Transcription
Good morning. The Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific will come to order. This hearing will provide details about the United States strategy towards the region, including how the United States will diversify critical supply chains away from China, while also addressing the many economic, political, and military challenges facing US interests in East Asia and the Pacific. Let me now recognize myself for opening statement. Good afternoon. Good morning. Welcome to East Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee hearing on implementing an America First approach in the East Asia and the Pacific region. We're pleased to welcome the Honorable Michael DeSombre, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Mr. DeSombre, thank you so much for joining us. Since October, you have led one of the State Department's most critical bureaus at a time when US policy in the Indo-Pacific must prioritize American strength, prosperity, and security while racing ahead of the Chinese Communist Party. During your Senate confirmation, you outlined three clear goals: bolstering US strength with allies and partners, advancing American prosperity through commercial diplomacy, and stopping the flow of fentanyl and illegal immigrants from Asia into North America. This hearing provides an opportunity to review progress on those priorities that you set forward and identify how Congress can support them. We begin with Taiwan. Our critical democratic partner facing unrelenting pressure from Beijing. The Trump administration and Congress have stood firmly with Taiwan against daily CCP threats and coercion. With US support, we're strengthening Taiwan's ability to deter a Chinese attack, blockade, or other form of aggression. We welcome the administration's approval last December of a historic $11 billion arms package for Taiwan. And Secretary Rubio informed the full committee last month at our hearing that a $14 billion now under review. The future of Taiwan must be decided by its people, not Beijing. Beijing's aggression extends beyond Taiwan. In the South China Sea, the CCP continues its campaign to dominate international waters by converting small features into military bases. Near Scarborough Shoal, claimed by Philippines, China has undertaken actions that risk further militarization. We must work closely with our allies and partners to defend freedom of navigation and uphold the international law. This subcommittee recently examined how the CCP has built a fentanyl uh precursor pipeline that continues to kill Americans. We must shut this deadly flow. Strong US leadership on human rights is also essential. Supporting Vietnamese activists, pressing for North Korean freedom, and holding the CCP accountable for atrocities against Uyghurs, Tibetans, and others. As the Burmese civil war carries on, the Trump administration has renewed sanctions on the regime, and we're excited to hear about the State Department's next steps in this conflict. At the same time, now is the time to deepen our core alliances like AUKUS and the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral, which remain indispensable Pacific anchors. The United States and Japan have reset the economic relationship, invested together in in critical minerals development, and worked to upgrade our defense relationship. Meanwhile, South Korea remains an essential partner of the United States in deterring North Korean aggression and reindustrializing the US economy. So, we welcome the strengthened defense ties and joint investments in critical minerals. Mr. De Sombre, thank you for your service. As you can see, there are a lot of issues that we need to discuss today. And so, we look forward to your testimony and to partnering with you to advance peace through strength across the Indo-Pacific. The chair now recognizes the ranking member from California, Representative Bera, for your opening statement.
Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, and glad that you're here, Assistant Secretary De Sombre. While we see a lot of challenges around the world, whether it's the the continued conflict of the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, you know, the the challenges we see in the Middle East right now, and challenges closer to home in the Western Hemisphere, I think the Chairwoman would agree that the Asia-Indo-Pacific region still remains the most vibrant, complicated, and consequential region as we think about the 21st century, and our our greatest competitor for influence, which is the the PRC. I appreciate your extensive experience working in in in including more than 25 years working in the private sector and serving previously as the US Ambassador to Thailand. So, I appreciate that experience that you're bringing here. When I think about the multiple opportunities but challenges, you know, the chairwoman talked about a few of them. You know, we often overlook what's happening in in the ASEAN nations in Southeast Asia, the continued civil war in Burma. You know, still simmering tensions along the Thai-Cambodia border. We'll be interested in hearing about that. I met with a Filipino delegation yesterday of legislators. You know, we still see tensions in the South China Sea and aggressive PRC gray zone. I'm going to call them a navy, but they may not call them a navy. They may call them fishermen that act quite like a navy. Um, that becomes a hot point. You know, I I think we appreciate the the Japanese Prime Minister, you know, in the position that she's taken in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia. And you know, certainly have seen some of the economic coercive measures that have retaliated against Japan. You know, we appreciate Chairman Mass, Ranking Member Meeks, and the entire committee for passing our trilateral legislation. I know Chairwoman Kim has worked on this a lot for a US-Japan OK trilateral cooperation at the legislative level as we look to maintain a peaceful, prosperous 21st century. Was recently in Korea meeting with the new Korean president, you know, again talking about our commitments to the peninsula. You know, you know, making sure that they don't have to worry about our commitment to be the nuclear deterrence. There's no reason for them to pursue any nuclear technology. Also, we'll be interested in hearing a little bit about, you know, President Trump's conversations were presently about nuclear-powered submarine commitments that they're very interested in um and then, you know, further south hosted a breakfast is at the the founding co-chair of the the Quad Caucus, the importance of the Quad, you know, um good reports out from Secretary Rubio's recent visit at the ministerial level. Yeah, when he was here in committee, he did say there would be a leaders level, whether it would be a direct meeting or one off of a prior meeting. I think that would be incredibly important at the leaders level. Um interested in, you know, I know President Trump had um while India's not your jurisdiction, India plays a critical role in this region through the Quad Australia. Um and then also we'll be interested, you know, we recently hosted a hearing on fentanyl trafficking and a lot of conversations and as I talked to the Pacific Island ambassadors, a lot of transiting of um illegal narcotics that are having a real big impact on um the islands there. Um You know, methamphetamine and fentanyl and so forth and I think we had a pretty productive hearing talking about how to disrupt some of those flows with our partners in Australia and New Zealand. And then more recently last year was in New Zealand or in Australia and New Zealand um on a codel and we saw the PRC navy while we were there circumnavigate Australia. So, we're seeing a much more aggressive um PRC navy in the region. So, um we'll want to get some updates on that and obviously an update on AUKUS which seems to be going well. So, lots to cover, vibrant region, um one that is incredibly important to, you know, our national security and and economic success in the 21st century. And again, look forward to your testimony questions and I'll yield back.
Thank you. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have senior bureau official for the Bureau of Human Resources at the US State Department Assistant Secretary Desaumbre before us today. Your full statements will be made part of the record and I'll ask you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes to allow our members to ask questions. So let me now recognize you Assistant Secretary Desaumbre for your opening statement.
Chairman Kim, ranking member Bera and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on implementing an America first approach in the East Asia and Pacific region. The region is a vital strategic importance to the United States and our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific is unwavering. As Secretary Rubio has emphasized, the United States must carefully balance our global defense priorities ensuring that we maintain robust alliances and a credible credible deterrent in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. While we cannot deploy identical resources to every region, we are steadfast in our support for our Indo-Pacific allies and partners as part of our enduring commitment to the region that is the world's largest and most dynamic economically and in many other respects. Our approach is rooted in strengthening alliances and deepening relations with the quad and trilateral cooperation with Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines and through our key partnerships such as AUKUS. We continue to advance economic collaboration, promote regional prosperity and reinforce security partnerships with countries across the region including growing cooperation with Fiji, Vietnam and Papua New Guinea. Our long-standing policy on Taiwan has not changed which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiques and the six assurances. We remain committed to preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. The Department of State, in coordination with our interagency partners, is investing maritime law enforcement and regional security initiatives. These efforts are designed to uphold international law, safeguard freedom of navigation, and support the sovereignty of Indo-Pacific nations. We're also leveraging our new approach to foreign assistance to help partners build resilient economies, address urgent humanitarian needs, and enhance our shared interests in a range of areas. Our targeted assistance supports infrastructural, commercial cooperation, health, and education, while also fostering good governance and transparency, and ensuring that every dollar spent advances American interests. A key priority is securing critical mineral supply chains. We are working with allies and partners to diversify sources of critical minerals essential to advancing manufacturing, reducing dependence on China, and ensuring the security of our industrial base. Maintaining US market leadership on AI and the digital economy in the fast-growing markets outside of China is another focus. Our PAC Silica initiative is building the coalition necessary to fortify our supply chains, while our embassies are working with Commerce colleagues to promote AI and related exports. Through APEC and ASEAN, we are mainstreaming American regulatory approaches to minimize red tape and promote innovation. Additionally, we are encouraging countries and partners to increase investment into the United States, supporting American innovation and job creation. And our new reciprocal trade agreements are promoting fair and open markets in the region, which enable US businesses to compete and thrive, while advancing high standards for labor, the environment, and digital trade. Our military colleagues, led by Secretary Hagerty, have highlighted the unique operational challenges of the Indo-Pacific: vast distances, logistical complexity, and the need for technological innovation. We are working to ensure that US forces remain agile, resilient, and ready to respond to any contingency while leveraging local economies and building the capacity of our partners. We are working closely with our developed country treaty allies, Australia, Japan, and Korea, to meet the security challenges of the future and increase resourcing and defense cooperation to share the burden of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. We are also working closely with our Southeast Asia treaty allies, the Philippines and Thailand, to ensure interoperability and preparedness. We share a clear-eyed assessment with our allies that a region dominated by hegemon would undermine the foundations of stability and prosperity for all. Together with US interagency partners, EAP supports US engagement to combat transnational crime across the Indo-Pacific, targeting the fentanyl supply chain, pressing China and other countries to take concrete law enforcement actions, and working to dismantle transnational criminal organizations running online scam operations that defrauded Americans of more than 12.5 billion in 2025. We are closely working in parallel with DOJ, which has restrained more than 15 billion in cryptocurrency from scam centers since October 2025, and advancing targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure to hold governments accountable for enforcement. I would like to highlight two recent developments that underscore our ongoing engagement in the region. First, the president's recent trip to China provided an important opportunity for leader-to-leader engagement, reaffirming our commitment to open lines of communication, and establishing a relationship based upon fairness and reciprocity. The president's meeting with Xi Jinping addressed critical economic and regional security issues, ranging from ongoing concerns with bilateral trade to Iran and the Straits of Hormuz. Second, the United States is advancing significant new cooperation within the Quad partnership, comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, India. We are implementing the vision Secretary Rubio and his Quad counterparts laid out last month in New Delhi through a concrete plan that is expanding our work together on critical minerals, maritime security, infrastructure development, energy security, and emerging technologies. The Quad's renewed commitments will help ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific and demonstrate the power of like-minded democracies working together to address shared challenges. Through these efforts, the State Department is making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous. By advancing our interests abroad, we are protecting our citizens at home, strengthening our economy, and upholding the values that define us as a nation. Above all, our Indo-Pacific strategy is guided by the aspirations of the region's people and our shared commitment to peace, stability, and prosperity. We remain engaged, present, and responsive to the needs of our allies and partners, and we look forward to working with Congress to advance these objectives. Thank you.
Thank you. Let me now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning, and I want to start with uh South China Sea. You know, recently Japan and the Philippines formally started the maritime boundary negotiation for their overlapping exclusive economic zones, but in direct response to that, Chinese Coast Guard has significantly ramped up patrols east of Taiwan. That is all while Beijing continues its campaign to turn the China South China Sea into a Chinese Communist lake by turning small island features into Chinese military bases and expanding its legal claim to waters belonging to other nations through artificial island construction. So, can you talk about what the Trump administration's um message is, and uh you know, for what message is Trump administration giving to China when it considers reclamation um activity in the South China Sea?
Chairman, thank you very much for to question. Obviously, the activities of China in the South China Sea, whether they're in reaction to the uh the Japan-Taiwan negotiation or otherwise, obviously are of utmost concern to us and something we pay attention to quite closely. Um as you mentioned in the Scarborough Shoal, uh we've been working quite closely with the Philippines recently in relation to Chinese activity there that has caused uh some issues. And so, it's an area where we are very focused on and really focusing with our allies and partners in line with the national security strategy to ensure that we have deterrents along the first island chain and really ensuring that we have the capacity to ensure that we maintain peace and stability in in the Indo-Pacific.
Could you be a little specific about what State Department is doing uh for that uh deterrence factor, especially in the open sea lanes, resilient [clears throat] supply chains, and freedom of navigation in South China Sea area?
Sure. I mean, freedom of navigation, we engage in in our uh freedom of navigation operations quite frequently in and around Taiwan along with our allies and partners. We also have assets around actually recently have relocated some uh Coast Guard ships to the Philippines, for example, from from CENTCOM, and there's [snorts] been additional uh Coast Guard ships added to uh Guam as well. And obviously, INDOPACOM is is uniquely focused on ensuring that we have sufficient resources in the Indo-Pacific to address those challenges.
Thank you. You know, as you know, Philippines is our vital uh mutual defense treaty ally and ASEAN chair this year. But, it is subject to constant gray zone coercion from the Chinese Coast Guard. So, how can the US and Southeast Asian partners work more closely uh to ensure South China Sea remains free and open?
That's a a very good question, Chairwoman, and is an area that we spend a lot of time focusing on. I was just in Manila a week and a half or so ago meeting uh on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting, meeting with uh Philippine national security uh individuals along with. And one of the the prime ways that we're seeing a lot of you know great cooperation is between Japan and the Philippines and Japan, Australia and the Philippines and other multilateral groupings that we're working together with to help support the Philippines in these efforts. You're you're absolutely right. They are the recipients of significant pressure from China. It is an area that they are focused on and we're focused on supporting them and we're focused on working with our other allies and partners to support them as well.
Mhm. You know, South China or Southeast Asia holds significant potential for diversifying our critical mineral supply chains away from CCP dominance. So, we're looking at Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. They're already members of the US led critical minerals ministerial, but another Southeast Asian country, Vietnam, which we talked about, it possesses the sixth largest rare earth reserves globally, but is not currently a member of the critical mineral ministerial. So, can you talk about the engagement with Vietnam in the critical mineral space and are there any challenges to expanding our cooperation with them?
No, that's a very good question. Thank you. Vietnam is an area that we are focusing in the critical minerals. I was in Vietnam a few months ago and spoke to them specifically about this and you know, they have great mineral resources, but they're currently unmapped. They don't know where lots of them are and that's an area where we are hoping to cooperate with them using US foreign assistance and other of the tools at our our disposal to try to help them understand where their critical minerals are and ensure that they they can be part of a supply chain that doesn't run through China.
Just staying on Vietnam quickly. I represent a large Vietnamese American community in Southern California, but they care deeply about human rights. While they also care about opening up our trade and economic relations with them. So, how is State Department balancing that human rights with our security and economic goals with Vietnam and how does EAP have to ensure the Vietnamese government address that human rights violation? Is there something a leverage factor here?
These These are all areas of our focus, the economic, the security, human rights. Obviously, we detail very clearly in the human rights reports you know, issues that we have and I can assure you that we privately raise with Vietnam those issues related to human rights and another aspects of corporate governance. At the same time that we are working to really help develop the economic resilience and economic growth of Vietnam. I think we found historically that economic growth is one of the best providers of freedom in the long term and so really helping Vietnam see the benefit of the private sector, see the benefits that engagement with the world can bring will also help bring about a much better Vietnam.
Great. Well, thank you. My time's up. I now recognize Ranking Member Bera for 5 minutes.
Thank you, Chairwoman Kim. Um recently I was in Korea with Congressman Zinke um you know, talking about a host of things but also appreciate the National Assembly um the week prior to our visit had passed their commitment to the $350 billion investment um in in the United States including $100 billion in shipbuilding. Um one area that did come up um you know, following you know, the the embarrassing raid that that took place in Georgia that I don't think the president um was was aware of. I think the Koreans handled it fairly well. I know um Chairwoman Kim has her partner with Korea Act and I'd love for us to address the visa issue legislatively but in the interim um one topic that did come up at the National Assembly as well as with President Lee is as they're making these investments, I think we understand that they would like to bring some of their engineers to help build some of these factories. If we're shipbuilding, some of um we do have to train up a workforce to to build the ships here in the United States. You know, again, Congressman thinking I have talked about, you know, through executive actions perhaps as those investments are coming in to have an allocation of visas that would also um allow those workers to come in. That's not a question, but I would just put that out there and I think that's a place where Congress, while we're working on Chairwoman Kim's um legislation getting that across the finish line, perhaps in the interim we could work on a way to to speed up those investments coming in, but also to allow some of those workers to come in as well. Um Assistant Secretary, you talked a little bit about the online scam operations. Um you know, a few years ago I let let a code out to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Lao um to look along the Mekong um River and had was not aware of how prevalent some of these exclusive economic zones, which really are you know, these Chinese gang operations um areas along the the Mekong where they are doing a lot of these online scams. And in some ways indenturing some of the the the civilians in these companies. I've recently met with the the Cambodian ambassador to talk about whether they were addressing this. You see drugs moving through these areas as well. I'd be curious if you could give us an update on your perspective. Yeah, they they gave me reassurances that they were trying to address and crack down on this. I'm not quite sure if it's moving fast enough.
No, thank you, Congressman. It's a very important area of stopping the online scams. As I mentioned in my testimony, we estimate that they defrauded Americans out of 12.5 billion in 2025, which is actually a 25% increase from 2024. So, the problem is is not getting better. It's still getting worse. We are very focused on that and implementing the president has an executive order implementing a whole-of-government effort to crack down on these online scams, really focusing on enforcement and intelligence to make sure that we can go after the transnational criminal organization of leaders, arrest them, take their money, put them in jail, and and stop them from defrauding Americans. And we are seeing, interestingly, some positive developments out of Cambodia and others um in terms of cracking down on the scams. Uh Prime Minister Hun Manet has definitely made it a priority for his government and and we have seen positive movements in that regard. Interestingly, what that has resulted in is a lot of the scams moving to other countries in Southeast Asia. And so, we now see, you know, scam centers cropping up in Malaysia, Indonesia, even in Timor-Leste, and other places, which is not good, but has actually the beneficial aspect that it's gotten us much greater cooperation amongst all these other countries that now are seeing the detrimental impacts of having those in their countries. And so, I've recently organized a contact group amongst, you know, some of our allies and partners, including many of the the Southeast Asian nations, to really coordinate and see if we can get coordination on enforcement and intelligence. And really, as I said, the goal is not to just shut down the scam centers, which had been sort of Cambodia's goal. The goal is to make sure we, you know, arrest the bad guys and make sure they don't ever do it again.
Great. Let me ask another question. Um you know, we haven't, you know, the ongoing civil war in Burma um that, you know, now has gone on for multiple years. Um if you could give us a quick update on your perspective where that's at. Um we have allowed the ASEAN nations to try to take um a primary responsibility in bringing an end to this civil war, but obviously, it's continued.
Yeah, I think we've seen in the last uh last 5 years that the civil war has continued and our policies have not, unfortunately, stopped the killing and then stopped the human rights violations. So, I mean, we continue to evaluate based upon changes on the ground of exactly the best way forward, but we will pursue engagements with all groups in Burma that directly benefit US interests, including in combating transnational crime, scam centers, expanding commercial access, and advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentle lady from American Samoa, Ms. Radewagen, for your 5 minutes of questioning.
Thank you, Chairwoman. Talofa and good morning, Secretary Tony Blinken. Thank [snorts] you for being here today, and it's great to see you again. As you know, the Pacific Island nations are important strategic partners of the United States as they sit between the United States and the Indo-Pacific, but China continues to expand its footprint in the region, including new debt burdens from infrastructure investment in Fiji, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Can you please update us about State Department efforts to resist growing PRC influence in the Pacific Islands region? And what steps can Pacific Islands with intense [clears throat] debt exposure to China take to reduce their strategic dependence?
Great. Thank you very much for that question. This is an area that is receiving tremendous focus from the State Department, I can assure you of that. Both from myself and the Deputy Secretary have spent a lot of time in and around the islands, including uh Deputy Secretary's coordination and hosting with Indo-Pacom Commander Admiral Paparo, a Honolulu Pacific Investment Summit in uh earlier this year. And that really goes to the two ways that we're really focusing on dealing with the challenges that that you present. The first one is trying to build up economic resilience. And so, really working with the Pacific Islands to figure out ways that we can get more American or other Western allied investments into these countries to help build up the economic resilience and we're definitely seeing great strides in that regard. As part of that, we're also really deploying large amounts of foreign assistance to help with various infrastructure and communication uh subsea cables being a great example working together with uh with Australia and Japan and others to really help ensure that all of the Pacific Islands are connected by safe, you know, up subsea cables to provide them the connectivity to the internet in a way that also doesn't rely upon our adversaries involvement in those cables. So, that's a a very big area. Um but then secondly, we're obviously emphasizing them by presence. Uh I've traveled out to the region, Deputy Secretary has traveled out to the region making sure they know that the Pacific is of vast importance to us. We are after all a Pacific nation and we want to ensure that uh that we are part of the Pacific and that they know that we're part of the Pacific. And we've been seeing some positive results. We saw the most recent election of Prime Minister Wale in the Solomon Islands for example, which has indicated that he's reevaluating the relationship that they've developed with China before and looking to work with traditional security partners as he describes. So, we're definitely seeing some fruits of our labor and it's an area where we will be continuing to focus. The uh Pacific Island Forum is coming up in another couple months and we will be well attended at that and we'll ensure that we're deeply involved with Pacific Islands.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back the balance of my time.
No. Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Auchincloss for your 5 minutes of [clears throat] questioning.
Thank you, Chair Kim, uh Ranking Member Bera and thank you, Assistant Secretary de Sambre for for being here today. Appreciate your service and your time. Uh I wanted to just get absolute clarification on part of your testimony um this morning where you said that policy toward Taiwan has not changed including the six assurances. I want to just affirm that that is absolutely your, the department's, and the administration's position.
Yes.
Okay. Um so, maybe you can help me clarify. I know that the president recently on Air Force One, when he was at the recent summit in China, um he told reporters that he had discussed US arms sales to Taiwan uh with President Xi in quote great detail. He went on to a Fox interview later to say that he was holding a major package of arms sales to Taiwan in advance and suggested that whether he notify Congress on his approval, quote depended on China. Uh I'm just trying to square those comments, which are a pretty alarming and blatant violation of those six assurances, with your testimony this morning. So, if you could help clarify, I'd certainly would appreciate that.
Sure, thank you. I think we can assure you that whenever we meet with China, they raise the questions of Taiwan and Taiwan arms sales. So, it is a part of almost every discussion that we have with them. So, it's something that is always discussed with them, but that is not in any way a deviation from the six assurances.
I I'm I'm sorry. I just I'm having a hard time So, we're not consulting with China despite what the president said.
China is constantly talking to us about their desire for us not to sell arms sales to Taiwan.
[snorts]
Okay. So, whether or not he consults whether or not he notifies Congress does not depend on China.
Correct.
Okay. The president I would I would welcome uh if if the president wants to clarify that as well, I'd appreciate it. Um speaking on um one more issue on on China, if I I may, and I appreciate that clarification. Um on July 1st, uh China passed a new ethnic unity and progress law. It's set to take effect. Uh in short, this law codifies and expands the Chinese Communist Party's campaign of forced assimilation between Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic and religious minorities in China. Uh I just wanted to sort of get your take on it and say that I really want to urge the State Department to engage with China. This is a very concerning law. Um we know that human rights has been a central component of high-level US-China dialogue across administrations and just want to make sure that we're not taking this critical issue off the agenda and handing Beijing a major win.
I can assure you we are not taking that critical issue off the agenda. We're tracking that issue and many of the recent challenging decrees coming out of China quite seriously.
Okay, I appreciate that and I guess I'll just I'll just end um on on the on the Uyghurs. We know that uh in his uh meetings with uh President Xi last month did did the president raise Beijing's human rights abuses against the Uyghurs and other ethnic ethnic minorities in Xinjiang?
We know that he raised various different issues with persons in China. I'm unsure I was not in the meeting. I'm unsure exactly whether that was raised.
Okay, sure. Um and then just as I conclude my time uh going back to the arms package, do you have a timeline for when the administration plans to notice um that arms package?
The as as Secretary Blinken has indicated the 14 billion is currently under review by the president and the president will determine when that happens.
So no no current timeline as to when that package might get noticed.
As I said, the president is reviewing it and he'll make that decision.
Okay. Um uh Madam Chair, I really appreciate the opportunity to ask these questions and I yield back the balance of my time.
Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky Representative Andy Barr for your 5 minutes question.
Uh Assistant Secretary, thank you for being here and thank you to the administration for uh the unambiguous commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific and I want to follow up uh from uh my colleague from Maryland's questions about the administration's commitment to Taiwan and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. I think context is important with respect to this 14 billion dollar uh package proposal that is under review. Can you just for the record describe the $11 billion package of arms sales that is a record commitment to Taiwan that the administration has approved?
Uh thank you for mentioning that. Obviously, the 11 billion is more than the entire amount that was approved under the prior administration. It represents a real sea change in in what we're providing to Taiwan. I apologize, I don't have the details in front of me of what are the equipment as part of that, but I can assure you it's some very important equipment.
I can I reclaim my time and clarify that it included HIMARS rocket systems, ATACMS missiles, howitzers, drones. So, this uh this concern that the administration has not yet approved an additional $14 billion needs to be put in its proper context, that there has never been an administration that has demonstrated uh the commitment to Taiwan that that this administration has demonstrated already with an $11 billion record commitment of arms sales. Now, we still have questions about how we can help the Congress can help the administration in in addressing the uh the backlog. So, let me let me actually address that um question to you. Um what can we do in Congress to help uh the more than deal with the more than $32 billion including this $11 billion commitment, the $32 billion in arms that are awaiting delivery uh to Taiwan. Um obviously, we have defense industrial base challenges. We have uh needs to backfill from uh Epic Fury. What can Congress do to help expedite the deliveries of these uh arms sales?
No, that's a very good question and I appreciate the that that you had the details on the 11 billions, uh which clearly do demonstrate what we're uh providing to Taiwan. I think as part of I think you raised a good good good point on the defense industrial base, and that's an area where we're really working to try to bring more investment into the US. So, trying to do whatever we can to facilitate those investments, along with obviously facilitating any uh any appropriations for defense that are requested by the administration as well. I think are probably the two most important areas.
Um let me ask you this. Um my colleague uh Rob Wittman, uh fellow uh colleague on the uh China Select Committee, has introduced the Porcupine Act that would categorize Taiwan as a NATO Plus Ally with the goal of expediting arms sales. Would this legislation be embraced by the administration in in in in helping clearing the backlog in military sales?
We obviously are very supportive of Taiwan and our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. Whether that specific bill, what it would do, I haven't had a chance to review it, so I can't specifically comment upon it, but we appreciate the support, obviously.
Let me ask a fairly blunt question. Um um can you assess the impact that Operation Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury has had in terms of deterrence in this in the Taiwan Strait?
Yes, I think that uh our our adversaries have looked at the capability of our US military and seen things that they did not expect and seen things that they don't have. And I think that has made them think quite seriously.
Well, I I you know, I I appreciate the bipartisan interest in deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, but there is nothing that I think has uh reinforced that deterrence uh than the president's uh uh demonstrated the the will to use kinetic force in in in in advancing American interests. And that certainly was was not present in the previous administration. Uh Secretary D'Souza, um let me ask you about the Philippines really quickly. Um clearly uh investing in development of Subic Bay as a shipyard has been important and getting the US Navy back into Subic would be an additional demonstration of deterrence. What next steps does the State Department see for not only new development in Subic Bay, but also to support the players that are already there?
No, thank you, Congressman. Very good question. As I mentioned earlier, we are already seeing some Coast Guard ships in Subic Bay at the moment that have relocated from CENTCOM to Subic Bay, which is a great addition to our our capacity there. Obviously, we are working significantly from a foreign assistance standpoint to make sure that the the infrastructure within Subic Bay and the whole Luzon economic corridor will support both economic activity and other other defense-related activity there as well. So, we are using the various tools at our capacity to make that happen and I know that INDOPACOM is very focused on ensuring that we have the right resources in and around in and around the Philippines.
Well, well, thank you. My time is expired. Congress stands ready to help the administration with those arms sales to Taiwan. Thank you for your leadership. Yield back.
Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Amo, for your 5 minutes questioning.
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Assistant Secretary, for being here to discuss your America first approach to East Asia and the Pacific region. Unfortunately, [snorts] this administration's America first policy has meant America facing important issues alone. To me, if you want to put the security and the economic future of the American people and our interests first, that means working with our allies, being a reliable partner, and showing consistency in our foreign assistance programs. Our foreign assistance programs put America first by supporting American jobs, businesses, our goals, and security. And a great example of how we can invest in the security of the Pacific, coordinate with our allies, and support our domestic industries uh it is better example, I think, right now than the continued implementation of the Australia, United Kingdom, United States security pact known as AUKUS. AUKUS works to promote free trade and security in the Indo-Pacific by coordinating with our partners in Australia while also supporting good-paying jobs and manufacturing here in the United States and in my home state of Rhode Island. So, Assistant Secretary uh Desombre, I have limited time, so if you could answer yes or no, do you agree that a program like AUKUS is a good example of putting Americans and America first in East Asia and the Pacific?
AUKUS is a great example, and the president has indicated that we're full steam ahead on AUKUS.
Great. And I agree, uh and I'm glad that we agree, but I'm concerned that on other issues, your America first is false advertising and doesn't actually put America first, support the role of our allies in our shared futures, and doesn't strengthen the relationships between East Asian and Pacific nations and the United States. Thanks to President Trump's executive orders, the United States is leaving international [snorts] organizations focused on Pacific nations like uh the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, uh creating a a vacuum, right? A vacuum that China will fill. The administration also closed Radio Free Asia for months, leaving no news organization to counter China's propaganda. The administration withdrew from the World Health Organization and canceled global health programs, leaving our citizens at greater risk of tropical diseases. The administration canceled food aid programs, leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children and greater regional instability. The administration delayed assistance to Taiwan. In fact, you're in in your written testimony uh that lays out how you uh are implementing your approach to East Asia and the Pacific, you know, mentioned Taiwan once. The administration tried to close uh the National Endowment for Democracy, whose programs cracked down on scam centers, scam centers in Southeast Asia that are stealing billions from Americans every day, the same people purported to be taken care of under an America First policy. Unfortunately, China is filling the gap caused by your foreign aid cuts, the closure of USAID, and the abandonment of our allies. They're using our absence as proof to the region that we're not a trustworthy or reliable partner. So, I I I just don't think that's putting America first. Those decisions make America weaker and less secure. So, Assistant Secretary, what are you doing to mitigate the impact of the loss of our soft power and the weakening of our regional relationships in East Asia and the Pacific?
Thank you, Congressman, for that question. And I guess I would strongly dispute that we have lost our soft power or had weakening of our relations with our allies. Uh focusing first on the allies, the relationship with Japan, for example, is the strongest it's ever been. And [snorts] we are in a new golden age of our relationship with Japan. We have a Prime Minister and our President have a very great relationship. And our work with them on defense, on economics, on security, on supply chains, on everything is at a level like it's never been before. So, the relationship with Japan is a
Sorry, name another country other than Japan.
Korea. Korea is also an amazing country. We've got great, you know, cooperation with them, not only bilaterally with Korea, but trilateral with the Japan, you know, Korea, and the US. And we're working very closely together, cooperating on maritime security and others. And each of those countries has agreed to invest billions of dollars into America to help reindustrialize America, to really ensure that we bring jobs back to America. We bring shipbuilding back to America. We bring all the industrialization back to
What about the Pacific Island nations?
Wonderful example. I think we've just spent $330 million along with Australia, New Zealand, Japan. We've committed for undersea cables to connect 13 Pacific Islands together with undersea cables.
do also know the State Department cut over half the budget to help Pacific Island nations counter China and slash development funding to the region.
Actually, our assistance for Asia including the Pacific has gone up dramatically and in the State Department of Appropriations last year, we had 1.8 billion dedicated in the Pacific and I can guarantee you we are going to be spending
I've like you to follow up with me on that because that is counter to the facts that I have.
I I would disagree with the facts that you have.
Okay, well, please follow up. I'll submit that in writing. So, here's the thing. My my time is ending. I think you have to know that China isn't using the cuts that we have that you will ultimately share with me to to send a message that the United States isn't reliable. And so we have to do better. Our nation's security and safety depends on it and our standing in the world. And so that's what the State Department's meant to do and I hope that you commit to that mission. With that I yield back.
Thank you and let me now recognize the gentleman from Guam, Mr. Moylan.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you. I suppose you've been to Guam.
I have.
Yes, exactly.
And I really appreciate your position that you're in now with all the experience that you had coming from being the ambassador and all the knowledge. And I understand you speak several languages. So, thank thank you for that. Maybe you can teach me tomorrow one day. You don't know [laughter] that one. But Under Secretary, you know, last Congress I secured a provision in appropriations to double the presence of the US Coast Guard fast response cutters which you mentioned in the Indo-Pacific. These Coast Guard play an important role in in diplomacy and building law enforcement capability capacity in the Pacific Island nations and countering transnational crime. So, as you mentioned for example, Palau is one situation there that we have. Our area is so large. I also like in addition to these fast response cutters for you to consider the C-130 capabilities having fixed wing in Guam for our free associated states for Indo-Pacom area to combat a whole lot bunch of illegal stuff that the the CCP is doing. So, I also want to ask you, how can we better leverage ship repair ship rider agreements and and US Coast Guard presence in the Pacific Islands to advance national security interests and deter the CCP influence.
No, we really appreciate the
support for the Coast Guards. And I, I do believe, I'm unsure whether it's a response to the bill, but my understanding is that we are moving from two to four Coast Guards in Guam, which is great.
And and you're exactly right. The ship rider arrangements we have with the Pacific Islands are immensely valuable because it allows us to help them to police their EEZs for both illegal unregulated fishing, but also drug trafficking, which is becoming an increasing issue in the Pacific Islands. And so, we have more of the islands now interested in signing up for ship rider agreements. We're actually looking to also have a Coast Guard based in Australia potentially as well and to have another cutter there. As I mentioned, we've recently gotten two cutters into Subic Bay as well. And so, we're really seeing an increase in the Coast Guard cutters and they are an amazing force projection asset that really helps us in the Pacific.
I appreciate that. And as we deter our aggressors with our strong defense, we would also like to ensure that our economy continues to grow with our allies. And one way that we can do that, and I'm the sponsor of the Pacific Island Flight Alternative Act, PIFA, which would waive air cabotage rules for Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. So, this legislation is critical in lowering the airfare cost for residents. And it's been a top request for years, supported by the local governments and a number of members of Congress. Senator Mike Lee also expressed support for the idea just last week. So, limited air cabotage uh uh expansions like the proposal would would deepen our economic ties between the US and our allied nations in the Pacific while delivering affordability to Americans in the territories. Um uh for this uh can um what do you what are your feelings on the limited cabotage exemption?
Well, thank you for that question. I I had my own personal experience with the logistical challenges when I was uh I went to the Marshall Islands and Micronesia and I wanted to continue on my travel to Palau, but the way to get to Palau from Micronesia, at least on that day, would have required, I think, three different countries and 30 hours of travel. Uh so, yes, the the travel logistics are challenging. And and one of the issues I discussed in Micronesia with some of the business owners, a person was developing a hydroponics uh growth uh agriculture in Micronesia, but complained because of the logistics, he couldn't get his stuff to market anywhere outside of Micronesia because it would all be wilted by the time it got anywhere. So, I agree completely that logistics, not just airfare, but also uh sea travel for goods are incredibly important to develop the economic resilience of the Pacific Islands.
Speaking again on Palau's waters uh do cover one of the world's most expansive EEZs and have seen the rising instances of unauthorized intrusions from unauthorized Chinese research vessels and fishing operations deploying illegal fishing uh uh aggregating uh devices. Oh, what can what more can we do? So, what more can we do to assist Pacific Island nations like Palau with IUU enforcement?
I I think really the addition of the Coast Guard cutters and the increased ability to have more of them at sea at once engaging in the ship rider operations. That's probably one of the most important aspects. We are also looking at other technological support that we can provide for monitoring and domain awareness in the Pacific to ensure that they can have better visibility on all the ships that are around them, some of which might be engaged in nefarious activities, including illegal fishing.
Thank you so much. And final word for the importance of Guam in the Pacific. Would you mind?
Oh, sure. I mean, Guam is an important gateway to the Pacific and obviously our resources there and our personnel there and, you know, the island itself is incredibly important as part of our we are a Pacific nation and Guam is part of us being a Pacific nation.
Thank you, sir. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Castro, is now recognized.
Thank you. China's used its control over the global processing of rare earth minerals or rare earth elements to pressure countries that criticize its actions. As you know, it's imposed rare earth and other export control restrictions on Japan since November of 2025 in response to a comment by Prime Minister of Japan that PRC military aggression against Taiwan could potentially pose a threat to Japan's survival. And so my question to you is has the administration communicated its concern to the PRC over its coercive economic action against Japan and other allies in the region? And given recent and past PRC coercion against US allies in the region, are there any trilateral or Quad plans underway to build resilience against and respond to that PRC coercion?
Thank you very much for that question. This is an area that we are acutely focused on, I can assure you, and it is a whole-of-government effort to ensure that we remove ourselves from the dependencies that we have. The whole world woke up woke up last October when China put restrictions on the export of critical minerals to how dependent we all are. Japan actually had experienced that once before about 10 years ago and had been a little bit further down the road in sort of understanding the challenges, but now they're experiencing it quite quite severely. We are working through all mechanisms bilaterally. You know, we in the Quad, we definitely have focused on critical minerals. This is an area that was discussed in New Delhi at the foreign ministers Quad meeting, and we are moving out. We are in the process, led by USTR, of negotiating a plurilateral agreement on the trade in critical minerals that will provide the the mechanism to resist the predatory pricing that China has used to essentially take away the processing capabilities from the rest of the world by undercutting all the processing when they start to then, you know, essentially run them out of business. So, we need to deal with those efforts. But, we are actually seeing a lot of good fruit coming from the efforts so far, whether it's in the Linus facilities in Malaysia or Mountain Pass in the United States, seeing increased processing and increased production of rare earths. And we are focused on this laser focus on ensuring that we remove that dependency as quickly as possible from us and our allies.
Uh the second question I have for you is on ASEAN engagement. You know, earlier this year you traveled to several places in in um Southeast Asia, Singapore, Hanoi, Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok, among others. In-person and consistent engagement with the region and interlocutors there is paramount, of course, to socializing our views and gaining traction on our own priorities. That's precisely why many of us were perplexed when the Office of Multilateral Affairs in the East Asia Pacific Bureau was shuttered by the State Department last year. Uh the FY 26 NDAA reauthorized an Office of Multilateral Affairs in the EAP Bureau. So, what's the status of reconstituting this office, and how does the department plan to bring back expertise that was lost in the reorganization?
Thank you for that question. Uh in this regard, the reorganization did not lose any expertise. That office was folded into our Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, uh led by one of my deputy assistant secretaries. I can assure you that we have sufficient expertise and have been deploying it. Uh I also completely agree with the desire or need for in-person engagement. I can tell you that I've now been to nine of the 11 ASEAN countries personally within the last eight months and it's an area where I anticipate uh significant continued engagement.
Uh are you reconstituting that office of multilateral affairs?
Yes, within the Southeast Asia office.
And what is that going to look like? Well, because you said you didn't lose any expertise, so what's the reconstitution going to add then?
I I'm not sure it adds much. It's just a different name for it. We have expertise within the Southeast Asia Bureau uh office already.
Did Congress waste that money or did we Did we Did we waste policy on this reauthorization?
I'll I'll defer to Congress on on that, but I I do believe we have sufficient expertise within our office.
[snorts]
Well, I mean, I guess, you know, our job is oversight and figuring out what tools to offer and to provide to the State Department, and you're telling me that the reorganization didn't take away any expert any expertise, didn't hurt the function, and then Congress reauthorizes to go back to something else. So So, what's the deal?
I think in general the the capability of the personnel and I'm coming from the private sector, you know, not having served uh all my life in government, have I've been incredibly impressed by the capability of the people that we have. And whether or not you have an office called by a separate name or a designation doesn't really matter that much. It's fundamentally the capability of the individuals, and I can assure you that we've got the capability there.
All right. My last question is, does President Trump plan to attend the ASEAN Summit this fall?
You've seen President Trump very engaged in Asia. He's obviously been to uh Korea, to Japan, to uh to China most recently as well. Um we will definitely ensure that we have high-level engagement at the ASEAN Summit.
I know, but do you know whether he's going to attend or not?
Uh I don't have his schedule.
Thank you.
Gentleman Neals.
Okay.
Let me now recognize gentle lady from South Carolina, Ms. Bieks, for your questioning.
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you Secretary D'Ambrose for testifying before our committee today. As a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air National Guard and someone who has seen firsthand how readiness gaps affect mission outcomes, I want to raise something that I think represents one of the best examples of American industry stepping up for our national security priorities. Lockheed Martin in Greenville, South Carolina, their facility is the only active F-16 production line in the world. Hundreds of my constituents, skilled tradespeople, veterans, and engineers, they work there on the campus that spans over 275 acres and contribute over 1.3 billion, and yes, I said billion with a B, um, annually to our state's economy. And they are genuinely proud of what they're building, and I am, too. And what they're building is strategic deterrence. Taiwan contracted 66 F-16 Block 70 and 72 jets, and those planes are being assembled in upstate South Carolina with the Greenville team already running two shifts, 20 hours a day. That is American industry responding to the call, and it deserves our full support. I also want to recognize the strong foundation this administration has built. Taiwan's passage of a $25 billion supplemental defense budget reflects a partner that is serious about its own security. Further, the administration's announcement of three presidential drawdown authority packages is exactly the kind of decisive action that reinforces that confidence, and I want to commend the work that has gone into making those authorities available. My question to you is how we can continue to build on that momentum. Some deliveries have faced timeline adjustments due to global security chain constraints, which is understandable given the complexity of these systems. But my question is, what tools or authorities does the State Department need from Congress to help smooth the FMS process and support our defense industrial base in meeting these commitments?
Well, Congresswoman, first of all, thank you for your service and uh I thank you for the question. And obviously, the development of our defense industrial base is a prime focus of this administration, and that's through both supporting our arms sales abroad and also supporting investments into the US to help develop, whether it's in shipbuilding or other areas. And so, ensuring that we can, you know, facilitate, you know, rapid foreign military sales abroad is definitely something that is benefiting our defense industrial base, and your examples in in South Carolina are obviously quite uh quite acute. I think [snorts] similarly, trying to ensure that we can rebuild our shipbuilding industry, which is another big defense uh area that we unfortunately have ceded to uh to our adversaries, is critically important. So, being able to facilitate those investments uh and ensuring that they can develop them quickly is going to be very important.
Well, thank you so much. Um, I'm going to shift gears just a little bit. Our alliance with Japan is probably the most important one in the world. So, the United States and Japan agreed last year to jointly develop develop critical mineral projects. What are the State Department's goals in aligning US and Japanese critical mineral efforts?
That's that's a very easy question to answer. The The goal is to be remove dependencies on our adversaries in our critical mineral supply chain. And we are working very heavily with all of our allies and partners around the world to do that, bilaterally, multilaterally, plurilaterally, in every way. And really, some of that involves developing in the United States, whether it's what's happening in Mountain Pass, some of it is working with our allies and partners around the world to ensure that we have secure supply chains in Australia or in Malaysia or in Japan or other places to ensure that they are not subject to being choked off by our adversaries.
Okay. Um, the US and Japan are set to renegotiate our mutual host nation support agreement before its March uh 2027 expiration. Have those discussions begun?
Those negotiations have yet to begin, but we anticipate them beginning shortly.
So, what kind of changes, if any, does the US want to see through?
I haven't had a chance yet to get up to speed on on the what we're planning on negotiating, so I'll have to get back to you, Congresswoman.
Okay, great. I'll look forward to having further discussions with you and talking about the great manufacturing that's going on in South Carolina. And my time is up, so I will yield back. Thank you.
I apologize. I thought your time was up, but you have few more seconds if you wanted. [laughter] Sorry. Great. Uh we want to do a quick uh second round of questioning, and I know if Miss Biggs wants to stay and ask further questions, you are more than welcome. Um I just wanted to revisit the conversation that we've had. Uh my colleague's asking you questions about Taiwan's um sales, and we it was just uh discussed that Taiwan's Legislative Yuan approved $25 billion defense package they passed just last month. I know it shows an important step in its commitment to their uh you know, deterrence and our commitment to provide them with what they want through the FMS. But um that budget did not include important spending on important capabilities like drones, and our American companies like Anduril and others are trying to build and drones directly in Taiwan. But without the full $40 billion that we thought they should pass and only coming short of that, what is the State Department doing to encourage Taiwan to spend the funds and drones that did not make it into that defense package they passed last week?
Thank you for that question. We are indeed encouraging Taiwan to pass additional budgetary support for those weapon purchases, and there are various different bills under consideration currently by the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan.
Okay. Let me also talk about South Korea. You know, the one of priorities for the current Lee Jae-myung administration is to facilitate the OPCON transfer as early as next year or into 2028. Um But I believe the US Forces Korea projects that transfer conditions will be met in 2029. So, whether it's 27, 28 timeline, is that realistic? If not, what are the challenges and do you see any progress that South Korea has made towards meeting that transfer conditions?
Yeah, as you indicated, the the agreement on the transfer of operational control is a conditions-based agreement. So, various conditions need to be met in order for us to both be comfortable that when they assume operational control, we will maintain the deterrence that we need in Korea. And so, there's ongoing discussions of exactly the timing of that. We understand the desire from the administration to do it as quickly as possible, and we're focused on ensuring that the necessary conditions are in place as soon as possible.
Thank you. And staying on South Korea, building on the very strong 73 years of US-ROK alliance, we need to make sure that we are best positioned to deter North Korean aggression that is fueled by its defense treaty with [clears throat] Russia. So, on that note, I also want to ask you about the progress that has been made in addressing some of the concerns regarding the treatment of some of our American companies in South Korea, namely Coupang. And there is also the non-tariff barrier concerns relating to South Korea. Can you address those issues?
Sure. In in the joint fact sheet that was agreed after the you know, discussions in Korea,
[snorts]
there are provisions relating to both of those. First of all, there's an agreement for them to not discriminate against US companies in any of their regulatory actions. And Coupang obviously has been a a topic that we have talked significantly with Korea about and and really helped them understand that we are not happy with the treatment that Coupang has been getting and that we expect them to treat Coupang in the same light that they would any other Korean company. So, this is is something that we continue to focus on with them. Similarly, the removal of non-tariff barriers, particularly in automotive and agriculture, are areas that were covered in the joint fact sheet, and I can tell you that I have instructed my embassies and actually embassies all around EAP to ensure that whenever we have trade agreements or agreements related to removing non-tariff barriers or other regulatory access issues, that our team on the ground are laser-focused on pushing to make sure that those agreements are implemented.
Thank you. One area I want to come back and revisit the discussion that you had with uh Ranking Member Bera on Burma issues. You know, for nearly 5 years, Tatmadaw has terrorized Burmese civilians through violence, aggression, and fear. And you know, I see Burmese military junta as an illegitimate foreign military that terrorizes its own citizens and holds they hold sham elections. They serve as a proxy for China and Russia. That is why I'm so deeply concerned about the safety of Burmese refugees, many of them in my district in Southern California, and they will face grave danger if they return to Burma. So, can you talk about State Department's current priorities related to Burma and how the administration is pressing junta to end the violence and release political prisoners and hopefully allow genuine democratic progress while protecting vulnerable Burmese in the United States?
Yeah, we're very focused on trying to help resolve the ongoing conflict and helping to address the country's acute humanitarian crisis, which continues to fuel mass displacements and transnational crime that threaten the safety and security of the United States and our regional partners. And, you know, we're open to engaging with all stakeholders to figure out the way to do that. I think we've seen in the last 5 years that our policies have not resulted in a in a solving of the humanitarian crisis. So, we need to figure out a way forward.
Look forward to continuing to have that conversation and working with you. Um, let me now recognize Ranking Member
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Um, ask a couple quick questions. Um, you just kind of following up on the critical minerals conversation. You know, I had the pleasure of working with Chairwoman Kim um and our staffs on the Dominance Act, which, you know, I raised with Secretary Rubio. It aligns um very closely with some of the administration's priorities in this. You know, um taking the the um Mineral Security Partnership, now now called Forge, and creating those that partnership with our allied nations nations that share our values um looking at Paxil like and and so forth. Um, training up a workforce that, you know, can can invest in this. And again, broadly bipartisan. We've passed it out of the the House of Representatives unanimously. Portions of it are getting um marked up in a um bipartisan way with um Senator Coons and Senator Ricketts on the Senate side, and again, I think this would be a bright spot where Congress and administration are in alignment. So I'd I'd ask you know I mentioned to Secretary Rubio but I'd also mention to have you guys take a look at the Dominance Act because I do think it would be a one that does align with the administration. As you're thinking about you know US engagement in the East Asia Pacific region through PAC Silicon Forge um and thinking about refining capacity, processing capacity. You talked about helping Vietnam identify where their critical minerals are. Are there specific countries that you're focused on? And I think particularly in you know, we know the processing refining choke point that, you know, we do have great mining capabilities but we're still sending a large amount of this to to China for the processing and refining. And if there are places where we could work in Congress to to open up opportunities, particularly in East Asia and Pacific countries like Malaysia.
No, thank you. And and uh countries we've initially focused on are the ones that we have a critical mineral agreements with. So we have it with Australia, with Cook Islands, with Japan, with Malaysia, with Mongolia, with the Philippines, with Thailand, and with Vietnam. We're looking at also New Zealand cuz actually the South Island of New Zealand has amazing mineral resources and and the current government there really is focused on actually taking advantage of its natural resources in a way that that prior governments had not. Um and so this is an area where we really are very focused and and trying to work with as many of the countries as possible. And the real challenge of both getting access to the mines. And Australia has huge resources in that regard. I think New Zealand does as well, perhaps not as as well developed. But I mean so far Malaysia has been the most advanced in terms of the processing because you had the Australian-owned Linus facility there already, which is now being expanded. Um, but we're looking for other places where it makes sense to do that processing. Some in the United States, the Mountain Pass facility, as well. But, there's additional, you know, areas in Malaysia, Vietnam, and others that I think and Thailand that could be good for processing. And so, we're definitely exploring those opportunities as well.
Great. And, you know, this past March, State Department also announced its intent to work with Congress to allocate 250 million in foreign assistance funding for Pax Silex. Um, could you give us an update on the status of that collaboration? Um, any additional information on what types of projects and and partners that may be the ones that you just touched on? And then, you know, obviously working with Congress, what we could do to support um allocation of that funding.
No, th- this is great. And Pax Silex is obviously a big part of our, you know, securing the semiconductor and and supply chain for AI and runs, not just critical minerals, but goes beyond critical minerals. So, it involves involves both of them and there's some overlap. I mean, just today, there actually is a two-day conference for Pax Silex at the State Department, uh, which unfortunately I can't be at because I'm I'm here with you today. Um, but chaired by Under Secretary Helberg, who's really running the Pax Silex initiative and is bringing together a large number of countries, including new ones signing on as observers that are trying to expand the group of countries that we're working with. So, it's it's moving quite well and there's combinations of different supply chain initiatives, different potentials for economic zones that will allow us to have greater, you know, focus on investment in those locations and really allow us to again, do anything to remove the dependencies we have upon the supply chains running through China.
Great. Um, I'll just make one last plug. I think, um, I would urge the administration to take a look at the Dominance Act again. Not partisan, bipartisan, good for our national security, good for our supply chains. I think lines up very well with um the the goals of the administration um and, you know, again, I think it would be a bright spot that would um be a good bill to send to the president's desk. And with that, I'll yield back.
Thank you. Yeah, um to that end, I know I have to concur that this administration has made great strides and with great initiatives like PAC Silica, you know, project uh Vault, what we're trying to do through our Dominance Act is to codify it so that uh we can ensure our uh allies and partners that there is a durability going forward. We included in the Dominance Act is also the economic security pack uh we're focusing on uh mining uh the, you know, educational force so that we can increase the mining uh workforce area. So, I do agree with my uh ranking member uh in our request for the administration to take a look at this and give us the support on that. But, you know, it's passed the House, it's in the Senate, and we're also trying to include that in the uh FY 27 NDAA. So, I know we are very optimistic, right? It'll get signed into law. Uh with that, I want to thank Assistant Secretary DeSombre for the valuable testimony and answering all of our questions from our members. And the members of the committee may have some additional questions who didn't participate in the second round of questioning session. Uh so, if uh Assistant Secretary DeSombre will be so kind, if you do get those additional questions that you would uh respond in writing and uh we will share that with the members. So, pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, and subject to the length limitations. So, without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you.
Thank you.