Transcription
The South China Sea is one of the most contested places on Earth. More than 3 trillion worth of trade moves through these waters every year. That's why most people assume the conflict is about shipping routes, fishing grounds, or the oil and gas buried beneath the seabed.
But what if we have been looking at the wrong thing? What if the real reason China cares so much about the South China Sea has nothing to do with trade, fish, or even oil? According to Singapore's former foreign minister, George Yeo, the answer lies deep beneath the water. Because at its core, this may be a story about one thing, nuclear survival.
"China says it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. So, it must have a deterrent capability. The US has been quite determined to deny China a counter strike capability. Because if it's just conventional warfare, repeated scenario war gaming by the Indo-Pacific Command, by RAND, shows that in a conventional war around Taiwan, the South China Sea, America cannot prevail. So, they must be able to threaten nuclear weapons. But if China can threaten back, then that threat is blunted. So, China has a few hundred warheads. America has many thousands. And China is thinking of putting their ICBMs on high-speed rail. It's about the same length of the carriage. Uh but they can't be sure because a few hundred, you can take every one of them. Yes, you have tunnels, but I know where the tunnels open and where they close, and I can close them. China's strategic bombing is very backwards, relatively speaking. So, they are very dependent on strategic submarines, Which is why the South China Sea is so important. It's not about navigation or shipping. At the core of it are nuclear submarines. You know, in Sanya they have a a facility like you see in James Bond movie, you know, deep down below the submarines come out. The Americans cover the seabed. They have all kinds of drones, uh seabed arrays, surveillance to monitor all the Chinese submarines. And the Chinese harass American submarines and encourage the fishermen to fish out American drones. They pay much more for a drone than for a tuna."
"I see. So, there's a game going on which is not much reported but which those who are interested follow. But just to be sure, China will increase its warheads to maybe a thousand, maybe more. So, that whatever you do you can't take out all my counterstrike capability. And without a counterstrike capability America's ability to prevent reunification of Taiwan will be severely blunted."
At first, that sounds strange. After all, what does a body of water have to do with nuclear weapons, right? The answer begins with a simple question. How does a country make sure nobody's there to attack it? For centuries, the answer was straightforward. Build a bigger army. Build stronger defenses. Build more weapons.
But in the nuclear age, everything changed. Today, countries like the United States, China, and Russia don't just want the ability to launch nuclear weapons. They want something even more important. They want the ability to survive one. This idea sits at the center of modern nuclear strategy.
Imagine two people pointing loaded guns at each other. Neither wants to shoot because both know they will be shot in return. That fear keeps both sides from pulling the trigger. Nuclear deterrence works in much the same way. A country must convince its rivals that even if it suffers a devastating first strike, it can still strike back. Military planners call this a second strike capability. Without it, deterrence collapses.
And this is where geography suddenly becomes incredibly important. China is now the world's second largest economy. It has the world's largest navy by number of ships. It spends hundreds of billions of dollars every year on defense. But if you are Chinese strategists looking at a map, you immediately notice a problem. China is actually surrounded. To the east lies Japan. To the south is Taiwan. Further south are the Philippines. Many of these countries are close security partners of the United States.
Now, look at the waters surrounding China. Much of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea are relatively shallow. Shallow waters makes it easier to detect submarines because there are fewer places to hide. Imagine trying to hide a whale in a swimming pool. It's much harder than hiding it in the open ocean, right? And submarines are critical because they are considered the most survivable lake of a country's nuclear forces. A missile silo can potentially be found. An airbase can potentially be destroyed. But a submarine hidden somewhere in thousands of square kilometers of ocean is a completely different challenge. That is why nuclear submarines are often described as the ultimate insurance policy. The United States has relied heavily on them for decades. Russia does the same, and now China wants that capability as well.
This is where the South China Sea enters the picture. If you look at the normal map, the South China Sea doesn't seem particularly special. But if you look at a map showing ocean depth, everything changes. Large parts of the central South China Sea plunge thousands of meters deep. Some areas are deeper than 4,000 m. That's roughly the height of more than 13 Empire State Buildings stacked on top of each other. Deep water creates a much better environment for submarines to operate undetected.
For Chinese military planners, this creates a major opportunity. China's southern coast sits right next to these deep waters. On Hainan Island, China has developed one of its most important naval facilities. This base gives Chinese submarines direct access to the deeper parts of the South China Sea. Instead of traveling through long stretches of shallow water, they can move into deeper areas much more quickly. And that matters because every extra hours a submarine remains hidden increases its value as a deterrent.
This has led many analysts to believe China sees the South China Sea as more than just a trade route. It may also see it as a protective shield. Military strategists have a term for this concept. They call it a bastion. A bastion is essentially a protected zone where nuclear submarines can operate under the protection of friendly forces. Think of it like a heavily guarded fortress. The goal isn't necessarily to dominate the entire world from that fortress. The goal is to make sure your most important assets survive. Russia pursued a similar strategy during the Cold War. It concentrated submarine operations in protected waters near its territory where its navy and air force could help defend them. Many observers believe China is attempting something similar today.
And suddenly, a lot of China's action start looking different. Take China's island building campaign. Over the past decade, China transformed tiny reefs and outcrofts into large artificial islands. Some now contain long runways, radar system, ports, and military facilities. To many observers, these islands seem puzzling. Why spend enormous amounts of money building infrastructure on remote reefs hundreds of kilometers from major cities? If the goal was simply trade, it wouldn't make much sense. Commercial ships already travel through the region without needing artificial islands.
But if the goal is to monitor and protect strategic waters, those islands become much more understandable. They function like a network of lookout towers. They extend radar coverage. They support aircraft operations. They increase China's ability to monitor activity across vast stretches of ocean. In other words, they help create protective umbrella under the surrounding waters.
Of course, this is exactly why the US and many neighboring countries are concerned. From Washington's perspective, the issue isn't just about reefs or islands. It's about balance of power. For decades, the United States has maintained a strong military presence throughout the Pacific. American leaders argue that freedom of navigation and open access to international waters are essential for regional stability. If one country gains overwhelming control over a strategically important sea, it could potentially reshape the security landscape of the entire region.
So, while China may view many of its actions as defensive, others often interpret them very differently. And that's what makes the South China Sea dispute so difficult to resolve. Both sides are often looking at the same map, but seeing completely different things. China sees vulnerability. The United States sees expansion. China sees security, but its neighbors often sees pressure. China sees it as a shield, others sees it as a sword. Isn't that right?
This is why disputes over the reefs, coast guard vessels, and military petrol patrols can become so intense. What appears on the surface to be an argument over rocks and islands may actually be connected to something much bigger. A struggle over military strategy, a struggle over regional influence, and perhaps, most importantly, a struggle over how a rising China intends to protect itself in an increasingly competitive world.
George Soros' insight doesn't necessarily explain everything happening in the South China Sea, but his argument highlights a factor that is often overlooked. Sometimes, the most important battles are not about what we can see on the surface. Sometimes, they are about what lies hidden underneath. Thousands of meters below the waves, where invisible submarines patrol the darkness, carrying weapons powerful enough to shake the decisions of nations. And if that is true, then the South China Sea isn't just a dispute over water. It is one of the most important strategic battlegrounds of the 21st century.
So, what do you think is really driving the tensions in the South China Sea. Is it really about trade and territory like most people say? Or is it something deeper like what George Yeo suggests? Drop your thoughts in the comments sections below. If you like what you watch, hit the like button, and more importantly, don't forget to subscribe to this channel to show your support. Thank you for watching.