Ran Samwad 2026 || Nitin Gokhale's Fireside Chat With CDS Gen Anil Chauhan

As we transition from formal deliberations to the fireside chat on multi-domain operations, the intent is to move beyond doctrine and into candid reflection. For this insightful exchange, we have amongst us General Anil Chauhan, Param Vishisht Seva Medal, Uttam Yudh Seva Medal, Ati Vishisht Seva Medal, Sena Medal, Vishisht Seva Medal, Chief of Defence Staff, and one of South Asia's leading strategic analyst, Mr. Nitin Gokhle. I now hand over to Mr. Nitin for taking the proceedings forward.

Good evening, ladies. Conduct this fireside chat. I believe and I just got some glimpses of the morning sessions on YouTube as I was flying into Bangalore and then later. And certainly a lot of discussions have happened on MDO and various aspects of MDO. But as the world grapples with uncertainty and chaos, warfare is certainly changing as we have known. And of course shifting and evolving as we go along. The pace I think is frightening and therefore the adoption of the new technologies in the Indian context is going to be something different. We live in a varied geography, hostile neighborhood. And it is all the more difficult because of these two factors at least. This is what I believe. And preparing the armed forces for the multiple scenarios is not going to be easy. I think the CDS has a most difficult job along with the other three service chiefs. Does the answer lie therefore in jointness, integration and adaptation? Let's ask the man currently leading the effort to combine the weight of the three armed forces into a combat efficient and effective machine that is the Indian military.

So let me start with you with the question General Chauhan. You've now spent nearly three and a half years as India's second Chief of Defence Staff. The journey has been quite eventful I would say. One of the big events was of course Operation Sindhu, but more than that I think there was a lot of heavy lifting had to be done on procedures, on creating jointness, integration, and then getting structures the base right for the eventual formation of theater joint theater commands. What has been the most memorable maybe one or two experiences or episodes that you remember? I know there are a lot that you will remember, but if you can highlight that to begin with.

Thank you, Nitin. I think to see the results of one's efforts during his service time that would have provided me the maximum amount of satisfaction. So in that way Operation Sindhu can be said as a high point of my tenure as CDS. I think this all happened because as you rightly said because of this jointness and integration efforts which we have undertaken over a long period of time ever since I took over. This is the bedrock of what you can call as what we are discussing today, multi-domain operations. And this is also essential for what we want to create, integrated theater theater commands. Why jointness and integration is important is because of the scale of the activity over which it is involved. See, when we are talking about creation of theater commands, it was primarily a discussion between service chiefs and me. I had to get consensus between three people, you know, of whatever my ideas were. And probably expanded further to army commanders or other CNCs, which has happened. But over here we are looking at complete all three armed forces right up to the last man. So the scale of this was huge. When we started this process of jointness, integration, I don't think we had a common understanding also what is the definition, what do we mean by this particular jointness, what do we mean by integration. Today we have a reasonably good understanding not only in English, Hindi. Ekikaran and Sanyuktikaran. That's a buzzword. It's part of now a lexicon. So everyone uses it and we understand. In fact, we've taken out a document also for it. Yeah. So not a doctrine, but some kind of an primer. While I said the scale, it was huge. And that's why it's an ongoing process. You can't say that finished it or something, but I started it. And it will continue hopefully.

Second thing why it is important is because of the difficulty. Let me say that each service, each of us, army, navy, air force, have been created, they've been structured, they've been groomed, they've been motivated to actually excel in their particular domain. And they protect their turf. True. And when we talk about jointness and integration, somewhere it impinges upon individual service domains. And acceptability of that, you know, that's a big challenge actually. So that we were able to overcome and I think we were able to overcome because uh I tried to change the narrative actually. So like this particular event we having, future warfare. So that's becoming a reality means if you start selling this idea that we got to have armed forces, we have to be prepared for future warfare. Services as I said, they came to protect their turf, but they are also keen to win the next combat. And if they know that future warfare is going to be multi-domain, it is going to be we have to fight jointly together. So that resistance starts crumbling. So it's been a big journey and this thing was tested during Operation Sindhu. So that gives you a lot of satisfaction. But this is as I said, it's an ongoing process. I don't see it as the end point of it. It will continue for some more time. So this I think is one of the achievements which I think of my tenure as CDS. Uh Second thing is maybe okay. I'll mention it as part and this is as part of uh Chairman Chief of Staff Committee or CDS, jointness and integration. Mhm. The second part I would say is as Secretary DMA. I've been able to kind of institutionalize the role of DMA into MOD. And they have a definite role and they're part of MOD now. I've been able to strengthen that. >> Right. Because it's a new department which was created in the MOD and unless its roots are very firmly established, it becomes difficult. So that I think is the second big achievement as far as I'm concerned.

Sure. No, DMA in fact I just want to spend one minute more on that because DMA looks after the administration. And I think administration is the non-glamorous part of this entire exercise of creating joint theater commands in a way. So there I think you managed to get a lot of systems in place, a lot of unfinished agendas that systems that were not catered to by Department of Defence earlier. Is that true? This is what I am hearing. No. It is much more than what you are saying actually for DMA. Mhm. It looks after operational preparedness of the three services. >> Of course. So this is slightly different from procurements. So procurement is still remains DOD's part, but all three services, their operational preparedness. When I say operational preparedness, it's not just sustenance of equipment. It is new structures, organizations, their doctrines, new organizations. Everything will be created through DMA. Also prioritization of Prioritization of procurement. Procurement etc. also I look after, but that I look after as CDS. But anything which we conceptualize, services or headquarter ideas, finally if it has to take form or shape, that has to go through DMA and get a government sanction. So as it is true for all three services and for headquarter ideas. So that's a big power which has been given to me. Our So that empowerment has helped. Yes. That So this whole thing being together, CDS and DMA, that requirement certainly has helped me to whatever we thought as reforms was finally getting implemented on ground. That's being done as CDS, not as DMA, it's as Secretary DMA. Secretary DMA. That's wonderful you know to know because that was there were a lot of apprehensions about DMA when it was created because it was a plus what everybody expected more than that at that point in time when CDS was appointed.

But let me move on to multi-domain operations. Since the morning I think everybody has spoken on different aspects of multi-domain operations. It's going to be as I think you said when you intervened, I was watching that about decision superiority. Everybody else has also many of them have used this term. But AI is going to be a challenge or dovetailing AI into decision making is going to be a challenge. How do you propose to use AI in this context, the multi-domain operations and multiple other challenges that come with it?

So Nitin, actually it There is not one. AI is only one. There are multiple technologies which are affecting the nature and character of warfare. It could be from stealth, autonomous systems, quantum, but I think AI is that mother of all technologies which is going to integrate. So that way It cuts across all the domains. It cuts across all domains in future. So hence it is important. You know, warfare Uh if you look at warfare or smallest of combat or engagement, the outcome of all these things is dependent on two things. Uh one is timely decisions and the correct decisions. These are two things which are important. And they are both interrelated. You can't have a correct decision being taken late. It will not work. So, it has to be timely and it has to be correct and then the outcome will be favorable to you. It's here where artificial intelligence is going to help us to take a timely decision and correct decision. Let me expand this further. Uh so, we could say that we are moving from net-centric warfare to data-centric to intelligent warfare. When we say net-centric warfare, we are trying to connect the sensors to the shooters. And over a period of time, what's happened, there are plethora of the the sensors are ubiquitous, hundreds and thousands of sensors of various types are available. So, that if you want to do change detection, you want anomalies, etc. So, machine learning, etc. will come in. And then we go to connect this to a number of shooters which are there also which are also expanded. So, maybe over here some kind of an automation is required. But when we are moving towards data-centric warfare, which is decision superiority, >> Yes. Uh rather than information superiority. >> Correct. Uh over here, we are actually looking at past data sets of ours. Mhm. Past decisions. And here, there'd be requirement of artificial intelligence, some language models and you know, some algorithms, advanced ones, to help you take a correct decision, operational decisions. A step ahead would be intelligent warfare, in which maybe, you know, uh artificial intelligence can be predictive and you can forecast. >> Yes. So, hence you'll be able to predict things faster. And then your decisions are taken much ahead of before you even say observe a particular thing. So, we are artificial intelligence will run through all net-centric, data-centric and intelligent warfare. Sure. So, what are we How are we incorporating this and where are we going to use this? I've just given you example of only operation side of artificial intelligence. Its application resides also in maintenance support of equipment, sustenance of equipment, operation logistics and also HR. All the In fact, training also. In fact, couple of our training institutions are already using some kind of models for artificial intelligence for training officers in staff college, CDM, etc. Number of places. Right. Uh this is already happening. Uh this all will require three, four things. Uh firstly, we'll have to have large compute power. We are working towards it. Some language models which should be Indian and some advanced algorithms which are How we want to use it. So, So, these are all What about those models also? That's all I would say work in progress. Sure.

But in that context then your training you mentioned that should be also in keeping with the needs of the future. So, one or two initiatives that you've taken, Ransamwar is one where, you know, you last year it was people speaking middle level or senior officers speaking and generally uh their presentations were there. This time I've seen CNC level, army commander level people have spoken or, you know, sort of given the opinion. In that context, future warfare course I thought was a brilliant idea to have senior officers uh and junior officers rank agnostic uh working together or training together. How has that progressed and what is that initiative all about? Is it about absorption of technology, adoption of technology? What is that?

So, uh Again, I think uh future warfare is a course which was rank agnostic. It also had a mix of civilians, academicians, think tanks part of this particular course. In fact, even Ransamwar today is not the first edition actually of Ransamwar when we held uh there were senior officers because we had opened up the subject uh to middle and junior level officers to contribute their thoughts. Uh we did not get better responses, but this time we got excellent response. So, tomorrow's sessions you'll find at least six officers we have middle level uh Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Wing Commander, Group Captain level officers. Mhm. Uh they are going to present their papers. So, uh uh when we talk think about the future warfare, so it has to be rank agnostic as you said and at multiple levels we'll have to work and think about. So, I think that's a work in progress again like all other initiatives in that sense.

But when you talk about futuristic wars or future wars, there is it has to also match with your weaponry, your platforms, use of weapons and platforms, maybe even lessons from the ongoing conflicts have to be dovetailed into uh the doctrines and implementation. Now, how is that working as far as, you know, your DPM, DAC when it gives prioritization, uh your new DA defense acquisition procedure, DAP, is going to come out. Is that aligning with the need for the future warfare or future wars that are coming in?

So, uh It's If you see the past five years, I think this must have been the most violent five year violent five years actually. Uh we've seen number of conflicts. Ukraine was there. We've seen it in Armenia, Gaza, Iran, us. So, there number of conflicts and each conflict has produced its own kind of lessons uh for us. And uh means and new technologies have been there. So, uh we've been able to cope up with this uh by emergency procurements which Raksha Mantri had given. And because of that, most of them were used during operation Sindhu. But we need to institutionalize this process of emergency procurements. So, probably in your DAP, you will have a system of fast track procurements. So, that needs to get institutionalized. Also, uh this kind of technologies which are coming in, you know, they support what I could say uh like the revolution military affairs. The first RMA was maneuver warfare. Right. Second RMA could be net-centric and third could be say data-centric or intelligent. I just spoke about Mhm. all these three. So, today when we look at our procurements, our priority should be in the ratio of say 70% for maneuver warfare to support maneuver warfare, 20% to support intelligent warfare, and 10% to support intelligent warfare. So, sorry, net-centric and and data-centric. And yeah, 10% for intelligent and data-centric. Now, this is going to get institutionalized. Sure. And we have already means even for research and development, our own procurements, this is the kind of format. And this system is slightly different from the earlier paradigm in which we had this 30-40-30 concept of 30% old, uh 20% contemporary and 30% niche kind of technology in your weapon system. Sure. So, your mindset is changing. Uh so, you are adopting new technologies. I must also say here that technology is one thing, but side by side you have to create organization structures, concepts, doctrine. This is work which has to go parallelly. Just by getting technology and platforms, it may not just work.

>> Yeah, because if you people are not trained, how will they use those technologies? But again, sticking to lessons from different wars and the latest war of course was the Israel US versus Iran war. What one or two lessons if you can just, you know, sort of mention offhand. I'm not saying for specifics, but what is it that because when Armenia-Azerbaijan happened, everybody thought swift short wars, drone wars are the in thing. Then Russia-Ukraine came and it's been prolonged five years now, almost four and a half years. Uh but now again this war came. So, what is the latest war has taught us really?

So, let's look at first uh uh Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. That's the first war in which in Nagorno-Karabakh, there was use of loitering ammunition and drones by one side and uh you know, the war was very, very swift and people said that this is a right. Uh Ukraine war was although started earlier in '22, but after that you find actually a revolution in the kind of drones which were being there. So, you had this first person drones, you had intelligent drones, you had loitering drones, you had stealth drones, you had drones on surface, on water, underwater. And to this multiple technologies and use of drone warfare and loitering ammunition exploded. Yes. And it was also in some manner that maneuver warfare which was tried initially, that did not work out. It did not work out. For Russia it didn't work out. Yes. Resulted in some kind of a stalemate. Uh as far as the current warfare is concerned, the war which is presently under ceasefire, uh too early to comment upon the large number of lessons that we will draw out. But over here again you find different set of technologies being used. So, over here we know that artificial intelligence has come in in a big way. And Americans have used it in targeting, etc. Uh ISR constant and so have the Israelis. So, these are new technologies which have been used in this particular warfare. Also, I must add that uh these technologies may have allowed us the Americans or the Israelis to win specific combat missions at operational level at tactical level. Right. But somewhere the larger picture that geography and strategy is important that is Iran's probably has used that. So they used the importance of geography almost that was one. And the strategy which they developed of what you call it mosaic the distributed command architecture. Mhm. Independent Dispersed all the Yeah, dispersed command architecture. Mhm. So that's the strategy which they used against this. They also they probably preparing for such kind of a conflict having built a lot of underground facilities and stored a lot of missiles. And beside in fact they also targeted very precisely American facilities and otherwise in those you know Gulf countries because nobody thought they would target military targets in the Gulf countries in that sense.

But about operation Sindoor just one thought on that precision weapons were also very useful for India long range vectors also proved to be lethal. And in our case against Pakistan we used their geography to our advantage. Because they don't have depth. So like you said straight of Hormuz was used by Iran to their advantage. We can also use it but we are in a hostile neighborhood with two adversaries primary and secondary. And terrain as far as we are concerned in the mountains is also one of the challenges. How do you you know sort of overcome the terrain challenge or take the terrain as an advantage?

Uh Maybe you know geography is there we can't change that kind of a geography. Uh our two adversaries both of both of them they have some kind of a land dispute. Right. Uh they are also nuclear weapon states. Correct. So that has got its own dynamics uh in kind of strategies. Say till say today's discussions have focused on only the theoretical aspects of future war Yes. So we said about technologies you know how are they going to be used how are they going to influence future warfare. It's practical application. Uh that particular part is also important you know because uh the way geopolitics is playing out there's a lot of uncertainty and probably uh the next like I said the past the five years have been full of conflicts. >> Violence One never knows the next five years may also be uh there's a proclivity by most nations to use force and that may continue. So and what kind of wars what kind of nature of duration of wars where will they happen that all is dependent on geopolitics. Sure. A part of it and maybe geo-economics may decide your supply chains and Correct. technology may decide outcome of war. Geography will remain constant and the aspect that we have two nuclear armed neighbors one is a nuclear weapon state one is a nuclear armed state. So that also is a reality we must factor in and kind of war. Yes we we will come to that but you've released the defense forces vision 2047 uh recently which talks about I think that slogan was Sashakt Surakshit and Viksit Bharat. What was the thought behind the you know that vision which was released that booklet that you have released? And that includes so many newer domains in it. Cyber six domains that have been spoken about but cognitive is something that I'm more interested in so maybe in two parts if you can answer. What was the vision thought and why cognitive?

So actually the vision document we had circulated it in the morning and the vision statement is there if I recall is to be integrated all domain force dynamic and self-reliant in thoughts There's also a dynamic response strategy that you spoke about. Yes yes. Mhm. So when we talk about vision uh so the security of the nation uh it's the responsibility of all citizens it's not only the armed forces. So when we wrote this particular vision it is not that we wrote it in isolation. The defense forces are not written this conceptualize this vision into armed forces. Uh we have taken all the departments of the Ministry of Defense on board. We have also circulated this vision to the National Security Council Secretariat. So given it to NITI Aayog for some kind of and comments uh because they are working on the national vision. So it incorporates all those efforts uh because ultimately fighting war is not only the specific to services you may say that you know armed forces maybe the last instrument of instrument of last resort but that's not the only instrument there are other instruments available to the government. So that is one part. So it's been vetted. Second what we have released is the open part of the document. So there's a restricted part of this document from vision to action which lays down the road map the responsibilities and the timelines which we want to achieve in those eight strategic verticals which have been given. Uh so readiness and all responsiveness capability development and sustenance strategic culture you know HR so all these eight verticals are there in which we have uh specific areas where we are going to work. So specifically cognitive warfare Yes. uh is part will find somewhere in this capabilities one of those So it is along with electromagnetic and others those six domains that you spoken about. So if you want me to elaborate on cognitive warfare Yes a little bit on that and then I'll come to uh what I was going to ask you about all whole of nation approach but that I'll come the next question but maybe cognitive warfare a little bit. So I'll give you my understanding it's again and evolving field of warfare. And what little lessons we learned from operation Sindoor uh we want to incorporate in future structures of ours and future concepts of ours in this. So there is I may divide this my understanding of perception management and cognitive warfare in two parts. Yeah. One is purely perception management which is a function which happens every time. Sure. Uh the services have been at it for a very long time each one has a statcom division army navy and air force and they're working wonderfully well. So maybe what we need to do is focus and channelize their efforts so so that everyone is in unison not we are not going to impinge upon their statcom that is one part and it happens during peace time. Cognitive warfare I think is to use this particular domain along with kinetic operations during war. That's So that I think is important and that has got two components. One is to combat fake news which today's morning session also I think one of the speakers >> CISC spoke about that also in the morning. Some time wasted in this. So how do we combat fake news etc. And this doesn't waste the time of operational commanders. It should be an automatic process it should be like a ticker coming on a television. Right. So you pick up whatever news is on the social media electronic media or digital media and then uh get someone to who's the right man to actually say that it's correct. >> be any specialist also. So in real time to do it that is we have we'll create some kind of a structure. And of course we also want to use this as part of your offensive operations in future. So it's a developing concept. Yeah. I really may not have all the answer right now but to as we progress we'll create structures for this.

So two things are from deriving out of operation Sindoor one is the prime minister saying that this is a new normal what what we did in operation Sindoor what India did in operation Sindoor and the shift over the past some years now several years from a reactive strategy to a proactive strategy uh which is domain agnostic non-linear that kind of thing. There's these two questions I wanted to wanted you to elaborate a little bit on what is the new normal that you interpret the prime minister's uh you know direction or maybe even his policy that this is a new normal and when you talk about when we say that India has now become proactive what do you mean by being proactive? These two.

Okay so after operation Sindoor uh politically the new normal which we derive from from statements like uh any cross border terrorism will be responded to. Right. Uh that is one. Second India will not make any difference between perpetrators of terror and their handlers. That the second thing. The third thing which the prime minister said that India will not be blackmailed Correct. will not be nuclear blackmailed. Sure. Uh the new normal then actually falls into two categories one is in conventional warfare or sub-conventional warfare. And second is at the extreme end that's in the nuclear strategic domain if I could say. So as far as the first part is concerned so we'll require some kind of persistent surveillance efforts. We'll have to have readiness levels which are 24/7 365 days. You know I don't know uh we all had this document Raksha Mantri's of directive. And somewhere over there it lays down that the government will give us some kind of a reaction time in case there is hostilities to break. >> Which will not be true anymore. I can't disclose what has been the time given but 30, 40, 70, 80 days. So, these are the kind of timelines which have been given. Now, are they relevant today? I don't think so they're relevant anymore. That's the new normal. That's the new normal. As far as conventional operations is concerned, even for it lays down how many days of hostilities of fight. I think that with kind of warfare which is changing you'll have to re-look at such kind of entitlements. As far as the new normal in the strategic domain is concerned, again there are two aspects to it. Nuclear weapons we say it's a weapons of deterrence. So, means we all know that India's nuclear doctrine rests on two pillars of no first use and massive retaliation. So, we need to strengthen that particular part. So, once deterrence is strong, that's why we're saying that we won't be deterred by nuclear threat. So, that I think is important. Second part is should deterrence fail then our forces should be able to in my view uh continue conventional operations in a contaminated environment to achieve So, that is another aim that That is what I understand as a new normal. Sure. And the strategic domain. Correct. But the strategic non-nuclear deterrence is also a new thing that needs to be

>> Before that you told us something about proactive strategy. Proactive, yes. Reactive and proactive. So, reactive and proactive strategies. So, earlier I think there's a lot of material on you know uh after this terror strikes etc. uh on uh cold start strategies and all that. What's happening is happens last time I was talking about uh deterrence and nuclear weapons. Yes. So, which creates some kind of an strategic stability amongst nations. The availability of nuclear weapons This also creates instability at the lower level. It leads to terrorism, it can lead to grey zone warfare and our western adversary has been using this. Right. To counter that they earlier thought of a proactive strategy in media outside to normal Correct. cold start and things like that. >> Right. Today we're talking about a dynamic response strategy. Uh that means when we say response it's assured. That will happen. That's part of the new normal. Yes. Which we said >> Dynamic response. And when we said dynamic, it will be proportionate, it will be just. When we say dynamic response, it does not negate the strategy of cold start or other conventional strategies. It only supplements it. Okay. So, we want to have a dynamic response at every level of escalation and when it So, that my understanding of dynamic is not the first reaction which is a dynamic response. It is at every level of escalation there will be a dynamic response. So, it is going to supplement the earlier strategies True. and not replacing them. Not replacing them but that's important to understand because even during Sindhur you would have worked out all the leadership, the military leadership and the political leadership or at least you know when you sat with the NSA uh escalation ladder or escalation response to Pakistan's responses. Uh how did they work out as far as operation Sindhur is concerned?

So, so it was not just selection of targets and hitting them on 7th. So, we had worked out some kind of an possible escalation most about four or five levels of the escalations and what should be our response in each level. And basically in this whole issue of escalation there were two principles which I thought that were relevant and I had been emphasizing on the services that one is we need to keep the channel of communication open so that it doesn't spiral out of control. That is one. And second thing is that uh any kind of an escalation will to has to end with our response. We have to So, we end the war or we end the We end the last ladder of escalation will be conducted by us. So, that were two principles which we followed. So, actually And we maintained that during Sindhur. To stop operation Sindhur when we did was actually now in retrospect when you see what is happening to the US and Israel, they don't know how to get out of the war. I think operation Sindhur is a great example of terminating the war on the our terms. So, since our operational objectives had been achieved that had been laid down since we had achieved that and uh and that was laid down right in the beginning in a proper communication to Pakistan by the DGM. Right. That we've hit you know >> On the first day immediately immediately after the first strike. >> First strike. Yeah. So, once they offered stop so obviously operation stopped. And in hindsight as you said means it's been good. >> good good good.

So, the question of the day or question of the evening basically is what everyone is waiting for especially my friends in the media here is in January when we spoke in Pune you spoke about uh finalizing joint theater commands uh by uh before uh you step down or you superannuate in May. Uh what has been the progress since then in the last two or three months and what is the road map? What is the timeline?

Okay. So, uh You all know that they've been carrying out this discussion on how to work the best possible method to implement this theater command model for us. And this has been going on under the rubric of operation Tiranga. Some kind of closed door discussions between the chiefs. So, I've had discussions now with six chiefs, not three. And three six have been involved into it. Uh we've taken this discussion forward in the last triple C. It was discussed with CMC's also. So, it's expanded. And today when service chiefs are uh writing or we're discussing if they're using the help of a lot of staff officers it's not restricted to only a service chief. So, there's a lot of information which is available on this what the thought process is on creation of theater commands uh amongst a lot of officers. So, that I think is one part. We must keep it in mind. So, it's not one view. It has percolated down. percolated down and so considered view. And where are we as far as uh thing is concerned. So, let me say that there are two things in theater commands. One is this concept and one is this manifestation. How it will manifest. So, when we say theater commands is a concept in which we are trying to separate out force application and force generation. Uh this concept no service has any doubt on this particular aspect that this theater command model has to be done and this has to be separated out. >> There's a consensus on that. 100% means no service is saying that this is not to be done. True. So, for that I think people should be assured that there's 100% consensus on this in writing and discussions and recordings of ours. Uh it's on the manifestation how are we going to implement it. Sure. There remains some differences. So, let me say that that there remains some differences. But this discussions on operation Tiranga to resolve all differences have been concluded means Okay. But let me stop you here. Operation Tiranga is the discussions on joint theater commands. Yeah. >> Right. And all those discussions then had wherever we arrive at consensus have got to the chief of staff committee to take as a formal decision. Mhm. And then it got recorded etc. They have concluded you're saying. Op Tiranga discussions have been concluded. Okay. And we have agreed that these differences being there still will proceed ahead with our recommendations to the government that we need to implement this particular concept. I'm sure these whatever little differences in manifestation are there will get uh resolved over a period of time. Uh so, hopefully I should be able to compile my third report of operation Tiranga another one week or so and then be ready to present it to the government. So, from our side services side this particular part would be done. And now we have to uh take it up to the Raksha Mantri. We may have to take it up with the CCS uh to get this thing implemented. Operationalize. Operationalize it or first is to tell them as to what we want to do. And get their feedback. >> their feedback, get their views and then So, we are at that stage. I see. That's good to know there's some progress from January definitely. Yeah, so we've concluded our discussion. >> That's the result of your discussion. Definitely.

So, I think from my side I have actually concluded. We got at least another 15 minutes and you have kindly agreed to take questions from the audience and so maybe we'll say take a set of three questions first and then see whether we have time. Yeah. Accordingly so, questions are welcome. Anyone. Right there General Pawan Anand is one. Um Admiral Chawla. And who else? Raju. Uh so, I think Raju Raju. Yeah, okay. I'll start with the Pawan Anand first and then come to you and then Admiral Chawla.

Uh good evening uh uh sir, the CDS, and hello Nitin. Uh Sir, the question is actually a little bit away, maybe a part digression from MDO or the discussion that we had today, but would be related when I finish with it. I think the most important thing for us is capability development when we talk about various kinds of operations that we've been uh that we are envisaging. Technology is changing faster than we can imagine. Technology is definitely changing faster than our procurement system. And then our procurement system has been divided into various parts and you just mentioned that there will be a faster track for procurement. If you're going to keep resorting to emergency procurements, then something is certainly broken in our regular procurement system. And having recognized that, we're going for these fast track procurements. When I look at the faster technologies which are indigenously available, especially digital technologies, there seems to be no process even in the latest DAP which is coming out. The draft is out and we find nothing of that over there. Is it time for us from the armed forces to get involved with the DDO to ensure that the DAP brings in technologies which are coming in over 6-month or 1-year periods so that we can catch up rather than remaining always in a lag period. If we don't do that, then what are the risks that we face?

General Raju, I think Uh thank you, sir. Firstly, I would like to thank the CDS for giving the update on the progress that has been made on the theaterization because when we talk of MDO, uh multi-domain operations, I think theaterization are completely interrelated because uh if you're looking at combining army, navy, air force along with information, cyber, industry, like all elements of the government, we need a common leadership. And theaterization is going to give that unique platform or unique capacity to be to apportion one leader with the responsibilities. My question is about one of the speaker in the morning spoke about present operations being extremely complex and that one that individual will not be able to handle it. You know, we have a large country and the Prime Minister of India is one and he handles 50 departments or 50 ministries. So, how do we change the mindset of our own leadership to say that what we are attempting or the direction that we are going is a doable proposition. That one leader with his team of experts around him will be able to conduct successfully the operations and with the right intent. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Chawla. Uh good evening, sir. Thank you for the update. My question relates to the formulation of the theater commands that you talked about. If you recollect that almost 7 years ago when we started this exercise, uh when General Rawat was the CDS, the first agenda had been the integrated air defense command. And today we have seen in all the conflicts when we talk about drones and missile warfare, the air defense, which is of course squarely the domain of the Indian Air Force, has become one of the most critical factors in modern warfare. So, are we looking at the integrated air defense command also in this formulation if that can be explained? Thank you.

Yeah. Answers to these three questions. The first question was related to uh technology and its incorporation in the real time. And that uh speaker had said that, you know, if we we should not resort to EP. I never said that that was one-time measure. We want to include this fast track procedure into our particular system. You know, every kind of induction which we do in the armed forces is based on forecasting as to what will happen in future. That's important. And earlier this was based on LTIPP, which we used to aggregate. Now we're changing the system to ICDP, integrated capability development plan, which has got a 10-year horizon. That itself is quite long. Uh which may translate to 2-year APP. So, what we need to do in my view is to keep at least about 30% of our budgets on the site reserves, which will be not related to ICDP in future. That will be related to this unforeseen kind of circumstances to incorporate uh this. So, that I think is important because ICDP, even if you make it at the 10-year horizon, I think it's too long and technology will change during this time.

Uh The two questions after that are related to theater command. I think that's the subject which interests most of us in uniform. Uh so, yes, warfare is becoming complex, etc. Uh and no one is trained, you know, so we have to train ourselves. Unfortunately, we have worked only in silos and we are specialists in a particular domain or particular service. Now, unless we have the experience, uh wider experience, you know, of other services, uh other government organization or involved in the issue of defense of the country or security of the country, uh we will fail actually. So, this exposure has to come in uh through our training academies, uh middle-level officers and upwards. So, today when we say that, you know, services are structured, organized, groomed, created to bring efficiency to fighting in that particular domain. So, anyone who is a middle-level officer in that service, it is his bread and butter to look after that particular service and protect that particular domain. But the moment he becomes a two-star or three-star, he should start questioning it actually. That should be the level of maturity and not protecting that particular domain. So, that thing should come out voluntarily and these initiatives like future warfare courses, Run Samwad, uh future frequent interaction between the services is paving way for that, I would say.

Uh Admiral Chawla's question regarding air defense command, I think uh there are two fundamental things, Chawla, over here. Uh Your offensive and protect defensive operations in the air domain are closely interlinked and you cannot have something which is entirely separated out. So, hence this uh point of air defense command, etc., that had been shared right at the beginning. Uh not withstanding the importance of air defense which has come in because of uh large number of vectors which are now available in the lower air space and also in near space. So, this spectrum has increased. So, today means as we say, uh and I spoke about, you know, operational preparedness, 24/7, etc. That's we are doing. So, today your JCs, which used to get operationalized during uh mobilization or something, they're all functional today. And they'll be functional throughout. All JCs with enhanced manpower are going to remain functional because of this importance of air defense. Uh number of applications are being made to help us air space management, flying of drones, etc. Uh our EWS assets, etc., so there's no fratricide in this particular domain are being developed, being tried out, and regularly being fielded uh for people. So, it has to work in an integrated kind of a structure. All should be responsible for this. It cannot be that a separate command is required for air defense. So, that thought process was there earlier. We shelved that.

Okay, we have time for a set of another three questions. Sorry if I'm not Yes, uh Admiral K.B. Singh, uh General A.K., and uh who else? And Admiral Monty Khanna there. I've just spotted and then We can take No, no. So, I just regarding this acquisition process, it's a big bugbear. Uh there are two things I want to just whatever I've read after retirement and it's made sense to me. One is that our DAP was mainly when we were acquiring products from abroad. And you know, we were acquiring. Now we've got to acquire capabilities and we have to be a stakeholder along with the industry. So, this entire concept has to change, the DAP part, wherein you are looking at somebody producing something to you. You have to co-produce, co-develop with your own industry. So, when you read things like the SPEED Act 2025 of the US, I did a study on that compared to our DAP. There, the service is getting into uh in collaboration with industry, getting into the you know, components of each platform that they want to get. So, they're going into that kind of detail rather than expecting everything as a finished product and then only talking about procedures. So, this is one area where we've tried to though the SPEED Act 2025, mind you, the US bureaucrats have killed in many ways, but the fact on ground is that there is a different thinking that is involved in between DAP and actually acquiring capabilities. Second issue is when we get into data centric and like you mentioned algorithmic warfare etc. All systems are going to be software intensive. A software differs from hardware. Hardware is a finished product that you get. A software is always, you know, is is always iterative by nature. It's like a potter's clay. You all all the time adjusting 1.0, 2.0 upgrades. So, you cannot ask for a product. You need to have a completely different acquisition pathway. Like the Israelis and the US have got an accelerated acquisition pathway for software induction. So, I was just wondering whether we can think on these lines and make a major adjustment in our acquisition processes. Otherwise, our acquisition processes are for acquiring something 5 years hence. Which is not going to work in the way technology is moving. Thank you.

General Leke and then I think Admiral Monte Khanna I think and then we'll take one bonus question. Air Vice Marshal Bahadur has also raised his hand, but let's see how much time we have. Sir, we are all privy to you know mammoth changes sir and the work that has been done in getting this jointness leading on to integrations. Hindi mein bahut sundar shabd hai sir gatish. I think what's important now is is to sort of uh act with speed because we know sir what all things are happening around. Do we have the times or do we have, you know, to walk this path the way we have been walking path and I'm saying and I'm admitting that there is a lot that has been done. I think what is important today is this gatish. And the second thing is the change in the mindsets. I think we are still very process driven. We are not outcome oriented and that's where I come to Admiral Karambir's point

Because, especially the DAP, with its, it's a very good time now in 2025 that the DAP is getting revised. I think this is the golden time for us to make sure that this DAP is not process-driven but outcome-oriented. There has to be an evolutionary thing.

Another thing of which I would also, because for MDO, again, what is important is civil-military fusion. And civil-military fusion will not come only by theories. I think if we have a national war game, a concept of a national war game, uh, you know, then only I think the other ministries and the department would know as to what is the expectation that the armed forces have from them. Armed forces would know, sir, what is the capability that a ministry has. And I think that's possible, and every year if we do it, I think that's how the civil-military fusion possibly can take place. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Monte Khanna. Uh, sir, one [clears throat] thing which has really come out in recent conflicts is the importance of long-range strikes and long-range vectors. Currently, they are distributed across all three services. Uh, so, are we also looking at, you know, integrating these into a rocket force or something equivalent, and how will this sort of uh uh roll into the and be integrated with the theater structures as well?

You want to take Air Vice Marshal Bahadur's question. Yes. Uh, sir, good evening. Uh, everything is based on education, all of us. So, that's the bedrock. And it's so good to see the joint vision document have that we would come up with a national defense university. Uh, what's the status on that, sir? Because that's a 2047 vision. Uh, the foundation stone was laid in 2012. So, where do we stand, sir?

Okay, I think we'll conclude here, but all yours. So, the second lot of questions, actually, two were suggestions largely, and there were just two questions. And uh, so, we've taken the suggestions quite well, sir. Whatever you said. So, means we all are aware that, you know, the acquisition process that was created to procure platforms, they're not, it's not created to acquire technology, as you said, or software, which is always incremental in its kind of its approach. And it followed, you know, what has been laid down in a GSQR, we'll buy this. So, we'll make some concession that even if you're 90%, 80% there, that will help spiral kind of in development. So, that may be there in the DAP. We'll also make and see that technology induction is part of this particular DAP and tactics-led modernization. We're also looking at a future warfare operational group that may help towards this end as to how, what kind of process we follow to acquire new technologies. Uh, General Leke's suggestion was also towards that. Uh, disha or gati, not only gati, disha, both.

So, I think both are important. Uh, as far as uh uh civil-military fusion and war gaming is concerned, uh, means I couldn't agree more with you. Uh, but first, we need to have tri-services war games, tri-services exercises. We should get our house in order. Till now, means you've been there. You just left the army about a year back, 2 and a half years back. Most of the war games etc. are done by commands, and the chief goes and attends, and that's how it's been. There are very few war games between us first. So, let's sort that thing out first. Then we'll take up to the national level.

Uh, regarding Admiral Monte Khanna's this thing, there would be a requirement to integrate the effects of these long-range strikes because these platforms are there. There are some issues, you know, whether uh such kind of weapons which are released from specific platforms which are there in the sea or in the air, whose ownership is that? We are trying to resolve these issues. I think ops branch of headquarters IDS is looking at it. And we'll have some kind of a structures in future for this particular capability.

As far as NDU is concerned, sir, I'd like to answer this question uh over our social gathering. >> [laughter] >> Okay. Yeah, so that's it. That's it. I think one final thought from you on this. You just spoke about the rocket force, not exactly rocket force, but combining all the long-range vectors in some kind of a form. The Pakistanis have announced a rocket force, but I think the thought process in Indian military began for a rocket force much earlier, isn't it? That's one clarification I wanted. If I remember correctly, 3-4 years ago it was talked about, or how was it?

No. So, we have uh following a particular doctrine that we don't want to create this confusion. All our ballistic missiles are with strategic warheads. They were not designed for, you know, conventional warheads, and that thing, if I can say, stands still today. But we have at similar ranges, cruise, hypersonics, yes. Uh, that we may develop with conventional warheads. We used this capability during operations in the war. Yes. When will we change this? It's a moot question. Surely.

Okay, on that note, I must thank General Anil Chawan. I think he deserves a round of applause, a big round of applause. >> [applause] >> Thank you very much for being a very involved audience. I hope we had a good discussion. So, thank you, General. Thank you very much for your time and your answers.