Transcription
Good afternoon, everybody. Uh, welcome, uh, and welcome to the Russell C. Leffingwell lecture. I'm Mike Froman, president of the Council. It's great to have you all here, and we are privileged to have Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada here.
Inaugurated in 1969, this lecture was named for a charter member of CFR who served as its president, a very important role from 1944 to 1946, and as chairman from 1946 to 1953. It's a lecture each year given by a distinguished foreign official who's invited to address CFR on a topic of major international significance. I can't think of anyone better than Prime Minister Carney for that role.
Uh, I'd like to thank the Leffingwell family for their generosity in endowing this lecture, especially Tom and Ted Leffingwell Polling. And we're grateful to have a number of members of the family here with us or online: Diana, Derek, and Ted, as well as Thomas Polling, who's tuned in virtually.
We're also delighted to have a distinguished delegation uh from Canada. Uh, Bob Ray, the ambassador and permanent representative of Canada to the United Nations; Michael Gort, ambassador and deputy permanent representative of Canada to the United Nations; David Lametti, the incoming UN ambassador uh to uh from Canada; and Tom Clark, the Consul General. So, thank you all for joining us.
Um, Mark, yes, that's worthy of um uh Mark Carney serves as Canada's 24th prime minister. He was elected leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, sworn in in March 2025. You all know his biography, one of the most eclectic biographies in politics, including having been uh the governor of the Bank of England, uh a distinguished member in the private sector, uh spends a lot of time in New York as well.
The Prime Minister is going to come up and give uh remarks for a few minutes, and then we'll have a conversation, uh he and I, and then we'll open it up to uh the membership as usual. So with that, please uh join me in welcoming Prime Minister Carney.
Thank you. Uh, thank you very much, Mike. You see, I'm armed with all our ambassadorial corps. Hi, Bob. Bob Hormats there. Fantastic to see you. Uh, I saw Bob Rubin. There a lot of I saw Bob Rubin on the way in here. Um, who uh who taught me Bob taught me everything about uh foreign relations. Bob Rubin taught me how to make decisions under uncertainty. Unfortunately, those two uh are coming together at the same time. I would do my best and I'm looking forward to uh looking forward to the discussion, uh your questions, and and counsel.
Um, you know what I'm what I propose to do in 10 minutes is just to say a few words about how a middle power like Canada uh can deal with the situation where the rules-based order uh is eroding, great power rivalry is intensifying, um and authoritarian models are hardening. I mean, that's a simplified version of the of what's going on.
Um, and I'll start by admitting upfront um that um we prospered uh under the old system. We we would like the old system back. We have the old system back. Is that going to happen? We prospered under the old system and we had we were able to pursue a values-based foreign policy uh based on or anchored on a rules-based multilateral trading system, an open global financial system. We had collective security anchored in NATO. Uh, our geography, which hasn't changed, but the facts around the geography have changed. We had enviable uh geography. It gave us uh privileged access um to the world's largest and most dynamic economy, and it distanced us from the major state and non-state uh threats.
Um, we also subscribed to an expectation uh that perhaps in in the past at the Council for Foreign Relations, it was also the case for some, an expectation that non-market authoritarian uh countries would converge over time uh through engagement uh to free markets, open societies, uh and even democratic values. Um, and this meant for a country with a values-based foreign policy that our engagement with those countries could be justified by the expectation of progress. In fact, the very engagement helped with that progress. Um, and alignment of values was uh merely delayed, uh not uh not compromised.
Um, so few things have changed. Uh, certainly that convergence of values has proved elusive. Uh, the economic strategy of the United States uh is clearly changed uh from the support for the multilateral system uh to a more transactional and managed bilateral trade and investment approach. Global power is moving, um, you can debate how much or how far this will go, from uh American hegemony um to uh great power rivalry, um, and technological change is shrinking uh that geographic uh advantage that we had and expanding the fields of conflict from the virtual to the extraterrestrial.
Um, all of this is reducing, I can have to observe this during UN week, reducing the effectiveness of our multilateral institutions from the WTO to the UN, on which middle powers like Canada uh have uh greatly relied. So what do we do about it?
Um, and I'm going to give you a punchline, which is we think we can thrive, uh, and I choose that word advisedly, thrive in this new uh this new non-system or the system that's evolving, uh for for three reasons.
Um, and the first is we have what the world wants. Uh, take on the energy side. We are an energy superpower. Uh, that is going to become increasingly evident. Uh, 85% of our energy is our is clean. We're one of the world's largest LNG exporters, one of the largest reserves of uh oil and gas. Uh, we measure additions to our grid in 10 gigawatt chunks. Uh, to put it in perspective, and you will see that with time. Uh, we are top five in 10 of the world's most important critical minerals. Uh, 40% of the world's listed uh mining companies are in Canada. Uh, to give a perspective there. We are a leading developer of AI, um, and our research universities um are some of the biggest producers in volume of AI computing and quantum talent in the world. Unfortunately, most of them go to the United States. I understand you're changing your visa policy here, so going to hang on to a few of those.
Um, uh, we have capital. Uh, our pension funds are uh some of, if not the most sophisticated infrastructure investors uh in the world. With all due respect to Larry Fink um and our government, we were talking about him earlier. I have lots of respect for Larry. I should say that. Um, and we have a government uh that still has fiscal capacity to act decisively uh at a moment when governments need to act decisively.
Um, now the second reason why I'd say we have uh good prospects, not assured prospects, but good prospects, is we have values to which much of the world, not all of the world, much of the world uh still aspires. Uh, we're a pluralistic society that works. Our cities are among the most diverse in the world. Um, public square is loud, diverse, and free. We, by the nature of our federation, we have to practice collaboration and partnership, uh, and it's a country that is still committed to sustainability.
Um, and I'm the third reason why I'm going to argue we can we can thrive in this time is we recognize what's going on. Um, this is not a transition. This is a rupture. This is a sharp change in a short period of time driven by a variety of factors. Um, we have a determination to rise up and meet this.
Um, this is going to I'm going to give you one last set of threes, and then we'll we'll have our conversation. Um, our response to this is to build strength at home, to build resilience by diversifying abroad, and pursue a variable uh geography to defend our our values and pursue our interests.
So, just on strength at home, I can understand if you were distracted by events down here and you haven't followed exactly everything we've been doing in the last four months. Uh, but while you while you were otherwise occupied, we've cut taxes on capital gains. Uh, we have removed all barriers to interprovincial trade.
Um, we have passed landmark uh legislation to fast-track literally hundreds of billions of dollars of projects in energy, in AI, in critical minerals, in new trade corridors. We are doubling our defense spending by 2030. Our core capabilities with respect to defense, AI, quantum, cyber, critical minerals provide unique opportunities for dual use and economic uh benefit, and we intend to fully exploit those.
Um, we are diversifying our trading uh relationships and our security partnerships. We signed the most comprehensive agreement uh with uh the European Union from a non-European Union uh member, uh the economic and security partnership with the EU. We signed that at the end of June. Uh, we're working on fleshing uh that out now. We will be, or we are on track, I should choose my words more diplomatically. We are on track to be a full member of SAFE, the European uh defense uh arrangement, which allows us to diversify and accelerate our defense procurement.
Last week, no, this week, what day is it? Monday? Last week. Yes. Uh, seem to miss the weekend in the middle, but we uh agreed a um uh a comprehensive approach within the context of USMCA, but a comprehensive uh approach with uh Mexico uh to deepen our bilateral trading relationships, and we are pursuing um more aggressive strategies uh throughout Asia.
My last of my threes is around that variable geography. Um, I'll just give a couple of examples of where uh we're active. Uh, the coalition of the willing uh for Ukraine. Um, we are the largest contributor on a per capita basis uh to Ukraine. Uh, okay. Um, and we, well, I won't go into more detail. We can talk about Ukraine if you wish. When you think about our Arctic sovereignty, that uh we are cooperating very closely with the Nordic Baltic 8 um for physical uh protection up there, economic development, and also defending NATO's uh western flank. Uh, we are active uh with like-minded parties uh in efforts to uh promote a two-state solution and Middle East peace. Easiest, not the easiest thing to do, I know.
Um, and I'll make one other point on uh critical minerals. Uh, we, out of the G7, are forming uh buyers' clubs for critical minerals so that the world can diversify away from Chinese dominance uh from them. So it's not just a supply, but it's having that secure uh access to capital or or an offtake, basically, so these can be uh developed.
And I, you know, I'll just say a word uh before I finish that, uh, uh, having chaired the G7 this year, I came into government six weeks before it was there. So, we had to, we didn't have Mike Froman, we had very good Sherpas, but we didn't have Mike Froman. So, we had a lot of work to do. Um, it was a very interesting, and this is a variable geometry support point. When we had two days, the first day, core G7, focused on a variety of issues, very productive. President Trump was there uh for that day, and these were good meetings, these were good discussions, a good meeting. There was progress made. Not everything landed, but it's never the case that everything lands. It was fairly narrowly focused though on economics, um, with uh Iran thrown in there's always a crisis, Iran thrown in as well. The next day with uh the leaders of most of the BRICS countries, some of the largest emerging economies, Australia as well, not an emerging economy, but others like those, the focus was on what this room would recognize as old multilateralism, global commons, where we're cooperating on energy, what we can do to actually develop, uh on on on critical minerals, financing for development, what's going to happen at COP. Lula was there, as was the world.
Um, that doesn't mean that's the way the world's working. I'm not naive about that. But there is a substantial proportion of the world that focuses on these issues. A country like Canada is one of them, and it's one uh that uh we will, it's something we will continue to do because it it comes back into uh into our strengths.
Uh, look, I'll I'll just I'll sum up. Um, I would ask you to, when you think about Canada, think about Canada, actually. That's my request. Think about Canada as a strong, sovereign, independent nation. Think about Canada as that. Um, but there is a, there is a big opportunity in this uh in this uh shifting. Uh, in Canada, uh, we understand what's going on. We understand the scale of the response that's required. We have the resources uh the world needs. Uh, we have the talent uh to turn that potential into uh growth. Uh, we're a reliable partner. We're connected more than anyone else through trading relationships with any other part of the world.
Um, and we're no longer relying on just the strength of our values, but the value of our strength, um, with your help. So, thank you very much, and I look forward to the discussion.
That. Well, all right, boss. Bienvenue, welcome to the United States of America. Sorry, I didn't mean that as a point on sovereignty. I just meant, did you get through customs? Okay. Recognize the Canadian passport. Still, still working. Still working. Excellent. Let me uh let me pick up on a couple of the uh the points that you made.
Um, you talked about diversification uh and and the strengths within Canada. Uh, Canada's been so reliant on the US economy. Uh, have been so integrated. I think something like two-thirds of Canadians live within 100 kilometers of the border. Most of the trade is here. Uh, you've had some economic headwinds in the last uh several months in terms of economic contraction and and higher unemployment. Um, how, how much can you reorient the Canadian economy both to be more east-west than north-south, or to be more integrated with other economies than than the US, given the long history there?
Yeah, it's, it's the right question and uh the first, the answer to the question starts with recognizing the need to do it. Um, and one thing I'd impress upon the audience is that Canadians understand the need to, as we put it, to be masters in our own house. Uh, the country does not want to wake up and look, on all due respect, on Twitter or X to see what uh what the latest uh change uh is in US policy. Uh, but wants to get on with what we can control. Uh, and that's a big part of the government strategy. So, uh, getting rid of barriers east-west, as you put it, barriers across the provinces, you know, that alone, if it's fully done, we've done the federal part, but if all our provinces reduce their barriers, the uh the estimates are that is a bigger return to the Canadian economy than the worst-case trade outcome with the US. Now, one has a more immediate impact, um, and the other builds over time, but the orders of magnitude are clear, and that's before we do what we need to do, which is to double the rate of housing. Uh, we announced a new approach on housing and infrastructure two weeks ago.
Um, and the first projects that we have identified there, scaled to around 50, 60 billion dollars of housing investment. The first major projects uh that I I referenced in in the remarks on uh new ports, new energy corridors, beyond those are measured in the hundreds of billions. So you start to build all of that out before the defense spending kicks in, and we're very focused on dual-use defense spending. There's lots of areas where uh we're we're going to be able to build out our AI, cyber, and other uh capabilities, critical mineral pathways, as part of that defense build. And it's before we get traction with those new trade uh and defense partnerships with Europe, for example, and in Asia. So, um, that's our, that's our, that's our primary focus.
Um, and candidly, we've been done a favor because we should have been all of these things we could have done before ourselves. So we needed the rupture, we needed the shock, it seems, in order to do them. But there is a very strong consensus in the country to do that. Um, as well, um, there is a very attractive for the United States, for Canada, obviously as well, and Mexico, version of USMCA that that can be developed, and it's, as you know from your previous life, we're in the early stages of of that development.
You you mentioned the defense spending uh a couple times, you referred to it as dual use. Yeah. Do I, first of all, it's Canada had been a laggard on defense spending. Trump sort of highlighted that quite pointedly, um, but now you've committed to, I believe it's 5%, three and a half of military spending and one and a half of infrastructure spending. Is, when you talk about dual use, are you talking about, is that in lieu of buying more military equipment per se? Is that the, or do you see yourself buying more?
It's a couple things. I mean, um, uh, we, we have a lot of catch-up to do. We're not alone in that in NATO. Uh, we're resolute that we will catch up. So, we, we're getting to the 2% level this year, which you can argue we should have been at before, but we're getting there this year. Uh, and then you have the ramp-up towards 5% by 2035. 5% of GDP by 2035.
Um, and for those who don't follow it quite as closely, what we agreed to, everyone in NATO agreed to, is of that 5%, three and a half is pure defense spending, and one and a half is related to defense resilience building that out. So everything in that one and a half effectively is dual use and has other benefits for your economy. But even if we set that aside and just focus on the three and a half of pure, um, NATO is going to be spending a lot more on cyber, a lot more on AI, integrating systems. I'm sure you've had lots of discussions here around drone warfare and the integration there.
Um, we will be spending necessarily from a military perspective, the end uses on some of the critical minerals. I mean, literally are militarily critical. So our development of that for our defense purposes, first and foremost, has direct spillover benefits because AI expertise, you know, being able to integrate big data lakes and optimize across them. Well, that is a skill that is transferable, readily transferable to other aspects of the economy. So we see a lot of the way this is part of the advantage. Last point, part of the advantage of coming late, you know, sometimes you go to some emerging and developing economies and have much better cell coverage because they came late. They did it right. This is, we're, we're coming late to some of the spend, but at a time when the nature of security and conflict and warfare and what's needed is changing very rapidly, and it actually plays to some of our strengths.
Let me ask you to put, not only your prime minister hat on, but uh, you've been a central bank governor, you've been an investor, you've been finance, looking playing by its own playbook economically, including a lot of excess capacity that's being exported to the rest of the world. You have the US playing by its own playbook, uh, uh, ignoring various agreements, including at times economies of the world are playing by their own set of rules. What does that mean for the rules-based system for a middle power like Canada?
Yeah. Well, and do you keep on playing by the rules even if nobody else? Okay. So that's the key. So who else is willing to play by the rules and can you get critical mass in that? That's that's one of the big questions. So, and nobody's perfect in this. Uh, but one of the things about the European Union is it's a rule-based system. Sometimes there's too many rules and they're playing by too many rules, but it is a rules-based system. Uh, we have a free trade agreement uh with the European Union.
CPTPP, newer. Uh, the US made a decision not to be, not to be part of that. I heard about that. Yeah, I heard about that. Um, and it's not too late. You can come back in. Um, but it's not the European Union, obviously, to the same degree, but it, it, it's, it's, you would recognize it as a rules-based, multi-plurilateral uh uh trade deal that has labor standards, has sustainability. There is open discussion. We're part of it. I don't want to overplay it because it's still early days, but of a bridge between the EU and the CPTPP. Well, Canada's in both effectively. Uh, we're deepening with Europe. We're deepening with some of those players there. Then we're in a pretty big system that is rules-based. We would like to think that we will get to a position with the US where we have new rules as part of USMCA, or a reaffirmation of these are the rules of conduct uh in USMCA. And you know, we're re-engaging with China and other uh major economies in terms of developing, developing the rules bilaterally with them. So there's more to play for it than there appears.
And you know, one of the things that, now, now I'm going to be a central banker, but this is important. Okay, this is really exciting. This is a chance. Check your phones. Um, when, um, but so much of economics is on the margin, right? So, yes, we're heavily weighted to the United States, and a big adjustment is going on in big sectors, steel, uh, autos, as examples of are forced products because of the trade shock, and we're hoping to make progress in all of those. But on the margin, when you grow into very large markets, which are represented by the EU and CPTPP, it makes a big difference.
Um, so it's the delta, it's the growth that's that's going to impact it. Previous uh governments in Canada have worked quite closely with the US vis-à-vis China, and sometimes it at at a great cost for Canada. How would you assess our joint effectiveness in influencing Chinese behavior, economic strategy, security behavior, etc.? And what do you think we ought to be doing differently, if you think there's room for improvement?
Uh, there's always, there's always room for improvement. Um, that's uh, I think one of the things that we can improve on, I'll say this from a Canadian perspective with respect to China, uh, is being clearer about where we engage. I alluded to it very lightly, but um, and it's a general point in variable geometry. You have different tiers of engagement depending on how like-minded you are. So with respect to China, or any other country that's well, any other, where do you engage deeply? Where are you comfortable engaging deeply? In the commodity space, in in aspects of energy, for example, straight, basic manufacturing, where where there are guardrails, and what should just be left off to the side? Elements that bridge into national security, privacy, other aspects like that. So that's where we can be, we can be better, number one. Number two, um, in my experience with China, um, they are, amongst other things, very sincere and engaged on climate. This is a country run by engineers. This is a country that understands a lot of the engineering solutions to issues around emissions. They've happened to have built real competitive advantage in a number of these areas as well. So there's a question of how, and there is a almost a standing offer from them about how to engage in the global commons in and around climate, which a country like Canada, which is an energy superpower, when we're certainly going to build and uh fully exploit that, then we're dealing on, and we care about this issue as well. It's still part of our policy. It's still part of uh uh, and and so there's an opportunity to engage. Again, the United States can choose, could choose that lane, uh, very easily, but probably at the moment, that's not where the, the engagement will be.
Right. Well, probably at the moment, probably, who knows, who knows. But that, you mentioned your chairmanship of the G7. The US takes over the chair of the G20 later this year. There'll be an opportunity for the Trump administration to take over one of these organizations and figure out what the agenda is for international cooperation. You and I have been involved in a bunch of G20 summits. You did somewhat better in your career than I did in mine. Um, but, uh, uh, what advice would you give to the Trump administration about about where the G20 could be useful and what the scope for cooperation can be going forward?
Wow. Um, it's called stump the prime minister. I didn't see that one coming, but that's, but that's the right question. Um, uh, look, the, as you know, with these things, uh, you want to, you want to pick three things, uh, and and focus. You do want it because it's a sprawling agenda, and you, you got to be clear, this is what we care about.
Um, I would, um, I actually think that I would emphasize, I think the infrastructure, they won't call it this, but I'll I'll use this term, but infrastructure for development in, in the infrastructure for the global economy, the leveraging of limited public dollars into multiples of private dollars. That is an agenda that's good for the world. It's an agenda that plays directly into American strengths, American strengths in finance, American strengths in, you know, just a whole host of energy, uh, uh, industries. It can play a bit complimentary into Chinese and other countries' strengths, but more Americas than elsewhere.
Um, and it's an agenda, if really pursued, um, will grow jobs and, you know, all good things back in America, but also would be enthusiastically endorsed by the by the broader broader group of the G20, and it would, it would give, it would reinforce purpose at some of those, and this is a question whether the administration wants to, but some of the multilateral organizations. So, the, you know, the World Bank's agenda is effective. It's a big, a big part of that agenda. So putting their own frame in and around that, I think makes a lot of sense.
Um, well, I, there should, I've got two others, but I'm worried that we're not going to have enough time for the audience to ask questions. So, very diplomatic. All right.
One last question before we open it up to uh uh to the group. Um, uh, I believe yesterday Canada joined uh some European countries in recognizing Palestinian statehood. What do you expect that to accomplish?
Well, I think the first thing to say is this is consistent with our policy since 1947. Since 1947, every Canadian government, whether of whatever political stripe, has supported a two-state solution uh as as many other countries have. Um, what we have been seeing first because of the acts of these heinous acts of Hamas, but then other, in terms of response, is that that prospect is receding before our eyes. Okay. So, uh, the idea of waiting until all the conditions are in place for a free and viable Palestinian state committed to peace and security side by side with the state of Israel, as what, what I've called a Zionist Palestinian state, which is what we want, um, those conditions being in place, keeping the concept there on the shelf when it is the avowed policy of the Israeli government that there will never be a Palestinian state. That is the policy of the current Israeli government, and their actions are consistent with uh with that policy, and I can just concentrate on what's going on in the West Bank without touching Gaza.
Um, so what we, what we're looking to accomplish is to, is to keep that front and center. Uh, to be with a host of influential, but not decisive countries. Uh, so we're alongside the Kingdom of Saudi, not in the recognition, but as part of this process, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, France, uh, UK, uh, Australia, uh, Qatar, Egypt, others, um, Norway, you know, actively trying to create conditions at minimum for a ceasefire, obviously, and then a peace process. That's that's part of that.
Um, and it's not, we're not doing that. We're under no illusions that this is any sort of panacea. Um, but it's necessary in our judgment. Uh, it's, and the judgment of most other countries in the world, uh, that we have to push on this now because, as I say, the, the, the possibility, in absolute violation of the UN Charter and in absolute violation of international law, of self-determination for the Palestinian peoples is, is, is being erased.
Um, so this is, we're doing what we can, uh, but recognizing, recognizing the limitations. All right.
Well, I can open up for questions. Uh, this is on the record. In addition to the very full room we have here, we've got about over 400 people, 400 CFR members online as well. Please, if recognized, stand up, wait for the microphone, identify yourself, and ask a brief question.
Okay. Uh, yes, this gentleman right here. Okay. Uh, George Raidenberg of the Davos Alzheimer's Collaborative, a successor to SEPAVE but focused on aging populations. Um, uh, so my question is a demographic question. Working-age populations in Europe are shrinking. You know, working-age populations are supporting a larger population overall. How does one deal with the financial costs of that? How does one deal with how to increase worker productivity uh in the Global North?
Um, fantastic. Are you taking a few, or do you want me to do? Uh, look, um, absolutely right. One of the biggest challenges, I think one of the first things you have to do as a, as a government, we haven't fully done this, but we, we will in time, uh, is to actually frame the policy and frame, frame, Australia does this with their intergenerational reports, basically, which frames, under current trajectories and with demographics, what the challenges are. That's first. The second is, um, you maximize your labor force participation, as much female participation, older, uh, participation. We, uh, are pretty good on that. We have a bit more to do, uh, later in, later in career, and, uh, but, uh, in for all countries, that's, that's the next step. Uh, clearly, uh, the deployment of technology, deploy, I mean, AI coming in, it's not like AI is going to solve everything, but that the multiplier effects there, gotten right, um, there's a variety of reasons why we have to get application of AI right, uh, across, across our economies. This is, this is one of them, um, and it provides some counterweight to that, and potentially substantial counter. I mean, okay, I'll, I'll be utopian, not utopian, but optimistic. Thank you. Yeah, I was going to say Panglossian, but then I was like, that's so optimistic. But if you take, if you take, so full bore, productivity estimates on AI application there, it's adding one to one and a half percentage points on productivity by, let's, and I'll, I'll push it out to the middle of, of, of the next decade. It actually dovetails pretty well with that bigger demographic crunch. I mean, that is, those are big numbers, uh, in annual productivity. U, so we have to get that right, and, and one of the challenges for us, of course, is to do that, um, alongside everyone else.
Yeah. Uh, Morian White, microphone coming. Yeah. Oh, um, thank you, and thank you, Mark, for being with us today. Um, I'm Morian White, and I'm a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute at SAIS, and I'm also chairman of the board of Refugees International. And Mark, um, Canada has had an exemplary role in refugee resettlement for many, many years, and I know your country, and you're not alone in this, is backtracking a little bit on this commitment to refugee assistance. Could you just elaborate a little bit on what the Canadian policy on refugee resettlement is going forward?
Uh, sure. Um, yeah, I'm not, mine now that they've taken the microphone away from you. I'm not sure, uh, I fully recognize the backtracking, uh, element, uh, of your, of your question. Um, and, you know, let's, I'll put in context. Uh, let's see the, uh, Ukraine, pin on the previous questioner, uh, and salute you for it. Uh, we, we've taken 300,000, uh, Ukrainian, uh, families into, uh, into Canada, individuals, I should say, individuals into Canada. Uh, we, uh, we still have have quite substantial uh levels of asylum seekers, and and, you know, the, the Ukrainian case is a, is a, is a humanitarian, deliberate, uh, policy. The asylum seeker, obviously, is, is, is received. Uh, we, like every country, uh, must control and be deliberate in with respect to our borders, um, and, and manage appropriately. And, um, so the government is, the government is very focused on doing that on the border side, but also treating asylum seekers, treating everyone who comes to Canada, uh, to the standards they should, and that includes processing claims in a timely fashion. And one thing we have not done well enough is process claims in a timely fashion. So that's, that's resources, uh, and efficiency. And so I would say when we look at that's the aspect of your question that I would, I would bear down on.
Yeah. Let's get to an online question. Yeah. Well, thank you, Missy. Um, look, I'll give a, a couple of examples, and I pick up on your, let me, let me pick up on on Palestinian state, um, Ukraine. Uh, there are other examples of this where, look, we believe in the UN Charter. Um, we believe in self-determination for peoples. Um, we underscore the importance of territorial integrity.
Um, and that drives our approach, uh, in Ukraine. It drives our approach in, uh, in, uh, in Palestine, uh, as well. It, it, you'll, there are other applications, but I'll, I'll, I'll stop there. That is, that's a consistent, uh, consistent approach. It. We welcome, I, and I very much welcome his personal, uh, involvement of of the president, uh, in, uh, efforts, for example, in Ukraine to, uh, broker ceasefires, to, uh, define paths for peace, um, uh, to provide, potentially, clemency to the security guarantee, security guarantees that the coalition of the willing, Canada included, uh, are prepared to provide, uh, to Ukraine, Ukraine, which is necessary for, uh, a lasting peace or lasting security for Ukraine.
Um, the situation, here's this is no insight. The situation in, um, in Palestine, uh, is both horrific and fluid. Um, and there are multiple efforts, very much including by the United States, including the United States, uh, to find a path to, uh, cessation of hostilities, ultimately security, and some form of peace. Um, we come at these, both those situations, from somewhat different perspectives, but the same ultimate goal. Um, and we have different partners at present in some of the initiatives in both of those initiatives. Uh, but we would hope that there would be, uh, convergence, uh, with the United States. Um, and we will certainly support, uh, leadership of the United States that's leading to outcomes that are consistent with our values.
Some European countries have suggested they would deploy troops to Ukraine as part of a stability force or peacekeeping force. Would Canada be among those?
Well, I, uh, we'll see what the, the structure is. Uh, we are, uh, we're very active in the coalition of the willing. Uh, we have, I'd remind that we have, uh, we have very large troop presence in Latvia as part of our NATO obligations. I visited them, uh, three weeks ago. Uh, and to underscore the commitment, uh, to security in the region, to Latvia, uh, and Poland. Uh, by the way, the brigades in Latvia, it is not, they don't do training, they, it's an operational brigade, which gives you, and that's before the incursions, the Russian incursions, uh, of recent weeks, and that gives you a sense of, uh, of, of both the stakes and, and the degree of our commitment. So, we'll see. Uh, in terms of Ukraine, uh, there's a lot to be done still to, uh, to move that first to a cessation of hostilities, uh, before the guarantees would would come into effect. But what we do know, and the United States, uh, acknowledges very much, is that without, given the track record of Putin, we, a security guarantee that's written on paper is not, uh, that if the signature is Vladimir Putin's, is not worth.
Thank you, Allison Sander, Planet Action. First of all, just want to start with a thank you for those of us who forget what leadership and diplomacy looks like. We follow you and it reminds us, and I think I'm speaking for the whole room. So, start with that. Um, a quick question. I think it's Canadian modesty that you describe yourself as a middle power. I kind of bump you up. And could you paint us a picture in these times where IP, capital, and talent can flow so easily? What is, you're a great strategist. What's the strategy for middle powers to use golden parachutes, different tax laws, and is there a coordinated strategy to just take some of the capital from here that's getting frustrated and attracted?
Um, well, we would, we would never take anything from the United States. Clear. We wish. That's on the record. That's on the record. I just want to underscore that we're here to give, not take. Um, we can not give too much. Not give too much. Exactly. No, like on the, I, I mean, I think this is, um, our, our strategy, our, our core of the strategy is the core, like, look, it's like any organization, yours included, like the core of the strategy has to be consistent with who you are and what your values are, uh, and, and then you build off of that. So, uh, the, I said in my remarks, you know, the public square is loud, diverse, and free. Um, that's important. It's important to Canadians, but it's important. It be, it, it, it's, it's a relative, it's becoming more of a relative thing than it had been in the past. Let's put it that way. Uh, the second is we are, look, the country is, uh, it is a very diverse country. It is a very networked country, uh, globally.
Um, you know, Toronto, New York, it's impressive. It's one of three born outside of the US. I think it's one of two in Toronto. Okay. And it's not that is not that is a more extreme version, but most, many Canadian cities look like New York, not in scale, but in diversity. Um, and that is that is a strength that's there as well. From a tax perspective, uh, I don't think you'll see in Canada, you know, Swiss-type tax deals, um, for individuals. That's not the nature of the society. It's, there is a social model that's consistent.
Um, but what is there is those first two components combined with very strong research universities that people can come to a society when people can live in, and a country that is connected to everywhere else in the world, including through trade and, uh, trade and investment.
Um, and that's something that we'll, we will push through combined with, which is something that isn't always there in Canada, or at least shouted out, which is ambition, um, and the scale of the ambition, and that's part of how you, people go to where things are happening, or where they think they can be part of something bigger, and that's, that, that's an important part of the strategy. Yeah.
Thank you, Jane Harmon. Jane, how are you? Um, Jane Harmon, former member of Congress. Congratulations to CFR and Canada for superb leadership, uh, which employs, uh, delightful humor. It's really refreshing. My question is more about Ukraine. And you've answered lots of it, but putting on your banker hat, uh, there has been a bill in the United States Congress for a while, sponsored by Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal, to impose secondary sanctions on Russia to force, uh, Putin, uh, to change his strategy. That bill isn't passing because Trump does not yet support it, despite a veto-proof majority. But my question is, how potent are secondary sanctions, and should this bill pass, how much difference do you think it would make?
Uh, well, thank, and great, great to see you, Jane. Um, uh, the, look, secondary sanctions can be incredibly, uh, powerful. Uh, and they were very, very powerful with respect to Iran, um, and the uncertainty around the extent to which what is secondary, if I can put it that way, particularly in the financial sector, is, is a powerful weapon. So, just for those who don't follow it, it's not just what bank, so to speak, deals directly in this case with Russia, but does your bank deal with the bank that deals with Russia? So, who's your client's client?
Um, and once you start asking that question, the risk really does pull in, and the isolation goes up orders of magnitude. Uh, the Graham-Blumenthal bill, as I remember, doesn't deal directly with the financial side. It's more of a tariff, trade-related. Is that correct, or am I misremembering? You think it has that financial? I think if it has the financial, I think that is power. It is something we have advocated. Canada's advocated. I've personally advocated some of the discussions, and I, I will say that the, the, the US, has has raised this issue on several occasions, uh, as a possibility. I think it is a possibility. I'm not saying the legislation per se, but the use of secondary sanctions, and our view, Canada's view, and a number of European countries would share this, uh, is that if we, that we should go quickly to that, uh, because that really is the biggest non-military, uh, uh, disincentive.
Um, so I'm glad, I'm glad you raised it. Yes.
Putting your, your former banker hat on, central banker hat on, uh, would you worry about the impact of secondary sanctions on the role of the dollar going forward in terms of weaponization of finance?
I, I look, I think this is, um, less, no, I mean, I, yes, I understand the motivation of the question, but I think it's, this is, this is, these would be very clear, well-motivated reasons, um, and it would be coming in, you would delay delivery, it, you'd say we're going to do it in two months or three months' time, uh, to, to, uh, effectively force Putin to, uh, to the trilateral table, um, and it would give time to reorganize, uh, reorganize relationships accordingly. You always have a risk, as you know, when you, uh, when you do financial sanctions in terms of, uh, uh, the impact on the dollar, but it is also, this, this is the thing that needs to be hammered home. It is so difficult to transact, even in other currencies, with ultimately the chain one step removed, not touching a US person, financial institution, the dollar, that, that's what gives this such power.
You support using the frozen Russian assets now. When I was a central banker, I didn't, but now that where you stand depends on where you sit. Where depends where where you stand depends on where you sit. Let's go to an online question. I'm much more enlightened now. Online question.
Um, thanks for the thanks for the question. Um, the first is the disarmament, um, and elimination of Hamas as a, as a force, certainly as a political force, military force first, and political force, uh, is one of, is one of the conditions for, uh, a sustained cessation of hostilities and peace. Um, and when you say who is going to do that, um, there are many proposals, as I'm suspect you're aware, uh, from a variety of Arab states, combination of Arab states, um, and European states, uh, to which Canada would be party, uh, if they were to come to pass, uh, for multinational forces to be, uh, deployed in Palestine to enforce a peace, uh, and to, uh, and to drive, uh, that process. Process, uh, process forward.
Um, so I think the first part of your question, I, I'd deal with directly that way. The conditions for, uh, a free and fair election, um, in Palestine, um, are many, um, and the time in order to get to that, uh, spot is, uh, is uncertain. Uh, the conditions, uh, for any form of self-determination of the Palestinian people, do not exist at present, um, and the prospect of them ever being in a position to make decisions in their own land. Um, it is the avowed policy of the current Israeli government to ensure that never happens.
Yes. Way, way in the back. Thank you, Keith A. Bell, Next Experiences, producer of New York Fashion Week and LA Fashion Week. Wow. You're in the right, uh, and, uh, I, I know two, two, two sons at the University of Toronto getting a fine education. Thank you. Good. Uh, one of them is a data science major and determined to start up his own company and feels compelled, although he loves Canada, is Canadian, would stay up there if he could, but Canada really doesn't have the opportunities that Silicon Valley offers. You know, your joke about immigration policy in the United States aside, isn't that a problem? Uh, why drive your brilliant young Canadians to the United States because the capital markets doesn't have the category of capital to support their new ideas, and is there a solution?
Yeah, I think, well, I think the first thing, uh, thanks for the question. Thanks for sending your kids back home, uh, if that's right. Um, the, uh, and I, I would, I would flip it a bit in that how much are
We're driving people to Silicon Valley and how much is Silicon Valley, uh, and Seattle for that matter, um, sucking in and attracting, and I don't mean that negatively, but just the, the sheer weight, uh, of the opportunity in the United States. And this is true whether you're Canadian, Israeli, uh, European, Indian. You, I, I, this is not a unique phenomenon to Canada. Uh, that, you know, 50% of our, the probably one of the best, I'll hedge, um, places to do computer engineering, uh, all forms of it, is Waterloo. 50% of the graduating class every year goes to, uh, uh, goes to the United States. Um, and we need to retain more of those.
Um, part of it, yeah, part of it is, um, the ecosystem, the venture capital ecosystem. I, I actually don't think that's the, to be honest, thing. I'm not saying there are things that we shouldn't be doing there. I think it's in part, uh, it's the demand part of it. It's the demand for the end, uh, product. So you can, the ability to scale in Canada is more limited, has been more limited, uh, for a variety of reasons. Part of it, our companies aren't applying things as, as, as much as US ones. Um, a lot of that is going to change in, in AI, crypto, uh, cryptography. Um, cryptography is, when I say crypto, I don't mean crypto, um, and, um, uh, and in quantum, uh, because we're, we're going to, we're going to drive a lot of that and there's, and spin-offs of that. Doesn't mean we'll keep everybody, but we'll keep more.
I mean, the president just had an interesting visit to the UK. Yeah. And signed this major technology agreement. UK is going to get hundreds of billions of dollars potentially of of investment into their AI infrastructure. Could Canada cut a similar deal with the United States? Yeah, we could cut, uh, we would like to cut a similar deal. Uh, the extent to which it needs to be done with the US government is, it's not clear to me it has to be done with the US government. I'm happy to them to come, um, but we've got. So what do you need? What do you need for an AI data center? You need, you need power, you need chips, um, and, you know, more clean power is preferred, um, uh, you need chips, uh, wouldn't hurt to have a fiber optic cable that went down to the US, uh, you know, proximity doesn't, uh, doesn't hurt. What, and so we, that, that strategy of, of building out the infrastructure that the UK, France, others are pursuing, that makes sense. Uh, that makes sense for us. Uh, and we've got to make sure that some of our power, those big chunks of power that are coming online are there for the overall benefit for Canada, goes to the previous question, uh, and, and the productivity discussion. That's nice getting that infrastructure. The big payoff is actually in the application, which means that you want to flow through, uh, some of that capacity for Canadian companies, Canadian usage, um, and actually the education side becomes that much more important.
There's another question way, oh, right there, uh, about two-thirds of the way back. Yep. Gentlemen, looking back. There you go. Hi, Andrew Waters with Morgan Stanley. Uh, Mr. Prime Minister, congratulations on passage of the One Canadian Economy Act this summer. Congratulations on re-referencing it. Thank you. This is very good. I wonder if you could say a few more words and give us a few more details on the projects that you're planning to fast-track through the approval authorities. Um, what are the size of those projects? When might they be approved and shovel-ready? And when might they, when might we start seeing those, uh, show up in GDP? Thank you.
Yeah, great. Uh, great question. Um, so we're going to, we're going to layer these, uh, approvals roughly every four months, uh, for the course of the next couple of years. Uh, we have a series of them, uh, that were initially proposed. Uh, Canada's a federation, part of the way you, part of the way we have to get things moving. We, uh, or parliament gave the government, uh, additional powers to fast-track approvals. So, two-year time horizon, and once we designate a project, it's presumed approved. Okay. So, they, something has to kind of go off in order for it not to happen, which means that a lot of the engineering and other work drive through. Um, but part of the way to get things done in Canada, I mentioned this in my remarks, is through partnerships. So, we started with the provinces saying, "What are your top priorities?" And they've given us a bunch of their top priorities. Uh, Indigenous peoples, Indigenous rights holders, what are some of their top priorities? Bringing those together and making sure that those are front of the, front of the line, front of the queue. Um, what you're, what you're going to see is a series of things in, and you're starting to see them in and around critical minerals, in and around energy, particular a mixture of conventional and clean. Uh, we just, uh, green-lit, uh, with BC, for example, one of the largest, uh, um, you know, whatever it was, uh, uh, one of the largest LNG projects, uh, SI, Silusum, um, which follows hard on the heels of LNG one and potentially LNG two, which is this giant consortium. Uh, those, those are, uh, just to give a sense of, of sort of blocks. These are effectively zero-carbon LNG because the liquification is, it's before the scope three, obviously, I'll say that under the control of planet Earth, um, right, but the liquification is done with hydro, um, very short shipping times, uh, to Asia, tons of demand, and displaces coal. Lots of good things about that. You will see a lot of that, those types of projects. But in parallel with scale nuclear, scale nuclear in, um, Ontario, where the, where the actual FID decisions and the capital is starting to flow, large-scale hydro, you know, 10,000 to 15,000, uh, megawatt hydro, uh, in the East, um, and then big corridors and critical minerals that are opened up. Last thing, sorry, this is too long an answer, but the, the AI infrastructure leg of that strategy is just being developed. We, we referenced it a few weeks ago around a sovereign cloud because we know that we're the offtake for that development, for that. Uh, and, and you'll see, you'll see something on that in the next few months. You've contributed so much to, uh, the United States, the UK, the globe when it comes to climate change, and now you're bringing it back to Canada. We are so privileged to have you here. Thank you for spending time with us. Thank you.