Ran Samvad 2026: India’s Military Leadership Discusses Future War Winning Strategies At Bengluru

Chief of Defense Staff General El Johan, Chief of the Army staff General Lupendi, Senior Commanders, Officers from the Three Services, veterans, friends from foreign countries, members of the academia and media, ladies and gentlemen. A very good morning to all of you.

On behalf of all personal training command of the Indian Air Force, I welcome you all to run Sambad 2026. Envisioned as a conversation among practitioners of war, it provides a forum where military operators, scholars, technologists and strategists could collectively reflect on the changing character of warfare and its implications on India. It is only natural for the second edition to follow in quick succession with this year's theme being multi-dommain operations and imperative for addressing conventional and irregular threats. MDO has indeed become a buzzword today.

However, before we delve into this topic and the changing nature of war, we need to take a moment to ask ourselves, was war ever restricted or exclusive to a single domain. It wasn't. The earliest form of conflict, unarmed combat, graduated quickly to land warfare with the use of Astra Shastra with the emergence of the navies adding a new dimension, a strategy that continued for long. However, since the dawn of the 20th century, once man took to the skies, all major wars have seen not only an optimum combination of all three, but a major decisive role of air moving on to the use of space and cyber. But a glance into our epics tells us that be the victory of Sugre over Bali, Lakshman over Maggnab, the Pandovves vanquishing Donachara or Jedrat or even the famous battle of Troy which lends his name to malware even today. Each of them owed its success to effective deception or use of the cognitive domain as we call it today. Sam Dham dand has been our ancient noteworthy strategy.

So what has changed today is the emergence of irregular threats, confrontations short of declared war, the speed and reach of platforms, the lethality of weapons, the ensuing effects of military actions, and the mass influence of rapid communication, be it genuine or fake. The modern battle space is no longer linear. It is multi-layered, interconnected, and persistent. Not many may have anticipated that the ongoing conflict would not only choke oil and gas supplies, sending prices soaring, but show its consequences across unimagined fields from currency shocks, fertilizer and food security, chip manufacturing industry, AI and Bitcoin mining, medicine supply, MRI machines, and yes, even contraceptors. It is thus essential to consider not just the target you see through your crosshair but carefully evaluate the entire target system for second and third order effects. While pursuing military goals, we must retain focus on the reasons for war, the conflict termination criteria and the desired end state less we get drawn into a protracted battle with diminishing gains. We as a nation demonstrated this very well in operation sindur last year. But we do see many contrary examples. It is important to remember that war is not a whimsical adventure of the military forces. It is a vital tool of state policy to achieve a political aim as envisaged by the national leadership. It dictates a whole of nation approach and needs all possible means exploiting all possible dimensions which only broaden with technology.

However, we need to be cognizant and cautious of the fact that while the enthusiasm to keep pace with emerging technology is certainly understandable, neither does it help to have a will do it upon approach, nor is it practical for everyone to claim a share of every domain. Thus, the critical requirement in today's war is not an attempt at ownership, but a focused, coordinated, and mutually supportive strategy without unnecessary attempts at duplication of core expertise. And that's what we intend to dwell on in the next two days.

Over the course of this seminar, our discussions will explore several interrelated dimensions of MDO. We will begin by examining how intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance must be integrated across domains to create a shared operational picture that enables faster and more informed decision-m. The conversation will extend to the challenge of reimagining operational art in an environment where actions in space, cyber, and cognitive domains interact continuously with conventional maneuvering. Equally important will be our deliberations on how jointness must evolve. Doctrine moving beyond coordination to the orchestration of effects across domains through unified planning processes, interoperable command structures and shared situational awareness. The seminar will also examine the force development implications of the transformation including the need to build resilient capabilities, distributed networks and integrated systems able to function in contested environments. Another dimension we will explore is the role of advanced simulation and wargaming in preparing our forces for multi-dommain conflict, enabling commanders to test concepts and rehearse complex operations in realistic digital environments. Finally, we will reflect on the broader strategic context in which these operations unfold, particularly the increasing convergence between the military and the technological,formational and economic instruments of national power.

Taken together, these themes represent not separate discussions but different facets of a single challenge. How to prepare our defense forces to operate effectively in a battle space where integration, speed of decision, and adaptability will increasingly determine success. To understand why such a conversation has become necessary, we need to reflect on how warfare itself has evolved. Warfare evolves in cycles of adaptation. Technological breakthroughs alter the tools of war. But it is a human institutions backed by training systems, doctrines, and organization cultures that determine whether these tools produce advantage. The introduction of gunpowder reshaped medieval warfare. But it was the emergence of professional armies and centralized states that translated that technology into military power. The industrial revolution introduced mechanization, rail mobility, and mass production. But it was a development of operational planning and logistic systems that allowed industrialized warfare to function during the world wars. The same pattern can be observed in the emergence of air. Aircraft alone did not create strategic effect. It was the development of air doctrine, professional training institutions and operational concepts that enabled air to transform warfare in the 20th century. Similarly, the revolution in military affairs characterized by precision guided munitions, stealth technology, satellite navigation and network command systems was employed very effectively in the 1991 Gulf War to achieve unprecedented speed and precision.

The domains of warfare have expanded beyond land, sea, and air to include space and cyber apart from the cognitive domain. They are not independent battlefields but interconnected layers of an operational ecosystem with actions in one having consequences in another. A cyber intrusion can disrupt command networks. Satellite denial can degrade navigation and targeting. An information campaign can shape political outcomes even before the first shot has been fired. Recent conflicts illustrate this transformation clearly. In the Russia Ukraine conflict, tactical formations were able to integrate satellite imagery, commercial communication networks, unmanned aerial systems, and digital targeting applications to strike high value targets at extended ranges with remarkable speed. Long range precision fires guided by realtime intelligence exposed vulnerabilities on logistics network and command infrastructure. The Nagono Karabak conflict integrated unmanned systems with electronic warfare and precision strike capabilities to alter battlefield dynamics rapidly. Persistent surveillance made concealment difficult while coordinated electronic attacks degraded traditional air defense networks, highlighting a critical lesson. Integration across domains has become as important as technological superiority itself.

Modern operations therefore place unprecedented cognitive demands on commanders and war fighters. Traditional military training emphasize domain specialization. While these competencies remain fundamental and indispensable, modern warfare increasingly requires something more. The ability to understand how actions in one domain interact with capabilities in others. The development of human capital remains central to military effectiveness. A commander planning an air operations must now consider cyber vulnerabilities and satellite dependencies. A land formation maneuvering on the battlefield must account for persistent aerial surveillance and electronic warfare. Maritime operations depend on space-based communications and data networks. In other words, the effectiveness of any single domain increasingly depends on its interaction with others. Trading systems must thus evolve from being platformentric to missioncentric. Operators must learn not only how to employ sophisticated systems but also how to integrate them within complex operational architectures. For the training command of the Indian Air Force, preparing such professionals is both a challenge as well as an opportunity. Our institutions have long been responsible to producing aviators, engineers, and aerospace professionals of the highest caliber. The task before us now is to ensure that these professionals are equally prepared to operate within a multi-dommain battle space. The future war fighter will require three essential attributes. First, professional mastery within one's own domain. Second, cross-domain awareness. Third, and perhaps most importantly, adaptive thinking. Commanders must be able to interpret incomplete information, anticipate adversary actions, and take decisions under pressure. Professional military education must therefore evolve accordingly. Joint and cross-domain modules must become integral components of training. Exposure to other services and agencies should occur early in career. Warfighting education must emphasize critical thinking and problem solving as much as pro procedural proficiency.

Another area where training must evolve is in the use of simulation and digital war gaming. Modern battlefields involve interactions between kinetic operations, cyber actions, and information campaigns that are difficult to replicate through live exercises. Advanced simulation and digital wargaming allow commanders to experiment alongside traditional combat operations in ways that would otherwise be impractical or prohibitively expensive. Thus, simulation becomes not merely a training tool, but a laboratory for doctrinal innovation. The trading ecosystem must also engage with technological innovation beyond the traditional defense sector. Many of the technologies shaping modern warfare like artificial intelligence, advanced sensors, satellite networks, and data analytics are being developed in the civilian domain. Military training institutions must therefore cultivate partnerships with universities, technology companies, and research organizations. The transformation towards multi-dommain warfare also requires closer civil military collaboration. Modern conflict often blurs the boundaries between military and the civil domains. Effective responses to such challenges require coordination between military organizations, government agencies, industry partners and academic institutions.

Ladies and gentlemen, the discussions that will follow will examine MDO from multiple perspectives, operational, technological, doctrinal and strategic. But I would also like to emphasize that the foundation of that transformation lies in training and education. If you are to operate effectively in a multi-dommain environment, we must prepare our people to think and act across domains. We must build institutions capable of continuous learning and adaptation and we must cultivate a culture of intellectual curiosity and innovation within our defense forces. Run Sambad represents an important step in that direction by bringing together operators, scholars and technologists. It provides a space for ideas to be debated openly and new concepts to emerge. I encourage all participants to engage actively in the discussions ahead to challenge assumptions and to share valuable insights from personal experiences. The ideas generated here will shape how we prepare for conflicts tomorrow. We look forward to some valuable brainstorming over the next two days. Thank you very much. Jind May I now request air marshal ashoto digshit param wishes civa medal ati wishes civa medal ya medal wishes civa medal sysk for a keynote address.

Chief of Defense Staff General Nin Chawan, uh, Chief of Army Staff General Upendra Devedi, all the esteemed veterans, uh, senior officers, uh, members of the strategic community, uh, officers from friendly countries, industry partners, scholars, distinguished guests, and members of the press. Uh, welcome to this edition of Run Sambad 2026. This is only the second edition of Run Sambad. But what a beginning we have made. A tri service seminar where practitioners serving and retired sit alongside think tank scholars, industry leaders and civilian defense experts to debate the hard questions about war and warfare. The Indian Air Force is rightly proud to host this edition and the theme we have chosen could not be more timely. Multi-dommain operations and imperative for addressing conventional and irregular threats.

Before I get into the substance, let me take a moment to acknowledge something remarkable. We invited research papers on six topics which with no restriction on branch or rank. The response was over a 100 papers. That tells me something important. Our officers think deeply about their profession even when operational commitments leave little time to breathe. This intellectual energy and this instinct to reflect and question I think it will be the foundation of everything we are trying to build here.

Let me start by talking about the changing face of war which previous speaker also alluded to. Let me start with the simple question. When does a war begin? Today not when the first shot is fired. By then the adversary has already been inside your networks shaping narratives degrading your satellite links and mapping your logistics. The opening moves of modern conflict are invisible, silent, and often deniable. And they happen across domains we barely acknowledged a few years ago, like space, cyber space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the cognitive space of public opinion. While the nature of war, a contest of wills conducted through organized violence, has not changed, its character is transforming at a pace we have barely witnessed in history. The battlefield no longer unfolds sequentially or phase by phase. It unfolds simultaneously across every domain where a single tactical action can produce strategic consequences within minutes.

So what does his history teaches us? History reminds us that warfare has evolved in sudden shifts when new technology arrived at the scene like gunpowder like internal combustion engine. But here is the crucial point that history keeps making and that we must never forget. None of the transformations which we have seen were merely technological in nature. Blitz Creek was not just tanks. It was tanks, air power and radio communication working as one. The Gulf War was not just precision weapons. It was joint integration enabled by a shared command network. Technology provided the instrument. Doctrine and organization provides the music. Both are required. Today's transformation follows the same pattern. What we are witnessing is not modernization for its own sake. It is convergence becoming the central principle of warfare.

Now let me give you some lessons from battlefields uh of today and uh by this way I will bring out the abstract and put it into the concrete. In Ukraine the early stage of the conflict showed how a smaller force using commercial satellite imagery space-based communication secure digital networks and precision targeting could impose disproportionate costs on a larger one. The decisive factor was not any single person, not any single weapon. It was the integration of sensing, targeting and strike into a coherent real-time architecture. So forces that relied on centralized command nodes and exposed logics proved deeply vulnerable. The lesson resilience and convergence are not optional. They are the price of survival.

And then there is what has unfolded as we speak in the Middle East. The USIsrael conflict with Iran, which began in earnest in Feb 26, is perhaps an instructive study in multi-dommain operations. Consider what has been in play. B2 stealth bombers flying ultra- longrange strike missions. Carrier strike groups providing sea-based air power. Submarine operations in the Indian Ocean. Iranian retaliation using coordinated salvos of ballistic missiles and drones. Striking across nine countries at once and Iranian restrictions on traffic through the state of Hormos. By this they have weaponized geography and economics as part of the same campaign. No single domain has been decisive. Every domain is contested. The conflict has also demonstrated how quickly regional instability reaches our doorstep. An Iranian naval frigate was recently sunk barely 40 nautical miles from Sri Lanka in waters where India has vital interest. For us, this is not a distance spectacle. It is a strategic lesson delivered in real time.

Closer home, our own experience with opindur in May 25 May 25 underscore sharper than any doctrine document ever put that jointness is the need of the R integrated operations coordinated across services and domains in real time define the new standard that lessons must not be embedded into how we train, how we equip and how we fight.

Now as someone who has spent a lifetime in aviation, let me offer a metaphor that I think cuts to the heart of the multi-dommain operations which are demanded of us. In an older generator fighter aircraft, the pilot is the integrator. Radar inputs, electro electronic warfare warnings, radio transmissions, and visual cues all arrive separately. The pilot must is stitch them together mentally under pressure in quick time. It works but it is cognitively demanding, slow, painful and at times errorprone. In a fifth generation platform, sensor fusion architecture does much of that work. It curates information, filters noise, presents the pilot with a single coherent picture. The result is not incremental. It is transformational. The pilot makes better decisions faster. The aircraft's lethality multiplies not because it carries more weapons but because it architecture compresses the time between seeing and taking an action. Multi-dommain operations are exactly that but at the topmost level. It is the deliberate integration of our capabilities, information flows and command authorities so that the Indian defense forces can generate decision superiority across all domains simultaneously. Not because we have the most platforms but because we have the best architecture.

Now let us be honest with oursel about what multi-one operations is not. It is not cosmetic jointness. three services talking to each other at conferences and meetings but planning separately. It is not about adding a cyber usage annex to a service specific plan. It is not about buying advanced platform without thinking how they connect to each other. True MDO is architectural. It requires force structures, command relationships, data standards, training pathways and industrial ecosystems be built for interoperability from the very start. It is about thinking in terms of systems rather than platforms, effects rather than service equities and speed of decision rather than tradition. In short, MDO is not about what we own. It is about what we can do together faster than the adversary.

Now, India's environment makes this transformation urgent, not aspirational. We face threats that do not respect domain boundaries. Among our along our northern borders, surveillance drone, satellite monitoring, electronic warfare, and rapid force mobilization coexist in a state of permanent readiness. In the maritime domain, sea lines of communication intersect with space-based surveillance, undersea competition, and carrierbased power projection. On western borders, the threat is evolving with each passing day. Hybrid threats, misinformation campaigns, cyber intrusions targeting power grids, drone swamps over sensitive installations deliberately blur the line between peace and conflict. These threats cannot be addressed by one service. They cannot be addressed sequentially. They must be addressed simultaneously across domains in a synchronized coordinated response. The ongoing Middle East conflict is a sharp reminder that sea lane disruption, energy supply shocks and regional instability can affect India's interests without a single adversary targeting us directly. Preparedness must be multi-dommain from the outset. That that is why MDO is not a future option. It is a present imperative.

At the heart of MDO is only one objective decision superiority. Not more data but better decisions and faster. See information overload is also as dangerous as information scarcity. Commanders drowning in unfiltered data are slow and paralyzed. Our challenge is data orchestration. ensuring that the right information reaches the right decision maker at the right moment across every service across every domain. Ukraine demonstrated this vividly. Decentralized units equipped with real-time intelligence and digital targeting tools were able to exploit opportunities instantly. Units that compress the sensor to shooter loop imposed disproportionate costs on adversaries. Rapid hierarchies with broken communication cause delays and disaster. For us, this means mission command must become real. Delegated authority operating with clearly articulated strategic intent supported by secure and resilient communications, distributed decision-m with preserved coherence. This is why 2026 has been designated year of networking and data centricity by Indian army. It builds directly on 2025's year of reforms which delivered our first formal MDO doctrine. Established the defense cyber and space doctrines pushed joint training through framework of joint services training institutions and enhancement of training curriculum in tri service institutes. The direction is set. Now we have to accelerate.

Capability convergence must drive how we design our forces. Three principles matter the most. First, we should have interoperable kill chains. A target detected by one service must be prosecutable by another without friction without losing time. Sensor and shooter must be able to speak to each other seamlessly regardless of which uniform they wear. Second is resilience. In an era of long range precision targeting and persistent surveillance, concentrated assets are exposed assets. Distributed operations, mobility, deception and redundancy must be built in R4 design from the ground up. Third is technological sovereignity. Anarba in defense is not just about making weapons in India. It is about controlling architectures, software encryption, data standards and upgrade cycles. Without that control, we are dependent on others at the worst possible moments. The record defense exports of nearly 24,000 crores in uh last year and Brahos missile serving with friendly countries tells us that Indian capability is recognized globally. We must build on that confidence at home.

The proliferation of drone technology across modern battlefield deserves a special mention. From Eastern Europe to West Asia, relatively lowcost unmanned systems when integrated effectively have changed the calculus of conflict. Answer is not reactive procurement. It is architectural integration. layered air and missile defense, manned unmanned teaming and electronic warfare resilence baked into our forced design.

Now uh a few words about human dimension uh doctrine, training, culture which are most important because platform and networks alone will not win future wars. People will. The future officers must be what we are beginning to call a hybrid warrior. He should be deeply grounded in domain expertise but fluent in cross-domain effects. He or she must undertake understand how a cyber operation can degrade an air defense network. How space-based ISR shapes maritime maneuver and how an information narrative can shift escalation dynamics before a single round is fired. And we must go further than the defense forces. Cyber attacks target civilian power grids. Disinformation campaigns influence public morale. Space assets underpin navigation systems by both military and civilian users. A genuine multi-dommain response must integrate intelligence agencies, space organizations, industry, law enforcement and academia into our planning architecture. Crisis coordination cannot be improvised. It must be pre-esigned.

Our move towards joint structures in theater commands with planning now having reached more than 90%. Is a historic opportunity. But let us be clear, structures alone do not guarantee synergy. Cultural integration is what makes a structure come alive. Jointness must evolve from mere coordination to genuine unity of effort. that requires transparency of information sharing, clarity of authority and most fundamentally mutual trust. Technology connects systems. Trust connects people and it should be built among all stakeholders.

AirPower occupies a distinctive position in the multi-dommain metrics as it is the glue that holds it together. It speed, flexibility, reach and precision enable rapid effects across depth. But the fighter cockpit of the future is not a lone platform. It is a node in a network. Its effectiveness depends on shared data, integrated training, integrated targeting and resilient communications. What is true of air power is true of every service. Each member must see itself not as an independent actor but as a component of a national combat architecture.

How do we know we are getting there? This is the next question which need to answer. We should measure our progress not by the number of platforms we procure or doctrine documents we publish but by effects we collectively generate which will matter operationally. How quickly can we fuse multissource data into a coherent operational picture. How fast does that picture translate into executable orders? How resilient are our networks under cyber or electronic attack? And how well can triggered systems be reconstituted in the field? Ultimately, multi-dommain operations will be a c cultural transformation, not just a technical one. It demands intellectual humility to question legacy approaches and institutional courage to implement reform. In high performance test flying which I was part of, we have an expression operating at the edge of the envelope. It means pushing the aircraft limits deliberately, carefully with rigorous preparation and disciplined confidence. You do not go there recklessly. You go there because the mission demands it and because you have done the homework and you are ready. India stands exactly at such a moment. The strategic environment around us will not wait. The convergence of domain, the proliferation of disruptive technologies, the persistence of irregular threats, all of them compel us to build an integrated force capable of detering credibly and responding decisively across the full spectrum of conflict.

This is addition of run Sambad. This addition of run samad is more than a seminar. It is a forum for rigorous debate and candid assessment. Let us use it to challenge assumptions, refine doctrine and align technology with strategy. Let us ensure that India's approach to multi-dommain operations is distinctively Indian, rooted in our operation realities, informed by the lessons unfolding around us and guided by strategic prudence. Over the next two days, four sessions will bring together practitioners and thinkers serving and retired, uniformed and civilian. CDS, service chief and senior military officer will share their perspective and place these discussions in the broader national context. We also have the six selected papers being presented by their authors. The program is curated to give equal weight to theory and practice because neither alone is enough. The world around us has changed more than anyone imagined. In ways both wonderful and terrible, often in ways no one anticipated. The sheer profanity of change in the past guarantees that change will continue. Now standing still is not an option, but participating in directing change is the best way ahead. The men and women of our defense forces deserve structures, doctrines and technologies that match their professionalism and courage. Our nation expects nothing less and I am confident that this forum will move us closer to delivering exactly that. I wish the seminar all the success and now let's get started. Thanks very much for patience listening. and Jah. Thank you. Thank you sir.

The requirement for multi-dommain operation needs to be driven by a strategy of deep convergence where capabilities across all domains are synchronized to create simultaneous compounding dilemmas for an opponent. In order to lay its foundation, we'll commence the first session titled MDO evolution requirements and options. May I now request air marshal Tajjinder Singh Param Vishes Sea Medal Ati Vishes Seva Medal Wu Senna Medal Air Officer Commanding in Chief Southwestern air command to chair the session. The air marshall has held key staff and command appointments including ACS ops offensive and ACS ops strategy, senior air staff officer at headquarter eastern air command, deputy chief of the air staff and air officer commanding and chief training command. May I now call upon the panelists for the first session. The first panelist is Vice Admiral Samir Sakena, Ati Vash Sea Medal, No Senna Medal, Flag Officer, Commanding Inch Chief, Southern Naval Command. The Admiral has held key staff and operational appointments a float and ashore. These include naval adviser to high commission of India and London, assistant chief of the naval staff policy and plans, flag officer commanding western fleet, flag officer commanding Gujarat naval area and chief of staff eastern naval command. The next panelist is left general dendra Sharma. Param Vishes Seva Medal, Ati Vish Sea Medal, Sena Medal, General Officer Commanding in Chief Army Training Command. The general officer has held important staff and command appointments which include Brigadier General Staff operations of a strike corp, major general staff operations and later chief of staff headquarter western command. May I now request the chair to take over the proceedings.

Chief of Defense Staff uh Chief of Army staff, former chiefs, all other senior officers, dignitaries and attendees. Uh firstly, I would like to thank Headquarter for planning the seminar and of course to training command for conducting it. uh uh before I start our the this particular session will expand on what has been said by the previous speakers especially the CISK and with a purpose to get some doctrinal clarity on the subject of MDO on three particular aspects and most of these topics will be discussed greater in detail by the individual speakers before I start with my talk u you know and I I first got a chance or rather I was detailed to speak on MDO in 2023 and after the talk the large number of people who attended thought it is just new jargon. It is just which is entered the lexicon. It is uh one odd veteran general kandare he told me please write it into a paper and today when we are having a dedicated seminar of on MDO I feel extremely happy that I put the money on the right horse I wish I had done that in the stock market this so without further ado I'll uh start with my talk uh much of it has been covered but I'll try to deconlict and add something new in my talk. That gu The scope of my presentation is flashed on the screen. Just take a little detailed look at the contemporary battle space. And lot of MDO has been covered. I'll try to trace the evolution of MDO in these by NATO, USA, Russia and China. It'll help us relate with the topic better and where we are. I'll also cover touch upon certain transformations that these countries undertook while they uh formalized or matured their concept of MDO. I'll take a quick look at some recent operations essentially a little bit of Ukraine and Venezuela and uh I'll leave the ongoing epic fury to General Sharma who is going to cover it in greater detail and a quick look at prospects for India. Much of that has already been covered by the CISK. This is one diagram which you are seeing very often. It is there in our joint in our multi-dommain operations doctrine itself. Uh we have the traditional domains and information domain and the emerging domains. I will come to this diagram or the sketch again a little later but quickly I'll have a look at domain. If you if you were to define it now, domain is a macro maneuver space whose control is vital to freedom of action and superiority required by the mission. This is a war fighter general principle. It is an area that one must have access into and make effects and this arena does not have to be physical. This is exact essentially the driver for MDO concept that this arena need not be physical. A quick look at the space missions. Space control we used to call about air superiority air control. The same concept can be extended now to space control both in the defensive and offensive counterpace operations. Also space power or space capability enhances conventional operations. We have for missile launch warning, communications, networkcentric operations, pnt, ISR, elint including oceanic surveillance, meteorology, situational control, uh situational awareness, command and control and the developing space force application through through space, in space and from space. These topics I'm sure are being covered in greater detail uh by the authors who have written papers on same coming to cyber cognitive warfare has acquired much more teeth through the digital system digital deception deep fakes influence ops scops the previous speakers have touched upon them and we keep seeing them or in the ongoing operations as as well decision inhibition degraded in the integrity of data. The delta system of Ukraine was compromised that they lost confidence in what to believe and what not to believe. Hybrid de uh destabilization wherein state sponsored activists including Iran uh carried out successful operations using telegram and other uh social media. kinetic synchronization which is combining cyber and kinetic attacks which we saw in of Venezuela and of course the ongoing epic fury. So now we come back to this same uh diagram. So here you have operations in the traditional domains and you have a lot of missions similar or if not more which are taking place in the other emerging domains with the information domain overlapping both traditional and non-traditional domains. Therefore, all operations are multiple domains. Do operations take place in every way and cross-domain maneuvers is the given with this kind of number of missions, number of options to manage them with a conventional wisdom of war fighting or planning. It is practically impossible. The number of operations options that are available in kinetic and non-kinetic domain have increased manifold and they are being further accelerated with the advent of technological developments like quantum etc. Therefore there is a need to have a new way of fighting a great new concept of operations that is why the need for multi-dommain operation. This aspect was I think very nicely covered by the CISK also. Therefore, what is required is to gain information superiority through joint integrated ISR and networks, have decision dominance through compressing the UDA loop loop and having a multi-dommain command control and communication network and be able to apply kinetic and non-kinetic operations jointly with seamless feedback and decurrence. So the key attributes are information superiority or the key objectives are information superiority and decision dominance and attributes being cross-domain application synergy and tempo. The NATO defines MDO as orchestration of military activities across all domains and environments synchronized with non-military activity. This point was also covered to enable enable the alliance to create converging effects as was covered and most importantly at the speed of relevance. Sorry. The American descent strategy 22. The first of the four priorities are defending the homeland paced to the growing multi-dommain threat posed by the people's republic of China. This sentence could well be a part of India's strategy as well. The same adversaries with multi-dommain capabilities which have evolved many fold since 2022. It recck acknowledges also the fact that the Americans place PRC as the top threat higher than Russia and this is a common adversity that we have. Their conops can be compressed into a definition of joint force achieves competitive advantage over a near peer adversary. This is one place where is a there's often a debate while you may have create asymmetry in a particular domain but in the context in which we are talking it is very important to have parity with your adversaries in our context especially you can't just bank on cyber and space and not have the kinetic wherewithal to be able to contest but the I the requirement is to create multiple complimentary threats that compel the adversity to do a response and create for him multiple dilemmas. So multiple dilemmas and near prayer adversary I think are some words which we could discuss later as well. Russia it had the premikov doctrine which was further defined by Jerzimov who was our uh defense minister doctrine which they call new generation warfare. It talks of emphasizes off on whole of government warfare fusion of hard and soft power a point which CNC training command also uh made quite lucidly and various domains blurring the boundary between peace and war that means war is not when the bugle goes or there's an announcement actually speaking uh we are in a state of war all the time in fact the Americans have coined The word contestation that means it's an ongoing struggle at all times with your adversaries. The escalation takes place into war but the contestation is always on and this happens in multi-dommains. information is recognized as a domain in addition to the conventional domains and Russians have given an empirical parameter whereas kinetic action to non-kinetic will be in a ratio of 1 is to4 and non-kinetic will precede this is what their doctrine says and more or less if you look at the way they operate they follow this Somebody needs to help me. It's not changing. Okay. China's development I'll take a little more time on three prongs of doctrine, cornops and capability from 1989 onwards. I'll take you to the last bullet of capability uh capability development. In the year 2000, PLA Air Force did not have an air superiority fighter. Indian Air Force had three. The Mirage 2000, the MC 29 and the SU30. But through a plan of action, if you go to the situation now, they are in the race for making the first sixth generation fighter as well as the stealth bomber. So the doctrinal evolvement evolution evolution of concepts has to be backed with capability development. When it comes to space, cyber and information they have developed as fast and perhaps faster than the western world. I will touch upon what all key transformations that have taken place. Lot of has been covered. data fusion AI to compress the sensor shooter loops. Uh in the case of USA, the United States is working on a joint all domain command and control system as a backbone. In addition to their existing network, the US Congress has earmarked I think $1.7 billion or something. I may be wrong on the figure and made US Air Force as the lead agency to create this backbone for multi-dommain operations. And of course this point was made repeatedly by the CNC training command emphasis on simulation wargaming and training since there are so many options both in the kinetic non-kinetic domain involving same services operating in both three domains or multiple domains. It is physically impossible like the example of the pilot given by the CISK also to be able to do so manually in a conventional way in which you do war wargaming or do our live exercises. Therefore AI based virtual or computer simulation is absolutely essential. The United States, I'm talking of around 10, 15 years ago, had a chance to take part in a war game. First, run their plan on a simulator, tweak it, run it again, and only then they are satisfied that they authorize the mission. So, we have to definitely evolve into this uh regimen and do so in a very fast rate. China platform to system of system operations. This point has been covered. They have reorganized their strategic support force having a separate information. This has happened two three times. Now this is the latest one in August 2025. I think a separate uh verticals of information support, cyber force, aerospace, this is the space part of it and the joint logistic support force. This of course is indicative I think of their expeditionary uh ambitions. Once again, simulation and wargaming. I put the bullet training separately for China. In China, all exercises, all exercises are joint exercises. There is no single service exercise. All training courses colonel and above are joint courses. There is no single service course. So, this is a lesson to learn perhaps or think about. MDO for Russia much is not known. They of course they have similar capabilities. Aerospace force this is a combined force of the with the air force. The cyber organization they have we have read about these in various spy thrillers etc. the GRU the FSB and the SVR. They have now gained cyber capabilities and carry out this thing. They have a dedicated information troops of Russia organization which is embedded controlled by the MOD. Once again there is an equal impetus and importance given to simulation wargaming and trading. Recent operations Russia cognitive domain targeting of targets and communications to the morale. All kindic attacks were preceded by cyber attacks to create greater confusion. The vice attack of February 22 which we are all well aware disrupted broadband of course this led to Starling of course but it led to phenomenon success on the land uh by the Russian however is also brought to four collateral cyber collateral this attack impacted Germany's wind tunnels uh 5800 wind turbines sorry and put them out out of service on the Ukrainian side. uh the drone attack at Russian air bases in depth is a classic example of multi-dommain operation with conventional you know smuggling or spying followed by uh assembling of drones and attacks inside the attack on Russian troops by their mobile signature is very famous on the new year's uh eve of 2023 and in the initial part of the war they used legacy artillery which was guided by Cston in absolute resolve which is the uh Venezuela operation in the cyber domain. We had a strategic blackout nationwide power outage in Venezuela. Anthropic clot AI enabled targeting. Essentially with all the sensor inputs, this AI application was able to create targeting options of more than thousand in quick time which otherwise would have perhaps taken months. They also identified the latency in command and control so that they could exploit it. Cognitive domain. Uh I'll just rush through. I'll come to cognit EW. Here they use something perhaps this com bobb which is a non-lethan uh pulse energy weapon against personnel and equipment. This was used when the final assault to capture the head of state was carried out to create confusion as a result of which this operation took place with minimal casualties. And of course space was well integrated as was the maritime domain prospects for India. We have actually speaking while we are generally self-critical we are making good progress. We have capabilities in all domains. Some may argue that they are not good enough or they need to uh uh you know develop faster. Uh but we have in all domains. I'll not get into the details of it. Good thing is we have the joint MDO doctrine which was issued by uh headquarter ids uh last year and our cornops is under evolution. Ran samwad being one of the platforms to have a meeting of minds to get some conceptual clarity and thereafter the plan of action which the cisks laid out for the next two years in a six monthly fashion. I think we are on the right track. Yes, we have to perhaps take ownership of this concept and put our mind to it in right earnest. Challenges generating a common all domain picture and a joint all domain command and control. A whole of government approach. Uh we have the next speaker speaking about it. Integrating the cyber and space components with a joint force. This is still work in progress and I think at the intellectual level at the soldier level we have to address the incompatibilities in technology time timing and thinking amongst all domains. Time means different uh is viewed differently by different services by different components. timing once again. So this is one aspect when we we have the next speaker uh general Sharma is going to talk about OPAT he will delve into this and throw some more light on how this can be nuanced for multi-dommain operations training three-dimensional thinking and technical orientation improved understanding of air cyber and space these two points were made by CNC training command and six as well network ccentric operations now networkcentric operations are not just for war fighting networkcentric operations have to be become the normal for peaceime functioning as well training for MDO this point I've already elaborated we need to go in for high-end combat simulator and step up the joint training to conclude ma MDO is the new normal it is mandatory to embibe we don't have a choice our adversaries will use it against us we have to have this multi-dommain capabilities We need to enhance our capability in all domains to bank on just cyber and space capability against another adversary would perhaps uh uh not meet the requirement. We need to upgrade our equipment profiles and force structures to align with the requirements of MDO. This topic is being covered uh tomorrow. We have to harness our non-traditional domain op capability both conceptually and doctrinally as well as have methods in place to do that. that is better integration of the defense cyber and space agencies into our operational gambit information superiority through seamless integration. Uh this aspect is being covered tomorrow and of course finally to have the decision dominance so that we can create effects as well as multiple dilemmas for the adversaries. With this I have finished and we'll go on to the next speaker. Yeah, thank you, General Anil Chawan, Chief of Defense Staff, General Upender Devidi, Chief of the Army Staff, Air Chief Marshall Homie Major and Admiral Karamir Singh, former Chiefs of the Air and Naval Staffs, Service Commanders and Chiefs, General Officers, Flag Officers, Air Officers, officers, distinguished veterans, friends from our friendly foreign country, members Members of media and academia. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my belief that here at the Run Sambad, we must occupy ourselves with one central question. What truly determines success in war? And I believe that Clauswitz gave us the answer that has survived two centuries of technological revolution, geopolitical upheaval and strategic transformation. The Clauswitzin triangle with its three corners. The government which provides policy and the political will to fight. The military which provides options that are aligned with that policy and dwell upon chance and creativity and the people. Clause said the people provide the will to fight the hatred for the enemy. And to this in today's context I would say that the people provide the technological capability the industrial capacity and the economic resilience. War loses scorance the minute one of these elements the government the people or the armed forces fall out of alignment with the others. This is not a Prussian insight. Our own Indian insights were articulated thousands of years before Claus was born. In 300 BC Chanak in the Atar shastra has emphasized the range of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies including psychological manipulation, intelligence, deception, diplomacy, economic strangulation of the enemy. Besides the obvious use of force, further going thousands of years earlier in the Mahabharat, Lord Krishna understood that the decisive domain was not Kikita's battlefields or arrows. It was not the politics of Hashnapur. It was in the mind of Arjun, the cognitive domain. Only by influencing that domain could he enable Arjun to act decisively to fight and particularly to defeat Bishma, the center of gravity of the Koro army. It is every generation's curse to relearn everything that was known in the age of the Mahabharat. Today's joint multi-dommain operation doctrine has now formally been written and this identifies cognitive domain not as a supporting domain as the decisive domain. Ladies and gentlemen, let me be direct about something that is often missing from our internal strategic discourse. Either we spend energy assuring ourselves that we are on target or we spend considerable intellectual energy rightly so cataloging our gaps and vulnerabilities. But a strategist who can categes produces paralysis not strategy. So before we honestly speak about the work that lies ahead to be done let us first take stock of the formidable foundational strengths that we already possess. We are a battle hardened force. Galwan 2020 where our soldiers fought hand-to- hand at 17,000 ft demonstrated institutional and national resolve. More recently, Operation Synindhur where we demonstrated the will, the capability and the strategic sophistication to conduct genuine multi-dommain operations under live combat conditions. Notwithstanding the nuclear overhang, we executed simultaneous precision strikes across domains with the Navy postured to deter escalation without engagement. Our missile systems, our air defense systems proved to be effective in real combat situations. Next, the doctrinal enhancement. With the release of the joint doctrine on multi-dommain operations last year, we have now formally codified six domain framework. land, sea, air, space, cyber, and cognitive as the operating environment for all future conflicts. The doctrine explicitly established the cognitive do domain as a co-equal to the physical domains and it mandates a common all domain operational picture and also frames our response

Not as a military exercise, but a whole-of-nation approach. Beyond doctrine and operations, India also possesses structural advantages that are unique among spars. Our strategic autonomy has given us access to technology ecosystems that no other nation commands simultaneously. Russian S400, Brahmos missiles, the American MQ9B, the C17s, the French Rafales, the Israeli UH drones, precision ammunitions. We operate the most diverse defense technology portfolio in a multi-domain conflict, and this provides optionalities. Simultaneously, we are committed to becoming a totally Atmanirbhar Bharat by 2047, and that, gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, is just 21 years away.

Our geography sets us astride the world's most critical maritime choke points, and the Indian Navy can exert strategic influence. Our geography is a gift from God. Our geopolitics is a reflection and a resultant of our policies. Our missile systems: the Brahmos, Agni, PL, Astra – credible, survivable, multiplatform. The Brahmos alone can be launched from sea, land, air, not to mention our SSBNs, which create a decision dilemma across domains. Our digital public infrastructure: Aadhaar, UPI, DigiLocker are the most sophisticated population-sized digital systems in the world. Our IT sector, IITs, and other such institutions that provide over a million engineering graduates every year, and Indian talent that is fueling the global AI research, OpenAI at Microsoft. These are our asymmetric advantages that will define the next century of warfare. And perhaps most profound of all, our democratic character. When India represents its strategic narrative to the world, it speaks from a platform of democratic legitimacy that authoritarian adversaries cannot replicate. Our independent press, our functioning courts, our civil society, they create an internationally credibility, international credibility that is a cognitive asset of incalculable value. Whatever the counter-narrative, we have to believe in our national motto, Satyam Eva Jayate.

The challenges we have. Now, I must also honestly speak about the challenges, as misrepresenting our own readiness to ourselves is the most dangerous form of cognitive warfare. Operation Sindhu taught us something sobering about the cognitive domain. By some accounts, 15% of our operational tempo was consumed fighting disinformation. Deepfakes of our Prime Minister circulated in real-time. Chinese bot networks that generated 10 million impressions of #IndianFalseFlag within 72 hours. Pakistan's information campaign, while crude, found purchase because we had no standing cognitive warfare architecture to counter it at speed. We won the kinetic battle. We could have equally done well in the narrative battle. In wars today, our adversaries are conducting cognitive operations continuously, not just when the moment of conflict begins. This is a distinction we need to recognize. This is an existential challenge for a diverse democracy, multicultural, multi-religious, multi-linguistic society that we are.

The C4ISR industrial gap, the C4ISR information infrastructure, which will be the nerve center of multi-domain operations, remains fragmented, non-interoperable, and in places obsolete. We have no common all-domain operational picture of our operational deployments. The three services are operating on different communication systems, different data formats, different encryption standards that are not natively communicating with each other. Our defense industrial base, while growing, is structurally constrained for prolonged production cycles. The public sector dominance, a budget in which finance may be adequate, but there is no ownership for the money. This is a stark danger.

So, I must now address the obvious question that truly matters. And the question is, what do we have to do to build a whole-of-nation architecture for multi-domain operations? And I offer nine recommendations that are structured around the people, the government, and the military.

For the people, I would say we need to establish a national cognitive resilience mission under, perhaps, the National Security Council, with three interlocking mandates: a standing counter-disinformation rapid response architecture, a national media literacy program scaled to create a billion citizen warriors, an array of cyber and cognitive warriors, and a cognitive warfare research center.

My second recommendation to the people would be to, you know, activate the startup defense ecosystem to scale. India's IDEX initiative has demonstrated a proof of concept, but the proof of concept is not to scale. We must move from a program of hundreds of participants to ecosystems of thousands. I recommend dedicated MDO innovation challenges in six specific capability areas: autonomous systems, AI-enabled sensor fusion, cyber offensive tools, cognitive warfare platforms, space-based ISR, and electronic warfare. These challenges should come with a three-year funded development cycle, not grants, not contracts, but developmental cycles with well-defined deliverables.

My third recommendation would be for the creation of a national defense technology reserve. India produces over a million engineering graduates annually. A fraction of those with appropriate security clearances should constitute a national defense technology reserve, structured much like our Territorial Army, in which AI engineers, cyber professionals, data scientists, and cognitive domain specialists can serve the nation in their professional capacity during crisis. The talent exists in India. We need the institutional architecture to access it.

My final recommendation to the people would be to build a defense industrial surge capability capacity. The lessons from Ukraine are not about tactics. It is about the ability to sustain attrition. We cannot allow this industrial our industrial base to wither in peacetime. That would be the equivalent of a folly in reverse. So, I recommend mandatory audit of tier 1 and tier 2 defense suppliers that can assure us that they have the capacity to surge ammunition stocks, drone production lines, precision munition manufacturing, not in peacetime, but for at least 90 days of high-intensity conflict. Also, I would like to emphasize simplicity as a principle of war. While we support our defense industry partners with our collective vision for Atmanirbhar Bharat, they cannot hold us hostage to obsolescence management.

For the government, very respectfully, I would submit two suggestions. Firstly, to establish a national multi-domain operations coordination council. A whole-of-nation approach cannot be coordinated through existing inter-ministerial processes designed for peacetime governance. We need a multi-domain Operations Coordination Council, perhaps chaired by the National Security Adviser or the Honorable Minister of Defence, with permanent memberships from the ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Information Technology, Space, Science and Technology, as also, of course, the CDS and three service chiefs, the heads of ISRO, DRDO, and NIC. The council should meet periodically at peacetime, daily in a crisis, to ensure that every element of national power is aligned with the military's operational requirements across all six domains.

The other suggestion to the government would be for a legislative framework for cyber and cognitive operations. Our democratic character is our greatest cognitive warfare asset and also our greatest vulnerability. If we conduct operations without a legal architecture, that would be a vulnerability. We need a Cyber and Information Operations Act that provides the CDS and the Cyber Command with clear authority, clear limits, and clear accountability. Without this, we will either be paralyzed in peacetime, or we will act in ways that undermine our democratic and pluralistic legitimacy, which is our strategic differentiator.

To the military, my three recommendations: Operationalize theater commands. The debate has must end. No initial organization will be perfect. Neither service headquarters nor HQ, all of them have morphed over time. What I'm suggesting is a decision deadline delivery mechanism. China stood up its commands in 24 months. We have been debating this for 24 years. And the IAF's concerns about asset legitimacy, asset scarcity are completely legitimate. They should be resolved within the theater command structure and not as an argument against it.

My next recommendation would be to establish a cognitive warfare command. And it should be a tri-service command with civilian specialists embedded. It should have a mandate to cover four functions: offensive cognitive operations against adversary decision-makers and population, defensive cognitive resilience for our own armed forces and strategic leadership, strategic communication and narrative management in crisis and conflict, and intelligence analysis of the adversary's cognitive campaigns in peacetime. This command should work with a permanent peacetime collaboration with IITs and AI and social media analysts, and with the MBA, giving the international narrative.

Finally, the need for a common all-domain operational picture. This is mandated in the doctrine, and therefore, I recommend a dedicated team to be nominated to oversee and define operational standards required to have a common operational picture.

Ladies and gentlemen, let us begin to where we let us return to where we began. As highlighted earlier, war is a continuation of policy, but more profoundly, it is an act of human will. The state that sustains it will align its people, government, and military. That which fights across every domain – political, economic, technology, psychological, and kinetic – will prevail. India in 2026 has such a moment of clarity. We have a doctrine that recognizes all six domains in operational art. We have demonstrated our ability to integrate them under fire. Our democratic legitimacy, strategic autonomy, geography, technological talent, and combat experience form a foundation that few can match. Yet, our most critical gap is cognitive. India's adversaries have already concluded that the decisive domain in any conflict with India is not the Himalayan heights or the Arabian Sea. It is the 1.1 billion screens in Indian hands and the narrative that flows through them. The decisive battlespace is not only airspace, ground terrain, or sea. It is the narrative through those billion screens. The whole-of-nation approach is therefore not a metaphor. It is an operational necessity. The government, the people, and the military must act in alignment. We have the doctrine. We have the talent. We have the will. We must act together. And now. Thank you. Jai Hind.

Thank you.

Shaurya Jind. Thank you.

General Anil Chauhan, Chief of Defence Staff. General Upendra Dwivedi, Chief of the Army Staff. Former Service Chiefs, our respected veterans, friends from friendly foreign countries, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. It's a matter of honor and a unique privilege for me to address this august gathering at the second edition of Raisina Dialogue on the strategic issue of reimagining operational art in the context of multi-domain operations. Operational art has long occupied critical space in military thought. It can be defined as the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Operational art serves as a bridge between strategy and tactics. Strategy defines what has to be achieved. Tactics defines how battles are fought. Operational art connects the two by deciding where, when, and in what sequence to give battle. The quintessential ingredients of operational art are the desired end state, centers of gravity, decisive points that address centers of gravity, lines of effort leading to the culmination point of the enemy. A regressive planning cycle encompassing sequencing, phasing, and tempo provides a campaign design which is the very essence of operational art. In today's multi-domain operations environment that encompasses not only land, air, and maritime domains, but also other domains such as space, near space, cyber, electronic, cognitive, information, and economic warfare, the application of operational art needs a very different and a nuanced approach. I shall cover my talk in two parts. First, I shall elaborate on the 21st-century battlefield while qualifying it with a recent example. In the second part, I'll elaborate on the nuanced approach towards application of operational art in the 21st century.

The modern-day battlefield has been transformed by the advent of niche and disruptive technologies. The new military architecture consists of cheap autonomous systems, AI-assisted targeting, commercial satellite imagery, resilient communications, integrated sensors, and cyber tools, all operating together as a whole. The side that wins tomorrow's wars will not be the one with the single best platform. It may be the one that can field enough platforms quickly enough and network them intelligently enough. The problem is no longer of technological sophistication. It is of industrial scale, software integration, and the speed with which lessons from the battlefield are turned into mass production. While persistent ISR, cyber and cognitive warfare, omnipresent drones, omnipresent omnipresent drones, a soldier will not get respite anytime on the battlefield. And what better way to visualize this battlefield than through the prism of an ongoing conflict? Operation Epic Fury. Operation Epic Fury, the ongoing US-Israel joint campaign against Iran, is a defining case study of multi-domain operations in the 21st century. The operation unfolded in three distinct yet overlapping phases. A shaping phase through cyber and kinetic, cyber and space disruption that blinded, paralyzed, and isolated the Iranian forces before a single kinetic weapon was released. A shock phase through simultaneous massive air, missile, drone strikes that delivered decisive effects across strategic depth. And a sustaining phase through continuous high-tempo strikes on missile sites, command control nodes, critical military assets, nuclear facilities, logistic installations, and civilian infrastructure.

Allow me to dilate now on certain specific domains that were operationalized during Opic Fury. Space was the foundational enabler, active before the first weapon was released, sustaining every phase through the conflict. Keyhole, Planet Labs, Maxar Worldview satellites provided detection, identification, target tracking, and battle damage assessment. GPS Block 3 satellites transmitting the jam-resistant MC code military signal guided precision munitions to 3m accuracy. Operation Epic Fury was perhaps the most cyber-intensive military operation in history. Cyber was the opening act, executed well before the first bomb fell, creating conditions for every kinetic domain to follow. Cyber operations were used for suppression of enemy air defenses, internet blackout, and power grid pulsing. US cyber operations injected false radar signals to create ghost targets, hijacked IFF codes, and introduced malware to lock out missile batteries. Iran's internet connectivity dropped 1 to 4% of normal levels within the first 48 hours, thereby creating a digital cage, severing IRGC command communications. Iran's national power grid reportedly collapsed on 5th March 2026 as a result of offensive cyber operations, resulting in a nationwide power blackout.

Simultaneous with cyber operations was electronic warfare. E8 E18G Growler and EC130H Compass Call electronic attack aircraft jammed Iranian radar frequencies, air defense data links, and disrupted command and control communications in order to provide safe corridors for strike air packages. Space-based signals geolocated radar emitters in real-time, feeding anti-radiation missile targeting systems while also jamming Iranian military communication satellites. The persistent domain during Opic Fury has been the employment of unmanned aerial vehicles. MQ9 Reapers and other drones simultaneously conducted persistent ISR to locate Iranian ballistic missile launchers, enabling precision engagements with Hellfire missiles and laser-guided bombs, concurrent battle damage assessment and retargeting within minutes. This helped sustain a fast tempo of operations and preserve costly manned platforms. The US re-engineered version of the Iranian Shahid drone, the low-cost unmanned combat aerial system, also known as the Lucas, saw its first combat use, precisely engaging targets up to 800 km using SpaceX Star Shield in a GPS-denied environment.

Information warfare in Epic Fury focused on denial of services. Iran's 96% internet collapse severely disrupted IRGC's command communications. State agencies of IRNA and ISNA were disrupted, eliminating the regime's channels for coordinating a response. Cognitive warfare targeted the Iranian population's perceptions, beliefs, and will to resist. Bar Sabah, a prayer time application used by millions of Iranians, including IRGC personnel, was hacked to push mass notifications urging soldiers to give up weapons and join the people. President Trump's 8-minute video addressed the Iranian people directly before the first strike, delegitimizing IRGC resistance and attempting to shape the post-conflict political landscape. We are all aware of the US of the recent US operation to rescue the weapon systems officer of the F-15E aircraft which crashed inside Iran within Operation Epic Fury. This rescue operation serves as a live case study of multi-domain operations where air, land, cyber, space, electronic, and information capabilities converge to create a temporary localized window of superiority for the extraction. Multiple and simultaneous lines of effort: ISR, precision strikes, special forces insertion, and deception was synchronized to disrupt Iranian efforts to capture the downed crew member, thereby demonstrating dynamic cross-domain integration and decision superiority.

Ladies and gentlemen, Operation Epic Fury illustrates that in the 21st-century battlespace, no domain stands alone. Space feeds ISR. ISR feeds targeting. Cyber blinds, brings the grid down. EW blinds the enemy. AI compresses the kill chain, and precision fires deliver effects across strategic depth. This is the battlefield that operational art must now contend with. It is to the reimagining of that operational art that we now turn.

The 21st-century battlespace, as illustrated by Operation Epic Fury, is significantly different in character from anything that preceded it. Yet, certain fundamentals of operational art remain unchanged. What has evolved is not the intellectual framework, but the environment in which it's applied, the domains through which it's operationalized, and the speed at which it must be executed. Desired end state, centers of gravity, decisive point, lines of effort, and culmination point remain the five immutable pillars of operational art, and Epic Fury was designed and executed precisely around these five pillars, as I shall now elucidate.

The desired end state of the campaign plan of Operation Epic Fury has not been articulated by the United States. However, extrapolating from statements of President Trump, other political leaders of the United States, and application of combat power, the desired end state envisaged by the United States could have been at two levels: the strategic and the tactical level. At the strategic level, the desired end state could have been to permanently disable Iran's nuclear capability, security of US regional interests restored and stabilized, freedom of navigation, Red Sea and Gulf of Oman secured, and regime change to have a pliant regime in Iran. Whereas at the operational level, the desired end state could have been: good force and the IRGC loses effective theater-level command control, severely degraded and destroyed Iran's military capability, IRGC proxy groups, Houthi and Iraqi militia are disaggregated. The goalpost of the desired end state may have faded or shifted since the start of the operation. However, each laid-down condition served as a design anchor for every target set and every domain that followed.

While there are many definitions of the center of gravity, the most acceptable one in my view is, I quote, "Center of gravity is that critical vulnerability, the targeting of which would cause the adversary to capitulate." Unquote. A review of operations to date would suggest that the United States has probably identified the following centers of gravity: targeting and decapitation of political and military leadership; network blackout to include C4ISR, ad networks, hardline communications and power grids; degradation of military capability to include ballistic missile capability, Iranian air force, navy, and critical military infrastructure; and destruction of Iran's nuclear missile program to include nuclear infrastructure, enrichment facilities, stockpiles, and delivery means.

By traditional definition, lines of effort are directional paths that connect a military's base of operation through decisive point to the centers of gravity, aligning in force, time, space, and purpose. In a multi-domain operational construct, lines of effort are designed to integrate and synchronize effects across domains in order to influence multiple centers of gravity simultaneously. A single well-conceived line of effort can generate cascading effects across several centers of gravity. Therefore, operational design should overemphasize on the convergence of effects where integrated actions across domains collectively degrade the adversary system as a whole. In Operation Epic Fury, the US armed forces appear to be operating along the following eight lines of effort:

Line of Effort One: Battlefield transparency, establishing persistent and high-fidelity awareness to achieve information dominance for decision superiority.

Line of Effort Two: Kinetic degradation, focused on application of lethal force to induce systemic confusion and loss of command control leading to capitulation of the enemy.

Line of Effort Three: Network disruption, brought the Iranian grid down, disrupting C4ISR, air defense networks, hardline communications, and power grids.

Line of Effort Four: Maritime security, enabled sea control in the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman to control global energy flows.

Line of Effort Five: Partner enablement, helped build regional coherence of efforts through multi-domain collaboration with Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and NATO partners.

Line of Effort Six: Strategic relevance and signaling, focused on the show of credible and capable force while maintaining escalation dominance through controlled force application and political signaling.

Line of Effort Seven: Information cognitive dominance, attempted to undermine the Iranian regime and disaggregate regime proxies.

Line of Effort Eight: Economic warfare, choke the sustenance capability to harass and break Iran's will to fight.

Thus, in multi-domain operations, lines of effort are not linear, individual, or sequential. They are rather conducted concurrently, simultaneously, and in an overlapping manner across multiple domains. Epic Fury has thus confirmed two truths. First, the five basic domains of operational art: desired end state, centers of gravity, decision points, lines of effort, and culmination point are not relics of the past. They are the very architecture on which future campaigns will be built. Second, traditional campaign designs rested on linear logic in which phases were distinct and domains were operationally separable. The 21st-century battlespace does not allow such luxuries. The reimagining of campaign design is thus an imperative born out of operational reality. We will thus examine three core elements of campaign design: sequencing, phasing, and tempo with a renewed and sharper perspective.

Traditional sequencing asked, "What comes first?" Air superiority before ground maneuver, fire preparation before the assault, information operations after the kinetic phase. Consider the use of drones by the US in Op Epic Fury. Multiple drones of varied configurations, payloads carried out ISR, target acquisition, identification and designation, precision strikes, battle damage assessment, electronic warfare, and communications relay simultaneously from the first minute of the operation, and not in any planned sequence, but in convergent and mutually reinforcing swarm. There was no ISR phase followed by a strike phase. Sequencing in a multi-domain campaign is not strictly linear but logically prioritized with activities conducted in parallel and mutually reinforcing ways across domains.

The traditional phasing models inherited from post-Cold War campaign planning assumed phases were distinct and largely non-overlapping. The shaping phase was assumed to be preliminary activity completed before the decisive operations began. Reimagined phasing of MDO must move to overlapping, adaptive, and conditions-based cycles. Phases overlap and recur. Shaping continues through decisive operations. Exploitation begins before culmination. Consolidation runs concurrently with continuing strikes. A campaign design in MDO could possibly have the following four phases:

Phase One: Shaping to establish ISR dominance, battlefield transparency, and electronic grid blackout through cyber, EW, cognitive, and information operations, and commence cognitive shaping.

Phase Two: Shock and dislocation. Execute coordinated multi-domain operations at scale and pace to induce systemic confusion and loss of command control.

Phase Three: Exploitation. Leverage degraded adversary systems to expand operational advantage and sustain pressure across domains to accelerate systemic collapse.

Phase Four: Stabilization and consolidation. Transition to a controlled posture by consolidating gains and securing key areas.

Tempo is perhaps the most profoundly transformed element of the campaign design of the 21st-century battlespace. Its mechanism binds sequencing and phasing together by controlling the speed, rhythm, and velocity of operations across domains. The battlefield tempo of the 21st century is enabled by persistent ISR providing a near-transparent battlefield, grid blackout by ensuring electronic dominance, machine-speed decision cycles, lethal and devastating strikes and revisits based on real-time PSDA, autonomous systems, network integration, and AI-assisted decision cycles have significantly enhanced tempo of operations.

Ladies and gentlemen, as I conclude, my argument can be stated very plainly. The five domains of operational art, namely desired end state, centers of gravity, decision points, lines of effort, and culmination points, are timeless. What the 21st-century battlespace demands is reimagining of how multiple domains of warfare are converted into a campaign. Sequencing must shift from linear chains to converging simultaneity. Phasing must shift from sequential stage gates to overlapping, adaptive, and conditions-based cycles. Tempo must shift from controlled operational rhythm to relentless multi-domain machine-speed pressure that is unsustainable by the enemy. My charge therefore is that in order to reimagine our operational art, we need to internalize new ways of sequencing, phasing, and generating tempo in our campaign design and to embed them in our doctrine, training, and command culture before the next crisis arrives. The commander who masters this reimagined campaign design will not merely outfight his adversary. He will outthink, outpace, and outlast him. This is the operational art of the 21st century. And this is what we must now urgently prepare ourselves for. If we succeed, we will enter the future crisis not as prisoners of 20th-century warfare, but as practitioners of 21st-century operational art, worthy of the responsibility of security of our nation that has been entrusted to us. Thank you very much for your time and attention. Jai Hind.

One of the challenges of MDO that we had mentioned was time and timing. So the organizers are very happy that we have managed to, you know, overcome this challenge for this session. We have 2 minutes ahead of time, and the house is open to questions. My request is, please keep your questions brief and specific. And if you can introduce yourself.

Thank you very much. I'm Rear Admiral Shrikanth. I retired from the Navy. I've been teaching operational art for quite a few years, and there are many in India who do that. I would like to suggest three small, short points about operational art itself: that we have to think differently about operational art as a framework for thinking and planning that is at all levels of warfare: the military strategic, military operational, and military tactical level of warfare, where some of the tenets may not apply. Rather, the operational level of warfare is the bridge that links the tactical level of warfare to the strategic level of warfare. It's operational art does not link these two phases. That is one way I would suggest of thinking. The second part is that rather than call these domains of operational art, they are tenets of operational art, is what I would suggest. They are not domains of operational art. And the third thing is perhaps that in PME itself now, we need to have much greater emphasis placed on the study of operational art and operational warfare as the bridge that links the tactical to the strategic. It needs a lot more focus and a lot more time to be devoted, which is something for everybody here to consider. Thank you.

Sir, thank you very much. I take your observation. These are issues for debate. Perhaps we could debate it on a one-on-one basis. I have given a postulation, you have given another one. I think we can, you know, move on to the question answers.

Jai Hind. I am Brigadier P. Sunil Kumar. I'm Commandant, Mechanized Infantry Centre and School. My question is for General Sharma. So, as I understand it's a given that we have to look differently the way we are organized and the way we do business. So, in your opinion, what are the structural adaptations that will be required to operationalize the way we look at MDO now, sir?

So, some of it has been alluded to even in the keynote address of the CISC on the structural alignment. And I think the first thing is, I think we need to, when we are seeing multi-domain operations happening simultaneously, overlapping, concurrently, and at, you know, pace, velocity, at a tempo which is really unsustainable to the enemy. The first thing that really stands out is that we need to move from this era of jointness to an era of integration. Now, having said that, there is one fundamental structural realignment that, in my view, is needed, which means in a theater of war, which is against a particular adversary, we need to have unity of command. And that unity of command perhaps can come out of having one single commander orchestrating all military-related operations. And when I say military, it's all the three services' operations against that adversary. And this brings me to the precept of theater command. It is an operational necessity in an MDO environment. Apart from that, what Admiral Saxena spoke about, whole-of-nation approach, whole-of-state approach. I mean, earlier we had this earlier construct of, you know, civil-military cooperation, which actually stems from the '70s, where '72, we had the fuel crisis, '74, the milk crisis, various earthquakes, floods, etc. Well, that remains in place where it is, but there is a new terminology coming in, which is called military-civil cooperation. That means, what is it the state can do? What is the academia? What is the industry contribution? What are the academic think tanks? How can they contribute towards enabling the military? And I think that is another facet that really needs to get looked at. So, in my opinion, and I think we also need a whole lot of technology coming in through different structures, some of which the Chief of the Army Staff spoke in his Army Day press conference, which he talked of the Indian Army Futures Command. So, these are new structures that need to come in to understand MDO, to get a cultural change into MDO, and to have a reimagined operational art to executing a campaign.

General Shivan wants to ask a question.

I'll just take a minute to add, sir. General, I'm Lieutenant General Ashok Shivani. My question pertains to that, besides the collaboration and convergence of the six domains and also the all instruments of national power and civil-military fusion, I think increasingly in the 21st century and the recent conflicts, what has come out is the society itself is a domain, and its resilience is a factor of vulnerability or a strength. And towards that extent, my recommendation is at the national level or the strategic level, we need to have a national citizen security culture. A change in behavior, culture which understands national security, defense, and the threats that today are being targeted towards the society. And this is more than narrative warfare, more than cognitive warfare. Thank you.

I think we are taking the next question. This observation.

May sir, completely agree, completely agree with your observation, sir. Thank you, sir.

General Vikrant Guri, I am the ADGS I. My question pertains to the chair, sir. This is regarding this being the foundational discussion on the subject. Sir, like the spectrum has been, I feel the electromagnetic spectrum needs to be recognized as a domain. Why? So, in our Indian context, it enables us to create capacities and capabilities and also for civilian use. We have other ministries and other agencies which are also using the same spectrum. While this was alluded to in the CISC, he mentioned it as an enabler and also as a domain, but as an articulation at the highest level, I think we should recognize electromagnetic spectrum as a domain which is contested and congested.

So, I think there is no doubt that electromagnetic spectrum or is a very critical domain in any operation. Even physical operation is highly dependent on effective exploitation and protection of the electromagnetic spectrum. Okay. So, to my mind, it is already there. If you're talking of in the cyber domain also, it can, whether you're talking of calling it a separate vertical by itself, it will help. I really don't understand structurally. I think we all understand that EW is going to be a is an very crucial part of operations. That I think our structures, our equipment profiles cater for that.

May I just have a moment? So, can I just qualify a little more, Guri? To your question, while you're right in what you say, I mean, there's nothing wrong with what you've said. But my own articulation of electronic warfare. Electronic warfare has four sub-parts. First is electronic EMSO. The second is information operations. Third is cyber, and the fourth is psychological. All four contribute to electronic, and electronic warfare actually is one of the things that helps in info dominance for decision superiority. So, perhaps you're you're right saying that EM, but my understanding is in electronic warfare, electromagnetic support operations is just one domain of four which contributes to electronic warfare. We can debate that later. So, you mean to say we should control the military should control the entire allocation spectrum? What? Yeah.

Okay, we'll discuss this a little separately, maybe. Yes. Yeah.

I am Vice Marshal Bahadur. I retired a decade back. Just a question, you know, we issue doctrines and joint doctrine for MDO. It will require colossal amount of funds, colossal. Is the government off with this? In the sense, how much of the civil administration or the budget or the Ministry of Finance is agreeing to what the services are saying, "We are going to train like this. Please give us so much money."

I think our post-structuring, our acquisitions are catering for all the capabilities. You know, we have the Defence Cyber Agency. We have the Defence Space Agency. There is a Defence Space Program. There are enhancements there. MDO as a concept is integrating better. There are already progress being made in integration of the service networks, the joint communication architecture that has been done. The further nuances, I really don't know how much of it is in the public domain. Work is in progress in that. So, I think the existing kinetic, non-kinetic capabilities have to be, of course, we have to progress further. We require more, and the plans are in foot. The Vision 2047 has been just laid out. I think it covers everything. So, it's not a question of having some separate money allocation for MDO. MDO is a concept of exploiting the existing domains and the traditional domains in an effective manner to require incremental and synergistic effects in all domains. So, per se, I don't see additional money. Yes, additional requirement of having space capability has been recognized by the government. We are going in for space capability for military use. We are enhancing our cyber capability. There are which which have been there. Probably the future speakers would throw some light on it, as would the senior leadership also. So, per se, I don't foresee additional fund allocation to become MDO. That is my understanding.

I just wanted to add, there was a talk about the structural part. There is no doubt that structural, the structure should support the operational concept. But I would draw your attention to what the CISC said. Structures by themselves will not suffice. That is why we are sitting together and thinking. We have to have clarity on concepts. We have to have clarity on doctrines and be able to plan jointly and make plans jointly. A single commander, I would think, in a future war, in past wars, you could have one general who could be credited for winning a war. In an MDO, it will be a collaborative affair because one person's part will fall short. It will be highly technologically intense. It'll have to be based on algorithms. Yes, the leadership would be critical, but it'll not be just a one-man, you know, that general deciding the course of war. It'll be a collaborative effort, intensely technical in nature. This is my perception.

Sir, I am Major General Abhinav Riser. First question is to the chair, and it is pretty surreal because you were my instructor at FIS to be asking you one here. My question is, sir, that do we require to raise functional units at Air Force, Army, and Naval levels like the US has done by creating the multi-domain task force or the Chinese have created the Information Support Force, which is ensuring actually communication, which is so critical for MDO, sir? So that is for you, sir. For Admiral Saxena, sir, I just wanted to make a quick point. I think what the when you talked about whole-of-nation approach, sir, what the Americans did by getting the CIA to use Ghostwriter to identify where the down pilot was, or getting Palantir and Anthropic to work together in Pentagon, is kind of a whole-of-nation approach which we need to sort out, sir. And last question, sir, to my Army commander, is that you had given the center of gravity, sir, which are so critical for all practitioners or all part today, sir. We were always relating them to very, very dimensional physical things, which has now changed, sir. So, how critical is it to be able to identify them in an MDO concept, the center of gravities? Thank you.

Thanks. It's always a pleasure to see you and meet you, you know, personally. Having been engaged with right from my AOC J&K days with jointmanship, Jang Diwi is here. I have come to this conclusion that if we start a discussion by making an organization structure, we'll keep debating that only. I think as war fighters, we should focus on capabilities. I'll give you two examples. The debate on the standardization, it's, you know, how long it is. The Army's own experiment or decision to go for IBG is how much time it takes. The fact remains that we have to have cohesion. We have to have all elements coming together so that all capabilities can be synergistically utilized. The structures, changes will enable it. But in this case, for MDO per se, technical capability will is far more critical. I think. So, the key point of having a common network, a common picture, common communication network, thereafter AI-based decision options. When these are there, the color of the uniform, I think, will not matter so much. We will, you know, be able to sit together. Yes, once we have the capability, I'm sure we'll be able to make a unit like you made a cyber agency, made a space agency. We may be able to make a brigade-level unit or a division-level unit just for this particular task. But as of now, I think our focus should be on getting the capabilities and getting the doctrinal and conceptual convergence amongst all the three services on the subject, which is very, very important. I think that should be our first priority.

General Abhinav, you started very promisingly that you would target only your instructor, and then I see you got very widespread and not spread anybody on the panel. So, thank you for that fairness. I, I think about organizations. I said we should have a, you know, joint command headquarters for these multi-domain operations. So, that would be my short answer to your question. To the description that you made about, you know, how the Americans did it and, you know, the technologies, the AI, the surveillance, the stuff that they have. Firstly, you know, I must make two points. One is that I am not anti-technology, but I do believe that technology is not the panacea to all our problems. You know, the, I, I think the CNC spoke about at mission command, what the Germans used to call "Auftragstaktik," what the French call "coup d'oeil," the commander's intuition of the situation will continue for a long time with all this AI, all the AML, ML that you have. And certainly, decision-making will be faster, data processing will be faster. But technology cannot be the panacea to everything. I ask you the question that with all the technology that the Americans used, what did AI not identify? They used everything. They did everything. What did AI not, and what can AI not do? It cannot replace you because you're a human being who's got empathy, who's got, you know, a certain courage. The AI did not detect the Persian civilizational strength. The AI did not detect the simple rule that the enemy gets to vote. Thank you.

No, no, thank you. There were a couple of questions actually. This can hear me now? No. Yeah, there are a couple of questions, but I thought maybe I'll try and answer them which was actually for the panel. What was about the General Guri that's about electromagnetic spectrum actually, and some kind of an explanation was given which I thought maybe needed more clarification. If you remember, in the last combined commanders' conference, this was the agenda that we'll separate out information warfare into, you know, cyber, electromagnetic, as well as perception management, S3. And that now has been decided. So, electromagnetic spectrum in its own domain is a kind of a new domain of warfare. We must acknowledge that because in all three, why we separated out because cyber was actually expanding into the digital domain. It's expanding hugely, and so was perception management was getting into StratCom and your cognitive domain. So, we separated this kind of out. And so, what Guri's concern is that we still haven't acknowledged as armed forces that electromagnetic spectrum will be a domain. It will take us some time while we are working towards it. So, that will address that particular concern.

General Shivan's question was something to do with strategic culture, development of strategic culture which develops strategic resilience of a society to fight. To some extent, Adul Sakana just mentioned the resilience of Iranian society or the Persian society for this. So, General Shivan is mentioning this that this itself, the whole society should be considered as a domain which provides the resilience for the nation to fight. In the Iranian case, I don't think 100% of the society, but part of the society, they have cultivated, created, and a separate force is created, the Revolutionary Guards, which are separate from the armed forces. So, they have a different zeal to fight, which is slightly different. As can this be required at a national level? That's a thing which is debatable, and how to go about doing it, it will be a huge task.

Third thing was about one Air Force officer, your student, I couldn't get his name now, who was talking about the Information Support Force of the Chinese and what are we doing towards creating such kind of structures. Well, I would have covered it at some other point of time, but we are working towards, you know, a StratCom agency which will contain cognitive warfare and which will contain perception management, which is going to come at HQ IDS. It will coordinate the efforts of all the three services, especially the perception management part, but work independently in the domain of cognitive warfare. We are also in advanced stage of getting a communication agency which will look after networks of the three services. We are looking at expanded cyber and space agency and a geospatial agency.

Lastly, is this question of AVM Bahadur asked about whether when we go for this kind of capability, multi-domain capability, will we require additional budgets or not? If we look at a very futuristic kind of a scenario, while we can say that, you know, it's only networking of existing capability which can get us to MDO, that could be one simplest way of looking at things. But I think it'll be far more than that. Well, currently, budgets, if we look at whatever is a wish list as per our LTIP of the three services over the next 10 years, the current allocation of budget, 2% of GDP with 8% growth and 10% increase every year should cater for all our requirements. That's a rough calculation which is done by HQ IDS. In new capabilities which we are say yet to identify completely in cyberspace, we have done that. Space, we know 52 satellites, we've calculated all that. But maybe there's something new which comes about tomorrow. If you want to say we want to have a Sudarshan Chakra complete now, that will be a real MDO, and that would require huge investments which will be requiring beyond that. So, we really haven't calculated the requirements of say, Mission Sudarshan Chakra. Probably what we are saying is whether how do we integrate existing capabilities. These were three, four questions which I thought needed some more elaboration, and you can continue with the rest of the questions.

Can I just clarify on Abhinav, you one was to me also. So, yes, there is a little academic debate on in centers of gravity. There are two definitions that one is the older version definition which has been given by Clausewitz, which also Milan Vego speaks of, where he says center of gravity is a source of power, is a strength from where he gets the freedom of movement to execute, etc., etc., etc. But remember, there's also William Lind and Robert Leonard who have given another definition, and one of the things he says of, you know, kings and queens, the most powerful piece on the chessboard is the queen, but you get the queen, the battle doesn't finish. It's only when you get the king. So, let me try and now contextualize both these things to certain recent historical evidences, and so we can decide, and the audience is free to decide for themselves what is the center of gravity. When the Iraq surge took place in 1991, the center of gravity was Saddam Hussein. They said, "Saddam Hussein and the Republican Guards go down, and the nation falls." The Americans fought 10 years after that. My second example is Epic Fury. Decapitation of the regime and IRGC, the regime will fall. Who's asking for a ceasefire today? You can have a look. In my own experience, I commanded a corps in Punjab, and in Punjab, we've got these enclaves that are there. A river line runs, and beyond the river line, you have your own territory, and you have international boundary. Now, in one of the wars, previous wars, we attacked head-on. We attacked the position of strength where the enemy was holding, and we had to destroy the bridge. Didn't work. In another operation, what we did was we went across from one of the flanks, which was thought that you couldn't go through, with an armored SC regiment and an infantry battalion, and we took the crossing on the river line. The entire force ran away. And this has happened not one, I have three examples to give you. So, is it his strength or his critical weakness? But as as

Practitioners of war, we need to decide where the center of gravity lies because if you don't get that right, you will get into a campaign. Vietnam is a case in point. They thought North Vietnam, they put 6 lakh 74,000 tons of ordinance on North Vietnam and what happened at the end. So I guess it's for us to understand as practitioners of war, what is that center of gravity, the critical weakness that will allow for capitulation. I hope that answers you. Thank you.

J sir, uh, Captain Sambell from College of Air Officer. >> Admiral Karamir Singh retired. So I just wanted to ask you the panel uh your views on this u you know matrix strategy which the Iranians uh used in I'm I'll just sort of related to MDO because MDO is heavily reliant on networking synchronization etc etc but if your networks they are your enablers they are also your vulnerability if you don't have enough resilience and if your uh ability to command and control your leadership is targeted your networks are targeted then adopting a strategy like the metric strategy where you had 30 different people operating independently given that kind of uh room for maneuver. Uh would you equate that to mission command or would you look at it as a different uh kind of a concept which we could emulate in in terms of a tipping point when if a tipping point comes in especially with our northern neighbor when you your if you lose your networking you lose your ability of the leadership to carry out any kind of command and control would that be a a strategy that we could think of just just a

So uh as I see network hardening, network redundancy, alternate paths go hand in hand when you are transitioning from network uh uh into uh true networkcentric operations. So currently I would say that difficult to visualize the total uh breakdown of communication. We'll still have our conventional ways of communication but yes degradation will be there and you're right to some extent that de uh uh delegation of operations would have to be done in to cater for the contingency but to visualize oursel that will be a complete blackout perhaps not but yes for all our plans we have to have a backup in case the so we we we do exercise operating in a degraded environment so that is one of the challenges which we have learned that we must continue to exercise a degraded environment. But for a big country like us, we are strengthening ourselves and having redundant paths to prevent a total failure. Yes, the backup plan would have to be there. Finally, the person on the ground would have to face the adversary. But it's very difficult for me to visualize something which will be totally uh blacked out. Yes sir.

>> So maybe sir, I was out but I heard part of your this thing. You are aware most of our networks are air gapped. So taking out this network completely unless we make a mistake is would be difficult. I also understand that technology is advancing like same tomorrow uh you'll be able to know uh bridge this air gap what we have so while when technology will advance toward that said we'll have that self-healing networks artificial intelligence etc. Presently you're aware that NFS is airgapped. We all will ride on it and we are going to have this DCN as a hot standby to this real hot standby. So seamlessly we should be able to switch on. So we're looking at redundancy multiple redundancies and hot standbys for such communication architecture for future. What you said for mosaic defense see we are wanting to fight a netcentric warfare a datacentric warfare. Mosaic defense doesn't work in it. It works in a different kind of environment. It'll only be able to hit a pre-desated that can work on small chits given to 10 commanders at so and so time go and don't do this. But that doesn't work in a netcentric environment where we want information dominant, decision dominance. So that will become we'll have to find ways and means to defend our networks.

>> That's why that's why I asked you know you you're dealing with a very sophisticated adversary in the north. uh you are have to think of a situation where or a tipping point where you have to have a situation where you know this whole reliance on networks maybe think of edge computing uh these are things that I thought maybe we could have as an alternate plan

>> all these thoughts are on sir

>> yeah that's all

With this sir, we have come to the uh end of our session sir. May we take a break sir?

>> Yes.

I extend sincere gratitude to the chair and distinguished speakers of this session for their valuable contributions. May I now request air officer commanding and chief training command Indian air force to fistate the panelists of the first session followed by a photograph. Marshall Tajinda Singh, Vice Admiral Sam Sakena Left General Deendra Sharma. May I now request all panelists to gather for a group photograph. Thank you sir. This brings us to the end of the first session.