Unpacking the 27th Amendment - Debating the role of the judiciary - Barrister Salahuddin Ahmed #TPE

Let us put aside all the technicalities and so on. So, even in common understanding, it makes sense that, "Look, if the Peoples Party and PML-N together have given 50% or 55% of the seats, why should we give them 100% reserved seats?" Not just in this day and age, but I think historically, if you look at judgments from 70-80 years ago. His judgments would rank, you know, in the top five judges Pakistan has ever had. All of them will also cry out, and then eventually you will go to a complete one-man rule situation. That is where we are headed. Now, the only difference, you know, will be different external and internal factors as to whether that era, that dark era of politics, lasts for six months, a year, or ten years. Hello, Assalam-o-Alaikum. This is a very special episode for us. Now, at this point, Resident Legal Expert. The only benefit of a constitutional amendment is that it provides an opportunity to meet Salahuddin Ahmed. And this is happening very frequently. Now, Barrister is one of the youngest. If not the youngest. I don't know if you are the youngest. You became the President of the Karachi Bar Council. Are you the youngest? I think I was the youngest. And Salahuddin Ahmed has joined us. How are you, sir? Perfectly fine. Thank you for having me. You must also be tired, thinking, "I thought we would meet every two years to discuss constitutional amendments." Now we are meeting every two months. No, it's a very good thing. Our importance increases every six months when there is a constitutional amendment. Break down, absolutely simple. One, well, that's separate, isn't it? There is the Field Marshal perspective. Sorry. Yes, it's okay. And there is the FCC perspective. So, in fact, the Supreme Court is finished. FCC has been formed. Right? The provision related to FCC is that all the constitutional powers of the Supreme Court, interpreting the constitution, declaring any law null and void. Rather, even if any application is filed in the High Courts against any government action, even if it has no relation to the constitution, whether it is against an SAO, or against a Mukhtiar Kar Patwari, its appeal will also go to the Federal Constitutional Court. So, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court becomes very limited. In the Federal Constitutional Court, the judges, their appointments have been made. They were made in consultation with the Prime Minister. Some have been selected from the Supreme Court. One has been selected from the Sindh High Court, who was previously the head of the constitutional benches here, Mr. K.K. Agha. One who was previously the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan, now a lawyer, has been selected. So, they have, well, now formed a Federal Constitutional Court. Secondly, they were tired of the High Court judges because there were still one or two who would give an order here or there or rebel. So, for them, they have taken the power that we can transfer them whenever we want, and if you do not accept the transfer, then we will initiate misconduct proceedings against you in the Supreme Judicial Council. So, there, they have also tightened the screws on the High Courts. So, let's get it out of the way. We are both against the 27th Amendment. The judiciary is being buried, which is very bad. It is very good to have an independent judiciary. My tweet was also misinterpreted. I am not saying that it was done very well or that I am defending it. But even now, as we are discussing, I was also watching your speech at the Hyderabad High Court. You are saying to come out, but I don't think anyone will come out. Because of the role the judiciary has played, I think it should definitely exist. It is very important for the public. It is very important for the common man. An independent judiciary. Because right now, you might feel that these are constitutional matters, but when your matters come up, that will be the problem. And I think your show with Asad, Asad Raza, made a good point that when you bring in compromised judges, if they are compromising with the government, then they will also compromise with the real estate builder, then they will also compromise in a murder case. So, it does hurt everyone. But how do we convince the person on the street? Because he will be like, "Okay, look, the role of the judiciary, I understand that people, and especially politicians, keep painting it in a very simplistic way. Firstly, the judiciary, it's like this: if you say that the judiciary has given bad judgments, it doesn't mean that every judge in Pakistan's history has been compromised, or pro-establishment, or anti-politicians. Judges come into the judiciary, there are good ones, there are bad ones, there are good judgments, there are bad judgments. The same way as you don't say that when Pakistan was formed, you know, it had this population, it had this square mileage. Now it's half of that. Right? So, you don't say that it means that our, you know, the army has had such a bad role, or their political interference, so we should abolish the army, or politicians in parliament have also had similar roles, whether you talk about corruption, misgovernance, abuse of power, etc. So, you don't say that, "Well, let's also end parliament." At the end of the day, these are institutions. In those institutions, your effort should be to bring reforms so that there is some improvement. Whether it is parliament, judiciary, army, any executive, whatever it is, that thing, you not only overlook that. You do this: from time to time, I see this in parliament and I see this in the judiciary as well, that judges or politicians who try to show some independence, you go after them and purge them. Among parliamentarians, you file cases against them, NAB, FIA, etc., you know, anti-state activities, and you shut them down. Right? Eventually, they also realize that, "Okay, it's better not to speak too openly." And to their friends, who may not be as outspoken but are in between, a very loud and clear message goes out that, "If you speak independently, you will face the same fate." So, it's better to go along with the powers that be. You do the same thing with judges. And often, it's done with the cooperation of political parties. Look, now, often people, you know, politicians will cite judges like, you know, Safdar Shah dissented in the Bhutto case. Safdar Shah faced the same fate. He had to flee Pakistan. Right? During Zia's era. Now, let's take the name of Durab Patel. Durab Patel was also removed from his job by bringing in the PCO. Let's take the name of Fakhruddin Ebrahim. Then, when Musharraf brought in the PCO, there was a purge. Wajihuddin Ahmed, Mamoon Qazi, all these people, they were removed. In 2007, when there was a purge, the same thing happened. So, every, and in today's era, I believe that if we take Mansoor Ali Shah as an example, what is his crime? Right? The discussion is that Saqib Nisar did many bad things, and he conspired against the Prime Minister, this and that. Asif Saeed Khosa removed the Prime Minister. So, did Mansoor Ali Shah support Saqib Nisar? He was one of the dissenting judges. Right? Justice Saqib Nisar did not want to see him as the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court. He removed him from there and brought him to the Supreme Court, saying, "He is not working with my wishes in the Lahore High Court." Even when he was seated in benches, he dissented with him. Now, you know, when a narrative is created against like-minded benches. And, you know, we had discussions about that. I was also strictly against like-minded benches. We talked a lot about them. Umar Ata Bandial, in those benches as well, Mansoor Ali Shah was one of those who resisted against that. Now, the problem was that when that era ended, perhaps the expectation was that Mansoor Ali Shah would be a pro-PML-N judge. Which he was not. Right? He said, "This is strange to me too." I mean, if you, you know, put aside all the technicalities regarding reserved seats, even in common understanding, it makes sense that, "Look, if the Peoples Party and PML-N together have given 50% or 55% of the seats, why should we give them 100% reserved seats?" This is not the mandate of the people. Now, that is exactly what the reversal of the reserved seat judgment has done. That the party that got, let's say, 55% of the votes in the elections, and let's ignore the Form 47 and all that, but even as per declared results, got 55% of the votes, will get 100% reserved seats. So, it is something that strikes at the conscience of anyone. Now, when you expect that every time you will target and hound out judges who think independently from the institutions. Right? Now, you know, down below, in the Islamabad High Court, for example, these Babar Sattar ones, you also know that he used to be, when he was not a judge, and, you know, the era of Faiz Hameed was going on, etc., how much the PML-N people used to say that, "Better than him, there can be no better legal analyst than a PPP person." When it was his turn to become a judge, the Prime Minister was directly against it. Right? Imran Khan was against it, saying, "He talks too much." The judges who were pro-establishment at that time, or whom you call pro-Faiz Hameed judges, Right? They all opposed him. His elevation happened with great difficulty. Right? But now, because he still wants to make independent decisions. He still says that, "If the ISI's involvement was wrong in the judiciary before, it is not right even today." So, you say, "Well, get rid of such judges." When you systematically get rid of all independent people according to the needs of the day, then the institution cannot be independent, can it? Then every judge will think, "Well, whoever is in power, the establishment of that time, if Faiz Hameed is in power today, then go with him. If Asif Munir has come into power today, then go with him." Then you cannot make any institution independent. But this argument, the argument in the APRC is absolutely correct. One argument is made that, "Well, there is only one strong institution because that institution does not let other institutions form. When you let institutions form, leave them independent, obviously their initial performance will be bad. Then it will improve, then it will improve, then it will improve. But your initial premise, I do disagree with that when you say that no one says everyone is bad, but they do. If I speak today, we are saying that parliament has wronged the judiciary. If any politician comes and tells you that you are talking about parliament, but in this very parliament, there are MNAs who have always stood with the truth. Today also, the truth stands firmly. But when you say parliament, you don't mean every single individual. So, the fact that certain individuals in the judiciary historically have been right and have stood by their principles and have suffered does not mean that as a whole, the judiciary's track record has been very bad. Similarly, the independence of parliament is very important right now. I have talked about it a lot. The current mess, we were also discussing it offline. If the parliament is dissolved, and Shahbaz Sharif and Zardari and Bilawal Bhutto come onto the streets, saying, "We have been removed, support us." What will the public say? See, exactly this is the point. You can never, at least I don't think you can seriously argue that, "Okay, in parliament, and you are absolutely right, there are some good people too. Right? The overall performance has been miserable, but they also have it, that there were good people, they were not killed." No, but, but you, no serious person, I believe, and they do, some people. You are right. There are some people who say, "Let's just end parliament." Right? I don't think that's a serious solution. Because if you maintain this standard, that, "Well, if parliament's performance, people say the judiciary's performance is 135th in the world." Then I say, "Okay, fine, tell me. Is your parliament's performance in the top 10?" It is not. So, let's end parliament too. What is the alternative? If, and, you know, speaking, well, thankfully, you know, our army has had a very good performance. Right? But if you look back a few years. Right? It hasn't been like that. And people don't talk about it. But it's not. If it's not stopped, then you, my case, you, it's not a realistic solution for me to say that because the army of Pakistan has had a bad performance in these matters, abuse of power has occurred, so I should start advocating for the army to be abolished. These kinds of extremist and simplistic solutions, I believe, are not even worthy of serious debate. But in that, it's not the argument to do it. That's a straw man. The argument was the first question that when you go, no one is saying to abolish parliament. But the question was also that if Zardari and Shahbaz Sharif, Bilawal Bhutto, Nawaz, Maryam Nawaz, if they are removed tomorrow by passing a law, or by any means. If they go to the public and say, "Look, we are being wronged." How important is parliament? People will laugh at them. Similarly, when you say that the judiciary, well, the good people are gone, this and that, most of them have seen the way to remain in the system, to go with the system, not to go too much here and there. Success is this. Similarly, they have succeeded, compromised, and risen. After rising, all the privileges, good, we are an independent institution, plots are also named. Then the same people, if they come and say, "My independence, in abstract, I want an independent parliament. I want an independent judiciary. But if Shahbaz Sharif asks me to come to the street, or if the judiciary asks me to come to the street today, I will not go to the street and protest for these people." Look, there are two things in this. It is true that people sometimes emotionally say, "Well, yes, these are all thieves. It's good that parliament has been dissolved." Right? The realization, but invariably comes, and has come many times, that all these politicians are corrupt. We have ended parliament. Right? After two, four, eight years, people realize that, "No, running this country without parliament, running the country at the will of one person is not a better solution." I believe the same thing might happen in the judiciary in four-six months, it might take four-six years, but that same realization will definitely come, and it will come to these politicians and to the public as well, that, "Well, to abolish a judiciary whose performance has been lacklustre. Right? And often compromised, to replace it with a hand-picked, completely compromised judiciary. That is not the best solution." So, when that realization comes, then people say, "Okay, fine, we are bringing the 17th Amendment by ending the 8th Amendment, bringing the 18th Amendment by ending the 17th." And that is something that will invariably happen with this also. But this binary is also not false that when you say that you are abolishing the judiciary and hand-picking, earlier you used to hand-pick behind closed doors, now you are hand-picking in front of everyone. Earlier, the Judicial Commission, well, first of all, the Prime Minister is doing it, let's leave that aside. That will be a separate discussion. But now you have done it directly. After five years, moving forward, what is the composition of the Judicial Commission? How were your favorite judges elevated before? How will it be done now? We can absolutely say that, "Well, earlier, at least, some consideration was given to principles, customs, history." Now, it's completely out of control. But again, why should the person care that much that earlier hand-picking was 20%? Now it's 80%. Because that is, whatever reforms you have, the way to gauge them is that if, you know, there was 20% corruption and now there is 80% corruption, then your better solution, your effort should be to go from 20 to 10 and to five, not to go from 20 to 80 and from 80 to 100. Right? You have to remove those flaws or bring more. Now, for example, you talked about the Judicial Commission. Look, when this whole system of the Judicial Commission was formed, in the 18th Amendment, some changes were made in the 19th Amendment. Initially, one complaint was that these judges completely do as they please, they don't listen to anyone else. They marginalized the role of the parliamentary committee as well. Everything was there. And even, you know, it was like that the judges themselves did it. When that institution grew, it took five to seven years because initially, there was a larger-than-life presence of Iftikhar Chaudhry, he brought all the judges with him, due to various historical movements, this and that, his personal influence was also there. But eventually, when after he left, and then you look at the Judicial Commission, you will often find that there have been disagreements among the judges in the Judicial Commission. Serious disagreements have occurred. The selections of the Chief Justice of Pakistan have been turned down by the Judicial Commission. You know, judges have said, "No, what the Attorney General is saying is correct." So, that debate and dissent started. From the Judicial Commission itself, you know, during the era of Umar Ata Bandial, this debate started that, "Well, you set some criteria for the selection of judges in the Supreme Court and High Court, we frame some rules," and Bandial sahib resisted those things. Right? But that debate and dissent started, and some rules were made. They were not sufficient, but that process was being built. Now, you have basically said that we do not want to move towards improvement. Now, just as Chief Justices used to do as they pleased before, now the Prime Minister can do as he pleases. How is that an improvement? It is much worse. But the effect does not change. Right? If Umar Ata Bandial, I am giving a random example, if Salahuddin Ahmed and Shehzad Ghayas are judges of the Supreme Court, and we give a judgment under pressure from the army, instead of us, if Shahbaz Sharif and Asif Taar sit and give the same decision under the same pressure, this is exactly what is happening. That the campaign that has been launched against the judges, against the Supreme Court and Islamabad High Court, and other High Courts, it has not been launched against this particular set because they are from the army.

They were giving a verdict in favor, that's why it happened, because they went and gave relief to Imran Khan against the wishes of the establishment. Okay? You, neither you, now okay, among them, you say about some judges that no, they were their personal likes for Imran Khan. You say some of them are like that. But many of them were such that demonstrably they had no connection with Imran Khan. But they said that, "Look, I will not make all the decisions on the basis of the establishment's oath." So you targeted them for that. You did not target them for their crimes of collaboration. You targeted them for their crime of confrontation. So when you target them for that, then the results will obviously be the same in the future. Going back to, we will come back to the politicization, but in terms of, right now, the ones in resistance, they are exceptions. If we say, "Sir, Parliament has bowed down to the army," Parliament is doing what the army wants, that is a separate debate. Whether Parliament is legitimate or not, then the Supreme Court can also be questioned. How the current composition, the current Chief Justice was formed, whoever became, they rubber-stamped it. You yourself say that they are not even putting dates for the 26th constitutional amendment. Eventually, even if a date was given, the 27th came a week later. So, the judiciary that exists now, whom we want to defend, whom we want to uphold, if they themselves are carrying the dead body of the judiciary, then one of the four shoulders is that of the judiciary itself. Absolutely, I see it completely differently. Look, it was this judiciary that struck down the military courts, wasn't it? It was this judiciary, last year, the 26th amendment came for this reason. And it was this judiciary that said that, "Nevertheless, we cannot give 100% reserved seats to those who get 55% of the votes." This judiciary gave that verdict. To overturn it, the 26th amendment was brought. And after the 26th amendment, the judges of the hand-picked constitutional bench reversed both those verdicts. So to say that, "No, the judiciary was rubber-stamping before, and it is rubber-stamping now." The judiciary did not rubber-stamp last year, which is why the 26th and 27th were brought. But nothing happened against the 26th in the Supreme Court, right? You didn't even get a date? Absolutely, absolutely not. Because when the 26th came, with apologies, the Chief Justice and the members of the constitutional bench, who were effectively selected by the government, they were in agreement. Okay? And that is the problem with the 26th and the 27th. That when you systematically target and marginalize judges who are willing to take an independent stance, and you promote pro-government and pro-establishment judges, and you even build new courts for them, then matters will naturally head in that direction. Before coming to politicization, if we go back further. You mentioned Sakar Chaudhary, against the 27th amendment. I know it might be misinterpreted and it might seem like I am becoming an apologist. So for the record, the PPP-PML-N came into power through elections. Pakistan's basic problem is the army's interference. The problem is that they get things done through compromise. Now that being said, a disclaimer, we have also talked about the suo motu powers that came with Article 184. Should there be a narrow suo motu window? Absolutely, there should be. But what you have done, now if I tell you, "Look, you want coffee today." I will order coffee for you. Now you come tomorrow. Tomorrow, go to the Karachi Bar Council and tell them that whoever wants coffee, Sajad will serve it. A day will come. I am like, I am not even serving coffee to Salahuddin. So, the judicial activism that was exploited, I don't blame the parliament for turning around and being like, "Then don't have this power at all." Look, I am against the power of suo motu. And based on lived experience, in the 90s, suo motu was exercised and it was celebrated a lot. You know, people like, you know, Asma Jahangir and all these people used to upload that. You know, first of all, the case of brick kiln workers and all those kiln workers was taken up. Environmental issues were taken up. So, the progressive people of that era welcomed suo motu a lot. Then the abuse of suo motu started from 2005 onwards, right up to, I think, Gulzar's era. Okay? And after that, my views also changed. You know, initially, I thought suo motu is a useful tool, an effective tool, that you can directly go and provide relief to people who do not have access to the courts. But after seeing all the abuses, I think there is nothing wrong with abolishing suo motu. And whether it is the Supreme Court, if only this amendment was made that we are taking away the suo motu powers of the Supreme Court. I would have said, "Okay. Absolutely fine. No problem at all. Take it." You have taken away the powers of bench formation, the complaint that Chief Justices used to manipulate case outcomes by forming benches at their will. You have taken those powers. I say, you took them correctly. Okay? Chief Justices should not have the power to exercise their individual discretion and change the outcome of a case. Now, in this federal constitutional court, you have given those same powers back to Chief Justice Aminuddin. Okay? So that just shows that you did not have a principled position on abuse of power. Your position was only that our person should abuse power. Regarding the army, which we were also mentioning, obviously the army is orchestrating it. But PML-N and PPP also have their personal experiences. I do think that, in principle, it is a different matter. But based on their past experiences, they also want this to happen from the heart because they have been so scarred by the judiciary. Whenever Parliament has been dissolved, the judiciary has stood with the army, defended and promoted martial laws. Children think that the Munir doctrine is coming. The doctrine is from the 1960s, that is the problem of Pakistan. So, their personal experiences of the judiciary, if we also mention PPP's experience from 2008 to 2013, what the judiciary did to them at that time, they are also like, "Look, if the judiciary is to play this role, that it has to do judicial oversight. Judicial oversight in the sense that there should be a trichotomy of powers." But I think the Supreme Court assumed judicial supremacy, so bringing them under Parliament, I think, has also become like a personal battle for them. Look, the objection against the judiciary, which politicians often raise, is that the judiciary often became an instrument of the establishment, which is a fact, fair enough, absolutely. And the solution they offer is that we ourselves become the instruments of the army so that there is no need for the judiciary. Now, the interesting thing is that the new model that the judiciary has created, okay, they have created such a model that it is not even an instrument of the army or the establishment, it has become a part of it. Okay? So I don't understand how that is a solution. To me, in fact, their conduct seems like this: when a bully goes into the street, and the boys there beat him up, he comes home angry and beats up his wife, saying, "At least here my power works." So, I mean, that is the conduct. If your genuine problem was that the judiciary often compromises with the army, then you should have strengthened the judiciary, not weakened it further and talked about handing it over to them. It must have been very brainless content, you probably haven't seen it. Have you seen the slaps between Shami and Moizi? These are four or five poor children. Someone said this is very good content. One child is made to sit on a chair, and one of the four children behind him slaps him. He has to guess who slapped him. And when his guess is wrong, he gets slapped from behind. So these two slightly older children, Shami and Moizi, get very angry with each other. So, as Shami is sitting, whoever slaps him, he will say, "Moizi, Moizi." And when Moizi comes and sits, and then Shami will take revenge on him. Now, these four children are not thinking that the person behind the camera who is making the video, uploading it, and earning millions from this content, whatever he is earning, my real enemy is him. But because he got slapped by Moizi, he said, "When Moizi sits on the chair, then you see what a slap Shami will give." So, the judiciary and politicians are like, "We cannot go against the army, they are very powerful right now. So Moizi has to suffer. Moizi, when you slapped him last year, now you too." And in this, what I am seeing, and this is not about decades ahead, I am talking about months and years, that when Shami will beat them up, and this same Shami will beat up these same politicians, then that will also be a very bad beating. This is the problem of the public's disconnect from these institutions. I was also telling Khawaja Asif that when I ask him a question, I don't know if you got a chance to watch the podcast. Look, Imran Khan did this, and I was like, "He did this. Now you are doing this. Tomorrow, they will do this in your place. We, I mean, the public has no stake in it, right?" So these judiciary and politicians keep fighting amongst themselves. The individuals who are involved may not be the best because, again, as we discussed, the interference has been there, so the system is designed in such a way that you have to be the most compromised to get to the top. You people fight amongst yourselves, take revenge on each other, and Pakistan never moves forward. I think that is the tragedy. No, this is the jostling for power of the political elites. And I count the judiciary and the army as part of the political elites. In their jostling for power, and the bureaucracy, in that jostling for power, the public's interest is obviously not even secondary, it's tertiary. Or, you know, as is often said, that with the establishment of a constitutional court, cases will become very speedy. Okay? In the Supreme Court, normal cases will run, constitutional cases will run there. Now, hardly anyone even talks about the fact that, "Look, there are 3% cases in the Supreme Court. 500, I think, pendency. Yes, 55,000. Okay. 3% of the 2.5 million cases are in other courts." Now, for the past several years, we have been hearing about delays and postponements in the judiciary. At the time when the 26th amendment came, the then Law Minister, Azam Nazir Tarar, had stated that now we will also reform the Civil Procedure and Criminal Procedure. Those reforms are still sitting in the committee. Okay? They haven't moved beyond the committee. And the reforms that the Supreme Court had to do, the 26th amendment came, the 27th amendment came, only for those 3% of cases. And even in those 3% of cases, if you examine those 3% of cases, you will see that their lifespan, from the lower courts, from the civil judge or magistrate, coming to the Supreme Court, you will see that 85-90% of that delay of these 3% is also caused by the lower courts. The Supreme Court was comparatively making decisions the fastest. Decisions were made in a year, two years, three years. Below, cases would pass for 15-15 years and come. No reform about that, no attention towards that also. So naturally, there was no thought of ending these delays, of actually making the justice system effective for the public. One of the tragedies of this whole episode is that one of the few people, even in the judiciary, one of the few people that I had met who had actually talked about something concrete, because in speeches, in speeches, we all rant about judicial delays. But the one who had actually done research and talked about actually creating a system was Mansoor Ali Shah. That, "Look, this is how we should monitor the performance of judges. We should track cases through technology, how much work a civil judge is doing, how many cases he has, how quickly he is performing, how quickly he is giving verdicts. What is happening in the district court?" These things, you know, you said, "Look, he gave a wrong verdict in the reserved seats case, so remove him." And you had finally, for one, a possible Chief Justice who was actually working at the grassroots level, you sidelined him because, "Now, because we don't like Imran Khan, and he gave a verdict in Imran Khan's favor, so remove him." I have said this before also, and again, everything is seen through a polarized political lens. If all this that happened, whatever the fault was for 10 years, if this polarization had not happened, I think Pakistan would have been blessed to have had Qazi Faez Isa and Justice Mansoor Ali Shah as Chief Justice. You may disagree with their opinions. No one can say that as jurists, both are bad. Probably two of the best we have had. Apart from the fact that they compromised on principles, did this, gave wrong verdicts, gave them for wrong reasons, political things aside, purely as jurists, I think Pakistan would have done well to have both of them as Chief Justice. Look, you know, as far as Qazi Sahib is concerned, I think Qazi Sahib allowed his emotions to get the better of him. Then, and he made two or three more decisions as Chief Justice. One was the "ball" one, then his stance on reserved seats, then with what eagerness he accepted the Practice and Procedure, about which he himself was such an active advocate, that, "Sir, the Chief Justice should not be the master of the roster. This is a colonial concept." When the government made him the master again through an amendment, how eagerly did he accept it? I understand that his personal grudges against the Imran Khan government and, you know, Faiz Hameed, etc., he allowed that to completely subsume his judicial mind. Because otherwise, in the first two or three months of Qazi Sahib's tenure as Chief Justice, he was well on his way to becoming, you know, leaving a legacy as one of Pakistan's best Chief Justices. But in the next eight months, what he did, I think he has now established his reputation as one of the worst. So that is something, you know, that judges should think about. I am saying that if all this had not happened, if it had been running normally, my opinion from the beginning has been that Qazi Faez Isa, you should not have sat on this case at all because you were personally involved. Because it is not possible. Right? I am not married, but if I were, and my wife and I were dragged to court, the idea that I can sit impartially as a judge in something that affects the person who did that to my family, that is not possible. So, judges should also think about this logic of Iftikhar Chaudhry, that I am so good that I can even handle my son's case. I recall I did an interview with Matiullah Jan right after Qazi Sahib's case ended, and he directly asked me a question in which he said, "Do you think Qazi Sahib should now hear cases against Imran Khan?" I clearly told him that in my opinion, he should not hear them. However, Qazi Sahib did not understand this, and he even heard them. And because of that, he tarnished his legacy. Regarding Mansoor Ali Shah, the funny thing is that you talk about him, and that is why you see the government trying hard to trap him in some way, but no decision of his comes to hand that they can say, "He gave this big controversial decision. Look, he showed his partisanship." There is nothing. You know, there is no such thing apart from the one decision on which they object, the reserved seats. Apart from the reserved seats, they don't find any other decision of his where they say Mansoor Ali Shah was bad. Okay? So, in terms of pure legal competence. Okay? I think he was not just in this day and age, but I think historically, if you look at 70-80 years of judgments, his judgments would rank, you know, in the top five judges Pakistan has ever had. So it is sad. Apart from judgments, like for, I think Athar Minallah's judgments are also very good. He took up very good causes. Yes, historically, when things were against PML-N, suspicion, and his starting by being part of Musharraf's cabinet, that will always be a blemish against him. But more than maybe the judgments, I think the issue was that now, obviously, no one can verify, but as much news came out about what was going on in the chambers. Good. Letters were going to journalists. During the time of Qazi Faez Isa or Umar Ata Bandial, this also used to come out that the judges were about to punch each other. I think that, now, no one knows. A phone call has come. You can say, "Okay, that judge is suspect." Because these are tangible corruption allegations, even if we don't say evidence. But apart from that, as much news came out, some politicization had also happened, right? Which is why all this is happening. Look, I understand that all this partisanship in the judiciary, which we saw at the beginning, gained momentum after Qazi Isa's case, and obviously, he was being targeted by the Imran Khan government, you know, Faiz Hamid, and during that period, you know, the judiciary, and it was visible, sitting in the courtroom, visible, you know, judges started. One went into the pro-Imran Khan camp, the others went into the anti-Imran Khan camp, and the bad blood that was created, that never eventually got resolved. It happened that some factions moved from this side to that side, some from this side made a third camp, etc., whatever. But that bad blood never got resolved. And I remember that Munir Malik Sahib, during arguments, this was his plea, he said, "For God's sake, you know, don't allow the Supreme Court to become a venue for targeting your fellow judges, because this will never, you know, it doesn't lead anywhere good. And it has led to, you know, this new court." And this new, maybe, as you are saying, the 27th constitutional amendment, if you are saying the judiciary will not be independent, then tomorrow, political parties will also not be there, media will also not be there. So I think it is also right to point out.

Here, if a Supreme Court judge can be a target, then you who are sitting wearing robes, then don't think tomorrow that there will be no Supreme Court. Obviously, and this thing, you know, you can't point to a single country. You know, and I have said it before. Where there is no concept of an independent judiciary but there are still thriving political parties. It can't happen. For civil liberties to exist, for democracy to exist, a judiciary, even if not fully independent, a partially independent judiciary is necessary, right? Without it, you cannot enjoy civil liberties. And they will end, and they are ending, and they will end further. Then these political parties of ours, what can they do? So you are saying that all this is Imran Bhai's, Imran Khan's, Imran Khan Sahib's fault, he contributed his full share, and whatever was lacking, these people came and completed it. But why are you digging with a shovel? We brought a bulldozer, and after that, the screams of all these political parties will also come out, the remaining media that is left, which still says, you know, journalists who say, "Okay, it happened, it happened, it's okay, the judiciary also did this, they also did that, in 1954 also a wrong decision was made." The screams of all of them will also come out, and then eventually you will go to a complete one-man rule situation, that is where we are headed. Now, this is just the difference, you know, different external and internal factors will come into play, that period, that dark period of politics, it lasts for six months, a year, or 10 years. I think sometimes I get clubbed in that category. My sentiments don't come from being an apologist for this regime. My sentiments mostly come from being fed up, man. How much have we fought? I think I have fought so much at this point that I saw the writing on the wall a few years ago. Then I made a lot of noise. Then the water was at the ankles, it could still recede. Now that the water has reached the waist, I have given up. Now people are saying, look, it has reached the chest. I am like, it was bound to happen. Now this water will not recede. Now the mouth will also go in. Look, there are ups and downs. You know, when Zia-ul-Haq came, he even hanged Bhutto. People also came out on the streets. No, no, no, hardly, hardly. People even set themselves on fire. Yes, yes, there were three or four incidents. Okay? But there was no mass movement. Okay? The fact of it is. After that, you know, in '81, in '81, it started a little. Then in '83, etc. MRDism from Zulfiqar. No, no, there was. I am saying that initially there was no reaction. So if you, if you were sitting in 1980 today, you would have the same thought that brother, Zia-ul-Haq will sit for the next 30 years. Because it was bloodless, does that mean the nation is in favor of the coup? Yes. Okay. So from the perspective of 1980, you would think that this regime will last for the next 30 years. Then MRD also happened. Then international developments also happened, etc. Eventually, an internal, you call it a coup or whatever. But these things change. And the stance, I understand that one should not abandon it in despair. You take your stance. Results may come immediately, and sometimes results come very quickly here. Sometimes it takes time, but the fire has to be kept alive. But you feel that in immediacy, let's say, maybe even a year is too much. In a few months, a lawyers' movement can be triggered. Because even resignations, when Mansoor Shah, Athar Minallah's came, there were many rumors. And especially people like a certain Islamabad High Court judge. Like, of course, as Babar Sattari is talking, if something is happening, it came from Lahore too. But we haven't seen such mass resignations. Courts are also running, everything is running. Do you see anything triggering anytime soon? Look, I never expected mass resignations. It's possible that instead of three resignations, there might be five, six. Okay. At best, I don't foresee more than that. As far as the movement is concerned, the lawyers'. Look, at least in Sindh, I am seeing a lot more resistance than there was at the time of the 26th. When the 26th came, frankly, many well-meaning people were also saying, "Oh, maybe it's good, maybe some improvement will come." Then, after seeing the performance of the constitutional bench for a whole year, and then these further government actions, at least concerning Sindh, you know, on issues like canals, corporate farming, etc., all these things were seen. This time, I am seeing a different spirit in the lawyers. Whether it emerges into a full-fledged, you know, lawyers' movement, that remains to be seen. Even in fact, even in Punjab, at the time of the 26th, I don't think any procession even took place in Lahore, Islamabad, etc. Not even in Peshawar. Okay. This time, processions have taken place in Lahore. They have also taken place in Peshawar. So there is certainly a greater resistance. Now, one thing people often forget is about 2007. In 2007 also, and that's why I also pointed out the Zia-ul-Haq martial law also. And you know, the current times are effectively your one step removed from martial law. In 2007 also, on March 9th, when Iftikhar Chaudhry was removed, then pick up and see if there was any big protest, any big procession for the next two months. In front of the Supreme Court, in front of the Supreme Court building, 100-200 lawyers would gather whenever there was a Supreme Judicial Council hearing. No more than 100-200 lawyers would gather. That exploded when, I think it was May 5th. When Iftikhar Chaudhry, no, he came to Karachi on May 12th. Before that, I think it was May or the end of April. When they went to Rawalpindi, then went to Lahore. When they went there, the opposition parties had set up different camps in every city, every district, etc. Slowly, in that period too, despite the visuals being very different. There was a powerful president. You know, the Chief Justice was being dragged by his hair. But even then, it took two months for the pent-up resentment to actually translate into the streets. So I think there is certainly potential for that even today. We are not going to get into the debate because we have discussed this before also. Obviously, there are no extremes. There was pent-up anger, then there was support. Last night also, someone was asking me, why don't people come out? I said, for a year, Sindh came out for canals. In Balochistan, Maharangs are being detained. People are not stopping. Otherwise, all the big Maharangs' rallies happening in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were visible to everyone. Gilgit-Baltistan, Azad Kashmir were also blocked. The internet had to be shut down. Where are people not coming out? And we were in Clifton. Here, if not here, then not in Clifton. So the whole country is coming out. But if the protests happening are given 24/7 coverage, then people sitting in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad will be like, "The revolution has arrived here." So that convergence that happened in the lawyers' movement, sort of within the institution, on the military, media, opposition, which amplified it further. Then support came, it became much bigger. That is also not visible happening at all. It has made it tougher. Okay, look, the media has effectively been neutralized from 2014-15 onwards. Now only your social media is left, and even that, after Pika, now their Faiz reference, Dawn, Dawn, Dawn League, so after Pika, even social media is, you know, coming under scrutiny. The bars are also actively working on it, both the political parties and the establishment, to somehow bring the bars under control, to capture them. So creating that convergence has become more difficult. This is true, but I also often explain to my friends that, okay, the electronic media is a massive amplifier, but that doesn't mean that revolutions didn't happen before electronic media, or mass movements didn't happen before social media. They did. They are tougher to coordinate, but they happen. It takes time, there's back and forth. It happens, but yesterday I was also asked, how will change come? I said, you need a majority. He said, where? I said, in a room. If you get a majority in that room, the chances are higher. So what is being amplified on the media and why? So even of the Zia-ul-Haq you mentioned, historically, we are told that sweets were distributed. When Musharraf came, when Zia came. When you dig deep into it, you realize, no, there were many protests, sustained protests. Similarly, when Imran Khan was also removed, or things happened, I myself saw videos of sweets being distributed on TV with my own eyes. So why are videos shown? So, apart from the media being more independent than it is today, I won't be surprised if certain people said, show it, just like the Faizabad dharna, it is written on paper that you deliberately amplified it. Absolutely, absolutely. Kiani Sahib is often mentioned, etc. And, you know, my answer to that is that these things feed on each other. The public movement feeds on internal resentment, and internal resentment is fed from public movement as well. Tell me any successful revolution or any successful mass movement in world history that was carried out without the revolt of the palace guards. Always, whether you look at the Russian Revolution, the French Revolution, in Cuba, any regime ends only when, no matter how many people come out on the streets, the regime ends when the palace guards either say, "Okay, brother, the door is open, do what you want," or they themselves bring someone and present them. That is how regimes change, and even in the most widely popular, you know, French Revolution, in the end, the regime ends like this. So to say that at that time, look, that person was there, he himself was also against it, etc. Obviously, that happens, and it is also the public perception, you know, that plays into it, that when someone becomes widely unpopular, or a particular regime or a particular person, you know, becomes widely unpopular, then the palace guards also think, "Why should we get ourselves defamed in the whole world for this unnecessarily?" But those are also facts and narratives working together. There were many protests against Ayub Khan. Khan could not have gone against Ayub Khan without those protests. Yes. On the flip side, I do think there was resentment against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as well. But PNA won 30-35 seats. PNA was not a mass movement. PNA was made bigger than it was because of Zia-ul-Haq. Yes. That's my point, isn't it? That they both feed on each other. Sharif had won. Yes. Musharraf had no popularity. But no, there are absolutely times when the initiative comes from the palace guards, and there are many movements where the initiative comes from the public. Later, the palace guards also join. Now, it is always difficult to identify the exact cause and effect. People think that Imran Khan or PTI are fools. But it is quite clear to me. Even when Imran Khan was out, the change he wanted to bring about was not to be brought about in the public, but in a specific place. That enough people go against one person. Absolutely. I mean, the whole May 9th incident certainly does seem to be along that narrative. But I think generally, it's not necessary that everything is coordinated. Okay? "Taking advantage of the opportunity" also, you know, that is there. And whether you take the judiciary, parliamentarians, the army, at the end of the day, they are manned by people, and people get influenced by the tides of history, you know. So to say that something is completely pristine, organic, which, you know, has no support from the bureaucracy, no support from the establishment, no support from the judiciary, etc., that is an unrealistic view of history. The movements only succeed because both people outside power and people within power. But that doesn't make a difference. If you start a movement, you protest. If some general calls Jio and says, show me the protest, what was yours? What you are saying doesn't change. What you are doing doesn't change, you know. Okay, let them interfere in our affairs. Since you have already been hired to take my petition, and things are being said openly, then let one more be said. A falling wall, General Faiz. There are rumors that a decision is coming. Somebody was also asking me, what will happen? I don't know what will happen, but if something is to be done, then the 27th constitutional amendment was necessary before doing it. What do you think of this army? I don't think the 27th amendment was necessary for that. If you are talking about the judiciary, if you are talking about 243, then perhaps if you want to set a precedent that the head of the ISI can face real legal consequences. You want to ensure that whatever happens tomorrow, I never face anything close or similar to this. Look, these immunities, you know, they are criticized a lot. Practically speaking, I understand that neither constitutional immunities can save the President of Pakistan if there is a regime change, nor for that matter Field Marshal. The language change in, you know, 243 or 248, it's not that difficult for any court to pierce immunities legally speaking. In the past, many immunities have been pierced. In that, they have made exceptions, saying, yes, there is immunity, but it will not protect any act without jurisdiction or malafide intent, etc. There are 10,000 ways. I don't think the purpose of 243 is specifically related to Faiz Hameed Sahib. I think its independent purpose within the forces is to have a clear, you know, command structure to allow for a protected period for the army chief, you know, even beyond five plus five. Now, that five years will start from today, then after five years, then in Article 243, subsection four, if all legal tenures end, even then, if there is a state compulsion, we can ask them to continue performing any of their duties. So I think it opens the door to that. I don't know if it is specifically related to the trial, but frankly, I don't have any inside information as such, it's an outside analysis. Look, what you are saying, if the regime wants, it gets exceptions. But you have also given a potential regime a get-out-of-jail-free card, that in case it is decided behind closed doors that nothing will happen, you can send the public. What can I do? The previous ones saw that they were given immunity. Yes, this is a face-saving, a face-saving can certainly be there. Absolutely. So these, the remaining clauses related to Field Marshal, are they as important as FCC, or is this just a stamina cup? I think in terms of, you know, the civil-military balance or imbalance in Pakistan, I think it's possibly more important. That's fine, the elimination of the judiciary, that is very important in itself. The three pillars of the state, you have cut off one pillar and thrown it away. But the civil-military equation, if it was at 80-20, it has gone to 98-2. Okay, maybe I am giving too much credit. Like 99-1. Now you have written that we know. No, I understand. Look, writing also, you see, you said something about Imran Khan, that perhaps the audience was not the public. The audience was inside the room. That's exactly what I think about 243. The audience is perhaps not the legal experts, or journalists, or, you know, the general public. There too, the audience is for the people inside the room, that this is already there. Now, whatever decisions you make in the future, you have to make them keeping this reality in mind. So, that is perhaps the messaging. You know, don't get into any delusion. Don't look anywhere outside the lines, because this thing is now here. That two years, three years, four years, five years, six years, seven years, eight years. At some point, resentment also arises in the institution, that if the process of becoming a CEO, if that process itself ends, after enough people retire without getting it, that becomes a resentment. I don't know how that will be tackled in a few years' time, because like the Quran says, that we all make our plans. But God is the best of all planners. So our people also have the spirit of resistance. It's winter these days, so they are eating fruits, oranges. But when they understand, they might start eating mangoes. I don't think, and in this, I don't want to sound like a dictator myself. But I don't think the security of governments or regimes or tenures are ever eventually protected by words on a piece of paper. Okay? The constitution is a piece of paper to be thrown in the... Are you saying this? Look, these people, and this is in a sense. Okay? And many judges have also written on this, that the protection of the constitution is ultimately its people who protect it. Okay? And that applies whether it is a good constitution, that the people have the spirit that they say, "We have to preserve these constitutional principles in our country," etc. It also applies to bad constitutional amendments. Ayub Khan also made a constitution. Eventually, when, you know, the people also turned against it, and the palace guards also turned against it, then he had to pack up his own constitution and take it back. So it's ultimately people who count. Whether people inside the palace or people outside the palace. Both sides of this argument, I see the merits. Right? If Balochistan comes and argues that the whole of Pakistan continues with the 1973 constitution, how can we... the 1973 constitution passed...

You can also see what was done. This complaint is also valid. And it is also absolutely true that whenever you have ruined the constitution, in the end, you have returned to the 73 constitution. So, the legitimacy of the 73 constitution in the people, that has persisted over time. Even if places like Balochistan have had a terrible experience with democracy and the constitution in Pakistan. I agree with that, and that's why I thought that the constitution of 1973, I mean, and it has flaws. Okay? I am not one of those who says it is a perfect document. It has many flaws. Both textually and procedurally. Yes. Okay. And there is definitely room for improvement. But its resilience was one thing, its demonstrated resilience, you ran it for 52 years. When, you know, even after martial laws, it was revived again. Nobody actually, you know, just said that okay, now a new constitution will come. My fear is that, you know, from the actions of PPP and PML-N, the 26th, 27th, now I don't know, maybe the 28th, 29th will also come. From that action, see, I felt that at least in PTI, if you talk about Imran Khan, his entire narrative did not have a very prominent role for the constitution. Okay? His people, they wanted change, revolution, etc. From the 1973 constitution, even to the extent of lip service, you will find very limited statements from them, etc. For the People's Party, it is certainly a crowning achievement, a crowning achievement, and after the Charter of Democracy, all of Nawaz Sharif's speeches also prominently feature the constitution, the constitution, the constitution, etc. It plays a prominent role. My fear is that now that these two parties have jointly attacked the constitution, perhaps the mass public legitimacy that was in that document will be lost. My fear is, my apprehension is that when this period ends, okay? And I see these things getting darker before they get brighter, frankly. But when this period ends, my fear is that this 73 constitution, which was a, you know, basic foundation, that okay, all these things are now over. This era has ended, let's go back to that. Perhaps its legitimacy as a document will not remain. And you will have nothing to go back to. And if that situation, you know, that consensus you build, the political consensus you build, when that ends, then building a new consensus in a more polarized, in a more fractured Pakistan, it might be very difficult. It's also a philosophical idea, isn't it? How much do you change for a thing to remain what it always was? How many things do you remove and change? And you can still make the argument that this is still the original thing. And and this is what I mean, when you yourself sat and saw the previous assaults on the constitution because military dictators had done it, it was very easy to say that okay, scrap everything, or let's go back to 73, scrap everything. In the 17th amendment, what Musharraf did, by bringing the 18th amendment, let's go back to the original. When you yourself, political parties, sit and destroy its very fabric, its, you know, its basic structure, you have destroyed it. Then later, when, you know, regimes also change, then to say again that no, okay, let's go back. That becomes difficult to say. I also keep telling them the same thing. Not them. But they say no, back. I said no, from me, the same love. In that, you also said that in the 18th constitutional amendment, if it was really about constitutional courts, then it would have been done, then there was consensus. But I do, because these cannot be factual arguments, these cannot be opinions, that if it was like this, why not do it like that? I do feel that if it had to be done then, even if the Supreme Court and Iftikhar Chaudhry wanted it, it might not have been possible. Now, if they feel that, you know, the dogras are an order, you see, I think at that time, the People's Party, Iftikhar Chaudhry, no doubt, he troubled the People's Party a lot. I understand that there was a big mistake on the part of the People's Party itself. Okay? When Yousaf Raza Gilani became the Prime Minister. Okay? You agreed with PML-N that we will reinstate the judges. After that, you wrote in the document that we will reinstate Iftikhar Chaudhry. After that, you backed out. You said this was not a divine scripture. Okay? It was a political promise. You made people march on the streets for another year and a half. Okay? And there was no, this point is made as a political defense by the People's Party that no, we suspected that he was in league with Kayani. This and that. Brother, you yourself were talking to Kayani in Dubai. Okay? So you had no problem with Kayani. You also gave him extensions even after that. Okay? The problem, I think, was just one: we don't like him. The second was that Mr. Dogar, who was the Chief Justice at that time, had sided with them. He had also supported the removal of Musharraf. He had also been a junior to Qaim Ali Shah. So there was that relationship, a connection. So the People's Party thought, you know, this Mr. Dogar is better for us. So, they made Mr. Iftikhar Chaudhry suffer on the streets for a year and a half, and also spoiled relations with PML-N on that issue, among other issues. So after that, to expect that Iftikhar Chaudhry will come and will immediately be very favorable to the People's Party government, I mean, you know, this is also a mindset. It is 2020. Now it seems that maybe the smart thing would be that, you know, something has become so politicized, then on the judiciary, and if people think I am making a biased argument, I think the same could have also been applied to Qazi Faez: this thing has become so big, we admit a mistake has been made, we can give you all your perks and privileges too, but now you cannot come back to the Supreme Court because this has become too contentious. You, as a person, you see, if, if Iftikhar Chaudhry had been appointed in February 2008. Okay? And at that time, this same discussion was happening. And in fact, it's quite funny, actually. At that time, the lawyers' leadership was saying that the Chief Justices appointed under Musharraf's PCO, we don't accept the PCO. Prime Minister, just announce that from tomorrow, all the judges removed under the PCO, these judges should come and take their seats. That is all that is needed, an executive order. The People's Party's argument was that no, Mr. Musharraf has done the PCO, now the PCO has its own legal standing. Now it is not possible to remove this. We will reappoint the judges. Or my argument that the judiciary has made in the past. Yes, yes, yes, yes. So, our, so now it's a big problem because so it was the People's Party that was accepting the legitimacy of the PCO, and the lawyers' movement that was opposing it. Eventually, after all the noise and uproar, the same had to be done. All the judges returned by executive order, and then all the PCO judges were also out. But, but, okay. But if this work had been done in February 2008, then I think a lot of the subsequent problems the People's Party government had with Iftikhar Chaudhry would not have happened. God knows, you see, this simple thing that a person has become politicized, I don't say that, I mean, obviously, this is speculative, whether it would have happened or not, etc. But I also say that, you know, people say that this was Zardari's foresight, that he saw that Iftikhar Chaudhry would do this, so he was opposing him. Brother, if you had not made him suffer for a year and a half, perhaps he would not have done so. But yes, you don't know, you don't know. But you can also understand as human beings, you can understand that if I keep slapping you for a year and a half, you know, like you gave the example of Moiz Moiz, that I keep slapping you for a year and a half, and then I, you know, after that, say that now you become absolutely right. But the second, more importantly, what you were talking about, that look, I understand that if you pull, when judges become controversial, become politicized, look, the thing is, if you remove a judge unconstitutionally. Okay? And in reaction, a movement starts. There is noise and uproar. This and that, and then you say that, you know, now this person has become controversial, now he cannot be brought. Then you are basically condoning and legitimizing unconstitutional action. Personality worship is somewhat necessary. You talk about institutional supremacy. For instance, if Justice Mansoor Ali Shah has praised a lot. If he starts a mass movement now, I don't think they should, because it's not just that he entered politics. He is contesting elections, he can come as an MLA. I think a judge in particular is somebody who, by coming out on the streets and giving opinions, giving speeches, sort of, they lose their impartiality. They. Yes, there is an argument. But I also believe that the distinction you draw, you know, that an institution is one thing, and individuals are another thing. I believe that you cannot maintain the independence of an institution unless you maintain the independence of the individuals who are in it. If you think that, let's say, if a judge has taken a bold action, you say no, but let's say we were talking about Babar Sattar. Now, if you think that no, see, Babar Sattar by himself does not mean the Islamabad High Court, does not mean that the Islamabad High Court's independence will be guaranteed, etc. But when you say that it is not necessary to protect individuals, you can throw them out, humiliate and disgrace them, etc., it doesn't matter. We want the institution to become independent. It doesn't happen like that. The institution is the people it is composed of, and if you don't protect individual independence, if you don't protect these individuals from reprisals, from unconstitutional actions, then you will not have an independent institution either. I didn't put 'as'. I said 'individual'. If you had made Justice Jawad Khawaja. He is also with them. But he, in particular, a judge, you have also been to the UK. Literally, it is taught that a judge has to attend weddings and other events, interact in society. Because that is the idea of a judge. Right? If you attend a labor event, just your attendance at that event for a judge in the UK might make all your judgments contentious. So when you are holding a mass rally at one time, after that, to assume, we will argue on principles, what should be, what should not be, a person has so much capability, capacity, that they will give an unbiased judgment. You are saying, brother, how can he be unbiased? See, Moiz has been slapped, but if you cannot be unbiased, you have already ceased to be a judge. Otherwise, the difference is that in England, judges are not thrown out. Okay? They are not put under house arrest. Okay? Their hair is not pulled. Okay? Now, the problem I have with your approach is that what it basically does is that it encourages people to say, you know, let's just pick him up, make a reference against him, or throw him out by an executive order. He will fight later. Even if he is reinstated, we will say that now you have become controversial. Now you cannot be like that. So you basically encourage people to take unconstitutional action. Qazi Faez, at least, fought battles in the courts. Iftikhar Chaudhry has gone beyond that, hasn't he? After that, you are also ruining the institution. Keeping such an impartial judge. Look, if you look at the, you know, lack of impartiality as such, if you actually look, yes, there were certain decisions that, you know, went against the government at that time. Generally, judicial overreach. But see, overreach, in fact, judicial, judicial overreach, I think, happened more in the case of suo motu. Okay? That should not have happened. But to say that, you know, I think Chaudhry sahib, and now, the issue that is most cited, Yousaf Raza Gilani sahib's own. Now, that issue itself, now, okay, you can take a different view that, brother, the Prime Minister should not have been convicted in contempt. But if you look at it at the underlying basis of that case, it was that a Swiss court had ruled that a case had been filed against Zardari sahib, a conviction had been made. After that, the Government of Pakistan wrote to them saying that no, we are not interested in this case, please drop it. The court, then, the NRO etc. all happened. Okay. When NRO was, you know, ended, struck down by the court, that it cannot be that such a political party, in league with a dictator, says that all of us, we all want to be saved. Okay? I think NRO was a defective piece of legislation. Okay? It was favoring MQM, PPP, etc., that, you know, everything is forgiven. Forgiven for what was said and heard. NRO ended. They were told that, brother, you write to them again that no, you know, take action according to the law. It's not that the state of Pakistan has no position that these proceedings should be withdrawn. Resistance came from the government. And eventually, you know, Gilani sahib, he, you know, sacrificed for that. Now, you can disagree, I think definitely, that, you know, it should have gone to this extent, or not, etc. But principally, you should also concede, I think, that fundamentally, the matter is wrong, isn't it? That if you have, you know, you have criminal cases against you, you know, and you say that now we are bringing NRO, we say that all cases from this period to this period should be immediately dropped. You know, just because you are in the government. So I have problems with that exceptional approach to politics. Behind that, it is that, brother, then this is very convenient. Just as you were saying that you can politicize any Chief Justice, then he will never come. Then if a military dictator comes, and he doesn't like politicians, he files six cases. Now there are criminal proceedings against them. Now they cannot come. Brother, criminal proceedings, and ideally, the end. In how many cases have they actually been acquitted through the courts? You know, but in how many cases have they not? Okay? It should be that you, your judicial system, you, and it comes back to the same thing, that you bring improvements to the judicial system. Don't make the, don't make the courts just a handmaiden of the executive of the day. Okay? Because then this is what happens, because the government is of another party now, all the cases are ongoing against them, and you are not getting bail, and this and that. When it's your turn, all of them suddenly end. Then when it's the other's turn, they are revived again. You have to make your system more independent and more effective. A lot of the problem with even all of their. These politicians' cases too. A lot of the problems is that, brother, a person is attending 100 hearings, 200 hearings. Every time they come to Karachi, Islamabad, a politician comes to Karachi, attends hearings, has to attend hearings. Brother, you reform that system, don't you? But that all goes out of the window because you say, you know, we just need to get through the next four years at the top. Secure your peace for four years, or two or three years. Whatever happens later, God be with us. The problem is the same as Moiz Sami, that this cyclical argument is that, you know, the judiciary also does this, if you fix it, it won't do it. Then Parliament will say, you also did this to us, you are also bad. They said, brother, unconstitutional things also happened to us, so if unconstitutional things happen to us, then we won't do it either. You people, Moiz and Shams, you have to move beyond tit-for-tat if the country is to go anywhere. You have to move beyond tit-for-tat and sit down and, you know, talk about grand reconciliation, etc. Well, nowadays, it seems like an impossible thing to me. But there has to be a thinking that, you know, let's move beyond this tit-for-tat now. Let's stop ganging up and beating up the weakest member that we see in front of us. There were questions from three or four people as well, but since before concluding this discussion, as they say, the road to hell is paved with good intentions, the Supreme Court that was formed, the role of the Chief Justice that was formed, Iftikhar Chaudhry created many models and templates, which others also followed, Umar Atta Bandial, Saqib Nisar, Qazi, whatever you argue about degrees, that Saqib was at 10, Qazi was at 2, however it was done, but that was also not right. So your father was also very active. You were also very active. No one is saying that the lawyers' movement was started with wrong intentions. But the result it produced also caused a lot of damage to Pakistan. Yes and no, as always. I think in the lawyers' movement, if you, you know, the positives in it were that a dictator was removed. Now, whether it was 100% because of it, or 50%, or whatever, but it undoubtedly, of course, the lawyers' movement had a huge role in the departure of General Pervez Musharraf. Okay. The constitution was restored. Some judicial excesses certainly, you know, perhaps as a consequence, did occur. I understand that. And when judicial excess reached a certain extreme, the right proportionate response, in my view, was the Practice and Procedure. Okay? And you needed some reforms on judicial appointments. Okay? Define their criteria more clearly, etc. If those things had happened, then I think you would see the judiciary progressing in a much better direction. Instead, you said, just cut this tree and throw it away. Okay? Which I think was a foolish approach. You will inevitably, in one way or another, see a backlash. You will, whenever, you know, the memory of these things takes time to fade. Okay? First, you will see a period of great subservience among judges. After that period of subservience, you will see a period of great hostility towards anyone with an MLA or an MPA attached to their names. And that will happen, and you will fall into that again, that cycle. So basically, we keep removing these captains and say why is the team not improving? Neither Babar, nor Rizwan, nor Shaheen. If you open academies all over the country, you will get good cricketers after 20 years. But nobody wants to wait for 20 years. You have 10 seconds, man, that your. Why do politicians support the amendment only when they are out of power? Politicians support the amendment? Yes, naturally, because when they are in power, they want everything to go their way. Why make a new constitutional court? Was the Supreme Court too independent for your?

Comfort? I haven't created it, Tayyab. The very purpose was that the Supreme Court was not making many decisions in our favor. So first, we created a constitutional bench. To solidify that, we then created a constitutional court. Why was the amendment passed? So quickly without wider public consultation? And I think I also have a full video on this, that discussing it principally is a bit pointless. Because the way it was passed, you are already showing that malafide intention. The fact is, when you are genuinely doing something for reforms. Like the 18th amendment happened. Actually, you know, you think about it, you consult people. You ask, if this is done, what will be its repercussions, if this is done. So that is the process of public consultation when you want genuine reforms. When your purpose is to break someone's back, then you don't tell the whole neighborhood that I will go and break his back at night. The neighborhood gets to know anyway. Now, what cases are left with the Supreme Court after January 27th? The Supreme Court has appeals of civil suits and appeals of criminal cases left. The Federal Constitutional Court has, firstly, any case involving any kind of interpretation or provision of the constitution. That is one category of cases, and they are relatively fewer. And the biggest category for them is any case of a citizen against the government, which we call a petition under Article 199. The appeal of any citizen's case against the government will come to the Federal Constitutional Court. So whether your case is against the Prime Minister of Pakistan or against the SAO of your area. Its appeal will come to the Federal Constitutional Court. How can this loop be stopped where political instability creates amendments and amendments create more instability? I think we have discussed quite a lot. But I guess you break the wheel? People have to get together and break the wheel and break the mold. It is possible, it has happened in the past. It happened in '73. To some extent, it also happened in 2010. It is possible, but it will take time. Aren't judges also politicians because they can shape political outcomes and cannot be apolitical because a politically informed person has some political leanings. I think what is the difference between political and parties and ending? See, to some extent, and this is said against judges everywhere, and in academic literature to varying degrees, judges are also politicians in robes, etc. Naturally, there is a political view. Okay, if there is a judge who says that there should be democracy, and another judge says that democracy itself has created the problem in our country, then this is a political thinking. Both have political thinking. I don't think you can eliminate that political thinking from any human being. But you can eliminate the fact that a judge should not be loyal to any party. And I think that trend, we have not reversed it after the 26th and 27th, but rather enhanced it directly. Now, political parties are practically speaking interviewing High Court judges, Supreme Court judges, Federal Constitutional Court judges. They are grading them. So in that position, obviously, politicization will increase. We have a bad experience of elevating favorite judges to form a bench of like-minded judges, bypassing competent judges. This is also a failed endeavor. What then is the way out? But I guess 20% was bad, so it became 80%. See, I, yes, one, that 20% bad became 80%, and the solution for that 20% was very simple. If we genuinely wanted to end bench fixing or judicial appointments, then a merit-based criterion, a structured kind, in which we have discussed before that let's create some quantitative, qualitative checklist for grading judges, so that at least it's not 100% objective, never, but at least 70% objective. You would have had to do that for appointments, for bench selection. Instead of one Chief Justice, which was in the regional practice and procedure, you had created a three-member committee. You could have continued that, or now in today's era, you can even do it with algorithms, and it actually happens in many countries with algorithms, that you know judges have certain rankings assigned to the areas of expertise, like this is an expert in tax, this is in criminal law, etc. They have rankings of 1, 2, 3, 4. After that, the algorithm decides that, look, this is a criminal case. These judges should sit on it. So you could easily have that. But obviously, reform is not the agenda. The appointment of judges is carried out by the executive in many jurisdictions, including the US. It is not considered a threat to judicial independence. Why is it lamented in Pakistan? Because in the US, at least the Supreme Court is heavily criticized that it is a partisan court, it is a nakedly political court. Now, it is the era of Republicans, so they are rapidly, it has been reversed also, that when it was a democratically controlled Supreme Court, any Republican who came, they would dismantle him. As far as England and other Commonwealth countries are concerned, there the executive acts with a lot of regard for tradition. Okay? Democratic traditions have been established there. It is considered shameful there and politically unjustifiable that the Prime Minister would appoint his personal lawyer as Chief Justice. Okay? Or a minister, you know, the Prime Minister, that a person who has not practiced at all, but shouts slogans very well at rallies, should be made a High Court judge, and this has happened many times here. People with criminal cases, murder cases against them have been elevated. In fact, in the era of 196, during Mohtarma's government, such a judge was appointed to the Lahore High Court who had a murder case. He was on bail. The hearing of his bail was in the adjacent court, and he himself was sitting as a High Court judge. And even now, after the 26th, we are seeing appointments going very, very close to that. That democratic tradition, and there have been many reports on this from the Commonwealth, that where such democratic traditions are ingrained, there the executive, where it does not abuse its discretion, then it is fine, but in countries where traditions are not so strong, there, yes, any judicial commission or something should have a majority of the judiciary. Faisal is asking why you are not regularly coming for volleyball. Faisal is not coming. I am going. To what extent does the 27th Amendment impact the practice of lawyers as a busy litigator? Can you elaborate on the aftermath? A fellow lawyer referring to the aftermath which joked about the fact that even Makhdoom Ali Khan Sahib is now publishing articles every other day because lawyers with integrity have lost clients. See, one issue that naturally happens, and I have seen this clearly, it happened to me personally. You know, after the 26th, you know, when important cases that are not to the government. And for example, you know, there is some case, some bail matter, it is high profile, you know the government or the establishment is putting pressure from the other side. Then there are these cases that are contracted. Okay? You know, the Chief Minister or the Prime Minister's friend got it. Such and such a company was snatched away. Cases where you feel, you know, the government has a very strong interest. There, people are reluctant to go to court. Okay? There is some case, for example, you know, the issue of jobs, that the Sindh Public Service Commission, the appointments are happening on recommendation or are being sold. If someone challenges it, then what people used to do before, they often did, and their expectation was that they would get some relief from the court, and they used to get it. You know, in such cases, often, you know, we often highlight the top-level cases, you know, parliament was dissolved or those kinds of cases where questions are raised on the judiciary. But in these cases, like the contract was taken away from him, he was the highest bidder. It was given to the second highest because he is friends with so-and-so. These cases, you know, or government appointments, things like that, the judiciary often passed orders. Now the expectation is, public expectation, that it is almost impossible to get a decision against the government from the judiciary. When that expectation goes, then naturally people stop filing cases. Then their effort is to find a big friend and reach the government directly through him and get their recommendation. You are saying you are against the 27th Constitutional Amendment because your fees are decreasing. The joke is, I think, because he has been in the profession for 25 years. So now at this age, playing the role of a middleman. At the end, you said, brother Faisal Wada said the 28th is coming, so it is coming. So I will not put my shoes on the table. But what is the news on the grapevine? Provincial autonomy under threat? I think in the 28th, I don't think they will go to the extent of creating new provinces. Obviously, they show it, they do it. But one certain possibility is that it is about local governments. Okay? Article 140A, there are Supreme Court judgments on it too, to implement 140A, to strengthen it. Under its guise, I think they can do many things like appointing magistrates, etc., through which provincial control will be, you know, administrative units and so on. You can play with things, you know, give whatever name you want, local government, etc., but basically taking power away from the provinces. And the problem is that in some, local governments are a very good thing. But often you have seen that when even a good thing is done with a bad intention. Just like every dictator has also brought local governments, and then it is always reversed because the one who brought it and under whose guise he brought it, was so malafide, and so much criticism has been received from the public that even a good measure gets reversed. So one thing I see is something like local governments and administrative units. Financial aspects, NFC, even if they don't formally change the NFC, the limits, the provinces' shares, they don't reduce them, they can do it from here or there, bring some other mechanism so that money can be clawed back from the provinces to the federation. So that will definitely, I think, also happen. I have started watching government propaganda videos to understand the issues with NFC. So if these videos are coming, it means something is definitely going to happen. See, the issue, the issue, they clearly say that look, if we give so much money to the provinces, then after paying our debt interest, we won't even have money for the army. If we have to do that, then we have to take money from the provinces. So they will say now, whether they take it by this name or that name, they have to take that money. And provincial governments should be clear that we have to protect our powers, and even, you know, this talk about education, etc. Now, even Imran Khan was talking about a single national curriculum. That also speaks to me for a long-term project when you go to this point that everyone's education and curriculum should be the same, we should believe in the same thing, then that speaks of someone who is coming with a project to change an entire generation. So it is something to worry about. I think the silver lining on this dark cloud is that we meet in the F. We do podcasts in the F. In the 28th, in the 28th, we will sit and chat. Thank you so much, sir, for your time. Thank you for listening. Take care. Goodbye. Thank you.