Transcription
June 25th looked at first like another ordinary news cycle. Then Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO, went on Fox News and told millions of Americans that the United States had used military bases in Italy and Romania to launch hundreds of bombers against Iran. He did not say it cautiously. He said it with confidence, almost as if this was the final proof that the Western alliance still moved as one machine.
But only a few hours later, Rome detonated the real story. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stepped before the press and said plainly, "No. Italy had not authorized it. Italy had not participated in any military action against Iran." Then Italy's Defense Minister Guido Crosetto confirmed the same position. No hesitation, no diplomatic fog, no room for interpretation.
So, pause here because this is where the surface story ends and the deeper story begins. On the same day, inside the same alliance, two senior Western officials gave two opposite versions of the same war. One version said NATO's southern flank had helped America strike Iran. The other said it had not. That is not background noise. That is a signal.
And the signal becomes even darker when you look east. On that same June 25th, six Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, welcomed the peace agreement between Washington and Tehran. Think about that carefully. These were the states Israel spent 40 years trying to pull into an anti-Iran formation. These were the capitals that were supposed to complete Israel's regional strategy. Yet in one day, Israel saw two pillars move at once. Europe began distancing itself and the Gulf began opening the door to Iran. The media will tell you these are separate stories. They are not. They are one story, actually.
What we are watching is not a single diplomatic embarrassment. It is the beginning of a structural fracture in the American-led order. And in the next part, I will show you the hidden mechanism underneath it. And why the country gaining the most from this crisis may not be the country everyone is watching.
To understand why the Italy contradiction matters so much, you have to understand one basic rule of empire. And I mean empire in the practical sense, not as poetry, not as ideology, but as a system of power. An empire does not survive only because it is strong. It survives because everyone believes it is strong. That belief is the real weapon. The Americans call it the aura of power, the silent assumption that if you defy Washington, the price will be unbearable. This is what keeps allies obedient, enemies cautious, and smaller states calculating every word before they speak.
But here is the dangerous part. That aura does not collapse first on the battlefield. It collapses when allies begin contradicting the empire in public. So let us look carefully at June 25th. Mark Rutte appeared on American television and said the United States had used bases in Italy and Romania to conduct bombing operations against Iran. He presented it like a moment of alliance unity, like proof that NATO was still disciplined, coordinated, and obedient to the American strategic line.
Then Rome answered. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said Italy had not participated in any military action against Iran. Italy had not authorized the use of its bases for combat operations. Italy's Defense Minister Guido Crosetto confirmed the same position. No vague language, no hidden wording, no diplomatic escape route.
Now understand what just happened. The Secretary General of NATO made a claim that a full NATO member publicly rejected on the same day in front of the entire world. That is not a normal misunderstanding. That is a rupture. And the real question is not what was said. The real question is why Italy chose to say it publicly. Because Italy had options. Rome could have remained silent. It could have released a soft statement. It could have hidden behind NATO language. Most allies do exactly that when the American system is under pressure, but Italy did not. Italy stepped out and denied involvement directly.
There are two reasons for this, and both are important. The first is domestic politics. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni was under pressure from inside Italy. Parliament, public opinion, and the wider political class did not want Italy pulled into another Middle Eastern war. If Rutte's statement was accepted as true, then Meloni's government would have been forced to explain why Italian territory had been used in a war against Iran. That could have created a political crisis in Rome. So, politically, Italy had to distance itself.
But, the second reason is deeper, and this is the part most people are missing. Iran reacted immediately through law, not missiles. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi pointed directly to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314, the definition of aggression. That resolution says that if a state allows its territory to be used by another state to commit aggression against a third country, then that state can itself be treated as participating in aggression.
Now, think about the trap. If Italy admitted that its bases were used against Iran, then Iran could argue that Italy was not neutral. Italy was not just an ally watching from the side. Italy was part of the aggression. That means possible legal liability, diplomatic exposure, and a dangerous precedent under international law. So, Italy's denial was not just political. It was defensive. Iran had placed Italy in a position where silence became dangerous. If Rome stayed quiet, Tehran could interpret silence as consent. If Rome admitted involvement, it exposed itself legally. So, Italy chose the safest path. Public denial, and that is why this moment matters.
Iran did not need to defeat NATO militarily. It used international law to force a NATO member to separate itself from the American narrative. That is a sophisticated move because now Iran can turn to the world and say, "Even America's own allies are distancing themselves from what happened."
This is the beginning of what I call the facade alliance. This is what I call the facade alliance. And the term matters because it explains why the West can look united from a distance while quietly breaking apart from the inside. When smaller countries align themselves with America, they are not always doing it because they believe in the same values. They are not always doing it because they are emotionally loyal to liberal democracy or to the Western project. In many cases, they do it because the cost of saying no is simply too high. They fear sanctions. They fear diplomatic isolation. They fear losing military protection. They fear being left alone in a dangerous region. So, they stand beside the empire not out of love, but out of calculation. This is the architecture of the facade alliance. On the surface, it looks like unity. Underneath, it is fear, pressure, dependency, and survival.
And this is why the Italy denial is so important. When the empire is strong, everyone stays in line. Even if they disagree privately, they obey publicly. They absorb the embarrassment. They swallow the contradiction. They protect the image of unity because the benefits of loyalty are still greater than the risks of defiance. But when the empire begins to weaken, the calculation changes. Slowly at first, then very suddenly. Allies begin to ask a dangerous question. Is loyalty still safe? And when the answer begins to look uncertain, they do not immediately rebel. They do something much more subtle. They create distance. They protect themselves. They build plausible deniability. They do not say, "We are leaving the alliance." They say, "We were never involved." That is exactly what Italy did on June 25th. It did not attack NATO. It did not attack America. It simply stepped away from the specific action that could expose it to political and legal danger. And that is how facade alliances begin to crack. Not through dramatic speeches, not through formal exits, not through public betrayal. They crack through carefully worded denials.
Italy was the first visible crack, but it is not the biggest one. The larger fracture, the one with far deeper historical consequences, is unfolding in the Gulf. To understand what is happening in the Gulf right now, you have to understand the strategy Israel has been building for more than 40 years. Because what we are seeing today is not random. It is not an emotional reaction. It is the failure of a long-term strategic design.
Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Israel's central regional objective has been very simple: isolate Iran. The logic was elegant. If Iran could be cut off from the wider Muslim world, especially from the wealthy Gulf monarchies, then its regional influence would slowly weaken. The money, the diplomatic cover, the weapons networks, the support channels for Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and other allied groups would become harder to sustain. No regional access, no strategic depth, no strategic depth, no real threat. That was the theory. And for a while, it seemed to be working.
The Abraham Accords in 2020 were the high point of this Israeli strategy. The UAE and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia was moving closer. Washington was pushing hard. For the first time, it looked as if Israel might actually complete the anti-Iran architecture it had been trying to build since 1979. A new Middle East appeared to be forming.
But then Israel made the move that changed the calculation. Instead of using normalization to stabilize the region, Israel escalated militarily. It pulled the United States deeper into direct confrontation with Iran. It continued bombing Lebanon. It struck Iranian nuclear facilities. It acted as if one decisive military victory would force the Gulf states to choose Israel permanently. This was the bet. If Iran could be humiliated, the Gulf would fall in line. If American power could be displayed, the Arab capitals would calculate that resistance was useless. If Israel could prove that Iran was vulnerable, then the anti-Iran coalition would become irreversible.
But that calculation was wrong. Not slightly wrong, strategically wrong. Because the Gulf states did not look at the escalation and see Israeli strength. They looked at it and saw regional danger. They saw shipping lanes under threat. They saw oil infrastructure exposed. They saw American bases becoming targets. They saw their own cities, ports, refineries, and investment projects standing directly in the blast zone of a war they did not choose.
And that is why June 25th matters. On the same day Europe began contradicting NATO, the Gulf states welcomed the US-Iran peace agreement. These were not symbolic statements, they were survival signals. Israel expected escalation to isolate Iran. Instead, escalation made Iran's neighbors more interested in managing Iran. That is the great reversal. The very strategy designed to push the Gulf away from Tehran has now pushed the Gulf into quiet dialogue with Tehran.
Now, let me show you the evidence, because this is where the story becomes much clearer. On June 25th, Secretary of State Marco Rubio rushed to Kuwait, then to the UAE, then to Bahrain. He met with Gulf Cooperation Council Ministers in Bahrain, and the official language around the visit was very important. He was not there to build a new coalition. He was not there to announce Gulf participation against Iran. He was not there to expand the anti-Iran front. He was there to reassure them. That word matters. Because reassurance is not the language of confidence. Reassurance is the language of anxiety. It is what a great power does when its partners are beginning to doubt whether its strategy still protects them.
When America is strong, it does not need to reassure. It instructs. It organizes. But, when America starts reassuring, it means the allies are no longer standing still. They are asking questions. They are calculating alternatives. They are wondering whether the American security umbrella still protects them or whether it now makes them targets. And this is exactly what is happening in the Gulf. Researchers with direct access to Gulf policy circles are already saying the quiet part out loud. The conflict has forced Gulf states to pursue a more pragmatic relationship with Tehran, built around dialogue, de-escalation, and the prevention of a wider war.
Now, translate that from diplomatic language into strategic language. It means the Gulf states are not moving toward Israel. They are moving toward a working arrangement with Iran. Not because they love Iran. Not because they trust Iran. But, because Iran is geography. Iran is their neighbor. Iran sits across the water. Iran can affect shipping lanes, oil markets, airspace, ports, and investment flows. Israel can escalate and then leave the Gulf to absorb the shock. America can strike and then negotiate. But, the Gulf states have to live in that region forever. That is why they are changing their calculation.
And inside Israel, the reaction tells you everything. A poll during this crisis showed that a huge majority of Israelis believe the United States had signed away their victory. Nearly half wanted Israel to keep attacking Lebanon even if Washington objected. Then Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz made the message even clearer. Even if America asks Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Israel will not. Think about that. Israel is now openly defying the same country that supplies its weapons, protects it diplomatically, and shields it at the United Nations. That is not normal alliance behavior. It means Washington is losing control of both sides of its own regional architecture. The Gulf does not want to be dragged into Israel's war. And Israel does not want to be restrained by America's diplomacy.
So, the American position becomes impossible. It must reassure Gulf allies who fear escalation while supporting Israel, which keeps escalating. It must calm oil markets while managing a war that threatens shipping routes. It must sell peace to the Gulf while still protecting the very actor the Gulf now sees as unpredictable. This is what I call the alliance inversion effect. The harder Israel escalates to isolate Iran, the more the Gulf moves toward Iran to protect itself. That is the reversal almost everyone is missing.
Now here's the part of the story that almost nobody is treating with the seriousness it deserves. While Rubio was moving through the Gulf trying to reassure nervous allies, Iran was making a very different offer to some of those same states. Not a military offer, not an ideological offer, a financial offer. Iran's message was simple. Let us make money together from the Strait of Hormuz. This is where the crisis moves from missiles to markets.
Iran has been developing what it calls a maritime service fee system for the Strait of Hormuz. The idea is to charge ships passing through the Strait for security, safety, environmental protection, and maritime services. On paper, that sounds administrative. In reality, it is much bigger than that. It is an attempt to turn geography into revenue. Iran estimates that such a system could generate around $40 billion per year shared among participating coastal states. That number matters because it changes the psychology of the Gulf. Iran is no longer only saying, "Do not fight us." Iran is saying, "You can profit by working with us." That is a completely different kind of leverage.
And this is not just theory. Iran and Oman have already established a joint working group to define the management mechanism. Iran's foreign minister met directly with the Sultan of Oman. These are not empty slogans. These are early structural negotiations over who manages, who secures, and who profits from the world's most important shipping lane. Washington understood the danger immediately. Marco Rubio rejected the proposal and called it a dangerous precedent that could lead to complete chaos. The United States and Gulf Cooperation Council ministers issued a joint statement rejecting any Iranian attempt to impose fees or control the strait.
But here's the question that matters. If you are Qatar, Kuwait, or Oman, what do you actually see? On one side, Washington is telling you to reject Iran's proposal. On the other side, Iran is offering a share in a $40 billion annual system, while also proving it can threaten maritime routes if ignored. So, the Gulf calculation becomes very cold. Is the American security guarantee still enough? Can Washington protect every tanker, every port, every refinery, every investment corridor? Or is it safer to build a working arrangement with the country sitting directly across the water?
This is why Iran does not need to win the war in the traditional sense. It does not need to defeat America ship by ship or plane by plane. It only needs to make cooperation look cheaper than confrontation. It only needs to make Gulf states believe that managing Iran is safer than isolating Iran. That is the real power of the Hormuz fee system. It is not just about money. It is about control. It is about legitimacy. It is about turning a choke point into a negotiating table. And if even one Gulf state begins to quietly entertain the structure, the entire anti-Iran strategy starts weakening from the inside.
Now, before we go further, I want to do something important. I want to give you the strongest argument against this entire interpretation. Because serious analysis should not only confirm what we already believe. It should test the opposite case. So, let us steel man the counter argument. The counter argument says this. The Gulf states are not moving toward Iran in any deep strategic sense. They are simply trying to calm markets, protect oil revenue, and avoid short-term instability. They welcome the US-Iran agreement because war is bad for business, not because they are abandoning the old American order. And Italy, according to this argument, denied involvement for domestic political reasons only. Rome did not want public anger. Meloni did not want parliamentary pressure. The Italian government simply protected itself from a domestic crisis. That does not mean NATO is breaking. It just means allies sometimes disagree.
This argument is not foolish. In fact, history gives it some support. In 1966, France under Charles de Gaulle withdrew from NATO's integrated military command structure. At the time, it looked like a serious rupture. France wanted more independence from American military control. It wanted to reclaim strategic sovereignty. And yet NATO survived. France remained part of the alliance. The Western system did not collapse. So yes, allied disagreement does not always mean imperial decline.
But here is what this counterargument misses. In 1966, France broke with NATO's command structure while the Soviet threat still made the alliance necessary. Western Europe still believed that without American protection, Soviet power could dominate the continent. The cost of leaving the American system was still too high. Today, the situation is different. The Gulf states do not view Iran the way Western Europe viewed the Soviet Union. Iran is not an invading superpower sitting outside their borders with tanks pointed at their capitals. Iran is a neighbor. Difficult, dangerous, and often hostile, yes, but still a neighbor. And you cannot permanently isolate a neighbor. You either manage a neighbor or you live in permanent crisis. That is the calculation now emerging in the Gulf.
At the same time, America is visibly under pressure at home. Inflation is rising. Voters are tired of Middle Eastern wars. The political appetite for open-ended military commitments is weaker than before. And when the guarantor of the system begins to look financially and politically exhausted, allies start recalculating. That is why this is not just short-term crisis management. When Iran offers a revenue-sharing structure in Hormuz. When Gulf Capital is welcoming a US Iran pause. When Italy publicly distances itself from NATO's war narrative. And when Washington has to reassure allies instead of commanding them. These are not isolated details. They are signals. Small signals, yes. But in geopolitics, small signals often appear before large shifts. The old order does not usually collapse in one dramatic moment. It weakens through hesitation, denial, silence, and recalculation. And that is exactly what June 25th revealed.
Now shift your attention away from Iran, Israel, and the Gulf for a moment. Because while the cameras are focused on the Strait of Hormuz, while diplomats are rushing between capitals, and while Washington is trying to prevent the crisis from spreading, one country is sitting almost silently in the background and gaining from the chaos. That country is Russia. And this is where the story becomes even more uncomfortable for the United States.
Russia does not need to enter the war to profit from it. It does not need to fire missiles. It does not need to send warships into the Gulf. It simply needs the Middle East to remain unstable long enough for energy markets to panic. When the Strait of Hormuz is threatened, roughly 1/5 of the world's oil flow becomes vulnerable. When that happens, prices rise. And when energy prices rise, every Russian barrel becomes more valuable. So while America spends money to manage the crisis, that is the asymmetry. The disruption does the work for Moscow.
But Putin was not only waiting for higher oil revenue. He was moving pieces on the board while America was distracted. On June 25th, Putin was wrapping up the Russia ASEAN Summit in Kazan. Leaders from Southeast Asia gathered as Russia pushed its expanded Eurasian partnership. Moscow signed energy cooperation agreements, positioning itself as a reliable supplier of LNG, fertilizers, and strategic resources at the exact moment Middle Eastern instability was shaking global supply chains. That timing was not accidental. When the Middle East looks dangerous, Russia presents itself as the alternative. When American policy looks chaotic, Russia presents itself as steady. When Gulf shipping looks exposed, Moscow offers land routes, energy channels, and infrastructure dependence.
Then Putin made another move, quieter but very revealing. He ordered the release of 24 Filipino citizens detained in Siberia after meeting Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. The Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States. Yet Putin used a humanitarian gesture to speak directly to Manila on the sidelines of a summit designed to pull Southeast Asia closer to Russia. This is how influence is built, not only through weapons, through timing, through favors, through economic necessity, through small gestures made when the rival superpower is too busy putting out fires elsewhere.
And Russia is doing the same with Iran. Construction has resumed on the Rasht-Astara railway, part of the North-South transport corridor linking Russia, Iran, the Caucasus, and wider Eurasia. Russian engineers have returned to Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant to continue reactors 2 and 3 after delays caused by air strikes. This is not charity. It is strategic tightening. Iran needs railways. Iran needs nuclear technology. Iran needs markets. Iran needs a powerful partner that can help it survive sanctions and pressure. Russia is offering all of that, but always on Russian terms. So while America tries to contain Iran militarily, Russia is binding Iran economically. That is the deeper move. Moscow is not trying to win the headline. It is trying to win the dependency.
Now we come to the actor that almost everyone is underestimating, China. And this is the part of the story where silence becomes more important than noise. While America is burning money, while Israel is escalating, while Iran is turning geography into leverage, and while Russia is quietly collecting strategic dividends, China is doing something very different. China is not rushing into the crisis. China is not trying to dominate the headlines. China is not trying to look dramatic. China is building the next decade.
On June 25th, the very same day NATO story began cracking in Europe, the same day Gulf states welcomed the US Iran agreement, China's National Development and Reform Commission released its 15th 5-year plan for energy system transformation. That may sound technical. It is not. In geopolitical terms, this is a map of future power. China set targets for clean energy to reach 30% of electricity generation by 2030. It pushed new energy heavy-duty trucks toward 40% of new truck sales by 2030. It placed nine major industries, steel, cement, oil refining, coal power, and others, under a new plan to cut carbon and reduce energy consumption between 2026 and 2028. And the central government committed subsidies covering 20% of investment for approved projects.
Now ask yourself the real question. What is America doing on the same day? America is spending billions on war management, alliance repair, Gulf reassurance, inflation control, and diplomatic damage limitation. China is subsidizing the industries that will define the next economy. That contrast is the story. Because great power competition is not only decided by aircraft carriers, missile strikes, or military bases. It is decided by who builds the supply chains, who controls the technology, who shapes the energy transition, and who becomes indispensable to the countries trying to grow in the next decade. And China knows this.
At the same time, during the World Economic Forum summer Davos in Dalian, Premier Li Keqiang introduced what he called China Opportunity 2.0. The message was carefully designed. China's technological rise does not threaten the world, it empowers it. Chinese products in emerging sectors are not weapons of domination, but tools for the global south. That is not just economic language. That is diplomatic positioning. China is telling developing countries, while America gives you wars, sanctions, and conditions, China gives you roads, energy, factories, batteries, solar panels, electric vehicles, and industrial capacity.
Then Beijing made another quiet move. President Xi Jinping met Bangladesh's Prime Minister Tariq Rahman in Beijing and elevated their relationship into what China called a community of shared future for a new era. Again, this sounds soft, but it is not soft. It is how China expands influence without firing a shot, and that is the key. China does not need to defeat America in the Gulf. Iran is applying pressure there. China does not need to profit from oil chaos directly. Russia is already doing that. China does not need to shout about NATO's confusion. Italy and NATO have already exposed the contradiction themselves. China only needs to wait, build, and present itself as the stable alternative.
That is why China's silence on Iran is not weakness. It is strategy. Beijing supported the Islamabad memorandum of understanding. It called on Washington to implement its commitments. It condemned unilateral sanctions. It defended international law and Iranian sovereignty. But it did all of this without committing soldiers, without opening another front, and without carrying the costs of war. This is the old Sun Tzu principle in modern form. The highest victory is not to win after fighting. The highest victory is to win while others exhaust themselves fighting. And on June 25th, that is exactly what China was doing. While America was fighting the last battle, China was building the next economy. While Washington tried to preserve the old order, Beijing was quietly preparing the system that may replace it.