Ness 403 – Ny verdensorden: Hva skal Norge gjøre nå?

NES, a podcast from the news. >> A warm welcome to Andreas Motsveld Kravik, State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And I thought this would be an Easter chat about the big foreign policy issues. Because yes, problems are piling up. Eh, at this very moment, the war between the USA, Israel, and Iran is ongoing. Eh, the war between Ukraine and Russia is ongoing. It has just been revealed that Danish soldiers have armed themselves to the teeth to be able to receive an American invasion in Greenland. So we are living in truly times that just a few years ago would have been described as completely wild. So when you in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are now trying to grasp the world and understand this new world, how do you think then, Andreas? Yes, I think I'll start by saying that I completely agree with the description you give, considering that we are living in a different world now. It is a very worrying world. And for our part, it is about trying to do several things at once. We must have effective foreign policy towards the various conflicts. We must ensure that we do the right thing in terms of supporting Ukraine, for example, against Russian aggression. That we uphold the Kingdom of Denmark's sovereignty against other actors when it comes to Greenland. We must ensure that we continue to work with the two-state solution, Israel, Palestine, all these things, but then we must manage not only to respond to what happens from day to day and week to week. Because as you say, it is truly enormous, the conflicts are piling up, the issues are piling up, but we must also manage to think quite deeply about what is happening. Create a real analysis and think long-term about where Norway should position itself to handle this at a more overarching level. So we must think both micro and macro at the same time. And it is demanding, but it is important. How, if we try to look a bit at the macro picture, what does the macro analysis look like from Yes, I was about to say Victoria Terrasse, but now you have probably just moved. >> Have we moved, so now we are somewhere else, but we can come back to that. No, I think, um, if we, there are a number of elements one can address. We have a different USA than we have had before. Eh, it is a USA that is more introverted, that places less emphasis on international law, that is less concerned with global common codes, global institutions that the USA has been a part of, not just been a part of, but been absolutely essential in founding, including the UN, the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, and those types of organizations. Eh, and not only that, but they are also more concerned with narrow interests, i.e., America First and this that we are familiar with. So that creates challenges, at the same time as we still have a situation where the USA is our closest security ally. Eh, so we must calibrate that in a proper way. Then there is no doubt that the war in Ukraine and Russian aggression have made it even more important than before to build up European defense capabilities, that we get a center of power in Europe when it comes to being able to resist Russian aggression and other types of threats. We are already working on that. Can come back to that, but I think that is important. We must also ensure that we manage to create economic growth in a proper way in Europe. We cannot believe that we can continue to fight for a liberal world order based on international law, with Europe at the forefront, if we are overtaken not only by the USA, but also by India, China, Africa, and other actors. That is important. And then we must also handle the fact that there are increasingly more conflicts arising. Something that in itself creates unpredictability in the market. We see that now with how the Israel-USA conflict directly impacts Norwegian politics regarding gasoline and diesel taxes and how consumers are experiencing inflation, increased food and goods prices, and so on. So all of this we must handle in a proper way. And then, in short, we have said that we still believe that one of the most important things we can do is to contribute, on the one hand, to a better and more autonomous and stronger Europe. We must spend more money on defense. We are doing that in Norway now. We are up to 3.5%. We are strengthening our strategic cooperation with major European actors like Germany with submarine purchases, eh Great Britain with frigates, eh we are working very closely with France and the Netherlands, Poland, and so on. And then we must cultivate the fact that we now have all of the Nordic countries united in NATO. So that is important. Eh, but then we must also ensure that we do not lose sight of what we are concerned with, namely that we must continue to fight for international law to be respected. That may sound difficult now, but we can come back to that. But we believe that is important. In a world where there are no rules, it will eh it is not sustainable. It will hit Norway very hard. So we are naturally working intensely on that. And then we must do what we can to ensure that we have effective global institutions that can meet the challenges they face, not only the UN, but also the World Health Organization, the World Organization, and so on. So these are things we are trying to do. I saw that Mette Fredriksen said that the USA was Denmark's most important, but not its closest ally. Is that eh will you use the same description of the USA? >> Yes, intuitively, that is not a bad formulation. I think most Norwegians would agree with the idea that we are now closer in many ways to Germany, France, Great Britain than we are to the USA in some of the policies and some of the things that the USA with Trump advocates. Eh, but then we have deep cooperation with the USA in very many areas, including the military and security policy, which means that they are clearly our most important partner. Eh, so in a way, one can identify with that way of thinking. But then there is this about the USA that things can change very quickly. Eh, it is a country that is, in a way, divided in the middle, and there is a very big difference between whether you get Gavinum or Mark Kelly as the next American president or JD Vance. And that means that there is enormous unpredictability regarding what the USA will represent in the coming years. So we must relate to both eventualities. We cannot have a foreign policy and a security policy that gambles on getting a like-minded American president. And an American president has a lot of autonomy and power in their ability to define American foreign policy. So therefore, I think that we must base ourselves on the fact that we will continue to have very close and deep security policy cooperation with the USA and, for that matter, other types of foreign policy cooperation, but we cannot, in the same way as before, rely on the USA, and there we must spend more money on defense, security policy, and other types of priorities. And that, we are already doing. What if we now go into, while we are recording this, the war between eh Iran eh and the USA and Israel is in full swing. >> Yes. >> And and Norway has been very clear that we will not send any ships to Hormuz. It is not our war. Are you afraid that the USA, after the war or during the war, might say that okay, when you don't want to help us when we are on the offensive and ask for help, then we won't help you either? Or do you think that the USA has so much interest in helping Norway that they must help us anyway? I don't think our security policy relationship with the USA is based unilaterally on eh European Norwegian needs, and then the USA comes in as an ally that is exclusively concerned with helping. I think that the USA has for a long time seen that not least Norway is a strategically important country for the USA. We are positioned in a way that having a good relationship with Norway gives the USA many opportunities to ensure a safe Arctic, not least. And we are positioned in a convenient way towards Russia and so on. So I think that we have a mutually beneficial relationship in a defense policy context with the USA. But there is no doubt that the USA with Trump thinks short-term and is concerned with what we call transactional foreign policy, that eh I can scratch your back if you scratch my back. And therefore, we must constantly bear in mind that if the USA experiences that one is not participating in certain things that they define as very important, then there will be a certain recoil. That is why Norway is keen on working closely with the USA, and we do that in many areas. But when it comes to this specific issue of Hormuz and sending military capabilities there, the Prime Minister has, as you know, been very clear and said that this is a war that we were not consulted on beforehand. We believe that the war is contrary to international law. We believe that one should try a diplomatic path, not a military path. Eh, and that will be the basis for how we handle it. But then it is quite clear that as a seafaring nation and with an open global economy, we have a great interest in that strait being open. So we will have to do what we can to contribute to that, but not with military means. Then >> is it completely out of the question if Yes. Yes. in 10 days or perhaps just after the Easter holiday, some hope that eh eh convoys might be underway. Do you think it is out of the question that Norway will participate in those convoys? >> I cannot imagine that we will do so at the present time. One never knows how things will play out. But right now, for Norway to participate there with convoys or in any other way with military means, >> do we have much to send there? We do, others can speak about that with greater authority than me, but I think all European countries can contribute something, eh not least with legitimacy and with a kind of collective effort. But again, our starting point here is based on the fact that we believe that this is a conflict contrary to international law. There are ways to handle this diplomatically, and eh being there in a military conflict with an aggressive Iran right next door is not in Norway's interests as we see it. How do you think, do you see a way out of this war now? Because we have followed it quite closely. And what seems to be the consensus among many is that eh the USA has won militarily tactically, but they have lost strategically by losing control of the Strait of Hormuz. And Iran is stubbornly refusing Trump's claims about negotiating. Eh, how do you envision this war lasting? Perhaps for a very long time. Perhaps Hormuz can be closed over the summer, perhaps until New Year's even in the worst case. >> Yes, it is difficult to say. I think one must assume that this is an existential war for Iran. For the current regime, this is absolutely existential. They have defined this as something they will not back down from, and have been attacked by the USA and Israel twice now in connection with diplomatic talks. So they probably think that here we must build up a deterrent capability, so we cannot agree to any solutions now that would open up for new attacks. They must strike the USA in a way that eh creates deterrence and re-establishes it. That is probably how they see it. And then they have a rather formidable ability to absorb losses and human suffering. We have seen that. It is a brutal regime. It is a regime without many friends. We are definitely no friend of that regime. And we saw it in connection with the protests from their own population where they killed perhaps as many as 10,000 to 15,000 people. Eh, and we know from before regarding the war against Iraq, an enormously brutal and bloody war, that when the Americans target civilian targets or target targets on one side that cause suffering to the civilian population, they are hardly affected by it, and that means that the resilience on the other side is great, and then we must acknowledge that they are quite good at that type of asymmetric warfare, and technology is also moving in that direction, that sending drones eh and disrupting maritime traffic and that type of thing. It is not that difficult if you have some capabilities, and they produce a certain defense capability quite quickly. Ehm, and then on the other hand, you have the USA, which has defined certain goals. It has been a bit inconsistent, but still, if the goal is to overthrow the regime, that looks very difficult. Eh, if the goal is to degrade the military on Iran's side, they might achieve that. The question is how long it will last, and one will then have to intervene again at a later stage. And then the question is, can they achieve this in a way that keeps the Strait of Hormuz open without the Iranians being able to strike targets there? Because in many ways, the challenge is that Iran does not need to close that strait, they do not need to hit every ship or be able to threaten every ship. But if they manage to carry out some kind of military action every two weeks against civilian traffic in the strait, then no ships will dare to sail there. They will probably not get insurance. And then it will be closed for all practical purposes. So how this will play out is difficult to say. For now, there is this deadline from Trump regarding trying to find a solution, and then we will see after that deadline. But much indicates that this will continue for quite some time at least. >> How has this war developed compared to what your experts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and you assessed it to be initially? Have you, have you been accurate, experts? It's not like one sits and plays out the scenarios completely, but eh we were also clear externally that a war between Israel, Iran, and the USA would be a catastrophe not only for the countries themselves but also for the region and not least for global stability, principles of international law, eh global institutions. So we have been very clear that that is not the solution. The solution lies in diplomacy. Eh, and then we have also been clear that such a war can have significant consequences with the Strait of Hormuz being closed, that you get an even more militant regime on Iran's side, and not least that some diplomatic solutions that one might have achieved before the war will be even more difficult to achieve after the war. So we have said this for a long time, and it is not about us saying that we were right, but I think it is becoming apparent that trying to confront a country like Iran in the way the USA has done now is very difficult, and we have quite a lot of empirical evidence for that by now, that it is not entirely easy to achieve. If we are to say something about Israel in all of this, because Israel is perhaps more of a winner than eh the USA, at least in the short term. >> Yes, I think that for Israel, this is good for Israel in the sense of Netanyahu and the way he envisions Israel in the region. He will probably think that he has wanted this, everyone knows that he has long wanted a conflict between Israel and Iran with the USA involved on Israel's side. He has now gotten it, and he probably envisions an Iran with reduced military capacity and which can then, to a very limited extent, threaten Israel. Eh, and Israel then emerging as perhaps the regional hegemon with the clearly largest military capacity. And that has been his vision and his government's vision for a long time. And then our view has been that yes, you can create a kind of eh an Israel that is clearly the strongest militarily and which also weakens Iran. But one must be aware of what that will entail over time. You will not get any stability in the region. You will likely get a militant, radicalized, aggressive Iran right nearby. Which will still have connections to various terrorist groups. You will get weakened Gulf states. You will get a USA that perhaps thinks that this did not go entirely in their direction. You might get an American administration characterized by a different American president who thinks that this is completely contrary to American interests and for that reason might also distance itself from and relate to Israel. So from our perspective, this is not something that serves Israel either. But I think, based on Netanyahu's perspective, he will probably think that this is good. >> What do you think if Israel were to say that now we are once again engaged in Lebanon against Hezbollah, and to achieve peace now, we must occupy eh northern or southern Lebanon, i.e., up to the Litani River. Yes, well, to start by saying that everyone understands that being in a situation like Israel's, where you have these militant groups on the other side of your borders, is a difficult situation. So we have no illusions about that. And we have been very clear in both condemning and completely distancing ourselves from what Hamas has done against Israel in terms of military terrorist attacks and Hezbollah. Our approach is also that it is possible to find solutions by working in a slightly different way than Israel does. Because it is clear that you can degrade these. And Israel has proven to be enormously effective in that regard. It was, for example, before the war, people said that if Israel confronts Hamas, they will get into trouble. But it can, it can go. If they were to confront Hezbollah, it would hit Israel hard. And if they were to engage with Iran, it would be an existential crisis for Israel. It has turned out not to be entirely true. They have managed to withstand these conflicts for quite a long time without suffering very heavy losses. Now, of course, now they are taking some losses now, against Iran, but still. So they are militarily very strong. But I think if Israel tries to achieve a stable region where they have a good relationship not only with the very closest countries around but also with the region as a whole and where they pursue policies that do not fuel these radical movements, then they must approach this in a different way. Then they must find solutions with those who are, after all, quite constructive people in Lebanon who want to find solutions. Then they must try to contribute to a ceasefire with Hezbollah. The USA, not least, has been very closely involved in that, and then they must also try to contribute to a diplomatic track with Iran based on very clear security guarantees and not least inspection rights for the international community, including Israel, regarding what happens on the ground in Iran. So that would be our recommendation. But that Israel has formidable military capabilities, I think the last months and years have shown. Do you perhaps think that the world Norway is advocating for now is a bit outdated, that we are already in the "law of the jungle" where might makes right? And Israel says that we cannot trust or negotiate with anyone like Hezbollah or Hamas, or to quote Golda Meir, that you cannot negotiate peace with those who want to kill you. That strength is the only thing that matters in the Middle East. And Hezbollah and Hamas must, like others, learn that if you start a war, it's not that if you lose the war, we go back to the start. No, we advance to, for example, the Litani River. >> Yes. Well, I think there are several things to say about that. I think that for many in the region, they will not see it that way, that eh Israel is mostly on the receiving end and that they themselves start all the wars. They will probably think that Israel, for example, with over eh yes since 1967 has occupied the West Bank and is constantly expanding that occupation, so Israel is at least as active as some others in seeking conflict eh and and based on exactly the logic you are raising, some will say that it is precisely the same thing we must do. We must not just respond, we must move five steps forward. And that is the logic that underlies, I believe, many of the actions seen in the Middle East, but also in other areas. So I completely agree with you fundamentally that it is important for us that we cannot present ourselves or conduct a foreign policy that is based on yesterday's realities. So it is quite obvious that we cannot just sit and talk about the UN Charter and eh principles of international law in a situation like the one we are in now. Therefore, we are doing the opposite by spending more money on defense, as we discussed earlier. We are up to 3.5%. We are spending more eh resources on coordinating with European partners. We are deepening our security policy cooperation with strategic actors in Europe and not least in the Nordic countries. And we are among the very largest contributors to Ukraine's self-defense against Russian aggression. So we are not naive in that way. We have a quite conscious attitude towards the importance of being prepared on the defense and security policy side. But then we also say that if one desires a world that is stable, if one is to handle some of the threats we face, then it is such that it will not work if one bases it on the law of the jungle. So some might say that yes, now the law of the jungle applies in certain areas. Now there are fewer conflicts that could have arisen that do not arise because international law still sets limits, and we can come back to that, but obviously a weakened framework, but if one believes that in a world like the one we are in now, with so much technology, with so many non-state actors with power, with so many things that can go wrong, if one believes that one can handle such a situation based on the law of the jungle, then I think that is actually the naive stance, I think. Then this will eventually go really wrong, and it will only be on the other side of a global crisis where the world community comes together and says, okay, now we must move away from this logic of the strongest. Now we must move towards cooperation based on legally binding rules. So we are trying to stay ahead of the curve there while operating with strength in the world that exists now. >> And then there are many who are, I think there are many who are afraid now. >> Yes. and who compare this to the interwar period and think that eh yes, the war in Ukraine can resemble the Spanish Civil War, or it could be Japan against China, or Italy entering Ethiopia, or Germany starting with Austria and Czechoslovakia, and a feeling that now it is escalating in so many places that sooner or later this will end in a real global conflict. How, how afraid are you in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of that? Or is the likely future much more eh hybrid threats, or can we one day wake up to a new April 9th, literally April 9th. I think that eh it is like that, isn't it, it is said that history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes, isn't that so? So I think that there is a relatively small risk that we will experience something similar to April 9th in terms of a full-scale invasion of Norway. I don't think that will happen. But that there is great instability and risk in the world we are in now, there is no doubt about that. And then I think one must also consider that if there is only a 1 or 2% risk of major global crises, then clearly if there is a 1 to 2% risk of major global crises over time, then at some point it will materialize. So one must pursue a policy that makes that percentage extremely low if it is to be sustainable. And that is what we are concerned with. And I know that some will be skeptical of this when we talk about international law, international cooperation, and that type of thing, but for us, it is quite clear, and if one looks at times of crisis, both after the First World War, everyone who had participated here was very clear that now we must have a different type of cooperation. We must have institutions, so they create the League of Nations. It was actually a wise thought at a macro level, but they created a setup that did not work and that collapsed, and then we got the Second World War. >> Tell me why it didn't work. No, I mean, there are several reasons, certainly, for example, that the USA, which was the initiator, could not even join because they did not get it, Wilson did not get it through Congress, and then you had a fascist Germany that also had little interest in global eh and regional cooperation based on international law, and Italy was becoming fascist, and the same with Spain and others, so it was clearly very difficult then, but it was probably also that it was simply too, how should I say, egalitarian a setup where one did not take sufficient account of the fact that some states are more important than other states, eh, right? So it became a kind of castle in the air, and it didn't work. Then came the Second World War. Eh, enormous destruction, enormous destruction. And then comes the UN on the other side of that. And then they try to create a set of rules and an institutional framework with the UN and the Security Council, which to a certain extent eh on the one hand says that all states are equal in that sense, that they have sovereignty, but some states are more important than others. And therefore, some states shall have veto power in the Security Council. And then you have a kind of system based on, what should I say, altruism and equality, but also based on sober power and political realities. And that system has been much more robust. Now, that system is still quite powerful, but not as powerful as it was. Among other things, because some of the power politics that lay beneath it, that you, for example, then vetoed right in the Soviet Union today, Russia, China, France, Great Britain, and the USA, it does not reflect the five most important states in today's world. And then you get a Security Council and a UN that does not correspond to real power realities. That is worrying, but nevertheless, the recognition after the Second World War was that we must do something else. That we cannot continue with the law of the jungle, because then we will have wars, and we have had it twice. And we experienced it ourselves, I think, after the pandemic, when we, you know, which was a relatively mild pandemic. It wasn't that many who died from it as a percentage, you know, one could imagine a pandemic 10 times as strong with a much higher death rate. But it was a pandemic that affected many. And then I think most people in the aftermath talked about needing more cooperation. We need more vaccine cooperation. We need better health cooperation. The World Health Organization launched a series of initiatives. But then, of course, one forgets and becomes preoccupied with other things. Eh, and that is the case. So, for our part, there is no doubt that if we want to preserve a stable Norway, we cannot just think about defense and accept the law of the jungle. Then we must build coalitions with other states to contribute to functioning institutions and not least eh not least international law that is powerful. And that is what many countries are doing, like Norway, but mostly then many middle powers, as they are called. For example, Canada has been at the forefront of this, and a number of European countries and others. But for this system to hold, we must get the USA in, and we must get China in, and a number of other actors first. Then we could achieve real stability. And we just have to work for that. >> Yes. And then there are those who think that yes, but this is already over. >> Yes, >> meaning the war in Ukraine, eh the war with Iran, eh you have the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. You have the war in Congo, you have Sudan, eh you have had Venezuela. Eh, we are already in the jungle. >> Yes, some believe that. And then there are many wars, I think, that one should be prepared for that could have arisen, but that do not arise. I remember not many weeks ago I was in Ethiopia, and there I met with several government representatives and also experts who said that if, for example, the USA were to intervene and take over Greenland, in other words, make it clear that they are not influenced by the UN Charter's rules on the prohibition of force and annex other states' territories, then there would be great pressure on Ethiopia to start a war against Eritrea. Because there are some who are eager for them to subjugate Eritrea and so on. Those types of conflicts are everywhere, really, on the African continent. So that was one of the reasons why, when Russia attacked Ukraine and this first came up in the Security Council, the Kenyan ambassador was among the very clearest in saying that we cannot have this. We cannot go on like this. Then my continent will go up in flames. And it is still the case that the vast majority of states are not involved in border conflicts using military means. Simply because they see that this leads entirely in the wrong direction. And there are also other things that show that there is still power in international law. For example, there have never been more lawsuits before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. This shows that states still resort to that court to resolve disputes. Other international courts, war crimes tribunals have full backlogs. It is still the case that war is the exception and not the rule. Many of these everyday matters are resolved. Whether it is various maritime law issues, trade policy issues, eh technical issues, they are resolved based on developed regulations. So there is still a lot of resilience in this. But there is no doubt that what we are seeing now and the conflicts you have referred to, it is worrying, but not something we can just accept. >> If we jump back to the Middle East. >> Yes. >> Then I think, I had you on the podcast for Yes, it's been almost >> 30 years ago. >> Yes. Yes. But it feels like a very long time ago since so much has happened. But it is it is not even a year ago. But then you had just been to Syria and hoped that it would go well. >> Mhm. How, how is it going in Syria now? No, Syria is still an area and a country where there have at least been elements of positive development, but there is no doubt that there are also great challenges there, and it is a country very marked by the fact that you have many minorities who eh who must function together, based on a rather close history where there has been a lot of sectarian violence, which means there are great challenges. And we have seen it now, for example, in Northern Syria where the authorities, this transitional government that governs the Al Shara areas, has led to the Kurds feeling insecure and withdrawing and having to move into rural territory, and that has created a lot of insecurity, and something we have discussed with Kurdish diaspora communities in Norway, and it creates a lot of unrest. Eh, then there are different opinions about whether this is intended policy from the authorities' side. I think it is.

It is desired that politics attempts to consolidate the state. Eh, and we have also said that eh, it is not necessarily the case that Syria must become a kind of Lebanon where you have, you know, different areas and different parliamentary bases linked to minorities. It turns out very often not to work in the long run. That one consolidates power can be right, but then you must have proper minority protections and you must ensure that you do not eh create eh conflict in society that can lead to civil war and the like. Ehm but then it has been obvious that some of Alsara's security forces have committed extensive human rights violations, have acted in a way that is completely contrary to humanitarianism, contrary to other kinds of international law. And then the question is, is this something that comes from Damascus or is this something that is created on the way? Because the power hierarchy and command lines in Syria are not as we know them from Norway and and and Europe or developed democratic countries. And then there is much to suggest that some of this has been committed despite clear orders from Damascus and not because of it. So we still believe that there is a basis for working with the government that is in in Syria, but we must be very clear and we have been and will continue to be both externally and in our contacts with Alhara as leader, but also Shabani as foreign minister and and others with whom we have engaged. And then there is a Yes, we have a new leader of the right wing eh Marie Søride Eriksen, and she sings the EU in and out of breath that it is like the EU that is the solution for all of Norway's foreign policy eh challenges. While the Labour Party is also for the EU, but the time is not ripe. If you try such a real-politically sober analysis of it in in what extent is the EU the solution? >> Well, I think the EU as such plays a decisive role not only for Norway, but for Europe, stability in Europe and contributes positively in in the world. There is no question about that. So we must do what we can for a good relationship with the EU on the economic side, the security policy side. And with regard to various issues that the EU is working on, the question you raise is relevant. Can Norway now eh initiate a membership debate now and then when we look at both the population and where it is now in Norway and all the things that characterize our national policy, international policy or foreign policy, then we think that it is perhaps not what should be at the top of the agenda now. Quite the opposite. So eh >> why? Tell us a little about what lines of conflict you think could be awakened then. No, well, we think there are several things here, but I think, you know, we've been through this before and you're old enough to remember at least the one in '94, you know. It takes over almost everything else except that kind of debate in Norwegian politics. If you start a debate about the EU, it mobilizes enormously on both sides and it becomes all-encompassing. The question is, is this something we want to engage in now, considering everything that is happening and we also have limited bandwidth in Norway, so we think it might not be wise now. And then it is also the case that very many Norwegians are skeptical of this. So eh then it is perhaps likely that it would lead to another no. And then we have spent a lot of time and effort and resources and created conflicts perhaps between between different groups in Norway and then we end up where we were. We don't think that's a wise policy now, but there is no doubt that we have a very clear interest in working closely with the EU. So we must acknowledge that it is important for us and we must and we are working very actively with it. And then it is exciting now with regard to Iceland. They have now made it clear that they will proceed and consider membership. And we see now that the EFTA club, which, you know, the EU and EFTA together in the EU and EFTA pillar of that cooperation, is being emptied of members, and then if Iceland were to join, it would be Norway and Liechtenstein in practice, largely Norway, and then it would be even more difficult to get through. >> and and do you think that if Iceland says yes to the EU, will we then have a Norwegian EU debate? Yes, it may be that it changes the picture for some, but I still remember from the 90s when Sweden joined just before Norway, and then many thought that now Norway will at least join, because Denmark is in and Sweden has joined and and then it is obvious that Norway too, but that did not happen. So it seems to me that Norwegians are quite autonomous on this issue and make their own assessments somewhat independently of what other countries do. So we will see how that affects the Norwegian debate. >> When will it be decided in Iceland? I don't have that. >> No, I don't remember exactly, but they will probably announce a Now they will probably negotiate first, I think, and then they will have a debate afterwards and then possibly a vote. That's probably it. I'm not entirely sure. >> Yes, it is But what about what do you think about that the Conservative Party is raising the issue so high now? Is it internal politics for the Conservatives, or is it that they actually believe that it is so nationally important? Well, I think I should be very careful about speculating about what drives the Conservatives in this area. But it is a fact that in the Labour Party there are different views on this, and we live very well with that. But it is views that make it perhaps easier for us to draw a conclusion eh like the one we have made, that we should not bring this up now because our party mirrors the population to the extent that there is great disagreement internally in the party. And that makes it perhaps even easier for us to understand that Norway can also be divided if there were such a debate. While the Conservatives are unanimous, really just completely one-sided that the EU should be something we should join, and therefore it may be easier to conclude in that way. But eh for me it is a bit difficult perhaps to understand that the Conservatives are so clearly coming out on this right now, considering where Norway is and where their partners on the right are. But that's up to them. They have made it very clear and in a way that is also fine in Norwegian politics that you flag your views and work based on that with democratic means. So it is actually completely unproblematic to get that out. And then since the end of January, early February, these Epstein files were opened. >> Yes. >> And and everyone got a feeling of what are Norwegian diplomats actually doing? >> Yes. >> See Terje Rød Larsen >> eh and and Torbjørn Jag. >> How have the reactions been internally in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to this? No, there are several things. There is no doubt that it has been serious for Norway to have had individuals who are quite prominent also in terms of foreign policy who come up in that context. It is unpleasant for everyone. But it also means that we must do what we can to ensure that we have orderly procedures, that we do not spend money we should not spend money on, and so on. So here there are several things that we think. One is that we must do what the Storting has asked us to do, namely to have a full review. We have an internal review. We will naturally be constructive in the investigation that the Storting will eh will have started. We will contribute everything we can. Eh and then we must also continue the work that we believe is important. So we cannot roll over and lie on our backs and and like become completely defensive. So we must find the balance for much of what has perhaps now been for some these eh yes, what shall I say, come into a negative spotlight, some of the peace and reconciliation work we have done, some of the organizations we support, much of that work we believe is important and believe it is important to defend and we will continue to do so, but we must also be very clear about not accepting anything eh mess or other things that have been uncovered, and it is a bit like the welfare state as such. I am concerned that we, the Labour Party, we have a great belief in the welfare state, in common solutions and the like, but then we must also be the first and most willing to criticize the welfare state and the public if something is done in a way that is not in line with what Norwegians expect. So it is that balance that we must manage to find out. How if we if we go back a bit to where we started, the world eh that we that we are in now, if we are to understand it, what kind of eh how how would you describe it? I saw an article in Foreign Affairs they called it that now the USA had become what they called the predatory hegemon. So >> predator hegemon. >> Yes. >> Who goes in and takes prey when it wants. >> Yes. >> What terms do you use then? >> Yes. No, but it is a bit, at least as the USA is doing now, it is quite obvious that this is not something we can support. And therefore, you know, we are back to this with increased defense spending, consolidation, strengthening of the European security policy part of NATO, strategic cooperation with key countries in in Europe. All of that we must do and will continue to do. So we must continue to cooperate with the USA where we can. Eh, and we must also cooperate with other countries, not least the global South. We must remember that very many countries in the global South now demand a seat at the table when major decisions are to be made. So if we want to be an actor and present Norwegian views and these issues are to be addressed, we must have a good relationship with Brazil. We must have a good relationship with South Africa. We must have a good relationship with India. We must have a good relationship with South Korea, Japan, and so on. These are countries outside Europe, outside perhaps the classic West that we must know well and know how to navigate and work into the global. So we are working very actively on that. Then there is this with the multilateral that I talked about today. So the foreign minister of Cameroon is participating in the summit of the World Trade Organization and there they will discuss, among other things, reform of the organization. And the USA is also participating at a high level, and China at a high level, and Brazil, and all states are coming at a high level to find solutions. This is a topic that Norway is very concerned about. We are similarly involved in discussions about the UN. But then, in addition to that, and perhaps that is where disagreements arise in Norwegian politics, we are concerned that we cannot just work like that, we must also try where we can to contribute to conflict resolution between states, between states and non-state actors where we can, so-called peace and reconciliation work or conflict resolution work. And that means that over time we have been involved in a number of conflicts that perhaps some in Norwegian politics are now questioning, but which we believe are right. Why should Norway get involved in Sudan? We are heavily involved there, I can say a bit more about that afterwards. Or Colombia, where we have been involved, Venezuela, Nepal, eh, for that matter, also Iran, USA, Israel. So we try to contribute to solutions. >> Let's take Sudan as an example. Why on earth should Norway >> get involved in Sudan? It's far away. >> Far away >> and not strategically important for us. >> Yes, then I know. That's a good question and it's a kind of a test balloon. Then you can say that eh in a way you can say that one has a kind of moral responsibility. Very many Norwegians are concerned that we should at least do something to contribute to reducing human suffering. So when you have an enormous brutal conflict in Sudan where very many civilians are killed, raped, subjected to abuse, eh if Norway can do something to help end it, then many Norwegians will think that yes, we shouldn't spend all our money on that. Perhaps not the majority, but that we spend some money to try to contribute to it, that is important. So there is a kind of moral argument here. So it is also quite obvious that there is a security policy argument for very many countries eh are concerned about ending the conflict. The USA is heavily involved. Saudi Arabia, UAE, i.e., the United Arab Emirates. Egypt is the so-called quartet. Great Britain is spending extensive resources on this. Eh, and so are major global major African actors like Ethiopia, including the African Union. If Norway can then play a role in ending and bringing an end eh either by building up a civilian alternative to the two military parties in conflict or otherwise contributing to reducing the conflict, then very many of those states will look to Norway and think that yes, we will recognize what Norway is doing, be open to discussing core interests that Norway can then bring to the table in other areas. Ehm so that is an argument. Eh, then it will be if we want a world based on international law, based on effective institutions, then the world community must also contribute to solving conflicts that are far away. Because, as you said earlier, if you get a feeling that yes, but there are conflicts in Sudan, there are conflicts in Myanmar, there are conflicts in Iran, there are conflicts in Syria, then you will feel that yes, but this international legal framework that Norway is so concerned about, it is collapsing. Eh, so we have an interest in ending these types of conflicts. And then there is the last thing, which is perhaps just as important, that many of these things that eh that spin out of these local conflicts come to Norway at some point. You can have migration flows, you can have eh conflicts that get out of control that spread. they other states which in turn impose eh setbacks on the economy which cause oil prices, gas prices to rise eh which cause food prices to become more expensive globally which makes supply chains vulnerable which causes fertilizer fertilizer to increase, fertilizer prices to increase. In short, the issue of conflict, I think we just have to acknowledge that conflict somewhere, anywhere, creates big trouble for a country like Norway, which is a global economy. But >> but does Norway risk when we interfere in countries like Sudan that we also make things worse? >> That we contribute to >> strengthening one party that would otherwise have been defeated, for example, or prolonging a conflict by keeping it alive. I think the eh the conflict that perhaps became most famous was the one in Sri Lanka where we sent Erik Solheim there >> Tamils against Sinhalese >> and we wanted to talk and then it ended with the Sinhalese just coming in and shooting all the Tigers. >> Yes. Well, what you say there is a real argument that we must be careful about. Eh, that we must, that is the first rule, really, when you engage in these types of conflicts, that you cannot contribute to making things worse. So you must constantly eh you must constantly think about that. Eh, and therefore we are very keen on working locally. Eh, not engaging in anything really, unless we are invited in by the parties. That is a key principle for Norway. It is not that Norway advertises eh our services and and hopes that one of the parties will call us and then we will go in. We do not go in unless both parties believe that we want a dialogue. We want to find a way out of this. And then we would like Norway to be involved in some way. And then we are keen on working with actors, not least local actors. It is very rare now, and I think we are past the time when Western actors can travel around Africa in the Middle East and create peace without engaging with local actors. So eh so we do that, and for example eh if we go back to Sudan, I have been in Sudan not too long ago and met with Burhan and that regime. Tell us what kind of conflict we have in Sudan now. >> Yes, I can briefly, you know. On the one hand, you have the eh the regular army. Eh, they call themselves Safanes Armed Forces, led by General Burhan. Then you have eh another eh some is a militia called RSF eh which has occupied a part of the country eh and has been very brutal. Saf has also been, but these are the two military factions that are fighting each other in a military conflict. Then it has ebbed and flowed who has had the initiative. And the civilian government that was there, it has been overthrown. It was overthrown a few years ago. Eh, and what Norway has been involved in eh has been trying to get the civilian, i.e., the government. >> Is it also an ethnic conflict that it is two tribes or religions or is it? >> No, to some extent you can say that, but not to such a great extent really. Eh, RSF, without getting too technical here, RSF was at one point part of SAAF and then broke out. Yes. So it is actually a component of the army. >> And and both are Muslims here? Yes. >> Yes. Eh, but then there are different affiliations and so on. That is correct. But it is true that it is an open secret that eh RSF has primarily been supported by the United Arab Emirates, you know. While Saf has had a kind of relationship with Saudi Arabia and some others. So you have gotten a kind of what is called a proxy war in this, you know, where other states fight through local actors. That is something one knows particularly well from the Cold War. Ehm so eh so one has then eh previously had civilian actors who ruled Sudan. They have been suppressed and overthrown. So what we are trying to do with partners is to create a civilian alternative to the eh actors so that when at some point there is a kind of ceasefire, there is a civilian alternative that the two parties can turn to and which can then take over the governance of the country in the long run. And that was the purpose of the trip we made in in Sudan, to talk to the parties and find out how to move forward in that work. But it is not something Norway does on its own. We have also had long conversations with the US representative in this area, Masad Bolo, who is Trump's special envoy in that conflict. And how bloody is that conflict? It is incredibly bloody, it is the biggest humanitarian conflict of our time. So it is >> How many people have been killed there in recent years? Exactly the numbers, but it is thousands of people who have been killed. And so there are immense immense challenges and there are refugee flows and eh people who have to leave everything they have and it is very difficult to get humanitarian access. That has proven to be a problem across many conflicts now, that actors do not allow the UN and other humanitarian actors access, and that is also something we are working very systematically on. But but there I believe that Norway, together with other actors, not alone with a Norwegian flag coming in as some kind of knight on a white horse, but together with actors based on common work, we can make a difference there. But then it is important to add that it is not a lot of money we spend on this. It is a matter of a few people upstairs with me who deal with this, who know a lot, who have great international recognition for the work we have done and who try to contribute. But it is not that very many people in the MFA work with this, the vast majority. >> How much of the MFA's resources go to this, do you think? >> To to Sudan or to conferences? to Sudan plus the rest of the peace efforts. >> I think that if I'm not mistaken, I think that eh the budget funds we have for so-called peace and reconciliation, conflict resolution are under 400 million a year. So it is less than one percent of our aid budget that goes to this. Eh, and then I think you can imagine that if how much Norwegians, just Norwegians now lose from that eh that we have this conflict going on in Iran and and in Israel and the USA, you know. It becomes very little money in comparison. We I think we have set up a kind of, it's a bit tabloid, but I think we have set up a comparative where we looked at how much we spend on peace and reconciliation versus military eh military capabilities. It comes out to about one and a half submarines or something like that. So it is very little we spend, but we spend something and I think that is important not only for resolving conflict but also for these other things that it gives us security policy capital. If you were to list Norway's biggest successes in this field, what would they be? For example, in Sudan, have we >> have we saved any lives, do you think? >> Eh, Sudan is ongoing now eh, I must be very careful to say that we have succeeded in Sudan yet because it is a war that is still ongoing. But there is no doubt that Norway has been among the countries that have contributed to eh humanitarian access, among other things for the UN, and ensured that both the authorities, those who call themselves authorities then in Port Sudan, i.e., Saf, this government army, have been more inclined to open up and allow humanitarian actors. And the same for RSF, for that matter, so we have contributed to that. Ehm, if we were to achieve such a civilian track, it would be eh important to create and save many lives. Ehm, of the major peace agreements that are somewhat noteworthy peace agreements, there is Nepal a few years ago. You were Colombia where we contributed to normalizing, you know, between the authorities and this FARC guerrilla. >> Eh >> Nepal was also the government and some kind of Maoist guerrilla, wasn't it? Yes, the Philippines is where we are active now regarding the government and this communist movement. But that's what I think is important to have a discussion about this where one avoids such either one fails or one has a full peace agreement. Often it will not be either eh eh, so binary, either it is very often that one succeeds with something and perhaps not with everything. But considering how much we spend on this and what we can achieve, we believe it is worthwhile. We stick to that. Just something like this corona agreement that we that that, you know, that was put in place. Eh, >> tell us what it is. >> No, this was this was work that was done where an agreement was reached between Russia and Ukraine to get grain onto the world market for, you know. And several countries contributed to that, and there you have this center that has come up in the Norwegian debate, you know, this Geneva-based center that was instrumental in helping to negotiate that eh, which some, not just the Frp, but also the Red Party in Norway, have been very skeptical about Norway supporting with some funds, contributed to that agreement being put in place. And it is an agreement that saved Ukraine a lot of money, but also contributed to food supplies all over the world, really. So there is quite a lot you can achieve for very little in this area. Eh, but very often it is absolutely correct that there will be great risk and not that one succeeds, but one succeeds with something, and that can be a lot for little. >> Yes. Now, now we have to go in for landing, but if you are to take the three things you are most worried about right now, then it is >> three things you are following, i.e., what what do you hope doesn't go wrong, to put it that way? >> No, again, it's short and long term. In the short term, I think that finding a solution to the conflict between Israel, Iran and the USA is extremely important. If we get a long-term conflict there where one perhaps manages to de-escalate, but where the regimes or the regime Iran is in a kind of permanent state of conflict with the USA and Israel and perhaps digs even deeper literally in terms of the nuclear weapons program and so on. and an even more radicalized militant regime. That is not good. So finding a solution to that based on some kind of agreement would be extremely important. Ehm, finding a solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. That it does not become further cemented, that the USA were to withdraw from that problem area. That would also be extremely unfortunate. A lot will probably happen there in the coming weeks and months. And then, to come back to the global and a bit more macro, but which is now coming up, it is this with the World Trade Organization and whether one manages in the meeting we are participating in in Cameroon to come up with a real reform plan, had one managed to get that organization properly in order, showing that the world community stands united behind that framework, behind that institution and make it function in our time, that would be very important. So these are some of the things, but at a macro level, i.e., at a more long-term level, it is about Europe being clear and maintaining its autonomy and developing in a proper way and strengthening its defense capabilities. Can Norway contribute properly there? Can we maintain respect for international law? Eh, and not least, can we get these global institutions moving? >> Could it be that Europe gets a future as some kind of leash for either the USA or China? So one should not underestimate the resilience of Europe. It is a tremendously large economy eh that Europe represents. And if one manages to translate that into political influence, then a lot is possible. But it requires that Europe manages to unite behind some priorities and that one manages to appear as a credible actor on key foreign policy issues. It is still the case that the USA, because it is a consolidated state, China because it is a consolidated state, can do a lot of things that the EU cannot. It is not a coincidence that it was the USA, for example, that defined eh in many ways the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, you know. It was Trump who took the initiative for that, which we supported. But I still think that the EU cannot do that because it is not sufficiently united on that type of issue. There is too big a gap between Spain on the one hand and Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany on the other. So then one becomes inward-looking to solve it, not so powerful. So one must continue to work on that. But I have great faith in Europe eh and that Europe can become a force, but I think everyone understands now that it is serious and that some of that energy that is spent on arguing internally must be resolved and must be released and used on external matters. I think >> that. Let's leave that as the last word. Thank you very much for coming and happy Easter. >> Thank you very much and happy Easter to you. 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