Transcription
The United States and Israel actually suffered a stunning defeat. Not many people in the mainstream media in the West will admit that, which is hardly surprising, but it is true. And if you look at the negotiations that are taking place, it's quite clear that the United States has conceded on almost every demand that the Iranians have made. It's really quite remarkable.
>> To the show, John Mearsheimer and Yanis Varoufakis.
>> Thank you for having us.
>> Of course.
>> Thank you. Um, I'm glad to be here with both you, Katie, and Yanis.
>> Yes, I'm really excited. I've interviewed each of you, but I haven't interviewed both of you together, and I think this is going to be a really fascinating discussion um with two people whose brains I really admire and um, I think it'll be uh really interesting to see where you guys uh overlap. Maybe there'll be some divergences, but I think mostly there's a lot of overlap, and that's what we will be emphasizing to start off with. So, um, I want to to throw this question out uh, either one of you can start with. Where are we now with the Iran war, and is this a watershed moment, and if so, how?
>> I'll say a few words just to start, uh, and I'll focus on where we are. And the question of whether it's a watershed moment is another big question, and I don't want to deal with both of them at once, but just on the where we are question. I think the United States and Israel started this war thinking that they were going to win a stunning victory. They did not, and instead, we've actually suffered a stunning defeat. Uh, not many people in the mainstream media in the West will admit that, which is hardly surprising, but it is true. And if you look at the negotiations that are taking place, it's quite clear that the United States has conceded on almost every demand that the Iranians have made. It's really quite remarkable. And what J.D. Vance is now trying to do is just operationalize this set of demands uh, that we have agreed to. Uh, and uh, President Trump, of course, can barely bring himself to admit that we have lost. Uh, and therefore, what he's doing is going to great lengths to claim that we have won. And if the Iranians don't recognize that, he's going to bomb them again and so forth and so on. But this is all nonsense. We have no military option. If we had a military option, we would have used it a long time ago. The fact is that the last thing the United States wants to do is restart the bombing campaign. We just want to be done with this war. We accept the fact that we have lost. And I'll just add, before I turn it over to Yiannis, that I think the principal driving force here is not simply that we don't have a military option. It's also the fact that we're facing an economic catastrophe. Uh, and President Trump has actually said that. He has used those words, economic catastrophe. He has said that he does not want to be Herbert Hoover. Uh, implying very clearly that he does not want to be responsible for starting the second Great Depression. And the fact that these economic factors are so powerful, uh, coupled with the fact that we have no military option, is what puts us in this position where we have no choice but to surrender. Uh, and if you look at what's going on, uh, this is what you see happening, despite the fact that it's not the conventional wisdom at this point in time in the Western media.
>> Well, I endorse every word John said. Uh, some lament the fact that so much carnage and economic damage has been inflicted uh without changing the status quo. The Strait of Hormuz might open. They were open before the war, before the bombs started raining down upon Iran. Uh, others claim, and I think there is an element of truth in that, that the best these negotiations will yield for the Trump administration is something like the 2015 Obama accord, um, Obama European Iranian accord. I think that uh, along the lines of what John just said, that the defeat of the United States of America, of this administration, is sensational, because I can't begin to see how Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, less so the United Arab Emirates, because they're far more gung-ho about their alliance with Israel, uh, how they can go back to that false sense of security that the United States offered them under their umbrella. Uh, I can easily imagine um, moves by, you know, the Gulf states, not only to find a modus vivendi with Iran, but to accommodate Iran's geopolitical uh, regional designs in their own thinking. So, this has been a major catastrophe. I also, I don't know about you, John, but I refuse to believe that Donald Trump couldn't see this. Uh, it's clear to to me that from his first administration that he was avoiding um, you know, falling into Netanyahu's trap and bombing Iran like the plague. So, what happened now? Did he suddenly believe Netanyahu when he told him that the few bombs will bring about regime change? You know, I don't have a high opinion of Donald Trump, but I don't think that he's that dumb. So, you know, the question is, what was the leverage, the compromat that they had on him? That's the only I, you know, I love conspiracy theories, but you know, we do know that Israel has excellent, excellent surveillance devices. I live in a country where our prime minister uses a lot of those devices in order that he controls everyone by having compromising material on them courtesy of the Israelis.
>> Mhm. It is, it is hard to understand why Trump was foolish enough to enter this war. Let me make the counter argument against you, which is not to say you're wrong. We may find out that you are right once more evidence comes out. But the counter argument would be that we actually fought a war. We, meaning the Israelis and the United States, fought a war against Iran last June. This is the 12-day war from June 13th to June 25th, 2025, and we were quite successful, and Trump certainly felt he was successful. Remember, he claimed on June 22nd, 2025, almost a year ago, that that one-day bombing campaign by the United States had destroyed forever Iran's nuclear capability. So, that precedent, I think, gave him a sense of optimism. And then he had been very successful with the Venezuela operation. Of course, there's no parallel between what happened in Venezuela, which was just a kidnapping operation that took a couple hours, and where they had the cooperation of the Venezuelan military on the ground. No American casualties. So, this was a very different situation. But nevertheless, I think you could argue that Trump felt he was on a roll, that he was being very successful with his employment of US military force in Iran in June 2025, then again in Venezuela. And along comes Netanyahu and David Barnea, who's the head of Mossad, and they convince him that we have the magic formula. Uh, that if we launch a shock and awe campaign and we decapitate the regime, uh, this will lead to regime change, the new regime will surrender, and the war will be won very quickly. And Trump just was uh enamored with that idea. And he had great faith in the Israelis, and he went along. That's the alternative explanation. But to come back at it from the other side, from where you were going, what's very surprising is that almost all of his, all of his aides, according to the New York Times story outlining the position of all the principal actors inside the US government on this issue, were opposed to the operation. They thought it was a bad idea. Of course, we know from the historical record that there's no case out there where air power alone caused regime change. And his aides, most of his aides anyway, the head of the CIA, Secretary of State, and the Vice President understood this and argued against the operation. But Trump went along anyway, which supports your basic point that maybe the Israeli secret leverage. Uh, who knows for sure.
>> Uh, John, the reason why I, I'm tempted to reject this scenario, the scenario that uh was caught up in the um, his own successes in Venezuela and in uh Iran in in June is uh that, you know, when you set as your objective regime change, that is very different to a mere decapitation sortie. Uh, so, you know, think back to his first term when he decapitated uh Soleimani. Um, he just took out the num-, the top dog of the uh Iranian military. Um, but he hadn't promised the world or the American voters that he was that was going to bring about um, a momentous change in the the the geopolitical map of the Middle East of uh of Iran. Um, again, June, the the the the bombardment, the 12-day, not wasn't really a war, it was a series of bombs with large bombs that fell uh on the nuclear facilities of Iran. Again, um, my interpretation is that he did it in order not to set himself the task of regime change. Um, Venezuela, as you said, is was a completely different kettle of fish. Um, it was um, a foregone conclusion um, um, setting aside the possibility of some disaster of helicopters uh, Apaches and so on crashing against one another. Um, the regime had already fallen um, in Venezuela before he started his operation. So, I, I don't, I don't, you know, I think that however uh, despicable he might be as a human being and however uh, inarticulate he may be, he's smart enough strategically to know that you don't promise the world regime change uh, by bombing Iran.
>> Let me reinforce your argument by coming at, coming at it from a very different angle. And let me just talk a little bit about the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961. Uh, JFK moved into the White House uh, in January of 1961. And of course, in April of 1961, the United States helped launch the infamous Bay of Pigs operation where Cuban exiles uh, tried to invade Cuba to overthrow Castro. Almost everybody who looked at that scenario before the actual launching of the attack knew it was doomed to fail. It, it's, it's hard to believe that the United States actually launched this operation. Now, what was going on here? I think what was going on is that the CIA, which was behind it, understood the operation would fail. But they believed that they would trap Kennedy into using American military force. Remember, the invading force was Cuban exiles, not American military forces, because the CIA couldn't get the president to use American military forces to overthrow Castro.
>> Mhm.
>> So the CIA, I believe, knowing that the operation with the Cuban exiles would fail, pushed the operation forward anyway because they believed that Kennedy would double down once it failed. And of course, Kennedy did exactly the opposite, and he fired Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA, as a result of the failed operation. Now, fast forward to this one. One could argue that the Israelis knew this would fail. And what they were trying to do was trap the United States into a war where it would have no choice in the end but to go in with its own military forces and topple the regime. Let me add one other dimension to this. What's very interesting is that David Barnea, who was the head of Mossad, played a key role along with uh, Prime Minister Netanyahu in convincing Trump that this cockamamie scheme would work. But what's interesting is that uh, Barnea's predecessor, who was the head of uh, uh, Mossad, a man named Cohen, thought this was a crazy idea. He, he knew it wouldn't work. And it was Barnea who flipped the script. And I think that Barnea and Netanyahu might have understood, like Barnea's predecessor did, that this was just not going to work. It was not going to work in the sense that a shock and awe campaign was going to overthrow the regime, but it was going to work in a sense that you would entrap the United States into this war, and we would ultimately have no choice but to topple the regime. But in the end, what's happened here is that President Trump has acted the way President Kennedy acted. Kennedy bailed out. He did not fall into the trap. Trump definitely initially fell into the trap, but now he's trying to get out of the trap.
>> I agree entirely with your uh, analysis. Everything you offered. Uh, the only thing that I'm worried about, John, and Katie, is that uh, we haven't seen the end of this yet. Maybe the Netanyahu strategy is going to work because Israel has the capacity to undermine this agreement not just in Lebanon but more generally with the Houthis with various other triggers that it can pull and, you know, bring the Americans back into the game on their side. I hope it doesn't happen. But it's, we're not out of the woods yet. This deal is not set in stone. It can be overturned and overthrown and undermined tomorrow by some other massacre in South Lebanon. And what, what I really appreciate in the historical parallelism that you bring to bear on this discussion
>> [clears throat]
>> going back to Cuba but also implying that uh, absolutely correctly, that one of the thing that students of American United States interventions abroad, let's call them that mildly, is that there is a structural conflict within different, different, different nodes within the American decision-making apparatus. There's no doubt that as we speak in Washington D.C. and maybe beyond that, there are, you know, different views as to what the next step should be. There may very well be clashes between the CIA and the Pentagon or parts of the Pentagon. There is definitely a clash of interests between Big Tech and Wall Street on the one hand and the military industrial complex on the other. So, it is always very helpful to keep in mind the fact that the United States is not one solid coherent act.
>> Although if we take a few steps backwards to get a see a larger picture, how would you define the American grand strategy now at this point in history that is, you know, during the Cold War, the grand strategy with, you know, one rival, one other center of power with one competing ideology. It was, you know, the the grand strategy of containment and all the other components. It, it set a clear goal which kind of brought more or less the whole political class together. All other strategies were kind of had to be subordinated to this wider grand strategy. What is it today? How is the United States dealing with the the massive changes in the world and its own role in this world? That's a large question for a, yeah, but um
>> Well, I think when uh, me and my friends or my friends and I thought about grand strategy over the decades, we always used to argue that obviously the Western Hemisphere is the most important area of the world to the United States, but given that the United States is a regional hegemon, there's no serious threats in the Western Hemisphere. Um, the question is, what are the areas outside of the United States that matter the most from a strategic point of view? Where, where are our vital interests at play around the world?
>> [snorts]
>> And I think most people in my circle agreed that the three areas that mattered the most were Europe, East Asia because there were great powers in Europe and East Asia. Uh, and the Persian Gulf because oil was there. Those were the three key areas of the world outside of the Western Hemisphere. Uh, and during the Cold War, we focused mainly on Europe because the Soviet threat was centered in Europe. But, the Soviet Union uh, was and Russia is physically located in East Asia, as we both know. So, we cared about containing the Soviets not just in Europe, but in East Asia as well. Uh, and the Persian Gulf was the area where we had to do the least amount of work. Uh, the British did the heavy lifting in the Gulf up until 1968. And then after 1968 up to 1979, we depended on the Iranians. This is under the Shah, the Saudis, and we didn't have any great threat. After 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and um, uh, there was the revolution in Iran, and Iran was no longer an ally, we built the rapid deployment force, which was an over-the-horizon capability. In other words, we were not physically located uh, with military forces, or we didn't have many military forces physically located in the Gulf. We had this rapid deployment force, which again was over the horizon. So, you see that during the Cold War, we cared about Europe. We cared about East Asia. And we cared about the Gulf. Uh, then comes the multipolar world that we're now in. And China is the principal threat to the United States, and therefore we pivoted to Asia. And there was a lot of talk about pivoting away from Europe and minimizing our commitment to the Gulf because we didn't see any great problem in the Gulf. Uh, we thought we had things under control. Uh, and with regard to the Western Hemisphere, um, you know, things were pretty in the Western Hemisphere. Uh, no serious threats to the United States. Along comes the Trump administration back into the White House January 2025. What you see is that President Trump decides to make the Western Hemisphere a high priority. And we're deeply involved in social engineering and military engagement in the Western Hemisphere. If you look at what's happening in Venezuela, if you look at what's happening with regard to Cuba, if you look at President Trump's rhetoric about the Panama Canal, about Greenland, and making Canada and making Canada the 51st state, the United States is paying a lot of attention to the Western Hemisphere, which kind of befuddles me because I don't think we face any serious threats at this point in time in the Western Hemisphere. But nevertheless, we are deeply involved in doing social engineering and even maybe acquiring territory in the Western Hemisphere. You want to remember that President Trump said at the time when we captured President Maduro of Venezuela that the United States now, or he, he now runs Venezuela. And that he basically viewed Venezuelan oil as American oil. It's really quite remarkable. So, you can see that we're on the march in certain ways in the Western Hemisphere. With regard to the Gulf, we're now involved in a major conflict with Iran. It's really quite amazing. One can make the argument, Glenn, that we will eventually leave the Gulf. That we can no longer maintain military bases there. Our alliance structure is in tatters. That may happen, but for the time being, if you look at American grand strategy, we are up to our eyeballs in alligators in the Persian Gulf. Uh, and as I said, we're deeply involved in the Western Hemisphere. With regard to Ukraine and Europe, as we talked about earlier in the show, it appears that President Trump is more or less re-engaging in Ukraine, uh, getting more deeply involved. And one could argue, Glenn, as the tide turns against Ukraine, which you and I know is happening as we speak, uh, that the Russians will feel, excuse me, the Americans will feel compelled to move in and do everything possible to rescue Ukraine so as not to suffer a humiliating defeat. And then there's East Asia. That is what the Pentagon calls the pacing threat. So, we're not leaving East Asia. Uh, and if you look at what the Chinese are likely to do over time and what the Americans are likely to do over time, that's a dangerous area of the world. Uh, I wouldn't be surprised if 10 years from now or even 5 years from now, when you and I are talking about all the problems in the world, uh, that China is not at the top of the list. Uh, So, all of this is to say that the United States, under President Trump, has a remarkably ambitious grand strategy. Think about what I said about the Western Hemisphere. Think about where we are in the Gulf. Think about where we are vis-à-vis Ukraine. And think about the pacing threat, China. Uh, we don't seem to believe in the word prioritizing. Uh, the United States still labors under the illusion that it can be everywhere and do everything all the time. Uh, and uh, I think that's where American grand strategy is at the moment. Uh, I think we could have a long conversation and we should do this the next time we talk or maybe do it the next time we talk about where American grand strategy is headed. You know, once uh, these various conflicts are behind us or they sort themselves out, and here we're talking about Ukraine uh, and uh, and Iran and also to some extent places like Cuba uh, and Greenland uh, then we can maybe get a clearer picture of American grand strategy. But I do think, Glenn, we, the United States, are going to have to learn to prioritize. I think this idea that, you know, we can maintain this militarized state that's involved uh, in really deep-seated ways in all four of these regions uh, it is not uh, is not workable over the long term.
>> Well, that's what I thought was the main challenge to the United States at this time in history though, that is, as transition from unipolarity where essentially has final say in every corner of the world to multipolarity. The grand strategy would have to include priorities, that is, you can't be everywhere, then what, what comes first? And and this uh, you know, I don't want to belittle the politicians. I think this is a difficult thing to adjust to once you had a political culture over decades of being everywhere at the same time and then embracing an ideology which makes it almost treasonous and, you know, uncaring not to be everywhere, cuz all our wars is of course sold as being about, you know, helping the and uh, yeah, helping the disenfranchised and advancing liberal democracy. So, it's very difficult to make this shift, but I thought that the, that was the lesson from the Iran war though, that is, if you can't have, I mean, when all the weapons had been spent in Ukraine and then suddenly, you know, how, how are we going to fight the Iranians? Then have to take the weapons from the Europeans, from the Ukrainians, from the East Asians and send it all not just to the Middle East but Israel, because even the Gulf states were robbed of some of their air defenses. So, I thought this was the main lesson. If you prioritize everything, you're not prioritizing anything at all. And but again, it could be, you know, huge shifts in international distribution of power is usually destabilizing cuz politicians, you know, they, they do need time to adjust to new realities, I think. Uh, anyways, do you have any final thoughts before we end the video?
>> Yeah, let me make two quick points. One is the debt problem. Uh
>> I, I, sorry, sorry to interrupt, but I always look at the debt clock.org and uh, I'm not even American and it's still depressing to me. It's a horrific number. So, yeah, sorry. Go on.
>> No, no, yeah. You're, you're right. It's uh, you said it. Think the chickens are going to come home to roost on that problem at some point in time. Second thing is, Glenn, if you look at uh, you look at the Ukraine war uh, and you think about fighting a war against China or you think about fighting a war anywhere, what's very clear is that you need a large industrial base and you need the capability to produce huge numbers of weapons. Uh, I mean, again, just to go back to the Iran war, we had to quit after 40 days cuz we're basically running out of weaponry. It's truly amazing the extent to which we have run down our inventories of like Tomahawk missiles, Patriot missiles, THAAD missiles, uh, air-to-ground smart bombs and so forth and so on. Really quite amazing. And it's also quite amazing how long it's going to take us to rebuild uh, those uh, inventories which have been uh, whittled down. Um, and what this tells you is that we are going to have to prioritize. If you're going to plan for a war in Asia, right? And you're thinking about how you deal with the Chinese in a war over Taiwan or the South China Sea, a war that's going to go on for many months. Now, let's hope this never happens. I'm not saying this is likely or it's going to happen, but the Americans are going to have to prepare for a long war. Uh, this is what the Ukraine war has taught us. And we don't have the manufacturing base. When you look at how long it's going to take us to replenish our depleted stocks from the Iran war, it's really genuinely frightening from a security point of view. Really. It's quite amazing. So, I think when you look at the debt problem and you look at the weakness of the American manufacturing base and the need to build uh, a war scale inventory of weapons and to have the ability to produce weapons once the conflict starts, we have a lot of work cut out for us. Uh, and that's going to involve prioritizing. So, I think that the events that are now taking place, let me put it slightly differently. The events that have taken place since the Ukraine war started in 2022 up to the present day, uh, this five-year period uh, is a period in which we have, or maybe it's a four-year period, is a period in which we have learned a lot. Uh, and what we have learned uh, should leave us deeply worried about our future. When I say our, I'm talking here about the US. Well, uh, until next time, uh, I hope to be able to discuss some more grand strategy with you cuz yeah, the US has a, yeah, fascinating history there. So, thank you so much for your time and yeah, have a good one.
>> My pleasure, Glenn.