Transcription
Noor Zai or Achakzai, who dares to have Afghan National 500 to 500, like armies with a few lakhs in a 25 km area of Quetta. Perhaps some intelligent people in the state think this is a very easy and cheap way to beef up security, but I think this is a repackaging of the good Taliban policy. So, it is important to recognize that Pakistan is not in an easy position. You can neither leave comfortably nor retreat comfortably. Now, Islamabad is not so weak that we told you for 15 years and now you are acting innocent. Why would the Afghan Taliban, Ali, what used to happen was that if the TTP ran short of suicide bombers, they would exchange with the TTP, whose cooperation and coordination was so close. Today, you are acting innocent and saying that we did not expect this. We told you. Who is a well-wisher of this country who would mobilize former Afghan National Army personnel as armed groups and deploy them in areas? Does it make any sense that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has no appetite to fight with the Taliban? The popularity of PTI is not necessarily based on consensus on the Taliban point. That consensus is otherwise an anti-establishment trend in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa right now against state repression. It is based on the fact that whenever the state claims in response to any action that so many people have been killed, the relatives of the missing persons go and demand the bodies because the missing persons in state custody are killed. That, you know, I have to write on my forehead every day that I do not support this. You have made it impossible for us because every time we conduct an operation, you will say that you have brought our missing persons and put them in it, and we will have to delegitimize it whenever we bring it up. You know, this burden falls on you. Let's say, for the sake of argument, I agree with you that the job of BYC is just this, but your job is that your trust in citizens should increase. This government was not formed when, in the beginning, in Balochistan, the way the setup was made, I told a responsible person that you are, God forbid, handing over Balochistan on a platter to the insurgents.
Viewers, greetings. Ali Wasi is once again present before you on the platform of Naya Daur. With me today is Rafiullah Kakar, a young man from the United Kingdom. And the reason is that Rafi Bhai is among those unheard voices who also belong to Balochistan. He understands Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and insurgency very well. And for this reason, I have invited him today because, in the past few days, there have been some contradictory things, and he himself has written a long Facebook post. He has also highlighted some things on Twitter about the current situation north of Balochistan. We are seeing a rapid surge in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan, which has been going on for a long time since the Jaffar Express, but now it seems to be accelerating further. Why is this happening? We will try to understand it a little. Thank you very much, Rafi Bhai. Thank you, Ali. Thank you very much for inviting me. Okay, Rafi, tell me, a few days ago, I saw your post on Facebook where you mentioned that in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan, in the suburbs of Quetta, a large number of TTP members have gathered, and on the other hand, the state of Pakistan has started preparing some Afghan National Army personnel, according to the TTP's own claim, against them, and they are fighting there. First, tell me, how do you see this situation there? Then I will ask you further questions. Thank you very much. See, in the last three to four years, since the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, the emergence of the TTP here has been gradual and slow in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan, such as Yub Qila, Sifullah, and Qila Abdullah. We have seen targeted attacks on cantonments, FC security check posts, and sometimes police stations. But they were on a very limited scale. In the last three to four months, there have been reports from people living there, local tribes, and communities, that on the northern side of Quetta, in the mountain range, which we call Takko Mountain, there has also been an emergence of TTP or TTP-like groups who declare themselves affiliated with the TTP. And in these three to four months, there have been several incidents where they clashed with the local communities. The local communities were forced, on one or two occasions, to take up arms and fight against them. Then, since they have more weapons and arms, they abducted some people, martyred some, and returned some. Along with this, we have also seen that in the last year, after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, most of the people from the old government have either gone to Europe, America, or other places. The lower cadres of the Afghan National Army or police have also come to these border districts. You know, many tribes live on both sides of the Durand Line, so they rely on their tribal networks. So they came this way, and they were in the areas across the border for the last four years. Now, in the last five to six months, we have seen this trend that these people have not only been organized but also armed. They have been given weapons, and they have been settled in places like Killi Beli near Quetta. Besides this, in Pishin, Saranan, Qila Abdullah, and ironically, in those refugee camps that were vacated by Afghan refugees, they have been settled. And apparently, it seems that the state is using these people as mercenaries for counter-insurgency or for other purposes of the state, including against TTP, BLA, and even for other purposes. I conclude by saying that the result of this is that since these people have been settled and imposed, they have also started harassing the local population and tribes, due to which people have also come out against them. There have been two or three protests against them in the last month, in which some have been removed from pockets. Then people came out in Saranan, there was a protest, and now there is news from yesterday that they are also being removed from there. And in the border districts, you will be surprised to know that under the name of an "Aman Force" (Peace Force), which Maulana Fazlur Rehman also alluded to, these former Afghans have been recruited, and it has been named a peace force. So, this is the situation.
Okay, I shared with you a few days ago on Raza Rumi's program, "Khabar Se Aage," on our channel. We have Hassan Khan, who is a journalist from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and also has his own YouTube channel. He explained it a bit in our program. He said that this is basically politics playing out in Kandahar. When the Afghan government, the National Government of Ashraf Ghani or Karzai, was in power, the Achakzai tribe was in power there, and they used to target the Nurzai tribe, who are primarily or predominantly pro-Taliban. They fled here, and that became a kind of Quetta Shura. Then, after they came to power in Kandahar, where Haibatullah Akhundzada is also from, the Achakzai tribe fled from there. And these Afghan National Army people, these lower cadres you are talking about, are fundamentally that Achakzai faction that fled here. And because the Achakzai is a very large tribe in Balochistan, these people are now coming to Pakistan for their targeting, and to respond to them, they themselves are coming. And the state, probably as you said, is using them. To what extent do you consider this a correct analysis? Thank you very much. There is no doubt that historically, tribal competitions or disputes have occurred here, and the Nurzai-Achakzai also had such a tussle. And the dominance of the Achakzai in the Kandahar region during the previous government is true. But to reduce what is happening now to this, I consider it not only simplistic but also baseless. The reason is this: firstly, many Achakzais are still here and are part of this regime. Although not in the majority as before. What is happening now is fundamentally a proxy war between two states, and whatever Pakistan considers its own interest, for example, Noor Zai, Achakzai, who dares to have Afghan National 500 to 500, like armies with a few lakhs in a 25 km area of Quetta. This is not a tribal backing powerful enough to arm and keep 500 Afghan Nationals as armies. This is obviously the patronage of the Pakistani state. And the journalist who wrote this, actually, two or three weeks ago, a very famous businessman in Quetta, a Nurzai businessman, was murdered. This statement was made on that basis. But the killer was caught just 10 days ago. His own cousin, a business partner, was also a Nurzai. So this statement was debunked anyway because that person was caught, and the police also revealed the whole story. So I think this is not a Nurzai or Achakzai problem. This is definitely a potential beginning of a proxy war between the Pakistani government and the Afghan Taliban, and it certainly points towards that. And in the past, this plausible deniability is now gone. Now, when the Taliban came, we admitted that we nurtured them for 20 years. So now I think we are doing the same thing in a different form, but using the same old excuses. So this armed group, as I said, for example, even in the hilly areas of Qila Saifullah or Yub, where there are no Achakzais or Nurzais, there are former Afghans in the peace force. So this is fundamentally a policy of the state to fight through proxies. And they also get paid; it's not that they are fighting for free. So perhaps some intelligent people in the state think this is a very easy and cheap way to beef up security, but I think this is a repackaging of the good Taliban policy, and it is as dangerous as the good Taliban policy was. And you know the consequences of this good Taliban policy that we are facing today.
In this, how responsible do you consider the Afghan government of the Taliban? See, people often tell us here that you liberal secular people always criticize the Pakistani state, but you don't see the responsibility of the Taliban in this, that people are coming from there and coming here. And this fact is established if the Taliban are sitting here, TTP, then incursions are happening from there, and the Taliban are failing to stop them, at least if they are not openly complicit with them. See, I am among those who have consistently opposed Pakistan's policy of good and bad Taliban for the last 20-25 years, that the Afghan Taliban is good Taliban and should be supported, and TTP is bad Taliban and should be opposed. And students like me have repeatedly written op-eds in the last 10-15 years predicting today's scenario, saying that if you bring the good Taliban to power, your bad Taliban will also become stronger. You are giving reverse strategic depth to the bad Taliban. If the Taliban come to power in Pakistan, any armed group that wants to do something in the name of religion or jihad will have an inspirational as well as a material support base. So exactly that is happening today. So I have no doubt that the TTP, and for that matter, any other religious group, might get some potential support, even test or indirect support at the public level or otherwise, from the Taliban government. But now there are two qualifications I want to make. First, we have been running the project of Talibanization so ruthlessly in our country for 40 years, in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, that its roots are very deep within your country. Even without any support from the Taliban there, these threats will remain. This is number one. The second qualification I want to make is that the state will have to think now. Before the Taliban came to power, we were drowning knee-deep in this quagmire. Now we are chest-deep in this quagmire. So it is important to recognize that Pakistan is not in an easy position. You can neither leave comfortably nor retreat comfortably. Which means that you have invested 25 years in the Taliban, brought them to power, you brought them. Now that you have brought them, show some patience, deal with it with some tact. It cannot be that now, if there is a blast here, it is basically Modi ji's doctrine that if there is a blast in Kashmir in India, there will be bombing in Pakistan. You have adopted that doctrine as it is, and you say that if there is a blast here, now I ask you, you ask me. I know that even if the Taliban cannot control the TTP 100% at this time, because the support network is the same, the ideology is the same, they fought together for 20 years, their foot soldiers are with them. So now, at the state level, you have to show some combination of tact and patience instead of sitting with a stick. This is not some software that you can update by pressing a button. It doesn't get updated. You have to bear the consequences of the 25 years of effort you put in with them.
Okay, they say that we brought them to power, and we brought them to power thinking that they would control the TTP. Just a few days ago, I was watching an interview of Salman Javed. He has a very nuanced view of the TTP and the Taliban. He says that the Afghan Taliban thought that just as Pakistan accepted them, they would have no problem accepting the TTP as well. It came as a shock to them as well, what happened.
No, Ali Bhai, see, Ali Bhai, see, Rafiullah Kakar, a humble student like me, understood this for the last 15 years that these two are one. Every Pashtun nationalist party told you that they are one. Today, you are acting innocent, saying we thought they would do this. Brother, how did you think that? We were screaming and telling you. I can send you how many op-eds of mine from the last 15 years with confidence, with humility but with confidence, in which I predicted 100% of today's scenario, that this is going to happen to you. The problem is, see, these people, Mr. Javed, whatever their value, these people, number one, your PML-N Punjab's civilian leadership is not even asked. This Afghan cell, two or three generals sit and make policies, and civilian people are made scapegoats, that you just accept and propagate. If political people were asked, they would understand. They would understand me. Now Islamabad is not so weak that we told you for 15 years and now you are acting innocent. Why, Afghan Taliban, Ali, what used to happen was that if the TTP ran short of suicide bombers, they would exchange with the TTP, whose cooperation and coordination was so close. Today, you are acting innocent and saying that we did not expect this. We told you. Let's forget the past. Whatever happened in the past is in the past. Even today, we are telling you the same thing. Tell me, which intelligent person, which well-wisher of this country, would mobilize former Afghan National Army personnel as armed groups and deploy them in areas? Does it make any sense? I think no civilian person, even from PML-N, can defend this from the heart, but why are they not asked? And they become uncles and aunties for free when someone else makes the policy. They are not asked first. People like us are screaming from the periphery, telling them that this is happening. Yesterday, Maulana Sahib told you in a full rally that we are being asked to form lashkars. You don't believe it then. You boast later when the work is done. They are not asked, nor is their input taken. The real thing is that the two or three people sitting and making this policy, forget the past. Today, you are again creating these armed groups, pushing out daily wage Afghan refugees, and arming again those against whom you nurtured the Taliban for 25 years. And who has to pay the price for this? The people of Pashtunkhwa have to pay the price. And I think this is also an important dimension. Since your viewership is higher in Punjab or proper Pakistan, look at this now. What policy is this? No civilian leader will agree, but they are not asked. You have completely stopped trade on the Afghan border. Now, leave aside the rest, take agriculture. Punjab's kinnow, Punjab's fruit, Punjab's mango. We don't have the standard here to export all of this to Europe. You don't meet any regulatory standards, sanitation standards. Afghanistan was the only place left, along with a few central Asian countries, where all of this used to go. You have caused billions of rupees in losses to the farmers of Punjab. The entire economy of Pashtunkhwa depends on it. Leave that aside, but no one can question it. Everyone knows why. Because they are just mouthpieces for those who make the policies. With utmost respect, but then a question arises. You advise that you have to show patience, but they say that we have had more than 200 rounds of talks with them for three and a half to four years. We talk to them about one thing, they accept it, and then they don't abide by it. Then we recruit people from the Afghan National Army into some militia, as you said. You say carry out airstrikes somewhere, or you say shut down their taps, close all their businesses, stop their trade. Suggest some solution, that this method will work, or a holistic one, but at least there should be some way out.
See, as I said, there is no quick fix here. We were knee-deep in the quagmire, now we are chest-deep. I don't have a quick fix, and neither does anyone else. My own theory is, and people get angry about it, but my estimate is, may God prove me wrong, that as long as a group like the Taliban remains in power in Afghanistan as a militia, such threats will continue to emerge here. Now the question is, you have no options. You have to manage with these options. So what is the first one? The first one is, as I said, this patience means that you have shown such a hard-state policy to Afghanistan. You sent 20-25 lakh Afghan refugees in just one year. What is their condition here, and they are all potential recruits for the TTP. Good, border trade is closed, this is closed, this will not work. First, you have to realize that the plant you have planted, the TTP and TTA, it is difficult to separate them like software. You have to be empathetic to them as well. So you need both the carrot and the stick. And a little bit, since Pakistan is militarily powerful at the moment, you give the impression to the Afghan Taliban or even the Afghans that you are powerful, we will do what we want. It makes no difference to them. On the contrary, you are pushing your last group, with whom you have some historical ties, towards India. So you have no quick fixes. I am saying I don't have a quick fix. This is what the state is doing, it will worsen the problem, not fix it. That patience and carrot and stick mean that you have to work with them to identify the exact demand. Just as we demand from India, the exact demand we make from India is: "Show us proof, which group went from our side, and tell us which people are there. We will work with you to create a credible mechanism and take action against them." India also takes the stance that we don't trust anything you say. If there is an attack here, Modi sahib says we will attack there. So, the same leniency or empathy that we demand from India, show the same empathy and leniency to the Taliban. The Afghan Taliban are in a position to take action against the TTP. I don't think they can take any quick, major action against them, unfortunately. But the Afghan Taliban have an incentive, and that incentive is that the Afghan Taliban's interest lies in remaining in power in Afghanistan for a long time and having a sustainable power-sharing mechanism. For that, it is necessary to have good partnerships with Pakistan and neighboring countries. So they have an interest in maintaining good relations with Pakistan. So you have to help them gradually target and reduce TTP hideouts or their potential support bases through targeted actions. This is the matter of patience. It won't happen all at once. It can happen gradually by working together. Secondly, we also have to realize.
Yes, please. I am saying, then General Faiz was right. No, you are settling them now, you are settling the TTP in your areas. Absolutely not. I am not talking about settling the TTP. I am only saying, as I said, there are no two binaries here: either they settle or airstrikes begin. There is a lot in between, and these are the options. You have to explain this to me. Apply the same framework to Afghanistan that Pakistan's Foreign Office demands from India. The situation will improve slightly, and we should not show the arrogance of power and strength. This is a dangerous thing because drone warfare, the Iran-US conflict, has demonstrated that traditional power asymmetry has now decreased with the advent of drones. It is a matter of time before Israel partners with India there, and drones start coming, and the nuisance value of drones is as much as that of a large missile. So I think with the neighbors and with those, and I think this last point, if you give leadership to the Foreign Office as well, trust me, I know I keep talking to people in the Foreign Office. They will advocate for this approach. They will also provide you with a better way to deal with these situations. My own understanding is also the same, which I have from talking to two or three former diplomats with whom I am in contact. If you talk to them, they will endorse this policy of completely closing trade routes. But I talk to them like you said. You mentioned India's energy, which raises a question: why doesn't Pakistan listen to India? The reason is that India feels that Pakistan has a claim on Kashmir. This territorial claim is not ending. This is the same thing. And because of this, India does not want to solve a systemic or fundamental problem because essentially, they do not want to give Kashmir to Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan does not want to give any part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to them, even if the claim can be anything up to Attock. But in the tribal areas, in Waziristan, there are many areas that are completely adjacent, up to which they 100% want their writ to be established. In such a situation, when territorial claims arise, how much room is there to resolve these issues through talks?
Yes, this is a very good question. See, in the India-Pakistan case, for the last 25-30 years, especially from 1990 onwards, the fundamental issue is not territorial claims. Territorial claims are of course an issue in their own right. The fundamental issue was that Pakistan made asymmetric warfare its policy in its India policy, meaning it would fight India through proxies and militants. So, all the diplomacy and discussions of the last 20-25 years have been about: "Brother, you have to end this use of militant proxies as a tool of your foreign policy." And the Indian National Congress tried. Apparently, they felt they failed. Modi came and introduced a new red line.
It is being said that brother, set aside everything. If something like this happens next time, our answer will be exactly this. The issue with the Afghan Taliban at this moment is not that, oh brother, the Durand Line, it has been there for 78 years, since Pakistan was formed. Who has been harmed? So that is not the issue. The issue, as far as claims are concerned, is the fundamentally ultra-aggressive stance of Pakistan's state on the TTP and the defensive stance of the Taliban. This is the fundamental point. So I believe there are separate frameworks for territorial claims, they are discussed separately, bilaterally. The reason this issue is not being resolved here is not because the Taliban have territorial claims. The fundamental obstacle is, number one, as I said, that the Taliban cannot demonstrate much action even in the short term. Secondly, you will have to cut the roots of the "Taliban projects" that we have planted within Pakistan. We are not able to do anything here either. Those problems remain in their place, they are intact. Therefore, this problem is complex. It is a summary of our foreign and domestic security policies of 40-50 years. So it cannot be dealt with in such an oversimplified manner.
Correct, but that is there, isn't it? I am not specifically talking about the Durand Line. My intention was that in the tribal areas, these TTP people of ours, they also have some claims over the tribal areas, that our writ should be established here. Not necessarily changing the map of the region. It is that we will control the territory here. This is my question, how can we bypass this?
Yes, look, in my opinion, in my opinion, that is non-negotiable for any state. And secondly, for the people of Pashtunkhwa. Whenever you have given an opportunity to the people of Pashtunkhwa, overwhelmingly they have supported FATA reforms and FATA merger or FATA reforms. So if any TTP or any such armed group claims that you should undo this and hand it over to us, that is non-negotiable. There can be no discussion on this. So I believe that another thing also comes into this, which is that all our political parties, especially those from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or not just the nationalist parties of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, I am also talking about those parties that are national-level parties. PTI, PPP, even from PML-N I have not seen much enthusiastic support from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa chapter for the operation. And then ANP or JUI or Pashtun Tahafuz Movement. If you are not going to conduct an operation, and they are not listening to us in these regions, and these are areas where they are not only asserting their territorial claims but demanding them, and also asserting them through incursions or there, then your state machinery, attacks on its administration. So how do we solve this? I don't see any way.
Yes, look, this is a very good question, and it is an important question in this context. You have framed it correctly that on one hand, people are fed up with the TTP, they do not support it. The price of terrorism is being paid by ordinary people, civilian institutions, security institutions. On the other hand, there is no enthusiastic support among the people for military operations. Look, this is a very important point. This is where the legitimacy of the state comes in. Look, it cannot be that you arrest the true representatives of the people, beat them up, and impose people on them with whom they cannot relate. You impose false state propaganda. You give false news against every true news from Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan. Judge this. I mean, in which media in the world does this happen? In Pakistan's mainstream electronic media, currently, there is no position other than the government's. Amazing, man. It is the basic ethics of journalism that if you have called the Interior Minister, and there is a sit-in for five days, you should also call a participant of the sit-in. No. Now, where the state's legitimacy is almost non-existent, and matters are being run through artificial control, people will not believe what you say. And understandably, they will sometimes take the opposite meaning. Military operation means that you are basically... it is easy in regular warfare, isn't it? You are fighting in the enemy's territory. When you conduct such operations in your own country, among your own people, in your own area, you cannot do it until you have the support and trust of your people. Now, when people do not have trust and confidence in you, why would they support you? For that, you have to take people into confidence. And why is it necessary to take them into confidence? Because military operations also have a history, and that history is that they have been partially successful at best, partially successful. People, we cried out at that time too, saying brother, good and bad, good and bad. Today, that has proven true. Just as I am telling you today about Balochistan, you are cutting the branch of one tree and planting another, in the form of armed militants of the former Afghan National Army. In such a situation, when a few people are making policies, and a few people are implementing them, military operations or any kinetic measures are carried out without any supervision or transparency, and people do not express confidence in you, this is a natural and inevitable outcome. For this, you have to democratize the political space. You have to take the true representatives and stakeholders of the people into confidence, and with their consultation, then if you have to conduct a military operation or do something else, people's perspective will be included. Otherwise, what will happen? It cannot be that you are beating up the representatives of the people, putting them in jail, occupying their minerals and resources, and along with all these things, you expect that when you tell them that you want to fight terrorism, your commitment is genuine, people will believe it. I think this is a bit naive.
No, but at the same time, look, as far as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is concerned, I think there might have been some rigging in some seats, but the election results are predominantly what the public sentiment was. PTI won fair and square, I believe. And in this, it is possible that somewhere, to remove Mohsin Dawar, to keep him out of elections, or to keep him out of parliament, a JUI or a PTI person was made to win instead. Somewhere, if a PTI person was unacceptable, to make him lose, a JUI person was made to win. But I think 98-99 percent of the results are correct. So it is not that the government does not have legitimacy to the extent of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Yes, look, I used the word "state's legitimacy," not just the government's legitimacy. The state's legitimacy is in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which, by and large, I agree with your assessment, that PTI is a popular party. So what you are doing with PTI, PTI is not on board with you. And PTI, whether we like it or not, is currently the most popular party. So you have to give PTI that political space in order to bring them on board. It cannot be that on one hand, you have a gun to their head, and you have twisted their arm, and on the other hand, you are saying, "Come with us." They are not coming with you. Why are they joining you like this?
Look, Rafay Bhai, let me explain the question a bit. My question is that if you look at PTI's policy, I remember that in 2004, we probably started an operation in South Waziristan, and Imran Khan and Hamid Gul used to appear together on Hamid Mir's program, and they both used to sit and say, "These are our own people." Even though they were people of Al-Qaeda, and Khan Sahib used to say at that time that they are people of Al-Qaeda, but they have come here now, they have married here, meaning they have become our sons-in-law. Then, whether it was the operation of 2007, or the operation of 2009, or the operation of 2014, they had very lukewarm support. When they came to power, the entire policy, perhaps the reason for bringing them to power was also this, in 2018, that this should be a seamless process for the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan. And they went out of power and became the political arm of the TTP. And that party, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at least, has been the most popular party for the last 13 years. Now, in this, you can say that somewhere the consensus was manufactured by the state to bring them in. But right now, that is the case. In such a situation, one of the most popular parties is hand in glove with the TTP. What losses do Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and TTP have?
Look, first, regarding PTI's stance on TTP or the Taliban, I have the same concerns about your concerns. I have no other opinion on this. And people like us, when PTI was in power, used to express these concerns. Unfortunately, the stance of all mainstream political parties on the Taliban or TTP or Afghan policy has been largely the same. The only difference is that Imran Khan, whatever his flawed opinion and understanding, has shown consistency on it. Others, when they get a signal from Pindi, they act accordingly. That is, they support one policy in the government's national security policy. As soon as the military leadership changes, they oppose the next one. So, in this regard, everyone is the same. Now, keeping these concerns in mind, I believe, look, this is the way. PTI or whatever its stance is, it is not a justification for the crackdown at the national level that is happening against them, the space that the state has reduced for them. You give them that space. And if I were advising the state, I would say that if they think this should happen, give them full authority with the TTP, under a transparent process. Tell them to come, we are with you. And even give them the Interior Ministry. Say, "Come, do it this way, we are with you." And if the price comes, then PTI is responsible for it. And then let the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa decide whether they are satisfied with PTI's policy or what other parties bring alternative policies. So, theoretically speaking, I completely agree. Your concerns are also our concerns. But this is not an excuse, it is not a justification for you to continue what you are doing with PTI. Yes, give PTI a level playing field, like other political parties, so that we can hold them accountable. At this moment, or at least any sensible person cannot hold PTI responsible for today's situation. Their hands and feet are tied. And as for future fears, I know that PML-N also has them, PPP also has them, because everyone has followed these policies in the past. Only Imran Khan has been more vocal and consistent in this regard. So again, I don't have a quick fix for you, but the solution is... a call for action, a call for action.
But my intention was that look, regarding the other parties you mentioned, even ANP supported the Sharia bill. I don't think ANP is in support of the Taliban. Rather, ANP has paid the highest price. They fought alongside. Pakistan Peoples Party or PML-N, other parties, they have at least taken a pragmatic position that okay, if the state does not want to fight now, then we cannot fight. But in PTI's case, this is an ideological project. Imran Khan Sahib is completely with it. And my question is not this. I am not saying whether they are right or wrong. You, you might have said it with a different intention, but you said "flawed opinion," and I completely consider their opinion flawed. But whatever their opinion is, it seems like their conviction in that opinion. That this is how it is. And they are the most popular. Popular. Which is why I think there is no appetite in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for fighting the Taliban, for operations, or any other way.
No, I think we need to differentiate a bit here. The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have also made the most sacrifices for the Taliban, both before and now. And the fight to stop this onslaught of the Taliban, or its confrontation, is also, obviously, being fought by the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The PTM movement arose, what was it? It was an anti-war, anti-Taliban, anti-war movement. PTM expressed these concerns in 2018-19. What did we do with it? Awami National Party has made great sacrifices. So there are such forces. And I believe that PTI's popularity is not necessarily a consensus on the Taliban point. That consensus is otherwise an anti-establishment trend in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa against state repression. That is what it is. And it has not been done this way. And if there is any little consensus at the public level, the only way to test it, as I suggested to you, is to empower PTI, let them handle it their way, and then let the people decide whether they want this or not. Remember, the skepticism regarding military operations is very legitimate among the people. There has been a terrible history. PTM emerged as a result of these very military operations. What did we do with them? So we have to understand that without ensuring transparency, without making people stakeholders, if you conduct opaque military operations, no party in Pashtunkhwa will have genuine political support.
Thank you. Okay, let's move back from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan, so we can bring this to an end. You talked about legitimacy, and yesterday I was watching one of your podcasts in which you mentioned Iman Mazari and Mahring Baloch, and the reason was clear because you made your position very clear. But many people are asking you questions because you... you are more obliged to respond to them. The question is that regarding Mahring Baloch, people say that if Iran attacks in Balochistan, and Pakistan attacks Iranian territory, and people die there, then Mahring Baloch says that these were our brothers who were killed there. If people attack a Pakistani train, the Jaffar Express, which was carrying people from Quetta towards Punjab or Sindh, and an attack happens there, and BLA people are killed, and then the state of Pakistan conducts a retaliatory operation and kills them. Then she says that she claims the bodies, she says that these were our brothers, their bodies should be returned to us. Here, many people in Lahore, in Islamabad, who are mostly Punjabi, not mostly, but all of them, they say that if you have... because I have never seen any political leader in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa say that these TTP people who died are our people, return them to us. But there, we feel that Mahring Baloch's thinking is like this about the BLA people, or Akhtar Mengal is also being talked about these days. How do you see this? Don't you think the state would be justified in suspecting them of being a political arm? And obviously, her father also has a history, as you know.
Yes, look, again, feel free. Since such questions are in the minds of people in proper Pakistan, our aim is to debate openly, and it is not necessary that we agree. Welcome, appreciate. Look, first, as I have just given you a summary of the last month, what has happened in Balochistan, and not a single news item about these has reached proper Pakistan, neither in the media nor anywhere else. Now, what we see on the ground, this has been the trend for the last 20 years: whenever there is an attack somewhere on security institutions or on them, those terrorists who were not visible before, if they had known this much, they would have stopped the attack. Suddenly, it is known that so many people were killed in retaliation, and in this, the history has been that missing persons, who are already allegedly in state custody, are killed and their dead bodies are thrown away. This has happened not once, but many times. That is why this has become a predictable trend in Balochistan. Whenever the state claims in response to an operation that so many people have been killed, the relatives of the missing persons go and demand the bodies, because the missing persons who are in state custody are killed. That practice is established. So they go. This has been a practice. This has not happened for the first time. This has happened many times in the last 15 years. So, understandably, after the Jaffar Express, exactly the same thing happened: they went and said, "Whose bodies have you thrown? Please give them to us, share them." So this is no longer a problem. The problem is that ordinary citizens in proper Pakistan are not at fault. They don't know about Balochistan. The narrative on the media is conveyed by two or three official spokespersons of Balochistan, because of whom the situation has reached this point in the first place. They lie, they lie, they spoil things. Okay, secondly, I want to talk about this. Look, Ali, you have seen the last 20-25 years of war and terror in the Western world. Now, what trend has started in the Western world? Let's say, if there is a suspected terrorist attack somewhere in France, and a Muslim appears on a Western channel anywhere in the world, the first question to him is: do you condemn it or not? Now, they don't ask this question to a non-Muslim white person. Now, why is this question asked? This is that colonial mindset that believes in collective responsibility. That is, if someone did something there, and because he was a Muslim, then all Muslims in the world are either with him, or if not, then it is the responsibility of all of them to declare themselves, to disassociate themselves. Now, this colonial mindset, I have a severe problem with it. I give an example. I have written in Op-Eds, I have written many times now, that brother, wherever the state or non-state actors kill unarmed people, whether they are laborers, barbers, or ordinary citizens, we strongly condemn it. This should never happen, and they should be held accountable. Now, what happens is, if Ali Bhai, and for that matter, I give an example, if I am called to the media every day, and the first question asked is, I will be put off by this. That, do I have to write on my forehead every day that I do not support this? So I think this is what happened with Mahring Baloch. Not once, she has condemned it ten times, saying that brother, we condemn the killing of any unarmed person. Now, when any incident happens, those people who have never told the story of Dr. Mahring's plight, have never shown empathy towards them, they raise their voice and say, "Mahring should condemn, Mahring should condemn." So this is that mindset. Exactly like the neo-conservatives here, the white racist thinkers, when they applied it to Muslims in the War on Terror, this collective responsibility. This is what I see at play in Balochistan. Now, one person does it once, twice. Now, does one have to clean their slate every day and every night, or every day? So I think this is what happened in the case of Dr. Mahring. In this, the perception that missing persons... this is genuine. This has been a practice. On which, before Dr. Mahring, the relatives of missing persons used to go and demand bodies to see which of them were their people.
Rafay, I completely agree with your point. In 2017, my Master's thesis, and I am very proud and grateful to Punjab University for allowing me, and in that, the themes that I had, we established exactly this: that regarding the cases of Balochistan, like there was an attack in Islamabad recently, on an Imambargah. We knew it was an Imambargah where the attack happened, it was the city of Islamabad. Then we traced the entire history and said that this person was linked to ISIS-K. But in Balochistan, even if it is written that three people died, you have to estimate that if it happened on Alamdar Road, then perhaps it is Shia killing. If it happened in Turbat, then perhaps it is ethnic killing. If it happened in such and such a place, then perhaps TTP was involved. So this is a reporting problem. I completely agree with your point. But at the same time, the state can say that you have made it impossible for us, because every time we conduct an operation, you will say that you have brought our missing persons and put them in there, and we will always de-legitimize it. So why should we talk to you? You have not listened to us. Because you also understand these things. In politics, and in the relationship between the state and the people, the state has immense power. If it decides that we will allow... this dissent is also being allowed by the state. And if it stops allowing it, that is also the state's decision. And then you have very limited options to deal with it. So don't you think that there is a situation where Mahring Baloch, or any other person, I mean, Sameen, or the people of BYC, and others who are talking about Balochistan issues or their human rights, they also need to look at the state's version of events? Do you think they should make an effort from their side, or do you think that they... what should they do? The state is not talking to them.
Yes, look, there are two easy ways for this. First, if the state is really in trouble, there are two easy ways. Number one, you solve the problem of missing persons itself, so that this problem does not come up every day. It's a very easy solution, isn't it? And anyway, the state or state spokespersons say that it is a matter of 70-80 people. Solve it. You have formed an independent commission many times. Form it. With transparency, compensate those who are not there. Deal with them, even if it is under your military trials, but deal with them and publish the data, so that this problem does not arise every day, whether this was a missing person or not. So this is one way. You don't do that. The second easy way is, in the operation where you kill people, and if the relatives of missing persons or BYC, you think they are wrong, they misquote, they misrepresent the facts, then the easy way is to conduct DNA tests of the deceased, publish the data, and present it to independent media and relatives, so that they do not get an opportunity to misrepresent. When you bury them in the darkness of night, and there is no transparency in the data, then this burden falls on the state. Look, there are people in this situation. God forbid, God forbid, we ever face such a situation. Some people have been waiting for their loved ones for 15 years, some for 20 years, some for five years. This is a very difficult time. And I will say this last thing: the state has to think whether what we are doing strengthens the state in the larger picture or weakens it. So, if I were to advise the state, I would say, "Brother, this burden falls on you." Let's say, for the sake of argument, I agree with you that BYC's job is just this. But your job is that your trust among citizens should increase. Your job is to attract those Baloch youths who have not yet turned to guns towards you. So is this the way? That you include them all, and increase your repression further? Because the alienation of Balochistan from Pakistan, or of Baloch youth from Pakistan, is a loss to the state. So, in a way, if the state thinks so, then you are giving victory to BYC and, for that matter, to those whom you accuse. When this government was not formed, when the setup was created in Balochistan in the beginning, I told a responsible person that you are, God forbid, handing Balochistan on a platter to the insurgents. They might not achieve so much benefit in 10 years on their own strength as you have given them victories at the popular level by repression and by installing artificial people. The victory of the people is... giving them those roads, those roads are a loss to the state. And you are benefiting those whom you consider to have this agenda. So again, the burden is on us.
It is the responsibility of the state to ensure that such actions are not taken. The state has the responsibility to look at the bigger picture. Rauf, my last question to you is, the situation is that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan is a genuine important threat. Perhaps I misheard you, but did you say that the TTP is so big that the state perhaps cannot fight it alone? No, I did not. So, you think it can fight? Perhaps then I made a mistake in listening. The TTP is present as an important threat. Its influence is to such an extent within our seminaries that even today, if you say something about them, I know that in a situation where a think tank was created by a religious personality, and a fight broke out there because of a report they produced that went against the Taliban, that's how strategic depth, deep strategic depth it was that day. Pakistan, you see that the BLA, and is the BLA an organization of today? BLA, Prince Karim Khan, who was the brother of Amir Ahmad Yar Khan, he also formed it in Afghanistan when he was fighting against the Pakistani state. So, support from Afghanistan for the Baloch cause, to weaken Pakistan, is always there. Along with that, the TTA is also present, and these internal fissures we have are before you. Do you see anything improving? And do you think that it has now become impossible for us to correct this, or do you think that no, there is... these are the foundations because of which you think perhaps there is still hope? Yes, if there is hope, then tell me that too. No, I don't have any hope. Look, this is a difficult question. The option to control the situation and fix things always exists. What is the difference? When you take timely measures, before time, you have to pay a small price. When the water reaches here, and you start drowning, then you have to pay a very heavy price to fix the situation, or give more substantial concessions. I always say this. This BLA or Baloch issue, people often ask, "Who should we negotiate with now? The matter has reached this point. Now only terrifying force will have to be used." So, I tell them, "Look, the small conditions on which Nawab Akbar Bugti could have been talked to and resolved politically, you did not do it at that time. Today, those terms are irrelevant. 10-12 years ago, on what terms could the issues of Balochistan have been resolved through political means and political approaches, today they are insignificant. Today also, mark my words, politically..." So, firstly, today you will have to give very major concessions compared to 10 years ago, compared to 12 years ago, to bring the situation back on track. But remember, even today, the concessions on which perhaps the possibility of improvement in the situation arises, after five years, they too will be insufficient. The cost of this conflict is progressively increasing. The cost of reconciliation will increase. The same applies to your Afghanistan or religious extremism. 50 years ago, on what terms could these situations have been controlled, today they are irrelevant. 20 years ago, without making major changes in your policy as well as in your political settlement, elite bargain, these situations cannot be controlled. So, theoretically speaking, yes, there is scope. Now, practically, I am not very optimistic. The reason is that to give these concessions, the current elite coalition will have to make many compromises on its short-term political interests, and I do not see enough vision, enough generosity, foresight in this elite coalition that they will take steps to move forward in the greater national interest by compromising on their short-term political interests. Rather, I think they are heading down the path of more wrong actions that are causing these situations to worsen. So, theoretically speaking, yes. Practically speaking, I do not see many possibilities for improvement, especially in Pashtunkhwa and Balochistan. On a positive note, Rauf, we end this discussion today. Thank you very much for joining us. I hope that many people in Punjab are now... Punjabi nationalism has taken birth. There are obviously some reasons for this. Naturally, when Punjabis are targeted by the BLA, no one likes to see dead bodies coming, but they should also think that they too have been carrying dead bodies for many years. Same goes for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, regarding the Taliban, our views are very clear. But when we look at our state's policies, it is evident that what you have sown, you are now reaping. Now you reap it with satisfaction. There is no need to scold us again, asking why we are reminding you. This is the situation. You can give angry responses to this, if you wish. You can think about it, and if you can influence policy in any way through your voices, through your tweets, through your social media, or whatever avenues are available to you, then try to think about Pakistan, about the present situation of Pakistan, about the future of Pakistan. Otherwise, it is also an option that you keep abusing each other in anger, and this country eventually becomes incapable of dealing with any challenge. Thank you very much, Rauf. Thank you to all of you who watched the program. Please allow Ali Warsi to leave for now from the platform of Naya Daur.