Transcription
You want to get paid to take on the risk. You don't want to pay to take on the risk. And that's what investors are doing right now. You want to get paid to take on equity risk.
Today, the stock market drives the economy, not the other way around. Uh by virtue of the stock market, because it's no longer the housing market. Home prices have stopped going up. It's all about the equity market. And I don't think that people know to the second what their house price is worth, but everybody knows what their equity portfolio is doing.
93% of the growth in the economy last year came from productivity. That's really unusual. That, by the way, is very disinflationary.
You're watching Excess Returns, the channel that makes complex investing ideas simple enough to actually use where better questions lead to better decisions. My guest today, a long time coming founder and president of Rosenberg Research himself, David Rosenberg. Welcome to Access Returns.
>> Thanks very much, Matt. It's uh great to be on.
>> I'm super excited you're here in part because I've felt like for years now that I've got a slightly different understanding of you than I see people often stand you up as. And I was at I was at Merryill as an adviser, as an allocator during the global financial crisis. And something that I watched was you precrisis through the crisis and then post crisis change your stripes. And sometimes you get pegged into this hole of like, "Oh, that guy's always bearish or that guy's always this or that guy's always that." I'm like, "No, no, no, no. You got to pay closer attention to what David's saying when he talks about it." So, I mean, start me off here. This framing of you as sort of like a cycle watcher and a cycle navigator is how I think of you. How would you put that?
Well, I I think that's uh I think that's very kind because uh really what somebody in my role should be doing is uh telling people when it is that you differ from the consensus and why and what the trade is uh on that. Um identifying, you know, where exactly we are on the in the business cycle uh and the market cycle. Are we early, mid or late? And um I had the benefit of starting my career on October 19th, 1987. Uh so maybe when people think that I'm Eeyore the donkey, you know, you you your first day as a street economist, uh the market collapses 23%. And uh you carry this dark cloud wherever you go. I think a lot of what you talked about, you know, the reputation of being uh the the perma bear, you know, it's a label and uh it's actually one that's that helped my career uh notwithstanding how how weird that might sound. Uh cuz to some people there's a sliver of the population uh that's not small that sort of understands that really what it is is somebody who is going to help you stay out of trouble and identify tail risk. Uh and uh there's not many strategists or economists uh that actually do that. Um so, you know, that's my stock and trade. I I don't think that I really am a perma bear. Well, when I get called that, uh I sort of uh I don't even shrug my shoulders. I just I just smile. Uh because Ira Gluskin who in Canada you know was just a iconic uh institutional investor who co-ran Gluskin Chef with Jerry Chef uh but Ira was the CIO and Ira was the one that hired me in 2009 and I was there for 11 years. So Ira ran a long only value fund and um I don't think that he would have hired a perma bear uh and even though I had that reputation but it's just like what you says cuz you followed me uh Gluskin chef just had a voracious appetite for my research um when I was at Maryland Canada and Maril Lynch in the United States. I mean they were Maryland Canada's um most profitable center. They they they they would do mega trades uh through the Merill desk and uh that's ultimately how they paid for my research. So um and they happen to be very thoughtful people. So you know uh I think that I don't want to really belittle anybody or preach. Um but I have found after being in this business for 40 years that uh sometimes uh the market for rational thought uh ends up being a very tidy part of the market for day traders and people that just want to embark on get rich quick themes and so I don't fall into that category. Uh so I get labeled the perma bear. Okay, I can deal with it.
Do you think do you see do you see more when you're looking at things the left tail risk versus the right tail risk? Do you think in terms of alltail risk or do do you think you're just hyper aware of the left tail risk because of that day one at the job was in the crash of 87?
>> Well, it's you know there's it's really more what what's the fat tail? What's the thin tail? But it's more like this. You know, I started my career as uh the financial economist at the Bank of Nova Scotia. First day, October 19th, 1987. Uh then I went to become the number two economist at the Bank of Montreal, Beimo Espurns in 1994. Uh then I went to Merryill late 99 and uh was there a total of 10 years. And then in 2009 I got to Glleskinchef. So up until Gluskinchef I was just a uh bigname sellside economist at the large multinational banks. Now um the data points I picked up over those decades was that the Wall Street or Bay Street economist and strategist is really nothing more than a marketing tool for the institutions they work for. They really don't have a lot of influence. And think of what happened at Meil Lynch as an example when I was calling and I was early on the call. Some people would say crazy early and they wouldn't be wrong. Uh and um Mirror Lynch ultimately collapsed and had to be bought out by Bank America. But one of the epiphies along the way was in the summer of 2007 before it became evident that things were falling apart. Uh, and I was instructed by my superior uh to no longer use the words housing bubble in my reports. I was advised not to do that anymore. I was making people internally upset and angry. Uh, difficult to get deals done, difficult to get trading revenues in, and it was unpopular. Well, so I just changed the words. I said, uh, housing mania is at a housing bubble. So, maybe I was being a bit too cute. But then I got a call from my superior when I was marketing in Dallas. And I was asked the question, who is it you think you work for? And I said, uh, Mirror Lynch clients. And the rebuttal was, no, you work for Mirror Lynch. And then I realized, wow. And that stuck with me to this day.
So, um, I get to, uh, I get to Glleskin Chef in 2009, and, you know, I had a lot of the big banks on Bay Street because I was in New York. I had a young family. Uh, I was gone for seven years and commuting on the weekends. It just wasn't enough. And, uh, I was losing track of having balance uh, in my life. And I was also thinking at that point starting my own business um, which was always my dream. And then just out of the blue, Gluskin chef gives me an offer to be their chief economist and strategist. And then I thought maybe as I'm turning 50 at that point, you can teach this old dog new tricks because it's the one thing I didn't have. I had B Street, Wall Street, I had commercial bank, a vessel bank, but did not have buyside experience. And I took that opportunity because I realized that it was going to make me a better economist and a better strategist and that I'll put my dream on hold because this will actually make things a lot better for my clients what I do. I'm going to learn a lot more. And boy did I ever. I learned more at Glleskin chef in 11 years than I did in the previous like 25 combined. Uh, and I'm going to get to the comment about the tail risks because what happened was that in my first presentation to the investment team at Gluskin Chef and it was after I've been there a month and I was formulating my view and putting together my chart deck and I'm meeting with the uh investment team and the very swanky uh uh boardroom that they had uh at Glustin Chef uh mahogany table. Everything was mahogany or oak and they had group of seven paintings everywhere. I think they were Jerry's. It was really it was really a special place. And uh the presentation ends and then Ira leads the Q&A and he says uh so Rosenberg and that's all he ever called me. Never call me Dave. Never call me Rosie. Rosenberg what's your plan B? I said uh plan B? He says, "Well, uh, yeah." He says, "Rosenberg, what if you're wrong? What do we do? Where are you going to be wrong if you're wrong? And what do we do about it?" And I, it was frozen, which happens very rarely to me. And he says, "You don't have a plan B. You don't have a plan." So, I requested that I come back a month later with something um, a little more elaborate. And uh I realized right then and there how the brain of a wealth manager, portfolio manager, institutional investor. I used to think that I had to figure it out because of course they say leave your ego at the door, your chief economist to me Lynch, but then you think I'm Sandy Kofax on the LA Dodgers and u but you think you have to figure it out, but you don't. And and I realized and this is after 11 years of sitting down with the portfolio managers and with the CIO. I I learned how to create and communicate uh a set of forecasts that is actually valuable for somebody who is putting money on the line and it is all about probabilities. Um there you have to have a base case. You have to have a base case. So, you have to have your plan A. But I realized it's not just plan B, you got to have plan C, D, or E. And I realized that just from what Ira said to me, constructive criticism is a wonderful thing. And then thinking about it and then learning from the people who you are supposed to cater to. Uh, and it was empowering cuz I realized their brain of an institutional investor or a wealth manager is just one giant probability curve, just one giant distribution curve. What does that curve look like? What's its shape? How is it moving? And and as you said, what is the left tail versus the right tail? What is across the whole continuum? What is the risk of being right or wrong benchmarked against the reward? So I used to therefore go into meetings and I could say, you know, it could be on anything. Let's say it's the S&P 500. That's all anybody wants to look at, but it could be anything. And I'd say, look, I want everybody to know that my conviction level in this particular forecast, I was at 85%, now it's 65, but it's still my base case. And by the way, what I said last week, well, scenario B is now E, D is C, and and the analysts and the PMS would be writing down furiously. And I never once changed my base case forecast. I just changed my conviction and I flipped around what I think are the most likely scenarios that the base case is wrong and I could see what I was doing was changing the shape of the distribution curve of outcomes for them. And so, you know, when I was there at Gluskin Chef, I got all the Wall Street and Bay Street research. I saw my former competitors. So I got to see all their research and I realized at their back page of their weekly say they have all their forecasts, all their forecasts, whether it's GDP, the 10ear no yield, the oil price, S&P of 100, you name it, the DXY, but they never tell you what their conviction level is. Is it weak or strong conviction? That's important. And of course, there's not enough room in the publication to put all your scenarios, but I know that nobody on in the jobs that I had in the past ever really did that. Um, so that was a great learning lesson. Uh, beyond the fact that, you know, and why I started my business was I realized I had a real void to fill in the marketplace. Uh, beyond just the scenario building and understanding the importance of what the brain of a portfolio manager looks like and my clients are are all investors you know they're not they're not academics uh and um that was particularly useful but I also found that the vast majority I mean everybody on Wall Street and Bay Street at these big banks they cling to the consensus and I realized because of the politics and desire for career longevity uh that they were all a commodity. They all sounded alike. So I thought at some point I mean I started my business in 2020. Um but I realized there was a a niche uh that needed to have somebody out there talk about tail risks, talk about risks in general uh and about opportunities. It's not always uh dark clouds. And so um you know that was that's basically the the evolution of my thought that really despite all the accolades and all the awards I got from the II vote and the Brendan Woods vote that I it wasn't until I reached the age of 50 at Glusken Chef that I really began to figure it out.
>> Better late than never. You know, you you and Walter White, the age of 50, does magical things. I wanted that as preamble. So, thank you so much for walking us through this because that probabilistic way of thinking and the way you approach it where it clusters around consensus and then you have to think about the tales is the way that I would hope that's the way I've always encountered your research and this is the way I would hope other people would encounter it too. So, I'm now bringing us all the way to 2026. And let's flush out some details because in your outlook for the year ahead, you called it the sixth mega bubble. It's hard to say. The sixth mega bubble of the last hundred years. Now, people hear bubble. They're going to autotune that out of their mind or are they going to frame it up in a different way? What are you seeing in the outlook? Unpack the probability distribution and why you're using the words you are.
Well, you know, the the bubble is not in the technology, okay? Generative AI is is not in a bubble. The the internet was not in a bubble. Uh, you know, um electricity and the railways, the printing press, the the the shift in the technology curve, and this is a very significant one. That's not where the bubble is. The bubble is in investor behavior. So, it comes down to this. Um, what is the price you're going to pay for probably what you're going to get? Uh, what's your Xanti expected return on the money you're putting in uh for the payback? That nobody really knows fully what the total addressable market the the tum is going to be. But when I was taking a look just at multiples whether it's median or average price to earnings price to sales price to book uh people have problems with all these different measures. So you look at all of them. Uh my favorite one is um is the sickly adjusted price earnings multiple the tape uh that was pioneered by Robert Schiller and it goes back more than 100 years and um it smooths out the business cycle and that's what I like about it. Uh and you should do that because although everybody's become a day trader, the equity market at least theoretically is a long duration animal. And um, you know uh at the time that we wrote that report, the cape was uh was 40. And um that equates to call it a 2 1/2% real yield at a time when the real yield on a long bond uh was 2.5%. So the equity risk premium was zero. So there's two things that I call a bubble. I call a bubble say in the stock market when investors are pricing the stock market as if it's a riskless asset. Uh I consider that to be a bubble. Uh and when the multiple u exceeds a two standard deviation event and we got up more like between three and four uh before the war. Uh well that classifies as a bubble. Um and it doesn't mean the bubbles can't last. You could have this period of hitting the 2 SD event and you could be there for another year or two before things roll the other way. Because these sorts of multiples are not sustainable. It's the sort of uh standard deviations we had in 1929 and sort of standard deviation we had uh in 1999. Uh it even exceeded what we had going into 2008. Um so the uh the technology is real. Uh the extent to which it wres havoc on the labor market, I think we're seeing early signs of that. Uh over 90% of the growth in the economy last year was productivity. Usually in a normal economy, economic growth is split evenly between capital and labor. This time around it's all capital. It's all productivity. Um uh so there's a lot of strange things happening that I don't believe are sustainable. And I guess because I lean on my mentor and hero Bob Ferrell and one of his 10 marker rules is that uh there there are no such things as new eras and excesses are not permanent. And that applies to valuation uh in the stock market. So when I talk about uh that there's a bubble, it's really about uh uh where the pricing is uh against the reality and then where that is trading against historical norms, which is why I'm always taking a look at what is the uh what's the sigma of this particular event. So it's got elements of uh the internet. Uh there's differences, but the valuations are not quite as crazy, but um it actually is the second most egregiously priced stock market in the United States um in recorded history. Uh and people always say, well, valuations are a timing tool. And they're right. It's not a timing tool. Um nobody gets market timing that effectively. Uh some people do, but it's like once in a lifetime. It's like hitting a hole in one. Maybe some people do it two or three times, but timing the market not advisable for most of us, for most of us mortals. Uh and uh the multiple though is the starting point for telling you what your expected returns are going forward. Now this is going to sound very bearish but you know when you get to these standard deviations in the cape multiple and you look over the next 1 3 5 10 years your total return in nominal terms is zero to negative like it's just not a uh an attractive proposition for me. Uh and how can it be uh how does it make sense to anybody and what else would you call it than a bubble when the earnings yield the real earnings yield is equivalent to the real interest rate and the risk-free rate. Um so this the market's telling you if you believe it you believe that equities have become a completely safe safe asset class. Uh treasury bills don't yield a lot but they're perfectly safe. Uh so uh that's a bit of a problem I have. Of course I'm using the 30-year bond as uh because duration for duration uh the real yield is like 2.6 2.7 and it's like 2.6 2.7 right now in a stock market when appropriately valued. Don't you want to get paid to take on equity risk normally? Uh and I think uh Harry Marowitz would agree with me. He won Nobel um prize on his work on the on the market. You want to get paid to take on the risk. You don't want to pay to take on the risk. And that's what investors are doing right now. You want to get paid to take on equity risk. And so that's where this sort of a you know bubble might be a strong word. So you know what I'll I'll say I'll call it a mania. How's that?
>> From one former mural person to another, we can call it a mania.
>> I'll I'll slip back into the mania aspect of it.
>> We'll slip back into that for a second. What I think is most fascinating about the framing is especially with the cape that tells you sort of the market story, the way it's being valued, the flight into capital, the reduction of labor, and that ties into this economic theme you're also writing about of the silent contraction. Can you unpack what that means?
>> Well, you know, I think that um you know, people like to just talk about headlines and they look at headline GDP growth and they think everything is fine or they look at the headline unemployment rate and they think everything is fine. But, you know, when the data come out from the BLS or the Commerce Department, uh these these are full reports. Uh they're not just a headline. And I don't quite understand why people treat economics differently than I mean, if you if you own Microsoft stock, would you really like it if the analyst uh writes a report with one line telling you what the what the headline or dig beneath the veneer to find out what's going on under the hood.
>> Surely don't people want well it's basically the question is beyond the headline of anything. Now I'm not a securities analyst but this is the way if I was I'd approach it because this is how I approach my own work. What is the quality? What is the quality of this number? And I don't care if it's 2% or 5%. So we are seeing you know very strange things happen in the US economy. Um like for example uh there's no doubt that the AI boom and its direct and indirect effects are pretty well accounting for all the growth of the economy. Uh just directly when you look at business capital spending you'll see that in the past year and this is in real terms adjusted for inflation that AI related capex is up 15%. But what about old economy capex? The old economy industrials negative one. So when we talk about a K-shaped economy, it's not just about the low end and high-end consumer. Uh there's K's everywhere. A huge split. When we talk about the consumer, how about try on this size? Try this off for size. What if I told you that consumer spending in real terms in the past year is up 2 and a.5%. Do you think that's a pretty good number? What would you say? Not bad? Pretty good?
>> I'd love to say not bad or pretty good.
>> Okay.
>> What if I told you that real consumer spending was up 1% year-over-year?
>> That sounds like less than half of my pretty good scenario.
>> Okay. But you see, because we're all narcissists and we judge the success of the economy based on spending, but we don't judge it based on income. What if I told you that real disposable income is only up 1%. You're seeing the cracks of uh called the stubborn inflation, if you will. Nominal wage growth is coming down. And over the past year, employment growth is barely up. And in fact, it's down 400,000 when you strip out health and education workers, which is where the employment boom is. But 83% of the US economy, 83% of the US law labor market has lost jobs on net in the past year. Now, there's another key right there. You've got a boom in health and education. That 70% 17% of the labor pie 83% is actually negative. Uh, so the K is just this wide divergence, the wide divide. But the wide divide I was talking about before is 2.5% consumer spending growth benchmarked against 1% real after tax income growth. That's a huge difference, you know, in a $30 trillion economy. So what I'm saying is that how you explain that is by this arcane uh but I would argue the most powerful and important behavioral aggregate in the national accounts called the personal savings rate. Now when you talk to a person on the trading desk uh about the savings rate their eyes just sort of glaze over. Um but this movement is very powerful because uh just think about the fact that um if it wasn't for the savary going down it would mean that people were spending within their means and consumption growth which is 70% of the economy would only be growing at 1%. Now I don't think most people say 1% 1% is called stall speed. You get to 1% consumer spending people will start asking is are we going to recession but it's 2 and a half. Why? Well, because this time last year, the savings rate was over 5%. Um, you go back two years ago, it was 6%. And today, it's down to four. I mean, the long run mean going back decades is like 8%. It's half that level. So, it means that people feel confident to spend more and more and more of their after tax income on fun and games and goods and services. Uh, this also is not normal. Um, but it's because of the equity wealth effects. People look at the 401ks, they listen to President Trump, and uh, of course a lot of this is geared towards the the high end. So you've had this very powerful stock market rally got interrupted temporarily by the war and that wealth effect on spending is caused the savings rate to go down. And so there's your other indirect impact of the AI boom because a lot of this because it's you people when people were even talking about the the market broadening out uh you know through a good part of last year into this year well and the tentacles are spreading uh like all the deals that the banks are doing AI related utilities uh AI related you know even before the war all the energy intensity in AI energy Um and so the uh and industrials right um you know same thing um all related to AI and this boom in the construction of AI data centers it's had a multiplier impact and you had this stock market boom in the past several years has had a dramatic economic impact you know I talked about when I started in the business in 1987 you know back in those days it was a different market, right? Back in those days, uh the uh you know the you know the the people who are in the stock market um would ask me for uh my my uh GDP view um you know the the the equity strategist would ask me for my GDP view uh and use that as an input to call the stock market. But now the causation runs the opposite direction. Today the stock market drives the economy, not the other way around. Uh by virtue of the stock market, because it's no longer the housing market, home prices have stopped going up. It's all about the equity market. And I don't think that people know to the second what their house price is worth, but everybody knows what their equity portfolio is doing. And they're checking it like 10 times a day on their phone. Uh, and when you feel richer, you spend more of your income. And that's actually sentiment driven. Uh, you know, it's interesting that, you know, GDP doesn't move like the stock market. And the stock market's driven by sentiment. Um, but the savings rate is all about sentiment. I feel richer. I'm going to spend more of my after tax income. And that process alone um has added well over a percentage point per year to consumer spending growth in real terms. That's big when you consider the consumer is like 20 trillion of the economy. Uh so that's something else to consider. We we're just watching uh history in the making. Historians will be writing about the period we're in right now. So what I'm saying is that beneath the veneer um there are a lot of very funky things going on behind the scenes in say these GDP numbers. They're not really what they seem to be. You know the other part of this of course is what about the fiscal side? What about the f how sustainable is that? Do you know we've run in the United States six consecutive years of the deficit to GDP ratio being over 5%. That's insane where we've been running deficits. I mean, the last recession lasted a few months and it was the COVID recession in the uh winter and spring of 2020. We're running deficits right now that we used to run to fight recessions, but there's not been a recession in 5 years. Um, and but maybe you'd be right to argue, well, this has mitigated a recession having all this fiscal laress, but at what point does that morph into a debt crisis? Um, so it's all very interesting to me that we've got all these things like like like you know I you're we just got the the bank started reporting this week and you could see the bank earnings outside of Wells Fargo were very good but really it was you know trading revenues up 17% trading revenues which just doesn't reflect anything in the economy. It's reflects volatility in the markets. Um, but it's a real low multiple part of the banking business. But that's what drove the earnings just over this past week and the limited sample size that we have. So I I mean I look at the data the same way. Um, is it a lowquality GDP? Is it a high quality? Um, but it's being skewed by things that might not have that long of a shelf life. Like we know that for this year, the capex budget for AI, I mean, it's gone from 400 billion last year to 700 billion. Um, but what's it going to be in 2027? Like, at some point, we're going to we're going to be choking on too many data centers. And that's been a huge part of that growth. Will the stock market will the multiple continue to will it go from a a three standard deviation event to four or five? Like will it get that crazy and generate more and more of a wealth effect on spending? I mean these are assumptions that you have to make. And what about it? What about employment? What's going to cause that to turn around? I mean that's the interesting thing is that heading into the Iran war, employment growth was zero and it was negative for 83% of the labor market. As I said before, this is before the war. And yet I'm told that with no employment growth, real income growth at 1% uh for the working class, that this is some sort of discreet economy we have in our hands. And of course, when you hear people at the Fed like uh Jay Powell only talks about how solid the economy is, um I think it's I I think it's on shakier ground than people think. And then what happens in November if the Democrats sweep, which looks like they probably will, and then all of a sudden five years and does anybody do the analysis on on where would the economy be? Where would the economy be? Where would the markets be if the government and this these are Republicans were not running up 5% plus deficit GDP ratios? Where would things be? But there's going to be a classic Bob Ferrell mean reversion trade I think after the November elections because what is what are things going to look like when we enter into a prolonged period of fiscal gridlock and then in 2028? What are things look like if we actually have the Democrats taking the White House and both chambers and you're seeing what the governors are doing right now with millionaire taxes and and maybe, you know, maybe that's the right thing to do. I don't know. Um, somehow we have to mean revert things. Uh, and maybe it, you know, we want to red address the K-shaped economy. I think no taxes on tips just maybe moves the ball maybe a couple of inches. Uh, so some big things are going to be happening. Um, you know, Donald Trump was great for the stock market and the risk on trade and crypto. Um, but you know, the United States, the there's the business cycle, there's the market cycle, they move in sine waves, but there's the political cycle. And uh the reason why we have mean reversion is to reestablish balance but it does mean it's going to come probably at the expense of spending at the high end. Think about spending at the high end as uh underpin the economy all the capex like basically like I said before I hear about a capex boom but hello no old economy industrial capex is actually in a recession. So, it's a very narrowly based economic expansion that we're in right now. And when you take these pillars away, uh I don't think there's going to be anything there to provide the cushion. It's just very difficult at the time. But just know that it's out there.
So, let's further gaslight some fellow narcissists then with this. The the outlook then for 2027 between valuations between the procarity of income between the labor situation between the the midterms coming up at the end of this year. I mean we have the the biggest small government ever operating right now and that's going to go through a wild change here likely in November. What do you think 2027 holds? You've been talking about you take away a couple of these uh pillars or crutches I believe you referred to them as. There's your recession. And again, not predicting this, but explain the nuance here of how we get to that outcome.
>> Well, it's like what what happens, you know, when you take the training wheels off your kids' bike, uh they'll learn to ride the bike, but they're going to fall down, you know, at least initially. So, the economy's got a lot of training wheels. Uh I think that um you know probably I would I would I my assumption is that we're heading into the peak of the of the AI spend in terms of incremental impact on the economy but we don't know in the future is how much excess excess capacity there's going to be uh because that always happens that happened with the railroads that happened with the canals that happened with the uh internet you um you build out too much that's just human nature so maybe when I said when I said that there's bubble in actual AI usually get the over over construction based on inflated um estimates of the of the of the TAM like I said before. Um so peak AI spend peak fiscal policy uh and the question is going to come what sort of a fiscal policy are we going to be seeing? Will the November midterms have investors thinking what's in store for 2028 and what that means for tax rates, what that means for corporate tax rates and what that means for tax rates at the high end of the income spectrum. I expect all these or all these things are going to change. Um now will it generate a recession? Hard to say, but you know, I think that you've got for 2026 something like 19% earnings growth baked in by the analysts and something not far off that for 2027. I don't know how how long and nominal GDP probably will do no better than four or 5%. So the assumptions of course is that profit margins which are already at record highs go to new record highs. So I don't know so much about the recession call right now for 2027 but as I said at at the outset what I look at is what's priced in and what do I think is going to happen. Like if we're talking about where how does that probability probability curve look like um I think there's a higher chance of recession than there is a renewed economic boom. So, we know what the curve looks like, but it's not harsh for me to make an assertion that uh we're not going to see that sort of deviation of profit growth and ultimately investors pay for profit growth. I don't think we're going to go through another sharp deviation like that where profit growth is going to outstrip normal GDP growth by a factor of four. I put very low odds on that. That's a high conviction call. So, for me to have a more cautious call on the risk on trade, I don't really need a recession. I just have to have things not go as rosy posy as it's being discounted right now. But um I'm not factoring in the possibility of of any shocks, just factoring in the I think elevated probability that things don't play out as positively. And and really what I'm expecting to see in the domino game is a lot of the props uh fiscal policy which has been tremendously supportive for the risk on trade. I I firmly believe that's going to change and the question is if that changes enough to undercut the stock market the savings rate's not at 4% anymore. What if it goes back to 6% where it was two years ago? Well, the the math on that is pretty daunting. Unless we get some sort of miraculous turnaround in the labor market. You're talking about taking off probably a point and a half from GDP growth right there. And the run rate on GDP growth right now was basically uh in and around 2%. So you're getting pretty close to zero on growth, which you say, well, that's not a recession. Um, but it's the next rung up in the ladder, and there's no way you're going to get that sort of pace of economic activity and get the earnings that are embedded in the stock market right now. So, I don't have to go and yell out recession, recession, recession. You know, I did that back in 2022 and I was dead wrong. But I had underestimated the extent to which everybody was going to spend the $2 trillion of those pandemic stimulus checks. That that blew me away. Every penny got got spent and that offset what the Fed did on interest rates and that's why the yield curve inversion didn't work. It's because we had fiscal policy on steroids. But that doesn't exist. That will not be existing. Um, I don't believe the next couple years. And that's the business that I'm in. You know, you ask me at the beginning, you know, really what it is. What is it? Um, well, it is a lot of guesswork. I like to say educational guesswork, but you know, it's funny that you'll say, well, I bring 10 economists into a room and I'll be lucky to get 10 different answers, you know. Well, it's because um we all have the same data. We all look at the same reports, but um the assumptions differ. Uh that's why you have various forecasts. Is uh your assumptions drive your conclusions. So those are my assumptions behind not necessarily a recession call uh for next year uh but for a a disappointing year benchmarked against priced in if the market was priced for a recession I would say hey you know I think we're going to have a very weak economy but we're not going to have a recession so you know start adding some risk. Um but it's basically comes down to what I said before. What is the value of the economist or the strategist is to identify uh what is priced in? What's your view? How big is that gap? And what do we do about it? But it works with both directions, good and bad, better or worse.
So, back in financial crisis era, we had the peak oil thing and we had all this stuff about inflation and if it was going to be sticky or not or how it was going to pull through and blah blah blah blah blah. And right now we have this giant oil spike again and you again are kind of pushing back on some of those sustained inflation calls or forecasts. Unpack what that is. Tie that into how you're thinking of inflation right here right now. We we we just won't call it transitory.
>> Well, you see the reason why it wasn't transitory was not transitory back in 2021, 2022, 2023. Now, it depends how you want to define transitory. I mean, that inflation runup was 18 months, but you know what? It wasn't like 3 months like the Fed thought. It wasn't the 1970s. A lot of people were talking about that. So, they weren't right either. Uh, but it was 18 months probably not transitory. Uh, and going from 0 to 9%. Really big move. But you see what happened then was we had the supply shock. Uh, we had global supply chains impaired because of COVID. Um, and that was the initial inflation shock. But then, you know, we got the vaccine and uh the supply chain started coming back basically everywhere outside of China for a while. But in their infinite non-wisdom, the government handed out stimulus checks of size, like $2 trillion. I mean, think about that. It's like, you know, 7% of the economy. Um, stimulus checks and also extended uh unemployment insurance beefed up payments and you can stay out of work for years and um that led to a total dislocation in the labor market. So you had all this demand from the fiscal side bumping against what happened on the supply side, but the supply side just as it was started to ease, we had the demand boost. But the big deal, we talk about of course giving free money to people and I didn't think they were going to spend um all of it, especially after, you know, basically um the you know something like half of the American public didn't have enough savings on hand to get through 3 months of idle employment, you know, coming into the um coming into uh the uh the co situation. So, I thought it was natural cuz, you know, economics is a lot about behavior. It's a behavioral science. Um, you know, what uh what were people going to do? I thought they were going to save at least half of it. And they ended up spending all of it. But the really big kicker here was that the price shock back in 2021, 2022, and 2023 happened because the government was paying people not to work. So companies couldn't get attract for them to attract their labor back in and the demand was coming back and the supply chains were starting to ease. Well, because the government was paying you to lie on the couch, they had to pony up and pay more. So what happened is that that inflation shock fed into wages and we had not a 1970s decade long, but we had an 18-month period of a wage price spiral. So that was what undercut the Fed that they didn't see. And you could argue that I didn't see um that when fees in the wages, it's a big problem, big problem because it becomes self-reinforcing. This time around, why I think it's different is we have a much different labor market. Uh, you can see in the job openings numbers in particular the Indeed job posting numbers you can see that the hiring numbers from the Jolt survey labor demand is declining. The reason why employment hasn't been even weaker is that companies aren't firing people either. It's just total inertia and they don't have to fire people because they're getting a lot of productivity out of their existing workforce. I mean, like I said before, 93% of the growth in the economy last year came from productivity. That's really unusual. That, by the way, is very disinflationary, you know, and when you hear Scott Bessant or you hear, it's the one thing I do agree with them on. Uh, Steve Steven, I I you know, one of the few things I agree with them on is that um it it it makes no sense to be talking about a productivity economy, which is what this is. I mean, 93% of the economy is productivity growth. How is that inflationary? Because it suppresses, you know, labor costs, which is the mother's milk for real inflation. Uh so right now, uh we don't have wage inflation. We have commodity inflation. We had inflation um because of energy, it'll feed into food. It'll be with us. The inflation readings next few months will be pretty ugly. We had the tariffs. Uh interestingly enough, that J. Powell at the pan panel he was at, I think it was the Harvard panel a few weeks ago said that, you know inflation um outside of the tariffs is between a half and a full point. Uh, it's been skewed to have half to a full point by the tariffs. Erggo inflation is just for the tariffs which are not going to go on forever. In fact, the effect is peeking out. Not that the tariffs are going away, but the incremental impact um because inflation is a rate of change. It's not a level. That's going to come out. Uh so if you're saying, well, the tariffs added half to full point, that's something right there that inflation is actually a target. I don't understand why the Fed is as hawkish as it is. They're like the deer in the headlights, but I think it's a case of, you know,
You know, fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. So, they they're never going to use the word transitory again. Um, but I'll use it, um, because that, that's what this is, because this will not get transmitted in the labor market. The labor market is cracking. Non-implying is cracking. Um, you're seeing it in the hiring rate. You're seeing it in the, uh, job opening rate, and you're seeing it in the quit rate. And if you remember the quit rate, the voluntary quit rate, uh, which I always called, you know, the, uh, "take this job and shove it" index. People were, people were job hopping because companies couldn't find labor, and, and the workers had all the bargaining power. Workers had all the bargaining power, and we had a wage cycle. The quits rate has come way down, like it's a completely different labor market today.
So then, I think everybody on the call has got to think about, well, what happens with this price shock coming out of the war if it doesn't feed into the labor market, because the labor market is weakening. And don't look at the 4.3% U3 unemployment rate. It's not going to help you out. Uh, nominal wages are slowing down. You've got to look at the price. Don't look at the unemployment rate. And by the way, the U6, the broader measure, is infinitely higher. It's telling you that slack is building up in the labor market. What does that mean? It means this price shock is going to hit the wall in the labor market. And what we'll end up with, at least for a while, depending on what happens now, and if the war is going to end, what is this, you know, this, what ceasefire turns into a deal? What does a deal look like? Of course, the markets are laying down their bets right now, but there, there's still enough unknowns. But this price shock hits the wall in the labor market means that real wages and then real consumer spending are going to contract. Now, that, that won't necessarily entice me to call for a recession because I don't know how long that's going to last. But you've got a couple of quarters of a situation like that, and you will get a recession. Um, but I don't believe that this inflation will be sustained because of the shape of the labor market right now. Um, it can only be sustained if it feeds into the wages, which is why we had that inflationary episode last 10 years in the 1970s. But the team stores were in control. Most of the economy was unionized, and everybody had COLA clauses. So you had built-in inflation back then. You had built-in inflation in the US economy through the 1970s. That doesn't exist today. So, no, I don't have a big inflation story for you. I have a, a disinflation story for you. Um, I think what people tend to forget, just arithmetically, is that, you know, a third of the CPI and 40% of the core is shelter. It's, it's rents and owners' equivalent rent. And, and now, after years of seeing negative rental data, and it feeds into the CPI with a lag, we're starting to see a shift right there in the data that's going to cause, I think people will be very, very surprised at how low inflation is by the end of the year. But everybody's got inflation on the brain. Uh, and of course, the Fed's talking very hawkishly, but that's only because, um, they, they, they fear they're going to make the same mistake they made in, in 2021. That's just human nature. Uh, but I think inflation is going to be a lot lower. Uh, the big risk when you're talking about the inflation call is that the Fed lags too long behind the inflation decline and causes real interest rates to go up. And that's something I'm watching very closely.
Got two more questions for you. The first is for equity investors or allocators with the equity sleeve. Take risk down. Be extra conscious of it. Are there certain places that you would just say wholesale avoid, or places that you see as opportunistic? How should investors and allocators just be looking at the market midway through 26?
Well, you know, at Rosenberg Research, for the past 3 plus years, I've been running a model portfolio. Uh, it's a unit holder of one. I seeded it with my own capital. It's on our website. Uh, we just did a, a modest shift just the other day. Uh, but it's a, it's a, it's a do, if you want to call it a fund or call it a, a model. A lot of my clients, I have 2,300 clients in 40 countries, and a lot of them are actually mimicking, uh, this, uh, this portfolio. It's up more than 60% since the beginning of 2023. So it's matched the S&P 500, uh, with a beta of point four. It's 40% of the volatility, and that's because, uh, it's an ideas basis. Our top conviction. When I talked before about, um, if you don't have a plan B, you don't have a plan. But this is, this is basically all plan A. This is all our top conviction calls. Uh, I would say that I'll just talk about how that's constructed right now. I mean, it's basically, you know, it's got like a 1.4, 1.5 sharp ratio. It's got a point four beta. So the risk is dialed pretty low. Uh, it is probably, I'd say 40% equities, 50% fixed income, and 10% other. And other being exposure to rare earths, uh, you know, uranium, uh, we have clean energy and energy infrastructure. So, like, it is a very esoteric, it's a very esoteric portfolio that really is not making a directional bet on the economy or on the markets. And that's what you want to do. You want to be non-correlated and you want to be diversified, and diversified globally. Uh, uh, coming out of this mess, uh, you know, I think that China is got, China has emerged as a winner, just not by doing anything. Uh, and I think the US has been weakened. Uh, I mean, here you got, I mean, Trump's going cap in hand for like 1.5 trillion to to to refund, uh, the Pentagon. Uh, we'll see if that gets done. But, uh, China's fiscal situation, nothing. I mean, you could argue that they, if the war was prolonged and there were oil needs from from Iran, sure that, um, they're way ahead of everybody in the game when it comes to clean energy of all sources. Uh, and they had stockpiled a lot of oil to begin with. But I just find, for whatever reason, and I'm not big raw China, China, China, but it seems like Xi is always a step ahead of everybody else. Um, we don't own China directly, but we own the X Japan, uh, Asia MSCI index, and China is the biggest component there. So, we, we like Asian equities. I'm not, I like the equity market. We just don't have a lot of exposure, uh, to the US. Probably 15% of our equity exposure is in the US. Um, but, you know, we have, as I said before, energy infrastructure, pipelines, rare earths, uranium, um, we have global defense, global healthcare. Uh, it's basically, um, a portfolio that mirrors my client base, which is global, and diversified. So we have commodities, uh, we have, uh, uh, we have fixed income, and we have, uh, and we have equities. Uh, we're still basically with a higher, and we're not constrained. Okay. So, but we have a higher fixed income. Uh, we don't own the long bond. Uh, we do think there's going to be this elongated elevated fiscal risk premium at the long end of the curve. Um, but we have some 10-year notes, but mostly, like when I look at our Canada, US, 35% of the portfolio is in two-year notes in both countries because we don't, and all the central banks have to do is is not increase interest rates. Uh, and when I look at the math as to what's probably going to happen, because I think the Fed will be cutting, uh, later this year and in the next year, uh, that probably is going to generate a 6, 7% total return. And a year ago, people would have said 6, 7%? Is that it? And so I think today, um, so, uh, it's better than cash. Uh, if rates really come down, then you would have been much better in the 10 year. We still have money in the 10 year, but we just like a high conviction call. So, uh, I regened here, scenario A, high conviction, uh, that the central banks will be cutting rates. We also have, we think there's too much tightening priced in to the Australian curve. So, we own short-term bonds in Australia, and we like the currency. We'll take on the currency risk. So, um, that's really how it's constructed right now. I would not get, uh, too carried away with this frenzy, frenzy crackhead momentum that we're seeing right now based on headlines and sentiment. Uh, that's not how I invest. Uh, and, uh, I'm not a FOMO investor, really. Just invest around our top conviction calls. I'd say half our portfolio is tactical, like making the bet against central banks raising rates in Canada, United States, too much priced in. Uh, that's tactical. But a lot of the other stuff, defense, healthcare, energy infrastructure, rare earths, uranium, so half of it is also just thematic. That is classic family office. That's a 3 to 5 year. And I'll put gold in there as well, because gold is part of the other. So, uh, like I've been saying all along, uh, diversification is not some dirty 15-letter word. So, what I'm preaching is diversification, preservation of capital, and the preservation of cash flows. So when you really look, if you go on the website and you look at this, uh, you'll see it's, it's really, um, it's a hard asset portfolio that's streaming off a cash flow stream. That's how I would describe it.
>> All right, one more for you. I want to take you back with Ira when he asks you about what's the plan B, and you said, I'm going to get back to you in about a month. You didn't try to answer on the spot, reflective, pensive, whatever it was. What, what was the instinct that you didn't want to answer on the spot and that you wanted to come back with research and talk to them later?
Well, I had to. Well, because, um, well, I, I, I really couldn't give a, a really wholesome answer to what he said on the spot. It required work and thought. And so, I'm, I'm quick on my feet, believe me. But the, all these, uh, portfolio managers, they had the client's money on the line. I'm not going to sit there and my way through, you know. Uh, so, I, it took me, and it took me about a month to go back and actually construct a whole, like, like I, I said the title of my presentation was this, and my first slide. I get it. So I just came back, um, with, uh, various scenarios and probabilities of what I thought was going to happen. And, um, so, um, you know, it's a, uh, you never stop learning in this business. You know, uh, I started, I started my business, uh, at age, uh, 60. I'm going to be co-launching, uh, an ETF based on this model portfolio in the next few weeks at the age of, uh, 65. And I, by the way, I just wrote a book that's going to be published in the summer. And, uh, it's called, um, uh, a, a, how a, how a, a bear survived in the bull ring. So, um, we'll send you an autograph copy when it's out.
>> I'm taking it. I think that's six reasons to have you come back on. I'm also proposing the ultra ego of Rosie Posey deserves to be out there in the world.
>> I, I like that one, too. I'll put that on the back. All right, let's get, let's get that out there, too. Uh, David, if people want to read more of your stuff, they want to bug you on the internet, where should we send them?
>> Right. Well, look, uh, I'll tell you what you can do. You can, um, uh, I mean, I mean, I got a Twitter handle. I don't even know what it is, but it's just that's for social media, just for like marketing purposes. Uh, you can find me on LinkedIn. Uh, but I'd say if you want to know about the research, because we, we, we're going to offer everybody on this call a free trial. Free. So, putting my disinflation view to work, free trial. Just, uh, Google Rosenberg Research, click on, or go to information at rosenbergresearch.com. Click on, you'll get your promo code, and Bob's your uncle, and you can check out, uh, you know, what it is, uh, that me and my team are saying. Uh, every single day, we cover, we, we span the world of geographies, economies, and and capital, all capital markets. Yeah. And I'll just do this. I'll throw this in there. I won't give my phone number. Okay. That's a little too personal. But if you want to reach me personally, uh, my email address is drosenberg@rosenbergresearch.com, and I'd be happy to take your questions, comments, and criticisms. And, uh, be nice to, uh, uh, start a chat. So, feel free to email me personally if you, if you so choose.
>> If you so choose, and indeed you should. David Rosenberg, this has been a long time coming. I can't thank you enough. Thanks for coming on Access Returns.
>> Thanks a lot, Matt. Take care.
>> Thank you for tuning in to this episode. If you found this discussion interesting and valuable, please subscribe on your favorite audio platform or on YouTube. You can also follow all the podcasts in the Excess Returns network at excessreturnspod.com. If you have any feedback or questions, you can contact us at excessreturnspod@gmail.com. No information on this podcast should be construed as investment advice. Securities discussed in the podcast may be holdings of the firms of the hosts or their clients.