Transcription
What's in it for Iran to help bail President Trump out? Because if Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz for the next six months or the next year, they're going to get a hundred billion dollars of extra revenue. If you pull out now, while Iran is in control of the Strait of Hormuz effectively, then what you're going to do is you are seeing the branch which leads to Iran becoming the fourth center of world power.
Well, everyone, we're very honored to welcome into the studio, Professor Robert Pape from the University of Chicago. Now, Professor Pape is an American political scientist who studies international security affairs with a focus on air power, political violence, social media propaganda, and terrorism. Uh, he is the host of The Escalation Trap, a fantastic Substack platform that he is sharing his writings with. Professor Pape, welcome to the show today.
Thanks for having me.
Absolutely. Well, professor, you have uh started to go viral on social media, obviously uh speaking out on the Iran war. Congratulations to your uh your podcast with on The Diary of a CEO. Huge fan of that and it's just an absolute honor to be able to chat with you today about the most important geopolitical conflict in the world right now and that is the conflict with Iran. Professor, my first question to you is what in the world is the United States doing right now in Iran?
Right now, the United States is trying to find some glimmer of victory so they can get out of the escalation trap. And this is not just a um happening chaotically. The frameworks that I'm offering um that really help to explain things have been doing quite a good job, which is why The Diary of a CEO had me on four weeks ago and they brought me back. Um, in fact, flew me to London to to do this. So, it was really quite a quite a thing. And um the basic issue here is that when we started the bombing, there was a predictable set of stages we were going to go through. Now I've studied air power for 30 years. I've taught for the US Air Force big book bombing to win and also modeled the bombing of Iran for 20 years. So these stages are not just happening in a chaotic way. So the stages are that we bomb to try to have regime change. Uh, target uh the bombs hit targets, killed leaders, but did not produce regime change. And the reason is because the bombing air power alone hasn't produced regime change in over a hundred years. There's not a single case. So this was always likely to fail. Well, they tried it anyway. And then it doesn't just fail. You see the opportunity for the other side to lash back is strong because the confidence here means that we didn't prepare backup plans. Now, that's very evident. Well, it wasn't so evident when I laid that out three days before the bombing. I said this is what's going to happen. Then we're going to find ourselves in a trap. Now, the trap is that we can't accept defeat. Donald Trump cannot accept defeat politically or his presidency if not completely over will be damaged in severe ways uh going into the midterms and countries as a whole find themselves hard to accept strategic defeat. That's why in Vietnam, we kept going for uh up the escalation ladder looking for this rung of victory that never came over 10 years in Vietnam. So, this is what the real problem is right now. And you see the negotiations, they start, there's a glimmer of hope, they break down because what does Donald Trump want? He wants a clean um uh victory that he can say is not just a victory over over Iran, but a victory over Obama. You see, so this is about domestic politics as much as it is about international politics. And this is why we're stuck in a trap. And um we we uh hope it will end, but I've been explaining that this is actually likely to go on and on and escalate and get worse. And so far we're now instead of just three days of bombing, we're now into week seven. And I I I'd like to have more hopeful tone, but the problem is this is the trap. And I doubt Iran is going to give him that clean victory. What's in it for Iran to help bail President Trump out? That's the fundamental problem here.
No, that's a that's a really good point. And I think Trump is desperately looking for that exit ramp, way to spin this as a political win. I mean, he's just not finding it at all. Like you said, seven weeks into thinking I just want to point out that it's understandable markets keep thinking that because President Trump is desperate, he's going to end it. Well, they've been thinking that since February 29. Okay. So this this is really really going on and on with these expectations that this pressure alone and by the way, the um the world's economy really is in the next couple weeks about to go over its first first cliff. There's actually several cliffs coming as I explained on my Substack a few days ago. So it's not just one cliff, but there's several and we haven't hit them yet, but they're coming and people keep thinking, wow, we're about to go off these cliffs. This will surely bring an end to the war. Well, the problem here is that this is just not the case because that cliff does not equate to strategic victory for President Trump and that's the fundamental problem. He needs a victory otherwise he's just likely to let it keep going and even over the cliff.
Uh, professor, I want to go back to a tweet that you sent a couple days ago. You've just hit on it. I'm just going to read this out for our audience here. Says, "Within 10 days, parts of the global economy will start running short of critical goods. After 30 years studying economic sanctions and blockades, I don't say this lightly. Not just higher prices, shortages. Markets are not ready for this." So I think you hinted at that when you talked about these cliffs that were going to go on. Can you expand upon that? Let our audience know a little bit more.
Yeah. So on what I do that is uh different and not just react, but I try to give frameworks. And by the way, I I teach frameworks for 30 years. That's what I'm teaching for the US Air Force. I'm not teaching how to put a bomb on a target. I'm teaching how military force interacts with politics in frameworks. And that's what's so been so useful here for uh policymakers, students, and now, I hope, the world. So the bottom line here is that when you when you study blockades, and these are economic blockades often in war, and I've studied them for 30 years as part of my economic sanctions work, my air power work, which also looks at the naval blockades, you see a clear framework which is in the early weeks of a blockade, uh, what you end up with is disruption of goods that go in, which increase the price of the good inside of the of the entity that's being um blockaded. Uh, in this case, the world is being blockaded. So, but it increases the price and the reason is because there's stuff left in that uh country. There's material, there's stockpiles. Um, and that's why the blockades, they increase price. But then after about four or five weeks, maybe 45 days, you get a different stage. That's the stage where those stockpiles run out. And that's where you get true shortages. Now, you've had fear of shortage. That's why the price went up in the first 45 days. But after the first after 45 days, now you actually have shortages. And you really see those shortages materializing uh because you have South Korea, you have the Philippines, uh, you have Asian states already going to four-day uh work weeks now because they're actual shortages occurring. Well, after um the next stage beyond that, say days 60 to 90 uh here um now you get to the third stage, which is contraction of commodity production because you uh you don't have um some alternative supply source for 20% of the world's oil, 30% of the world's fertilizer. There's nothing like that just sitting around waiting uh lying idle to be plugged in. So what you end up with is a three-stage, which is price rise, shortage, contraction. And I published this a few days ago and you see now we have uh the IMF coming out basically explaining this uh here. I'm giving more details and then also the um I'm comparing it to the 1973 in in these stages. So, so you can really see that in the 1973 oil shock, almost identically the stages happen there too. Same with the blockade around uh Japan to get Japan to surrender in World War II. There's these three stages and once you understand the stages, then you know what to look for at each stage as the hard indicators. And that is then gives you a heads up on the risk that's coming. And and so we're at day uh 46 right now. So we just passed day 45. And uh even that with the US military blockade in addition to the Iranian blockade, there's precious little going to get out of the Strait of Hormuz at this point. Maybe it's a couple ships here and there, but we're not expecting a flood, that's for sure. So, what that means is that this is likely to be a predictive model that you're likely going to see uh here by May 1st, you're going to start to see real shortages happen and they will start to be reported in the newspapers. And then by June 1st, that's when you'll probably start to get the first actual um reports of true commodity contraction. Think producers producing less of furniture, producing less of medical equipment, uh producing less of automobiles, every there there will be just generalized contraction as those inputs uh that are are not just more expensive. Uh, they're just not there. So that is where the real rub comes and that's why um uh you will see as much as they're screaming and shouting right now, we got to end this, we got to end this, wait till May 1st and then wait till June 1st and then this is going to then go on. And that's what happened by the 1973 oil shock. That went on 151 days, 151. That's exactly the number of days it went on and that was enough to send uh the US economy into uh stagflation for eight years. Uh, interest rates on homes at 16%. Not 6%. 16%. So we need to understand that that this is really the why Hormuz is so important and why what's occurring here, the the real effects are coming. They're lagged, but they're not lagged for 20 years.
Everyone, I hope you're enjoying today's interview with Robert Pape. I love learning from some of the smartest minds in geopolitics, business, and life. And I want to take a moment and tell you about today's video sponsor, Nomad Capitalist, who is hosting their premier event in Cancun, Mexico this November. Nomad Capitalist Live is the world's number one event for global citizens, where top entrepreneurs, investors, and thought leaders share actionable strategies for protecting wealth, securing second citizenships, and navigating today's economic uncertainty. I've been honored to speak at this event the past two years and once again will be making another appearance at their 2026 showcase event. If you love geopolitics and want to learn how to protect your family, your wealth, and your security for a better future, come join me in Cancun this November. Tickets are on sale now at nomadcapitalist.com/live.
I've seen your analysis and in stage four you believe that Iran will become the world's fourth power. Um, yeah, I'd like to get your thoughts on on that. You know, as as you know, you know, and the other thing that you've mentioned in another tweet, after 40 days of bombing, Iran has more leverage, not less. Let me know your thoughts on this.
Absolutely. So as as some of your listeners because they probably have heard me in earlier weeks, no um in the beginning couple uh week or two of the war, I explained there's a three-stage escalation trap. Now, people ask, is there more? Yes. So we've gone through stage one, as I said, the bombing to topple the regime, didn't collapse, hardened the regime. Stage two, that the opponent Iran captures lashes out, horizontal escalation takes or moves. Stage three, then we have the ground power dilemma. And that's when you saw, and I was predicting we would move Marines even before they moved, and then that's exactly what happened. But now, once you get into the ground power dilemma, notice it becomes right away clear that this is going to be very, very expensive. Right now, it wasn't so clear when you started the bombing because you weren't really thinking about that. So as you get to now stage age three, the real issue starts to become, do you just pull out? Do you just back away? And what I'm explaining is if you do that, and many people wanted this to happen, you don't just go back to Feb 27, the day before the bombing, because a new branch opens up. If you pull out now, while Iran is in control of the Strait of Hormuz effectively, then what you're going to do is you are seeing the branch which leads to Iran becoming the fourth center of world power. I published a big op-ed on this and the details of how this would work out in the New York Times. I'm not saying that Iran today is the fourth center of world power. I want to be very clear. What I'm saying is that we are at a a fork in the road where it's not that we can just go back to Feb 27, the status quo ante. That's what everybody would I would love that. No, we're at a fork in the road. And this is uh you see this in President Trump. He I think he gets this because he already recognizes if he just cuts any old deal right now uh here, it's not just he doesn't have a strategic um uh victory to brag about. He's creating Iran as the fourth center of world power. And so that's why JD Vance, you hear him say, "Well, I got to we got to get that enriched uranium because if Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz for the next six months or the next year, they're going to get a hundred billion dollars of extra revenue and they already have enough enriched uranium for between 10 and 16 bombs." The the intelligence assessment by anybody. I don't mean a a Trump assessment is a year from now, it's 90 plus percent likely Iran's going to have multiple nuclear weapons. I mean, who are we fooling here? So, are they going to just not do it out of the goodness of their heart? No. That this is the actual reality of where we are. So they will be about a year from now, maybe a year and a half, a uh oil in control of 20% of the world's oil, 30% fertilizer, etc, etc. And also then a fully nuclear capable, if not weaponized, oil hegemon. Now you're talking fourth center world power, you see what I mean? And so that is uh what the off-ramp looks like if we just back away and cut a deal. Iran is unlikely to abandon its nuclear capability. Otherwise, what's to stop um Israel from bombing into the future anytime it wants or America? Uh, and it's also unlikely to give up world power. Why is Iran going to give up world power now that it's uh emerging? It's not quite has it yet, but it's emerging. And this is where this dilemma between stages three and four, I call it, are going back and forth, back and forth. So you keep, you know, you you hear one day the news is we're preparing 10,000 uh special forces to go seize something in ESO. The next day the news is we're back to thinking about the negotiation trap, which it track, which is essentially the stage four Iran gets to become, you know, on the track to becoming a world power. But we're bouncing back and forth. And the reason is because from Trump's perspective or America's perspective, we're stuck unless Iran takes a sucker deal and bails us out. And and I can't tell you the number of people that keep emailing saying, "But Professor Pape, um why Iran will just concede? They're just going to give up magically." I I wish that was true, but we we don't have any evidence of that. They're just going to magically give up. What they've been doing is gaining power, not surrendering power.
Yeah. No. And and I think if you thought it this long, and I mean, like you said, the regime has been hardened. Uh, there hasn't really been any strategic military objective achieved at this point, you know, from the United States. So why would why would uh Iran give Trump the bailout that he needs? Even if you got a new regime, even if you got a new regime, the fact that a week ago today, I mean, just just remember a week ago today, President Trump uh issued the the threat to destroy in one night all of Iran's civilization. That means that is essentially as blisteringly clear a nuclear threat as is ever issued with nuclear weapons. So people may not know that. I study this. States don't do that. That is what counts as a nuclear threat in uh in in diplomacy. Well, President Trump here is effectively then just threatened all 92 million Iranians, which includes the entire pro-democracy movement. So, so much for like let's support the pro-democracy movement. But that also means let's say you got a pro-democracy movement that toppled this regime. Why is that pro-democracy movement abandoning nuclear weapons? What if with, you know, th this is not like, oh, they're just going to be uh our tools here and our puppets. They hate their regime so much they will just obey America as part of America's new empire. That's not going to go down, especially once you threaten to murder all of them in one night, which there's only a few people in the world who have that power and uh Donald Trump is one. We have 500, four to 500 Minuteman 3 missiles with nuclear warheads of the multiple times the power of Hiroshima and Nagasaki here that could hit Iran in 90 minutes from the time the president pushes the go codes on the black bag that he has with him 24/7. So this is enormous power that we have given to one person in the United States. And so when that person makes that threat, Americans may not know what to make of it. I strongly doubt Iranians are going to be uh as as fooled by this. This is that dangerous of what has happened. And so I I just don't really think you're going to get it's going to be very easy for any of these wishful thinking at this point that Iran's just going to abandon everything. Oh yeah, we're going to sink their economy. We've done this before, by the way. We sunk their economy before and it and with these sanctions and it hasn't worked. So the bottom line is I just think we're we're heading to we're still stuck in a trap.
Yeah. Um, professor, you brought up Israel, and I'd like to get your thoughts on on specifically Israel because your escalation trap uh theory is is really an advanced game theory based on the prisoner's dilemma where there's really two two people involved. But I think we have Yeah, but yeah, I think we see a third person involved and a third country rather, and that's certainly Israel. Let me know your thoughts on how Israel
Well, this would be like the prisoner's dilemma and since you know it and I suspect a lot of your audience will know it, I won't go through all of the mechanics. So, this is a little bit inside baseball for folks here, but the prisoner's dilemma has these two prisoners where the police, they were accomplices in a crime, and the police put them in different rooms. And so, they try to get each to rat on the other, and they offer each a sweetheart deal if they rat on the other person. And that's the prisoner's dilemma. Do they rat on their their buddy or not? Well, this is the case though where you would have a third party go in where instead of it being the rat, you know, encouraging the ratting out of the other, the third party goes in and say, "Yeah, you rat them out. We're going to get you anyway." So, so that's the squirrel. That's what it means to be a spoiler in this prisoner's dilemma. So, Israel has basically been uh acting as what's called the spoiler in various rounds of diplomacy. So, going back a year ago, um, the uh there were negotiations between the Trump administration and Iran at the end of uh May uh 2025. And um, and President Trump is saying, "Wow, we're we're close to a deal. We might actually do a deal here." And what happened is Israel did a bolt from the blue attack. Air power killed the actual negotiators we were negotiating with. Literally killed them dead. Okay. So that and that was just before they were about to get on a plane and go to the negotiation. So literally had the timing exactly right because of the negotiations, they knew where they would be to kill them dead. Well, that then happened effectively yet again in February. Uh, and you've heard this from Marco Rubio where Rubio said, "Well, I'll tell you why we had to start the air campaign on February 28. It's because Israel told us they were about to do this again and kill the Supreme Leader and also effectively 20 of the most dovish members of the elite who were actually working with the negotiations." So, Israel did that again. And so what you are seeing here is Israel at least twice. There may even be more uh rounds of this because people are sending me these rounds in my email. I I understand. But the fact is there's at least two rounds of Israel acting as a spoiler. And this is going to make it extremely difficult uh if for no other reason than um Israel has killed the most dovish of the doves here uh who were going down the road of negotiating with the United States. Um, and that is always basically a bit of a risk here because there are always more high hardliners uh here who are mad. They don't want negotiation. They want payback. They want pain to come directly uh here. And if they got to absorb some pain, fine. They want pain to go out, not just come in. And so that's what Israel has done. It's really been so difficult to have uh actual u consummation, I would say, of a bargain.
Um, professor, I want to go back to another tweet that you said. Said, "Iran has figured out that we cannot beat them and they're taking full advantage of it. They don't need to win militarily. They just need to keep the system under pressure." So do you see that as Iran's strategy moving forward to just uh, you know, you know, they I think they've actually proven to the world that they can actually sustain, you know, the United States military. I think new knowledge that has come with war. See, war is not just a reflection of pre-war trends, but in pre-war trends, there's some ambiguity. What is actually the interaction, you know? So, I I put out what my predictions several days before the bombing. And I'm not surprised, not that many people took them seriously because I'm a professor. I've got no classified information. Then it starts to come true, right? Well, here you have a situation where that ambiguity is being resolved pretty strongly. The fog of war is lifting and what it's lifting is Iran can't be easily beat. And that means long war. Maybe six months from now. So I'm getting, you know, maybe we can, you know, we'll we'll topple them in November. So, but think about the wreckage that's going to occur with the world economy between now and then. So what you're seeing is Iran adopted a long war strategy. Um, it was the Vietnamese strategy. It's not just some special idea. Same with the Afghan Taliban. This is how you beat America. You go long war, go at the soft underbelly of American politics. Um, and that is how our opponents go up against. They don't go toe-to-toe with navies. So that's why that just doesn't even matter. We sunk their navy. That's not the that's not how Iran's going to win this or come out ahead. Uh, and so this is what has really materialized. Um, and this is why as each uh day goes on, they've got knowledge now. That's what the point of my my tweet on X was there. Is that they actually have a piece of hard information they didn't have before. Before the war, they might have thought they could outlast America for six weeks. Now they know they've outlasted America for six weeks and dollars to donuts, they think it's n if they have a poly market among the regime, they're probably saying 90% likely we're taking this to November because they their goal is to sink the end. They want regime change too. They want regime change in America. Yeah, you see my boy too could play at this game of regime change. It's not just, oh, America gets to topple regimes. Other countries have that idea as well.
Amazing. Amazing. Yeah, that's a that's a good point. Um, professor, you at some at one point you had mentioned a percentage, you know, about a 70% chance that the United States would send in ground troops. Um, do you see that uh in the future? I mean, we are coming to the summer months, which many people say,
Yeah.
In my first episode on The Diary of a CEO, that was about four or so weeks ago.
Uh, he really pushed Stephen is just a master at getting things out of you. And I was kind of reluctant to put a number on it, but the truth was I did have a number in my head. And I said it would be limited. It would be like going after the nuclear material and then in part of that, you might have Marines go on the beaches and so forth. So you could have some staging uh for this. So the bottom line is I said it would be 70% likely. And I have to say, after watching JD Vance's um statement about how this cannot end without that enriched material out of the country. This isn't about a 5 to 20-year deal. This is they want of the the Trump administration wants all of that enriched material out, including the thousand pounds of 60%. And JD Vance was the most essentially dovish of the Trump administration. So once he's on board with escalation for that, I'd up it from even above 70, maybe 80%. Now, there's still a chance. I don't say it's 100%. There's nothing that is 100% here, but we're we're closing off these opportunities and it's because Vance now is clearly seeing he's decided that Iran can't keep that 60% enriched uranium. How are you going to persuade them to give it up? You can crush their economy. Absolutely. Uh, here, but by the way, oil is only 20% of their GDP. So this is Saddam Hussein, it was 50% of Saddam Hussein's GDP and he didn't buckle for 12 years. So you could say, well, we'll eventually, you know, squish them with the economy, right? Well, you're talking about long times. And it's just um, they they've got a real reason to hold on to that enriched uranium, which is to actually make nuclear weapons.
Yeah. Yeah. Well, I think um, you know, given the evidence as far as, you know, how Israel has attacked them and, you know, like you said, killed their peace negotiators, the United States, I mean, it's probably something that I would imagine many Iranians certainly would like to see.
One final point for your audience. Just flip it on its head. Let's imagine that Iran had these thousands of nuclear weapons and it had an ally here in the region, uh, here, say Pakistan, that also had nuclear weapons and America did not, and they were doing that to us, and they were uh, we were having negotiations because we wanted nuclear weapons and the ally Pakistan kept killing our negotiators, literally every time we we tried to have a deal. Would we Americans just say, "Oh, yeah, we give up and we're just gonna be under the thumb of Iran and Pakistan." Seriously, is that seriously what America would do? I don't think so. And that is what we're trying to get the other side to do. And is there some chance? I still would say there's that 20% possibility, but this is not a 50/50 game and we got to stop talking as if, oh, sure, we don't know what the future is. No, we have a we we do risk assessment. These are the risks and these are the probabilities.
Yeah, absolutely. Well, Professor Pape, it's been an absolute pleasure to chat with you and I want to make sure that our viewers know that we're going to put the links to your Substack, The Escalation Trap, down in the description below. But you also mentioned to me that you are hosting uh one of the most important events for more Americans and people around the world to understand this and it's actually an event. I'd like for you to uh let our audience know about that.
I run a center at the University of Chicago called the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, and we host the annual Chuck Hagel Lectures at the University of Chicago. The next one is April 17th and it's all focused on the Iran war and China and Asia, one of the big issues here that has not gotten enough attention. And we are having on the stage uh, I'll be the moderator for a conversation with former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and former Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. He is the most knowledgeable person on uh for either government here, either Democrat or Republican for the last 15 years on China and Asia. So this is not just another event. And the listeners here can go to Eventbrite. They can go and and look for this, search by my name, COST, Chuck Hagel, Hagel Lectures, April 17th, and they can join the live stream for free. So there's no cost whatsoever. It will be a public hour and a half conversation. That live stream is free. Uh, we can we can uh host up to, I'm told, uh 50,000 here on the live stream for free. So I don't think we'll break that threshold, but be among the first 50,000 and you're gonna see get a ticket and it's and it's just free and it is going all around the world. This would be this is going to be live-streamed everywhere.
Absolutely. Well, for to our audience that's listening, we're going to put the links to that event, also Professor Pape's Substack, also his Twitter so that you guys can follow along. Professor, I just want to say thank you so much for the work that you do. Thank you for these incredible insights. Let's stay in touch. I'm sure we have you back on the show as we continue to see this escalation trap unfold. Uh, but just want to say thank you so much for your time today.
And thank you so much uh here. Terrific and very important work you're doing. Thank you so much.
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I think events like this really matter today because we've got millions of people who are looking for answers, who have lots of experience from all over the world, and they live individual lives. And at an event like this, people can come together and really share their experiences. I've been watching him for many, many years and that was probably one of the reasons and influences of me leaving the UK and moving to Southeast Asia. So, so to be in this event and actually meeting the people who I've watched for many years is it's pretty cool. It almost feels like a full circle moment for me. The best part is the people I've been meeting so far. To be honest, I've met individuals who have connections in places where I'm actually planning to do business or establish certain entities and so on.
Events such as this one are deeply inspiring. They are challenging in that you've got to ask yourself questions about some of the old assumptions you've held. But more than anything, they offer possibility. It's not just hope born out of rhetoric or anything. They offer hope in that it's real sense, reliability, and practical ways. An opportunity to really move skills, capital, and people all over the world.