build up so much pressure that they react over there? Exactly, in the models they use, even from demonic, it's written that the whole thing goes up with the tariff increases that we make if the others don't react with counter-tariffs. That's of course naive to the highest degree. The argument is, they can't react with tariffs because they are not inflexible. Yes, but that's exactly not the case. They react with counter-tariffs. That means exactly this is happening now. One makes these countermeasures, it escalates, in the end he won't be able to turn around. That's my firm conviction, because he has dug himself in so firmly. And one thing is different from his first presidency. There, I think he still had a feeling when something didn't work, to turn back, and also the deal he made with Jean-Claude Juncker at that time. He has now started to tell people in the USA for some time, "Look, this will be difficult now, we all have to go through it, but then the historic, historical great deal will come sometime." That reminds me of people who, as we have just said, are absolutely crazy, namely those who believe that their lifetime and world time coincide in their lifetime. So they organize everything like that. The philosopher Habermas knows this wonderful thing about lifetime and world time, and they say, no, such people believe they control everything, and after that there's nothing more, but you just have to wait, so then it will come sometime. That won't work in the long run, because you have just mentioned the pensioners in the USA. It affects a wide range of people who are all affected, and they don't have a good education system across the board. We must see, the productivity in industrial companies is low. So it's not clear how anything works. And the irony is, what Joe Biden did with the Inflation Reduction Act, with the Chips for America Act, and other things, was quite successful. We saw a first slight reindustrialization boom there. But I'd like to ask again about that, that's interesting. Joe Biden's economic policy, at that point, the two nomics, it worked, the IRA worked, but one thing didn't work, namely getting inflation under control. American inflation was always at 3, 4, 5%, and that, in the end, together with the migration issue, but that particularly led to him losing the election. I read a study by Goldman Sachs today that says what he's doing now will fuel inflation by another 3 to 4%. That means life will become even more expensive for Americans. Uh, again the question: Why is he doing this? I refuse to simply assume, similarly to Putin, when one says that he's a madman and wants world domination and so on. He's not crazy. So what's the calculation behind it? Why are they doing this? In any case, I would say he approaches the topics with a frightening naiveté, because if you look at the topics of the first few weeks, he also promised an end to the war in 48 hours. No. I would like to mention as an example: He promised, but that's election campaigning, I say, but then he rolled out the red carpet for Putin. Zelensky was ready to immediately conclude a ceasefire, and Putin launched a new offensive in eastern Ukraine. So, in that sense, everything he says there with a certain naiveté is shattered by the facts of the world. And that's the same with the tariffs. Uh, his narrative at home why it works, you are initially right that the two terms were not economically successful for the Americans because there was a loss of purchasing power. Yes, the worker in Ohio no longer had. We let Mercedes and the pharmaceutical companies in Europe bleed, and for that I lower taxes. That's the narrative he has at home. And I tell you, if you talk to the corporations in Europe, then you have to honestly say that there are also many who are considering whether to invest in America now. There are already some, if he really pursues the course in terms of tariffs, then few European companies want to forgo this market or permanently pay the tariffs. There are shifts. I had a meeting last Friday with the supplier industry for the automotive industry in Bavaria. And there are already some who are globally positioned who are reorganizing there, and also their product lines. BMW, I hope I have the number right in my head, BMW sold 400,000 cars in America last year, I believe. That's real money. That means, what are they doing now? BMW is also the largest American car exporter, crazy! So BMW in Dingolfing, worldwide, the world's largest BMW plant is in the United States of America, and they export many great products from America. So it's crazy. BMW and many of our corporations live from a global open market. But I would already like to say, take the pharmaceutical sector, for example. In the pharmaceutical sector, Europe is the pharmacy of the world. We produce for the whole world here, for the whole world, with top companies, we also have great innovations that we have in medicines, and America buys very massively from Europe there. And if you look through economic reports today, if you talk to CEOs, there are many who say, I'm building up production in the United States of America. That's the logic he describes, but nevertheless, the collateral damage is so immense that it can't work. And I would like to say again, we have to talk about ourselves now. And I would like to mention two thoughts. One is, we must believe in our internal market. We Europeans, with 450 million people, are a damn large continent, damn economically strong. We also have money here. We have economic power, and we do not yet have a European internal market that would give us strength, that would create growth, for example, in energy, in services, in finance. And the second, America, and by the way, also China, because with China we now have the great concern that they will push the overcapacities that they can no longer sell in America into Europe now. So China will also become a more difficult partner, which I assume, then one urgently needs alternatives. And I say there is an agreement, namely Mercosur with South America, Brazil, Argentina, 720 million people would be brought together in one area. We concluded that in December, and Europe must have the power to conclude such trade agreements. We need new partners in the world, because the rest of the world is just as shocked as we are, and they are all looking for stable partners now. And my image of Europe is Europe that continues to believe in and represent rules-based fair trade, and we would also benefit massively if we consistently followed this path now. You said earlier, and now the question to you, an open question, the dream is, in the logic, 0% tariffs. That's exactly what they don't want. They don't want all this bureaucratic growth, they don't want all this craziness because we profit from it. Mr. Stegner, if that happens, and if China then, so to speak, its goods, and they have overproduction in incredibly many areas, so the Chinese automotive industry, the electrical industry, for example, Mr. Hüter nods there, that's where it starts. Many will not survive if they don't eventually find their way onto the world market. Photovoltaic systems, please. Photovoltaics, wind turbines, the whole topic. If they now say, we want this world trade, that means staying with the tariffs down, then they will inevitably come to Europe, they will find their European markets, and they will say, then we will flood Europe with our cheap goods. Isn't that extremely dangerous? The great political narrative of Trump was, at some point, Chinese and others took your jobs away from you because you were no longer competitive. How great is the danger that this will happen here? I believe the danger is not insignificant. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if we now submit to an escalation, in all areas there are only losers. And therefore, I think prudence and cohesion are one thing. But I also think, despite all this, that if it comes to that, I wouldn't forget one thing: America is a large democracy, and someone is in a position of power at the top, which is difficult. In the long run, they will notice if someone says, if you have Corona, then inject yourself with disinfectant, that it's maybe not such a good idea, and that one can perhaps say, Americans also have an interest in much more Europe. But I doubt that the Trump course will be the American course in the long run. It is a large democracy, years will also pass. That's why I believe we need a good European reaction for the meantime and to work together, but to believe that it will go on forever with Trump, I don't think so. But they do look at what's happening in the USA, as I was just saying, the attack on freedom of science, the structures in the country are also being questioned. That's why I'm not so much of the opinion that this can be presented, that German companies now all want to invest there, invest in this location. What legal certainty do they have? What requirements are they imposed? So I'll say, what we call economic supply conditions, he's worsening them every day with what he's doing. You can look at his appointments, what he's done in one day, it's all an attack on the constitutional order in the USA, and he does it in a certain systematics, so that one must also ask, do I want to be there? When I talk to German companies that are there, they all tell me, I'm glad if I don't have to travel there. I was in Chicago a week ago for a conference, the procedure at border control is simply completely different. It has changed. Yes, it has completely changed. And what does that mean? Uh, so you are questioned longer. Uh, you are constantly asked trick questions. So if you tell them three times no, you are not here for business reasons, but for a conference and to visit friends, then it comes but yes, here for business. No, I, and then it will ask, yes, where is the other suitcase? Yes, I don't have a suitcase, I'm only here for a day. And then they want to see the ticket. I've never experienced that on entry, that they wanted to look at the return ticket. So it does show that the dynamics are different. The taxi driver in Chicago told me, "Sure, yesterday I had a Briton here." He sat in a little room for 8 hours because he probably answered stupidly at some point. So I think you shouldn't underestimate that. Arbitrariness. Yes, that's arbitrariness. And there's one more thing we have to consider. We always talk about China so negatively. The Chinese, we assume that they are not as stupid as the Americans.
Also, in den Reaktionen, also dass sie natürlich kraftvoll gegenhandeln, schon; aber sie werden jetzt doch erleben müssen, dass sie Europa als Partner brauchen.
Auch da gilt, was ich aus Unternehmen zunehmend höre: dass die Gespräche mit den chinesischen Regierungsstellen mit so wieder ganz andere sind. Zwischenzeitlich war das nach dem Motto: "Hör mal, pass mal auf, wir wir wissen wie es geht. Wir zeigen euch das jetzt." Das hat sich wieder völlig verändert. Und der Hinweis: es hat noch nie gegeben, dass China, Südkorea und Japan gemeinsam über Handelspolitik reden. Die Perspektive einer erweiterten Freihandelszone über die dies es da schon gibt. Das muss ich mal vorstellen: Südkorea und Japan, die an sich schon nicht miteinander reden.
Also, Trump macht genau das Gegenteil dessen, was er will. Er stärkt, er stärkt, er stärkt die diejenigen in der Zusammenarbeit mit China, und das zusammen mit Europa gedacht. Ich würde China hier nicht auf die Negativliste setzen, sondern als Potenzialfaktor sehen. Wir haben dort, erh, noch zu Ende sagen darf, wir haben da eine erhebliche Bedeutung unserer Wirtschaft. Wir lernen da auch viel. Sie haben eben über die Produktionsdynamiken gesprochen. Wir haben auch eine hohe Innovation, ist doch ein Thema, oder nicht? Ja, aber die müssen, die werden sich in diesem Markt auch bereinigen. Wir haben bestimmte Märkte, wo eigentlich fast alles, was Schrauben, Muttern, kommen zu 98% aus China. Also, wenn sie die Tische und die Dinger hier, die können sich, wenn wir die Schrauben, Muttern nie aus China bekommen, weil sich einfach über die Spezialisierungsmuster der letzten 50 Jahre das so er anderen Dingen abhängig.
Deswegen mein Punkt: ich glaube, wir müssen China wirklich ganz pragmatisch betrachten. Da gibt's viele Schwierigkeiten, viel Allokation im Immobiliensektor, immer noch nicht funktionieren, wie viel Kapitalmärkte. Da können wir aber gemeinsam machen. Ich glaube, das ändert sich gerade.