Transcription
Greetings, may you all be well. Today, we want to talk a little about the beginning of the talks, let's call them, between Lebanon and Israel in Washington, and what is expected from this path, away from what is being said in political rhetoric, the ongoing Lebanese political debate. And of course, it doesn't have a horizon for recession, at least not now. Before evaluating if these negotiations, or rather the start of these talks, will lead to the beginning of negotiations, will there be any hope of reaching any results and conclusions that will have a scope and a path to implementation, or will they remain at the initial steps that some parties, specifically America, for political reasons, have shown that Trump and the current Trump administration are capable of controlling the situation in the Middle East and foreign policy after the confusion that occurred in the war on Iran. But also, for Israel, controlling the situation is an achievement for Netanyahu, which he will invest in his upcoming parliamentary elections, of course. And we heard Netanyahu's words a few days ago, talking about the achievements he made to change the entire Middle East and considering that Israel has become not a regional power, but a power of international weight. I think there is a bit of inflation in the Israeli ego. In any case, what I expect to happen today is simple, not very complicated, and it doesn't have much of its own horizon in this meeting. The Israeli ambassador is expected to arrive somewhere and repeat the precondition set by Netanyahu, which is the disarmament of Hezbollah as a prelude to negotiation. And this demand will be supported and backed by the nature of the signals that Israel always sends through its ambassadors, especially in the Security Council and the United Nations. But this time, more clearly, that these Israeli demands and conditions are supported, indirectly, by the decisions of the Lebanese government, such as disarmament and steps in this regard, banning the military and security activities of Hezbollah and others, and declaring Beirut a disarmed city as a prelude to negotiation, and portraying that Israel, the Lebanese government, and official Lebanon are in agreement. The problem, however, is exclusively with Hezbollah. And this position, despite the fact that there are many enthusiastic or exaggerated people in the media who repeat this kind of talk, saying that we and Israel have no problems, only Hezbollah, ignoring the large number of problems between Lebanon and Israel, in addition to the issue and dispute over Hezbollah's weapons. However, official Lebanon, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the government, the key ministers, who commented on the start of the talks, did not say this. This is not their talk, and this is an Israeli tactic that is not new. We can go back to the Security Council sessions that preceded the issuance of Resolution 1701 in 2006, at the height of the July war, and the conflict was still ongoing. In the presence of the Lebanese envoy to the Security Council, who was then the Minister of Culture, Tarek Mitri, he delivered Lebanon's speech. As for the Israeli ambassador to the UN, his talk was always that we and you agree on everything, but the problem is Hezbollah, and the attempt to… Of course, to issue these images, and the Lebanese side would respond that this tactic is rejected. Our problems with Israel are one, two, and three. We will not dwell on this context, but this is what is expected, which is to take a picture. The occurrence of the meeting itself is something that benefits Israel more than Lebanon, in my opinion. And the setting of preconditions, which are still clear to Israel, there is no ceasefire before steps, primarily the disarmament of Hezbollah, which, in my opinion, is an impossible condition that Israel has learned. Because if the Israeli army, with its planes, drones, and all its technology, is still in the midst of this conflict and the ongoing fighting in Lebanon, in southern Lebanon more specifically, but in many areas, and it knows that the Lebanese government's capabilities are limited, and it knows the repercussions of involving the Lebanese security forces in a conflict with Hezbollah, and that this is actually a limit. In any case, all parties concerned with the decision in Lebanon, even Hezbollah, which is de facto concerned with the decision because it possesses weapons, and the Lebanese government, the President of the Republic, all of them are not considering this. And of course, the army leadership.
From the Lebanese side, it is also expected that Lebanon will reiterate the condition that was put forth in the President's initiative and the government's proposal in Lebanon: that any negotiation must be preceded by a ceasefire. This is the entry point for negotiation, of course. This is what Israel has rejected so far, openly and clearly. And the Lebanese side will rely, in my opinion, and I am still trying to figure out what this discussion will be like, as I imagine it will be very long. On the agreement to cease hostilities on November 27, 2024, which ended the 66-day war, and the Israeli violations of this agreement, and therefore the return to the point where we agreed that a ceasefire is the entry point and a condition that must be passed through to any future path. And things will stop here because I don't think there is a path now. The political path continues with side contacts behind the scenes, mostly through intermediaries, to see what the next step is. But I think that both the Lebanese and Israeli sides, but the Lebanese more so, of course, because the initiative is not available to it, it's not a matter of less for the Israeli side, but of course everyone is waiting for the ongoing negotiation, even behind the scenes, even through indirect channels, for the American-Iranian negotiation and for expected meetings. No one can be certain about them, but there is talk today from official Pakistani circles that preparations are being made to complete the American-Iranian negotiation in Pakistan in a second round. Now, in Lebanon, I think that despite all the rhetoric that rejects linking Lebanon to the negotiation taking place in Pakistan, of course, the faction opposing Hezbollah, Hezbollah, on the contrary, wants all of Lebanon to be in Pakistan, even though it has no invitation so far to go to Pakistan. But in reality, the attempt to enter the door of negotiation through the door of regional negotiation, we will see the extent of America's interest in even reaching this hypothesis. But in any case, the two parties in Lebanon are betting on the American-Iranian negotiations. Without Iran and America reaching an understanding, there is no conflict raging in the region, which is now on a two-week break. Let's see how it ends. I don't think there is any negative or positive horizon for any direct or indirect discussions. This is not to mention peace negotiations, because the two parties involved in this war, at least those who initiated it, Israel and America, if there is no understanding, at least from the American side, to end the conflict that began, why would there be any American interest? What would motivate America to exert any serious pressure to compel Israel to make any concession, even to start with a ceasefire, before we talk about anything else? Why would this happen? And without pressure and without this compulsion, there is no possibility, as stated in the statements of all Israeli officials concerned with the foreign and military situation of Israel, for a ceasefire to occur in the near future. I am not with the theories I always hear that Israel controls America all the time and manages America, etc. No doubt Israel has a great influence on American foreign policy towards the region, due to many factors that we will not delve into. Some of them have a cultural aspect among some religious universities in America, the influence of the Israeli lobby, financial pressure, and speculations about leverage from Epstein's files and others, which, in my opinion, are still in the realm of suspicion and speculation more than any tangible evidence that can definitively link these events. But America, regardless of all these pressures and Israeli influences on the American decision towards the Middle East, when it comes to American will and direct American interest, it is clear who is stronger in this relationship. I don't want to discuss much beyond the objective reasons that determine who is stronger: the size of the country, the size of the economy, the size of the army, the size of the influence, and other trade relations in the world, the world's need for whom more. There are many factors that one can use to determine the balance of power. But regardless of this, when America chose at some point that this genocidal war that is happening in Gaza needed to stop, it stopped, even though all the statements in Israel were not enthusiastic about stopping the ongoing aggression in Palestine, in Gaza. So when America intervenes, it resolves the dispute between the two parties, not because there is a strategic conflict between American interests and Israeli interests necessarily, but certainly there is a difference in interests. America is concerned with the end. I still don't say that this is the theory of the madman, that you portray yourself as having broken free from all controls to scare those you want to fight or negotiate with. But there is something approaching madness in Trump, not that he is playing the role of a madman. His problem is that the theory is supposed to work, you shouldn't be mad playing this role. He still doesn't understand the vital American interests that necessitate this conflict that he has opened in the region. And are these interests related to oil and China? I am not… I mean, it's not that I'm not convinced. If one follows the numbers related to oil and China's need for it, specifically from Iran, it's simple. We mentioned it in a previous video that China's third most important energy source is oil, first is coal, second is renewable energy, and third, which it relies on, is oil and its derivatives. Between 10% and 13% of the total oil that comes from this third category comes from Iran. And China has direct interests with the entire Gulf and with other countries in this region. That's why some people ask why China is not directly involved in the conflict. Of course, China's interest is to maintain balances, especially with a country like Iran in the region, but not at the expense of entering into a military conflict that threatens its relations with other parties, which, as I read recently about China's investments in the Gulf, are around 4.5 to 5 trillion dollars. So this is a balancing act that China always performs, and this is part of what explains China's calm and low-profile performance, even though it has clear roles in negotiation and even in helping Iran to some extent. Most of China's oil comes from Russia, part comes from Malaysia, part comes from Brazil, part from the Emirates, part from Saudi Arabia. I think Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. The Strait of Hormuz, of course, largely affects Iran and Iraq as primary exports, and also partially the Emirates. But if we combine these three elements, they reach a significant number, 25%. But if we put it in context, is this 25% of China's oil that it can find alternative markets for, whether from Russia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, from which it also imports, or any other country in the world that has export capacity, more impactful than the costs that America has imposed on itself and on the global economy by waging war? In any case, this question is open. Let's close these two threads we opened. If the reliance of the two parties in Lebanon, besides the reliance of Lebanon and Israel, remains for any political path between the two parties to have any future, it is to advance. And the possibility of advancement is linked to the progress of the discussions and negotiations taking place in Pakistan. Even in Lebanon, the two parties to the conflict, the two parties to this dispute and division, are relying. Some people talk, some don't, about negotiations in Pakistan, but each has a different horse they are betting on. There is a team that places its bet on the American side in this negotiation. There is a team that places its bet on the Iranian side. In what sense, and why? This is the path that one should keep an eye on more than the formalities that we will see today in Washington. I think in Washington, I don't know if it's New York or Washington, but my memory says Washington. The idea is that the difference in betting is on whom you are betting on, in the possibility that if America agrees to most of the conditions that Iran demanded, except for the Lebanese issue entirely, will Iran stall the negotiation for this point? This is a question mark. But the question also turns: if Iran agrees with the United States of America on most of the points of disagreement, except for the Lebanese issue, will America also suspend the agreement so that the separation of Lebanon from any understanding, which may only be a ceasefire and not solutions, continues? So here, both parties concerned in Lebanon are waiting for what will happen. Israel certainly, and the entire region, for different reasons, but we are talking about our story now. Let's see what will happen in Pakistan to understand the framework within which we understand our margin of movement here. Our Lebanese margin may be smaller, but the margin of movement in the ongoing conflict, without this understanding, if the understanding comes, it will open a framework for one to see what the horizon is, what the path is, what the achievable possibilities are in the near future. We have negotiations with Israel, but regardless of whether we reach negotiations or not, a ceasefire and opening a political path to address this war that has been ongoing for more than a month and a half. Or the worst-case scenario is if the negotiations between America and Iran fail, because here, in addition to the conflict returning to square one in the Middle East, we don't know what the scenarios are. This is while all indications suggest that neither America nor Iran is enthusiastic about returning to this level of conflict and the open fire circle, due to the costs for each of them, quite simply, politically, militarily, and economically, currently. But even in the foreseeable future, if we reach this scenario and the negotiations fail there, I think Lebanon will be in the unknown. The Lebanese-Israeli path alone, Israel is not enthusiastic about peace with Lebanon at all, only a ceasefire. Peace is the second point, and this is evidenced by Israel's disregard for the Lebanese messages that have been ongoing for months requesting negotiation. Because the current reality is that Israel has freedom of movement in the South and anywhere in Lebanon with its planes, its intelligence, its military operations, its assassinations, and its occupation of parts of Lebanese territory. This is much better for Israel and offers Israel much more than anything Lebanon could offer in peace with Israel. And this was the same with Syria, which, despite its readiness for negotiation and discussion, Israel showed no enthusiasm for. The reason is that I play with the social fabric of Syria, as they are doing here in Lebanon, with evacuations. An evacuation happened recently, talking about areas by name of sects, not in areas that target a building. There are areas with a Shiite majority, talking about mixed areas. The same in Syria, protecting the Druze, Kurds, and others. You know how much minorities matter to them in Israel. You can see what they are doing to the minorities there. And the existence of military bases and a buffer zone, military bases overlooking the depth of Damascus, the depth of the political capital, is more important and better than anything that an agreement with Syria could offer. Because, at the very least, any agreement with Lebanon or Syria, no country in Lebanon or Syria would accept it. Israel would have to withdraw at least to the borders it was at before the recent conflict. So this path, without the regional leverage that allows it to have a party here, the American, regardless of opinion about it and its policies, is capable of setting borders for Israel and obligating it to certain commitments. Without it, neither the American has sufficient incentives nor the Israeli has the decisive desire to enter into any such path. And Lebanon, for its part, has no leverage, especially in light of its internal division. The problem, the great disaster we are living in, is that this open conflict over Hezbollah's weapons, the decision of peace and war, the defense strategy, national security, the strategy of national security, and other major titles, to distance this conflict, its local parties. Some of them find it easy to talk to the Iranians, and some find it easy to talk to the Americans or the Israelis more than they found it easy to talk to each other in the past 21 years, regardless of responsibilities. And in my opinion, there are enough responsibilities to distribute so that no one feels uninvited to this feast. This is all I wanted to say in this video. Waiting for today is a station, not that I underestimate the symbolism of things and meetings, but in depth and substance, the event that could affect our reality in Lebanon, negatively or positively, is not yet here.