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MetaphysicsMike vs Roy: Is The Trinity Logical?

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Transcription

Hey Roy, how you doing tonight, man?

I'm good. I'm good. What about you?

Good. Good. So, are you a trinitarian?

Yeah. So, I saw the topic was that you wanted to talk about the consistency or logicality of the trinity, right?

Yep. Correct.

So, when we say something is logical, we're just going to be saying it's internally consistent. And I think that the trinity as explicated by Bo Branson in his dissertation is going to be consistent. So, I mean, I can send you the model if you want me to in chat. Um, do you I I hear that you don't read Discord chat. Would you mind just checking it so I can send you the model?

Here you go.

Uh, this has a proof of consistency showing that it doesn't entail any contradiction if you want to um look at it. Okay. So, I'm scrolling down. Jump to the present. We'll just click that. All right. I think I'm looking at it. I could probably make it big screen, too. We'll do this. Okay. So, let me see. Yeah, this looks pretty standard. So, I'm I'm definitely wondering. Listen, my first question to this is always going to be this. So, Roy, what's the difference between formal and informal logic? What's what's the difference?

Well, typically in informal logic, you're going to be using some informal language, whereas in formal logic, you're using a formal language.

No. Nope.

Okay. What definition are you using?

I'm using the the what you're going to find in any logic class.

Because listen, so what you said when you're talking about internal consistency, what you're doing is appealing to just formal logic. Just formal. But there's a whole other half of logic called informal logic which refers to the content in the truth value. So let's go ahead. Now that said, let's go ahead. I I can pull this. There we go. Sweet. On screen.

Okay. Can you actually explain why it's like inconsistent, though? cuz I don't I don't see why I would hold to your semantics about what is formal or informal logic cuz the top when when you say something is logical, that's typically going to conotate that like you're saying that it's consistent meaning that the set of propositions affirmed doesn't entail a contradiction so I've already shown that the set of propositions doesn't entail a contradiction like there's no contradiction even under like classical logic so I'm very confused as to what this has to do with the topic.

Okay, so is informal logic logic?

Okay, that's This is going to be a question. Can you ask?

Dude, answer the question. Is informal logic, logic, brother? Brother, let me this is this is how this is going to go. This is not like one of your trinitarian lies where you can just ramroll everything. We're going to I've answered you and you also have to answer me. Is informal logic logic?

Sure. But I don't see what this has to do with what.

Okay. Yeah. Yes.

Logical. It's just going to be that it has a consistent set of propositions. I gave you a consistent set of propositions. So if you're conceding that it's consistent, you're conceding that it's logical. So can you actually show me why this is going to be a contradiction?

Okay. So listen, number one, the fact you don't know the difference between informal and formal logic shows you're not even remotely prepared to have this discussion. You come up, you think you're going to bake, but you don't know what informal logic is. Okay? So the reason why it's relevant is because your view could be formally consistent but still unsound. Hello. Hello. Is that.

Soundness is a property that deductive arguments have? What I'm giving you is a model. I'm not really sure what you're saying when you're saying this model has the property of soundness. I'm not giving you a deductive argument. That's a category error.

Okay. Really? Okay. So when we say in logic something is sound, what does that mean, Roy?

Yeah. That means it's going to have a set of premises which entails a conclusion and those set of premises are true. I didn't give you a set of premises.

Thank you. Thank you very very much.

I didn't give you a set of premises with a deduction. I gave you a model. So I don't see what that.

Correct. So what it has to do with the with the topic is that logic is more than just informal logic, Roy. That's what it has to do. So I will concede to you that you can formalize the trinity in a way that is logical in a strict formal sense. But what you can't do is formalize it in a way that doesn't presuppose certain metaphysics which are informally facious. All right. So.

What do you So what do you mean by logical then? Cuz the typical definition of logical is just going to have to do with it abiding by the laws of logic. So if you're just conceding that there's no contradiction. What do you mean, wrong? I can literally show you a dictionary definition saying this. So for example, say that of relating to involving or being in accordance with logic. That's just the definition of what it means to be logical.

Okay. All right. So here here we go. Question. Here's a very simple argument for you. Ready? All birds are made of cheese. I'm a bird. Therefore I'm made of cheese. Is that logical?

It's going to be formally valid. But once again.

Formally valid. Thank you very much. That's not going to be a model though. You're equivalent on logical then?

No, I'm not saying if you're saying that a set of statements is illogical, then you're saying that there's going to be no model of that set of statements which is consistent. What you gave was a deductive argument. Those are two completely different things. No, it's Listen, you're misunderstanding that when you're saying a model, you're presenting a model that is appealing directly to formal logic. That's what that's doing. So, I can also use formal logic, be completely consistent, okay, and it still be nonsense just like that was, right? That that's nonsense because birds aren't made of cheese, right? and and I'm also not a bird. I'm a human being. Right? So the point is that all you're actually doing, your argument here, what you're doing is you're saying, listen, this is logical in a strict formal sense. Therefore, the trinity is logical. What I'm telling you is I think that we need to raise that bar from just being formally consistent to also being informally true. That's what that's what we're arguing for, right? You you don't just believe that the trinity is logical, you also think it's true, right?

Yeah. Once again.

Yeah. So So then So listen, so if the answer is yes, then you're also appealing to.

Definition of logical is going to refer to what you call formal consistency. Logical just means being in accordance with the laws of logic. In other words, there's not going to be any inconsistency with the laws of logic.

Okay. All right. So your honor, motion to strike everything after yes. Okay. If you are acknowledging that, then you just demonstrated why informal logic is important as formal logic. So I will I will concede it is logical in a strict formal sense, but it's still untrue. You don't get the claim to truth. You understand?

Okay. That's not going to be relevant to the topic of this discussion. Of.

Of course it's not relevant. Yeah, of course it's not relevant. Yeah, it's not.

Topic topic. If you're asking me is true, that's going to be different from asking me if it's logical. Like there's plenty of things that are logical and not true.

All right, you're muted. All right, so here we go, folks. He comes in. He wants to say that the trinity is logical. Okay, in what sense? In the sense that I can present the exact model he has here on screen, which is logical in a strict formal sense. Okay. So, does he believe this is true? Yes, he does believe it's true. Truth appeals to informal logic. So, the real standard for logic is going to be something that is sound. Okay. Sound, which is both formal and informal logic. Okay. So, that said, here here's what I here's what I would want to know from here. So, how do you know that the trinity is true? How How do you know that these things represent accurate representations of what a person and a being is?

Okay, once again, that's just going to be completely off topic. I don't know why you're running to a different topic and you go whether or not it's.

Of course it's of course it's off topic.

You're not ask me if it's true. You made about whether it's logical.

Okay, here we go again. Here we go again. Ready? Is informal logic logic?

Okay, define informal logic. Is it is informal logic logic? You already answered this once.

Informal logic informal logic in a way that means that a model has to be true and valid in the sense that it's formally consistent. I don't.

What, dude? All right. All right, brother. You're you're not even listening. No, that's that's not true. Soundness refers to things that are both formally logical, right? The structure and form is perfect and informally true, meaning the premises are true, the content value. No, I'm not saying I literally.

Okay, stop stop cutting me off. Stop cutting me off.

You're No one's No one's romantic. Here we go. You said it's.

My gosh, you you guys are insufferable. You realize I can just mute you. You're insufferable. I let you finish. Let me finish. Is that is that too much to ask you? Okay. Listen. You said the topic is if is it logical? That's what you said. Okay. So, I said you need to meet the standard of informal logic. You said that's off topic. Okay. Here we go. Very simple. Is informal logic logic? Yes or no?

Okay. You once again straw man me. I said the informal. Is informal logic yes or no? You claimed it's off topic. That's what you claimed and I'm I'm proving to you it is on topic. Okay. Because informal logic is logic. Okay. So, would you like to try this again? Is informal logic logic? Yes or no? The trinity is logical. Okay. In a strict formal sense, how do you know that the metaphysics you're presupposing is true? How do you know the premises are true?

Dude, that's irrelevant to the topic. I already explained this. You're giving a idiosyncratic definition of logical here.

Okay. So, is informal logic logic?

Under your definition, you would have to clarify what you mean by that because the way you're defining it, you're seem to think that formal informal logic, something being logical according to informal logic just means that it has a true set of statements and it's formally valid. Meaning.

No, it's what you're that's what you're implying the definition is. If you disagree with how I've said it, then explain your definition.

Okay. So, so here we go. Listen, the beautiful thing about the internet is that we can prove you wrong right now. Right. Right now in front of all these people. Okay, ready? What is informal logic? We're just legit going to ask Google and watch it bake you. Okay, ready? Informal logic is the study, analysis, and evaluation of everyday arguments, reasoning, and persuasion expressed in natural language. It serves as a tool for critical focus, context, context, and detection of informal fallacies. Okay, so here we go. Ready? What is formal logic? What is formal logic?

You're pre Why would I accept your source of Google? Why would I accept your source of Google?

Listen, Google.

Okay. Okay. So, Google, this is moving. I think you're kind of being you're you're straining at an ad here. Google is going to be pulling from all the different resources online. I could we could pull up Stanford and it's going to be saying something the same but just in more depth, right? So, what you'd have to do is reject this. Don't say that comes from Google. Say is it wrong. That's what you need to do. Is it wrong? Okay. Formal logic is the study of arguments, inferences, and propositions using strict symbolic rules which determine validity. Okay. So, informal logic and formal logic are both logic. Okay? Check this out. Ready? Watch. What does it mean to be sound in logic? What's it mean?

Yeah. Being sound means that there's going to be an art. You ask me the definition of sound. Can you let me say it?

It's it's a Yeah. So, yeah, I was I was speaking hypothetically. I'm typing it in. It's both valid. Both valid.

And has true premises. I know what exactly. So then you said that you you said listen you said you said that I am it's off the subject right to be saying that really to be logical it should be affirming both you should have a perfect model a structure a form and you should be able to formulate it in a way that when you use your metaphysics it's true right these are true premises right you like logic doesn't just exist exist in this vacuum. It exists as a tool of finding truth. Right? So that what it means to be sound is that it's both good form in structure. It's valid, right? And the premises are true. Okay. So then what I'm saying is the trinity can be formally logical. That's like probably what the third fourth time I've said this to you, Roy. It is. I understand. I'll cons I'll concede your model. You get it. Congrats. You get it. Yes, you're It's informal. It's formally logical. Congrats. Okay. And I'm a bird made of green cheese.

But it also valid or.

I would Okay. So, listen. That already happened a long time ago. What we're doing is getting you up to speed. Okay. You said I was off topic. Informal logic is logic.

Yeah. Going completely off topic here.

No, it's not.

You're not even letting me respond to your argument about.

All right. So, no. No. Let's Let's deal with that. What's the difference between logic and metaphysics?

Yeah, logic has to do with the principles of reasonings. Metaphysics is just the study of being.

Metaphysics is just the study of being. Did you just conflate Dude, you just conflated metaphysics with ontology. [laughter]

Oh my gosh, dude. Ontology is the study of the nature of being. It's literally just a branch of metaphysics. Again, you you don't know what you're talking about. You come in hot and heavy. Ontology is just a branch of metaphysics. It is not is metaphysics. Again, you don't know what you're talking about. Okay? So, seeing that you don't really know the difference between metaphysics and logic, let me educate you. Logic presupposes metaphysics. It presupposes it. So, your whole concept.

Okay. So, no very very simple. This is very simple. Are you ready? So, let's bring up your argument. Okay, look at this right here. F equals father, S equals son, H equals holy spirit, and O equals divine substance. Okay, so what you're doing is you're assigning an identity with the object. These are the objects in your marker that that you I mean, you use them in really fancy ways. When it comes to the hypothetic union, it's more about polyatic predicates. But the point is that how do you know what that means? What what it means for f to equal the father unless you're also presupposing identity. That's metaphysics. That that's metaphysics. I mean.

Dude, asking me how I know is just going to be an epistemic question, man. That's still not going to be relevant to the logical model that I gave. You're just going on irrelevant tangent still.

Okay. So, okay. So, are you saying that logic doesn't presuppose metaphysics? Is that what you're saying?

It doesn't require it. No.

Okay. So.

You don't need to give a metaphysical account for a logical model. That's just not true.

Okay. The point is that the laws of logic are metaphysical. Okay. I just gave you one. We're talking about the law of identity. How do you even know? How can you plug in these objects into your argument unless first having an understanding of their identity of what it means for something to be non-contradictory? Okay.

Are you just asking me how I know the laws of logic are true?

Okay. Does the does the laws does the the law of identity is that metaphysics?

No, that's logic.

That's just logic. So, so you're saying that the law of identity is not dealing with metaphysics. Is that your position?

If you formulate it in a logical system, then yeah, it's just logic. It doesn't require physics.

Okay.

Having some form of language is something.

Oh my gosh, it's unbelievable trying to speak with you guys. These.

Logical systems were developed has in part to do with the fact that people didn't want to have metaphysical commitments with their logical systems.

Okay. So you're still sort of presupposing that logic only refers to formal logic. As I've already demonstrated, informal logic is logic and therefore what you said is false. All right. So.

You're equivocating on logic. You're using an idio definition of logic in one of your premises.

Idios. Okay. So all right, there you go again. Are you telling me that informal logic isn't logic? Is that what you're saying?

That's not what I said. I said you're using an idiosync.

Okay. All right. So, it's still logic. I'm still right. You're point you're you're literally.

I'm saying that under your idio informal logic then it wouldn't be logic. But under the typical definition, it would be.

Because as I said, informal logic just has to do with logic as it's um formulated in some natural language.

I just like introduction.

Okay. I mean, if you're not going to let me give my justification, sure. But like I don't see how that's going to be like a fair discussion then. No.

I was going to go into how exactly I'm justifying that claim, dude.

Yeah, please do. No, I'm I'm I'm open to it. Of course, I'm I'm not trying to like shut that down, Roy. I'm just sort of like laughing because I feel like you keep saying I'm arbitrarily like assigning the meaning of informal logic, but clearly.

He's doing the justification or just going to go. Okay, so cool.

Who's going on? Okay. Nah, nah, nah, nah, dude. I am I was just being super kind to you and that was rude.

No, I'm not going to let you come up here and berate me. You don't know the difference between formal and informal logic. Okay? You think that you can presuppose.

Identity in an argument without using metaphysics. Okay? I mean, this is you guys are so bad. You're brainwashed is what you are. Now, I'm open to talk to you, but you're not going to be rude.

Okay.

All right. Sorry. You're going to actually let me give like No, I'm not trying to shut you down. Please, I want you to give your justification. I was just telling you why I was giggling. It's not It's not for the reason you asserted. All right. So, go ahead.

All right. So, there's going to be this introduction to logic by Peter Smith, which is pretty, from what I can tell, standard, right? And the informal section just has to do with looking at the validity of certain inferences in natural language. The formal section just has to do with the regimenting certain arguments within a formal system.

So informal logic is just going to be logic as it relates to some natural language. It seems you even agreed to this earlier in the debate, right?

Yeah. So see listen, so yes, but in a very qualified sense. So let let's take it like this. Let's let's look at your argument, right? So So when you're saying that the the father is God, right? When you're when you're saying the father is God, is that an identity or a predicate?

In this model?

You just like in what model? Okay. Yeah. In this model, it's just going to be a predicate that's specifically going to correspond to some agent noun.

Which I already explained when I sent the model.

Yeah. Yes. So that so then that is an assuming an identity, right? An an identity. The father has a unique identity. I literally.

Said it's I said it's a predicate. Remember what I said when I sent you the.

I sent you the model. In that model, God works as a predicate specifically as a predicate that corresponds to an agent noun.

This was already established when I first sent the model.

Oh, okay. So, if it's a predicate, then how does that not end in multiple divine instances? Tri theism.

Okay. You're going to have to give an argument. Just asking a question isn't an argument. Oh bea because if Jesus is just being predicated God and God is in the father is God in virtue of his nature that's not God and God in the same way obviously. Okay. If if the inference how does that follow what's the.

Dude? Listen, if the f do you disagree that the father is God by his identity? That's an identity statement. You agree with that?

In this model it's just going to be a statement of predication. We're just talking about the model and whether it's logical or not. Oh, okay. So then even the father is just God by predication. Is that what you're saying right now?

Dude, I'm saying in this specific model that I've given you, that's going to be the case. God is going to be a predicate.

If you want to get into the idea, like if you want me to concede some form of monarchical trinitarianism, that's going to be a theological discussion that's not like required for this model. Like it has nothing to do with this model.

All right. So I'm I'm I'm going to be really charitable here. So I think the way that you're you're thinking of this is literally just in the notation, right? You're just predicating G to F to father, right? So in that relevant in the context discussion.

Yeah. So so that is that is what you meant. Okay. So that's not what I mean. I'm talking about how these statements have meaning. Well, you said it would pertain to theology. Like I mean, I guess we could just give it to you. That's really fine. So yes, we'll just say yes. when you're saying that the father is God right theologically what does that mean right that that's what.

As I said, if you want to get.

That is presupposed in your argument is the point that's what we that's what this debate is really about it's not about whether you can formalize it in a valid way on paper the question is does it exist in reality across time and space okay if we say the father is god in what sense I'm not talking about you predicating the letter G in a in in a in your model in your your the form or structure of your argument. I'm talking about literally God exists. Okay? Is the father God in virtue of his nature or is he just God through predication? Okay, once again, these are just theological or metaphysical questions. They have literally nothing to do with the topic. I have no burden to answer the questions there.

Okay.

If you want to ask questions about the logical nature of the model, then like go ahead, but this has nothing to do with the topic. All right. So, Roy, correct me here if I'm wrong, but did you not say earlier that well, metaphysics, Mike, since you conceded that it's formally logical, we can move on to the metaphysics. Did you not say that? You know, I'm going to click.

No, I said we can move on to your definitions of like what exactly you mean by informal logic? Cuz you seem to have this view of informal logic in which something is going to be logical according to informal logic if it's true, meaning that it's a true set of propositions. Okay with that definition.

Okay. So listen man, I have already told you that you can formalize the trinity in a way that is logical in a strict formal sense. Do I need to say this like eight other times? You you get that. Okay. Okay. So then let's get to informal logic. Let's get to the metaphysics because that's the truth value of the claim.

Look, I don't think you're getting my point. I'm saying that by conceding that it's going to be like formally consistent, you're just conceding that it's logical. That's going to be the same thing because that's what logical means.

Okay. So abiding by the.

Brother, you keep saying that without the qualifier. It is logical in a strict formal sense. Hello, we keep saying this. We keep going over.

No, saying something is logical. You idiosyncratic semantics.

All right, goodbye. Goodbye. We're not We're not going to keep going.

All right, so as you can see, Mike just gives up and basically runs from the point that I'm making. Remember, to say that something is logical is simply to say that it is in line with the laws of logic. Mike seems to want to dispute this by saying that the definition of logical that I'm giving is only accurate for the term in this qualified or idiosyncratic sense. The issue is that this is just plainly false because it is the ordinary sense of the word to just mean that it doesn't violate the laws of logic. And this is especially the case given the context we're in. For example, in debates about the LPT which are going to be important for like establishing how the term logical is used in this context. What the proponent of the LPT is basically arguing is that the trinity is going to be contradictory. And this is what illogical is going to mean in this context. That being illogical means contradictory. So contextually, the definition of logical would just entail that something doesn't violate the laws of logic. Furthermore, when I went up to the panel, it seems Mike agreed with this given that I interpreted his topic to be about the consistency of the trinity and he seemed to admit my interpretation was correct. The issue is that when I tried to explain this to him, he just refuses to engage and here he just kicks me. Now overall I think this debate went well for me and it really reflects poorly on metaphysics Mike. So firstly there should be the obvious issue that Mike despite complaining that I am supposedly rude was using ad homonyms throughout the entire debate rather than just engaging with the arguments. Notice how I never had to engage in ad homonyms but rather stayed on the subject and stick to the arguments. Furthermore, notice how Mike had to interrupt me throughout the entire debate whereas for large portions of it I let him go on a tangent. So, for example, when he was citing the AI overview, I decided to just let him talk instead of interrupting him when at that point it would have been fair for me to interrupt him. So, despite what some people claimed in the chat, I was actually being way more charitable than he was to me. Because if I had done something like that, he would have immediately called me out for using AI and probably have kicked me because I used AI and then on top of that interrupted me while I was doing it. Secondly, Mike dismisses claims I made which are like clearly true. And then he tries to say that I'm the ignorant one despite the fact that like if anything, this would just show he's ignorant because he doesn't know these like clearly true things. So for example, he argues that I'm not qualified to talk about this subject because I didn't understand the difference between formal and informal logic. Yet the understanding that I gave is literally the one that is standard because it's the one that's given in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Likewise, Mike starts crashing out over my definition of metaphysics because of the fact that like supposedly I conflated it with ontology. But the obvious issue is that the definition of metaphysics that I gave is going to be adequate given that metaphysics can appropriately be defined as the study of being qua being which is just what I said but in different terms. Third, Mike gives idiosyncratic redefinitions of words and then shifts the topic. The most obvious place where this occurs is when he uses the term logical and then he defines it to signify that a set of beliefs is not just consistent but also actually true. Note that under the standard meaning of the term logical, Mike actually conceds the debate by saying that the trinity is logical because he conceds that it's going to be consistent or at the very least he conceds that the model I gave is going to not entail any violation of the laws of logic. meaning he thinks that there's a model of the trinity which is going to be logical. But the obvious issue is that this is just conceding the debate topic. Regardless, there's also his definition of informal logic which seems to be in idiosyncratic. Fourth, Mike seems to make a lot of category errors, especially in one of the fundamental arguments for the trinity being illogical because he tries to dismiss a set of propositions with no inferences as being unound. Mike is applying terms which are fitting of arguments specifically to things which are not arguments. This is just a category error. And yet Mike's entire case for the Trinity being illogical despite being consistent seems to hinge on this idea that like the Trinity is supposedly unound. The obvious issue is that the model of the Trinity I gave isn't an argument. So it cannot be unound in the sense that Mike is using the term. Remember when I gave a model of the Trinity, I wasn't giving an argument. what I was giving is a consistent set of propositions and then my argument was about the set and its consistency. So to reiterate the argument I was giving was not in the model itself. The model itself is not a considered as a deductive argument rather the argument I gave was about the model. So when I gave the model, I wasn't giving an argument. Rather, I was giving a consistent set of propositions and then from there I constructed an argument based off of it. Now to put it a bit differently, the argument I was giving can be restated as such. Premise one, for some set of statements to be illogical, then there must be an inconsistency entailed by all models of said set of statements. Two, trinitarianism/ the Trinity is a set of statements. So premise three, if the trinity is illogical, then there must be an inconsistency entailed by all models of set of statements. And this is going to follow from premises 1 and two. Premise four, the Bransonite model of the trinity is a model of the trinity. So premise 5 follows that if the trinity is illogical, then the Bransonite model of the trinity entails an inconsistency. Premise six, no inconsistency isn't entailed by the Bransonite model. So the conclusion follows that the trinity is not illogical. Now for premise one, as I've explained, something being illogical just means that it violates the laws of logic. And I've already covered this before, so I'm not going to get more in depth into it now, but it seems that like Mike wants to admit that there's a sense of logical which is in line with the definition I gave, but the standard sense of the term logical is not in line with what I gave. But he has it reversed. His sense of logical is going to be idiosyncratic. Whereas my sense of the term is just going to be the ordinary one given the context. And this is something I've already covered. As for premise 2, this is just going to be definitional because in this context, the trinity or trinitarianism is not intending to refer to the persons of the trinity themselves, but instead it refers to the doctrine of the trinity. Regardless, it seems Mike agrees with this premise at or at least he didn't dispute it for the sake of the debate given that it was implicit throughout the entire discussion. Now, for premise four, Branson defends that this model is adequate to describe or to model the Trinity, and he does this in his dissertation. Regardless, Mike seems to accept this at least for the sake of the debate. And as for premise 6, Mike conceds this. And if you want proof, just note that showing that one of the laws of logic has been violated would entail that all contradictions follow. And so there's going to be at least one contradiction. Now, as a clarification, the specific regimentation of Branson's view that I gave here isn't going to be taken strictly from his dissertation. Rather, this is just going to be like a condensed form of what he says there. So Branson covers a formulation using second order logic and in first order logic. I chose the first order logic regimentation as does he. But there are multiple ways to sort of model Branson's view and I've just chosen one of the ways. Regardless, even if you model Branson's view exactly how he does it in his dissertation, that's still going to be coherent. So my argument still works. Now, after the debate, Mike goes on a rant about me for like 5 minutes straight, complaining about my arguments or about my positions. Most of it was filled with mistakes and straw mans, but I will respond to it here. Note that like in the debate, he still engages in ad homonyms. And so, obviously, I'm not going to respond to those because I don't have any actual substance. Like, for example, he starts accusing the people in the chat that said I won of just coping, but that's not going to be like a substantive point. So there's no burden for me to respond to it. Now firstly, he claims that I won't accept that there's a truth value to my propositions that I gave in the model. This is just false. I said that the propositions I gave are true. So I do think the trinity is true, but that asking me about the epistemic justification is outside of the topic for the debate. In other words, I don't have to prove that the trinity is true to prove it's logical. Those are two different questions. So then after that he talks about how logic presupposes metaphysics. This really in my opinion doesn't make too much sense. First of all, he hasn't actually justified why that's the case. So I don't even need to give a rebutting defeater. Regardless, we can literally just point out that typically logical laws are taken as self-evident. Whereas metaphysical claims are going to be inferred from other truths about reality and thus are going to be epistemically posterior to the laws of logic. Then he strawmans me again by saying that I don't think informal logic is part of logic. This is false. What I said was that his definition of informal logic was idiosyncratic. He says also that informal fallacies debunk my argument. But then he never explains how besides just saying that I think informal logic isn't logic, but this is just a straw man. Also, he uses AI again for some reason when doing this as if that's going to be like a good source here. And then again, he just repeats the point that the Trinity is formerly logical but not true. The issue is that all he's really trying to say with that is just that he's saying that there's a set of propositions that model the Trinity and that this set of propositions is consistent, but then the propositions themselves aren't going to be true. But obviously under the ordinary definition of logical in this context to say that the trinity is logical is really just to say that it's not going to violate the laws of logic or that it's consistent. So he's just conceding it's logical by saying it's formally logical. Note that logical just in the ordinary sense would just imply consistency. Afterwards he brings up another unitarian to argue against me and then both of them give arguments for like a couple of minutes and for this section I will respond to the substantive points here. So firstly he argues that because model construction involves reasoning and since fallacies are relevant to any form of reasoning it therefore follows that fallacies are relevant to model construction and therefore fallacies are relevant to evaluating models. The issue is that he's equivocating on relevance. When I said that applying soundness or fallacies to my model is a category error, what I am saying is that claiming that the set of propositions I gave itself is facious or unsound is a category error. It is in that sense that informal fallacies are irrelevant to the question of whether the model is logical. This is because the model itself doesn't contain any inferences. So when someone argues that the specific set of propositions is true or that the specific set of propositions adequately models a set of statements, they might use informal fallacies in their argumentation for their model. But that's not going to entail that therefore the set of propositions itself is going to be facious. For example, someone can give a facious argument for 1 plus 1 equals 2. And thus fallacies are relevant in some sense to that question of whether 1 plus 1 equals 2. But that's not going to entail that. Therefore, you can argue that 1 + 1= 2 is itself going to be a fallacy or unound. Like that's just going to be a category error because that's a proposition on its own without any inference. So it doesn't make sense to say 1 + 1 = 2 is unound. Remember, Mike is claiming that the set of propositions I gave itself is unsound and/or aacious. But the model is not going to be an argument with any inferences in it. And so me stating what a set of propositions contains isn't going to be an argument in itself. And thus the model itself can't be sound or unsound. Rather, the argument is about the model. However, the issue is is that the argument about the model I gave is going to be sound. And this is because the only premise that Mike actually contests was premise one. And as we have seen, his contentions weren't sufficient to refute it. And there seems to be enough justification to accept it. And since all the other premises were granted, my argument would follow. Secondly, metaphysics Mike accuses me of doing metaphysics even though I supposedly explained that my model doesn't require me to do metaphysics. Specifically, he points to how I use energeta and hypothesis. The issue is is that he is equivocating on what it means to engage in metaphysics. When he asked me to engage in metaphysics, what he specifically wanted me to do is give a justification as to why my metaphysics were correct. I specifically denied the need to engage in metaphysics in that sense. In other words, I don't have to prove that my metaphysics were true to show that the trinity is coherent. Regardless, my usage of the term energeta isn't going to require any fleshed out metaphysics, if it requires metaphysics at all, because all energeta means is just operation. Furthermore, we can just define hypothesis as a incommunicable object and then we can add this definition to the model. Note that this will be an addition to the model, but it won't make any difference to the answer we give as to whether the trinity is logical. So, it doesn't seem to make a difference at all. Note that either way, none of this requires me to engage in metaphysics in the sense that Mike wants me to because Mike wants me to engage in metaphysics in the sense that I have to justify my metaphysical paradigm. But what I'm denying is that I have to justify that paradigm. All I have to show is that the set of propositions I gave is internally consistent. That's the only burden of proof that I have and I met that burden of proof. In fact, Mike admits I did. So, Mike conceds the debate. Mike then says that trinitarians came up with the qua operator and relative identity. But the issue is that these things can be dep defended independent of theological concerns. So for example, a common defense of relative identity involves identity over time and that's not really going to require any theological commitments. As a final note, earlier I talked about how my Discord froze in the middle of the debate. And for context, I used my friend's recording of the debate for the majority of this video that he got on his own and that he gave me permission to use. But I also took my own recording just in case. Regardless, in my recording, you can clearly see that my Discord froze. And so because of this, on everyone else's end, it looked like Mike was just talking and that I wasn't responding. And so because of that, I cut that out of this video. Note that the cut didn't actually like change the debate in any significant way because all that was cut out was this period of silence where I wasn't speaking and Mike thought I wasn't responding.