Transcription
But I do have a lot of investigative information to share today. First, as I mentioned yesterday, we were able to take possession of the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder. That was at 9:57 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time. Our investigator, our local investigator, had immediately uh began uh a trip down to our headquarters in Washington D.C. to take the CVR and FDR uh to our labs for downloading and for analysis. We do have some preliminary information to share from the final three minutes of the from the cockpit voice recorder. And again, I just want to say it's preliminary and is subject to change. And for that, I'm going to turn that piece over to Doug Brazy.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. The airplane was equipped with an Acron Aviation model Survivor 25 cockpit voice recorder and an Acron Aviation model FA21000 flight data recorder. The cockpit voice recorder contained more than 25 hours of good quality audio across four separate channels. The flight data recorder contained approximately 80 hours of data and recorded more than 400 parameters. The NTSB will convene a cockpit voice recorder group scheduled for tomorrow at the NTSB headquarters in Washington D.C. to review the accident flight recording and produce a written transcript. The following is a summary of events captured on the cockpit voice recorder during the final 3 minutes of the recording. All times are referenced to the end of the CVR recording.
3 minutes and 7 seconds prior to the end of the recording, the approach controller instructed the airplane to contact LaGuardia Tower. At 2 minutes and 45 seconds, the flight crew lowered the landing gear. At 2 minutes and 22 seconds, the flight crew checked in with the LaGuardia Tower. At 2 minutes and 17 seconds, the LaGuardia Tower cleared the airplane to land on runway 4 and advised that they were number two for landing. At time 152, 1 minute and 52 seconds, the flight crew set the flaps to 30°. At 1 minute and 33 seconds, the flight crew set the flaps to 45°. At 1 minute and 26 seconds, an electronic 1,000 call out occurred from the enhanced ground proximity warning system, indicating that the airplane was 1,000 ft above the ground. At 1 minute and 12 seconds, the flight crew confirmed that the landing checklist was complete. At 1 minute and 3 seconds, an airport vehicle made a radio transmission to the tower, but that transmission was stepped on by another radio transmission. And the source of that of the of who made that transmission has yet to be identified. At 54 seconds, the flight crew acknowledged that the airplane was 500 ft above the ground and on a stable approach. At 40 seconds, the LaGuardia Tower asked which vehicle needed to cross a runway. At 28 seconds, truck one made a radio transmission to the tower. At 26 seconds, the tower acknowledged that radio transmission. At 25 seconds, truck one requested to cross runway 4 at taxiway delta. At 20 seconds, the tower cleared truck 1 and company to cross runway 4 at taxiway delta. At 19 seconds, an electronic 100 enhanced ground proximity warning system call out occurred. At 17 seconds, truck one read back the runway crossing clearance. At 14 seconds, an electronic 50 call out. At 12 seconds, an electronic 30 call out. And at that same time, the tower instructed a Frontier Airlines flight to hold position. At 11 seconds, an electronic 20 call out occurred. And at 10 seconds, an electronic 10 call out occurred. At 9 seconds, tower 1 instructed, excuse me, the tower instructed truck one to stop. At 8 seconds, there was a sound consistent with the airplane's landing gear touching down on the runway. At 6 seconds, there was a pilot transfer of controls from one pilot to the other. And at 4 seconds, the tower again instructed truck one to stop. At 0 seconds, the recording ended.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Brazy had mentioned that 6 seconds before the end of the recording, the pilot transferred controls. Uh we do know that the first officer was flying and transferred control to the ca the captain. With respect to aircraft rescue and firefighting operations, uh we will be developing a timeline of events. Uh we do know that they were responding to a United Airlines flight 2384 at the gate uh which had two aborted takeoffs and uh the ARF or the aircraft rescue and firefighters had received information that there were fumes or a smoke or some sort of smell in the cabin. So they were in route to address that truck one uh which uh Mr. Brazy had mentioned had collided with the aircraft. We do know that there were other vehicles behind truck one which did not begin to cross the runway. We have seen varying uh information about how many vehicles. So we don't we need to verify that information and we'll provide it at a later time. Truck one, however, did not have a transponder.
With respect to air traffic control, we have seen different information about how many certified professional controllers were in the facility. Uh, and we need to verify that in starting with interviews this afternoon. We'll begin to interview the local controller at 4:00 this afternoon. We do have logs, but there's also conflicting information, including dates and times on the logs. So, now we have to go through that and and rectify uh some of those inconsistencies. We do however know that there were two people in the cab, two people in the tower cab at the time of collision, the local controller and uh the controller in charge. Again, local controller and controller in charge. For those who may be watching and aren't familiar with aviation, the local controller manages active runways and the immediate airspace surrounding the airport. That local controller had signed on at 10:45 and was the shift would have ended at 6:45 a.m. Uh that doesn't mean that he was in position at 6:4 at 10:45, but that he had just signed in at 10:45 p.m. The controller in charge is responsible for safety of operations. All safety of operations at at he had clocked in or signed in at 10:30 p.m. Uh, and that shift would have ended at 6:30 p.m. I mean, sorry, 6:30 a.m. Uh, again, that was signing in at 10:30 p.m. The controller in charge was also doing the duties of the clearance delivery position that the clearance delivery controller provides pilots with their departure clearance. It is not clear who was doing the who was conducting the duties of the ground controller. We have conflicting information. We have some information saying it was the controller in charge. We have some information saying it was the local controller. The ground controller duties are that they manage all aircraft and vehicle movements on the taxiways and that generally excludes active runways. So these two positions were combined into two positions. And what we do know is that that is in the standard operating procedures for LaGuardia. It's for the midnight shift. It's also common practice across the national airspace where you would have two controllers in the tower cab during the midnight shift. The midnight shift, as a reminder, is one that we have uh many times that the NTSB raised concerns about with respect to fatigue. Again, I do not know. We do have no indication that was a factor here, but it is is a shift that we have been focused on in past investigations.
Now, we also know as I had mentioned yesterday that LaGuardia has ASDX. ASDX is a runway safety system which allows air traffic controllers to track surface movement of aircraft and vehicles. Yesterday I mentioned that we requested from FAA the ASD replay of the event that is a replay of the display of information that would have been available in the tower cab. We also asked the tech center for the ASD analysis of ASD. Their analysis shows that the ASDX system did not alert. The analysis, and I'm going to quote the analysis here. I will repeat it a second time. ASDX did not generate an alert due to the close proximity of vehicles merging and unmerging near the runway, resulting in the inability to create a track of high confidence. Again, the analysis is quote, "ASDX did not generate an alert due to the close proximity of vehicles merging and unmerging near the runway, resulting in the inability to create a track of high confidence." Now, I saw the replay and there were two targets, so radar, because there's no transponder, you have radar. Uh so two targets with radar uh returns on taxiway delta. What it looks like on a replay are two blobs on tra on taxiway delta. We also don't see any of them go in front of the plane on the runway. Uh we do also know from the replay that the runway status lights were functioning according to the replay and uh but we still have to verify that with tech ops from the FAA.
Now I do want to address one thing which is reports of distraction. I have seen a number of reports from press about distraction whether there was distraction among controllers. Look, this is I would caution pointing fingers at controllers and saying distraction was involved. This is a heavy workload environment. You had a United Airlines flight. We still have to determine what happened at shift change which was around 10:30. We have to determine who else was in the tower and the facility and available at the time. We know uh that that controller was still on duty for several minutes afterwards. Normally, they would be relieved. We have questions about that. Was anybody available to relieve that controller? We don't know that yet. We also uh have questions about what else was occurring, what other traffic uh they were uh dealing with at the time. So, one thing I will uh close with before I take questions is we rarely if ever investigate a major accident where it was one failure. Our aviation system is incredibly safe because there are multiple multiple layers of defense built in to prevent an accident. So, when something goes wrong, that means many many things went wrong. And so, here that's why we're here. We're here to prevent this from reoccurring. Uh prevent this from happening again and that's going to take some time. So with that, I will take questions. I ask that you raise your hand, state your name and your affiliation.
Team of CNN. Given the fact that combining control positions has been a factor in previous incidents that you've investigated, including the DCA airport, what would you say now that you know in the control on Sunday night? Is that a safe practice and does it make you upset that position?
So there's a little bit of a difference in the question is on combining positions because we saw the combining of positions in the midair collision in uh that occurred uh near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport about a year ago. Uh this our understanding right now and again this is preliminary and subject to change. Our understanding is that in the DCA midair there were procedures followed uh a a list like traffic volume, staffing available, training, uh workload that was considered in order to combine positions like the helicopter position and the local control position in DCA. In this situation for the midnight shift, it is standard operating procedure that they only have two on duty and those two perform the duties of other controllers. That is our understanding right now. However, we're going to further dig into that as part of our investigation. Certainly, I can tell you that our air traffic control team has stated this is a problem that this is a concern for them for years. That they have had this concern for quite a long time. I can understand it's a concern especially if there's a heavy workload.
SDX did not work and during the near collisions of 2023, you repeatedly said that SDF should be more important prevention. How upset does it make you that it's clear that it did not work in this?
Well, the question is uh how upset does it make me that ASDX didn't work? Because we've repeatedly recommended that ASDX work well. In order for ASDX to work well, you have to know where ground vehicles and and aircraft are. So, in this case, that ground that vehicle did not have a transponder and it would have been helpful when you have a radar when you have a uh radar target. It is. It does not provide you with the information that you need like it would for an aircraft as a controller.
Yes. Jackson with Canada. Is there any indication from the boys or reporters? The pilots saw the fire were aware that was on the runway.
Is there any indication from the CVR that the pilots saw the fire truck on the runway? We I don't have information at this time on that. However, we are doing further analysis on our cockpit voice recorder. uh we have a group that we have formed that will analyze the CVR and part of when they analyze is they will they will talk in the group about what they're hearing uh what they've heard any sort of background noises and we'll provide a transcript and then we'll release that publicly so we'll know more then.
From NBC4 New York WBC with regard to the midnight shift is it literally a midnight shift if that you've expressed uh concerns about it in the past or is it sort of that later shift when there's typically less traffic at an airport? The reason I ask it is around this time late at night on a Sunday night at LaGuardia, there are still lots of arrivals to that degree, does that raise questions about the protocol and staffing here at this airport?
Well, uh, so the question is, uh, about the shift and are we just concerned about that shift in the past or would there be other shifts? Uh, and does it make sense to have uh, two controllers in the cab with such a busy uh, airport and this be sort of standard operating procedures and common practice across the national airspace. I think I restated it accurately and have now forgotten what you asked me. But on on on your standard operating procedure on the standard operating procedures, look, LaGuardia is 900 flights, I believe, per day. That's pretty substantial. It's not the same as other airspace or uh other airports across the national airspace. That's certainly something we will look at as part of this investigation. How that would would that make sense, you know, why would that make sense at LaGuardia? We we will that is part of our analysis in this investigation. And what was the other one?
Oh, on the midshift, we have we have identified the midshift generally as concern in other investigations largely due to fatigue because it spans that time frame at your circadian low during your day the day when you're most fatigued.
Madam >> yes, we're talking about airports. So um secretary is there as well. But when I refuse to speak about the responsibility that this uh agents are having the powers I'm trying to think do they know that the other person is doing the other responsibility? Is there a moment that they confuse as to who is doing what since they're doing more than one responsibility at a time? Do we know both were trying to help the same emergencies whether it was the crews or the runway?
Uh the question was could there potentially be confusion among the two controllers of who's having what discussion and could it be that they were both having the same uh communications or different communications or conflicting information communications more than one job >> since they're doing more than one job? Uh that I can't answer that right now because that's something we have to investigate as part of this uh accident scenario. Uh those are the exact types of questions that we'll ask uh when we interview the controllers, both the two that were in the cab at the time and the other controllers that may have been on duty either and include previously or u after that. One thing I want to do is come back to something that uh Pete asked about which is controllers and the information they should have and uh asdx in our past uh recommendations. Controllers should have all the information and the tools to do their job. All the information they need. We've recommended asdx but you have to have information on the ground movements or you know whether that's aircraft or vehicles moving on the airport in taxiways on runways. They should have all the information. This is 2026. You know, the secretary talks about upgrading our air traffic control system. We have an old air traffic control system. This is why he talks about that. We need to upgrade, but we also need to improve safety across the air. It's not just air traffic control. It's safety all around.
Yes. Chairperson, that shows a different news. I'm wondering is it common for ground crowd vehicles to have transponders and and second what does it mean that a transmission range transmission was stepped on okay uh with respect to transponders the question is is it common for ground vehicles to have transponders I don't have the latest figures on that I would suggest speaking with the Federal Aviation Administration on that or you can contact Eric and we'll get back to you on numbers should they that's something we'll determine as part of our investigation And I will tell you uh that not having a recommendation. Yeah, they should even though we don't have a recommendation uh air traffic controllers should know what's in you know before them whether it's on airport surface or in the airspace they should have that information to ensure safety. Now that's not an NTSB recommendation. So I want to be clear but it could be we don't know. Uh and your other question on stepped on the communication was stepped on interfere like it it means there may have been a mic key or some sort of interference or interruption of the transmission.
Because somebody else on the other uh why would that be significant? He was asking the question on uh what does stepped on mean with respect to communications. That would be significant because that would mean that somebody may not hear the other part of that communication.
Yes, sir. Oh, I went go ahead. If I may, does the data recorder give any indication that the pilots made any attempt at action?
Uh, and you're probably asking about the flight data data recorder. We don't have information the download from the flight data recorder yet. That group, I believe, is getting together today to start going through the data. We do have good data, but they're going to start looking at it today and we'll provide further information uh down the line.
You and then you >> uh similar to that question, New York Times, was there any uh evidence that the truck tried to swerve or break one?
I'm sorry, I didn't hear you. Uh can I confirm the names of the pilots who passed away? No. I would refer you to the New York City Chief Medical Examiner. We don't confirm uh any fatalities, injuries, or names. Uh and your other question, >> the truck, did he turn and break the evidence?
Uh with respect to the truck, did the truck turn and break or break? Uh I've probably seen the same CCTV video that you have. We have to uh do some further investigation on that, including interviews of uh both firefighters that were on board. Uh, and right here >> is slightly different from that guys in Montreal. Do we know if the two people in the truck hurt the stop when they were saying the direct to stop truck one?
The question is, do we know if the two firefighters in the uh firefighting vehicle heard uh the directive to stop? We don't know that yet. We need to do interviews of those uh two firefighters.
David sharers in 2023 you held a forum on runway incursions and near miss and as a result the FA rolling out this runway um runway encryion devices memory controllers do you know if that was here or any other additional technology to help and as part of that if ADSB didn't know been mandated do you think proposed fire truck that
Uh the first question on other technology that would have been available to alert to the controllers. I'm not I don't have that to provide at this time. Our uh investigators have to begin uh their analysis. Again, this is our first full day on scene and we're not even through the the day, but we will have more information on what types of technology might be have been available to them. The qu the second question is is on whether ADSB in and out would have helped prevent this. I would just caution and I've heard the discussion on ADSB in and out with respect to this particular uh collision. It happened very quickly uh and uh we need to match up times. We need to look at visibility uh with respect to uh the airplane coming in and look at uh uh the movement and visibility of those in the truck. Uh so we can't say at this time whether that would have made a difference or not.
Thank you chair. Can I ask one question about transponder? One question. Any indication as to why truck one did not have a transponder when other trucks did in that area?
Uh and let me clarify the question is on transponder on that truck. We have no indication there were transponders on any of the trucks. Uh so but there are transponders on other trucks at other airports uh you know across uh the nation. In this case they did not have transponders >> part of the investigation. Thank you so much.
All right. That's probably uh the first press conference where we actually got some really good information from the NTBS NTSB chair there uh Jennifer Hamundee on the um just the the heartstoppping uh crash of that Air Canada jet and firet truck at LaGuardia airport. But I want to bring in ABC News transportation reporter Sam Sweeney, also aviation analyst John Nance. Uh also um uh Mick uh M actually and also Mike McCormack who uh worked in air traffic control for years in New York. Worked it during uh 9/11. And uh Mike, we were just talking uh in the last 30 minutes about this press conference coming up, hoping that we were going to get more information. you are truly my expert because you have been an air traffic controller. You teach now you're bringing up the next generation of air traffic controllers. Now that we heard Jennifer Hammedy uh go through minute by minute um of of what was heard, said, and seen before and after that crash. Tell me what you think about the fact that she said all the info and all the tools that these air traffic controllers should have had, they didn't have and that she also made the point we have an old ATC system and it must be upgraded for these exact reasons. So, let's just back up. You heard everything. What stands out to you? And I have a number of notes I made and questions about things that she said.
Cara, it was a excellent briefing from the chairperson and as you mentioned lots of good information. I think one of the first things that really stand out for me is that it's just a matter of seconds less than 10 seconds that this action really transpired in. So it would have taken extraordinary action in order to catch the error and correct it before it resulted in collision. The second clarifying piece of information was the fact that there were two controllers in the control tower at the time of the event. one working the controller in charge position which is providing oversight to the operation and one working the local control position and that the ground control function appears to have been combined with the local control function but yet to be determined because as it the chairperson mentioned there are discrepancies in the logs that the controllers use to track who's working what position at what time. The next thing is the ASDX, airport surface detection equipment. And there were two crash, fire, and rescue vehicles identified on the CCTV replay. One is truck one and the other one they call truck one and company. And because of the fact that they're moving next to each other, it's causing the ASDX not to pick them up as a single target and then provide an alert to the controller. And that's where we talk about technology. There should be technology available integrated into the ADX at the Guadia airport that would take care of that. So you heard mention ADSB that's that is a surveillance system that is highly accurate and has been integrated in other ASD systems across the United States. So if you have a vehicle that is equipped with automatic dependent surveillance B and that aircraft and that vehicle can be picked up by the ASI and alerts can be provided. So, I would expect there will be more questions asked and more recommendations around that technology.
Got it. And let me ask you too um about truck one didn't have a transponder. Um I'm reading up on why it's important to have a aviation uh transponder and it looks like if you don't have that then you're not visible on ATC radar systems. What What did you make of her saying or make of the of the point that she made? that this truck didn't have a transponder.
There are two forms of radar surveillance that air traffic control utilizes and they're coll-located on the same antenna. The one as the chairperson mentioned is primary and that is simply sending out a radio beam and getting echo return back to the system and that's what SCX was picking up. A transponder is a piece of equipment on board an aircraft or a vehicle in which the radio beam goes out and is interrogated by that piece of equipment and it sends a specific signal back to the radar that identifies that vehicle or that aircraft specifically and is able to more finely be tracked by surveillance systems to provide that information to controllers.
Got it. Okay, John Nance, taking into account what Mike uh just told us, what were your thoughts after you listened to all the details here uh from the NTSB chair?
First and foremost is the fact that this is almost a textbook example of when you're able to get good data out of the uh flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder. And we know now that we've got enough that they're going to be able to piece this together microscond practically by microcond. That's not really the correct reference, but basically the seconds are awfully long when you've got uh something like 9 seconds for this whole sequence. They're going to be able to reconstruct this in such a way that then the question turns not only to communications, what was said, who said it, and when was it heard or not understood or not heard in terms of the firetruck, uh it's going to be able to get into human factors. Now, there's a very very important point here, and I'm sure Mike would agree with this. There there is a flaw in our air traffic control system that's been there from the very first. And that is that we have expected 100% perfect performance from human beings 100% of the time. They're fantastic. Our our controllers can do incredible things, but they're still human and they still make mistakes. So how mistakes occurred and how we might have interdicted by having a better system are also going to be one of the key questions that will be answered here.
Yeah. And I do wonder if after this and after hearing from the NTSB chair uh that we will see an old ATC system uh finally upgraded. Sure sounds like it's time. John Nance, Mike McCormack.