Transcription
But all countries, including Singapore, face this problem. And it's interesting that no Muslim country today has condemned China on the Xinjiang policy.
But when I was, uh, cruising in Croatia, someone told me what an Italian professor in Chengdu said. It's quite interesting. Take it in the right spirit. You know, he said, "The Chinese, the Americans are not known to love Chinese. They're not known to love Muslims, but somehow they love Chinese Muslims a lot."
In 1984, 1982, Margaret Thatcher visited Deng Xiaoping and mooted the idea of another 50 years of British rule. She was badly advised. Deng Xiaoping, with great accuracy, spat into a spittoon, you know, and Margaret Thatcher was so rattled when she left the Great Hall of the People, she tripped on the steps, and they knew that that's not negotiable. So in 1984, they had the Joint Declaration. Now, the Joint Declaration is asserted by the British as a treaty which bound China post, uh, 1997. China never accepted that. The Joint Declaration is called a Joint Declaration because you make your declaration. I make my declaration. We put it up together in order to facilitate a smooth handover on June 30th, 1997. It was not the treaty. If it was a treaty, like the Treaty of Nanking, it would have been called a treaty.
So I have a very interpretation of Hong Kong, and it's based upon my own experience living there and the sort of things which were happening. That when they stormed the legislature, I think it was Nancy Pelosi who said, "Oh, what a glorious sight." Until January 6th happened, then it didn't look so glorious after that. So the double standards were so thick, you could cut through it with a knife. Yeah.
Germany was divided because it was an aggressor. China was divided because it was a victim. So the moral cause of German reunification is, on any balance, greater than German reunification. I thought that was a very powerful message that Wang Yi put across, but it was hardly reported in your media. Uh, they don't support invasion. They've said that in their first principle. But at the same time, they say there's a history to it, which was NATO's relentless expansion to the East, which the Chinese have always opposed because it bifurcates the world and it is divisive and aggressive. So China is saying, "Look, if you want peace, you can't just look at a snapshot. You've got to look at the entire video. Then, when you look at the entire video, you'll find a way to the future. But if you just look at a snapshot, you won't find a way to the future."
Fore! Foreign! Foreign!
Well, thank you so much, uh, Professor Yo, for your insightful, uh, speech. My name is Mahmud Jawadi. I'm a second-year master's student here at the School of Transnational Governance. Well, my question is a bit about the, the state of play and the status quo and the future of EU-China relations. In 2019, the European Union characterized China as a competitor, a rival, and also a partner. And since then, until now, different European officials just describe, uh, China as an assertive power, or sometimes describe it as a country trying to rewrite the international order. But two weeks ago again, uh, Mr. Borrell submitted a paper at the Gymnich meeting stating China as partner, rival, and competitor. So there is no change in characterization of China. Uh, so my question is, how accurate is that characterization and that vision? And, uh, if you think that it is not really accurate, what would be your prescription in order just to characterize China for Europe? Thank you.
For a number of centuries, the West has been used to being dominant in the world. I talk about Jesus Christ from being Chinese to being European. An equivalent process must, must now take place to bring us to a better balance point. It will take time. That the Americans, from helping China rise again, now fear China's rise, is to be expected. That there should be a Western response should also be expected. China will not escalate because it knows it's getting stronger and philosophically has a deep sense of itself. But at the same time, they cannot afford to show weakness. And just by being firm and being independent, the Chinese are giving hope to others, they too can stand firm and be independent, even though they are weaker. And this will help crystallize a multipolar world. But this is not a process which the Americans can take lightly, and not even a process which the entire West will take lightly. So we are in the period of a great transition, but it will come about. And to some extent, the global economic situation and the Ukraine war will help precipitate gradually this future.
Oh, you're from Iran. Oh, okay. Then, then I will elaborate later. Yes.
My name is Tamas Such. I'm from Hungary. Currently here for a one-year, uh, visiting fellowship. I work for the European Commission otherwise. And, uh, thank you for the amazing lecture, very insightful. And, uh, my question is basically also specifically because you have been minister for culture and also minister for foreign affairs, among many other titles. Uh, how do you see the role of culture in foreign policy in general, and the role and use of soft power, uh, in China in particular, because they're quite controversial views, especially since Xi Jinping took power. So basically, that's the question. Thank you.
In my years in government, I found that, uh, culture touches the opposite party the most and is the most remembered. I knew Frank-Walter Steinmeier when he was foreign minister, and what we most remember is a little project when I had a piece of the Berlin Wall in my constituency and I asked Helmut Kohl, whom I was a minister in attendance to, in 1994, and at that time was already a recluse, I asked for a message from him through hostmanship, and he gave me that message. I don't think Steinmeier remembers me for anything else. In my relationship with India, I was for 10 years involved in the revival of an ancient Buddhist university called Nalanda, which was recorded in great detail by a Chinese monk in the 7th century, but which history was long forgotten. It had, it was the world's first university. It was destroyed by Afghan invaders after Oxford was established but before Cambridge. And in India, they did not know the history. But in China, that history is immortalized in "Journey to the West" and the story of the Monkey God, never lost. In the 19th century, the British archaeologist Alexander Cunningham, who started the Archaeological Survey of India, a great institution. He read a translation of what the monk wrote in the seventh century, and he was astonished by its accuracy. And after that, grew in India a group of Buddha-sabhs, they call them, you know, who were archaeologists working off Chinese records of India. So the Indians remember me and gave me a very high award for this university project. And I, with the Russians, I help, I'm still helping them establish a church in Singapore. And the Russian foreign ministry remembers me not for my work in the trade ministry or foreign ministry, but for my work in helping them establish a church in Singapore. So culture touches people the most deeply. They'll forget everything else, but they never forget how he treated them in their identity. Yeah.
Uh, Morton Bergsma. I'm the director of Silver UP, the Center for International Law Research and Policy. We have an office here in Florence. Thank you for your, uh, brilliant presentation. Uh, in, uh, the question of Xinjiang and the Uyghur, the US State Department and various British actors are saying that there has been genocide. Whilst the leading scholars of the law, of, of genocide, they say that there is no evidence, there is no proof, and that the US State Department should stop using this classification unless it produces the proof. By making use of such classifications as genocide and crimes against humanity, one also generates feelings of blameworthiness and that there is a threat, uh, from the Chinese government. What are your thoughts on the way the US and and British actors use human rights terminology, the human rights narrative, and soft international law, uh, in the context which you refer to between the United States and China?
Well, it's part of, uh, the information warfare that makes it very difficult for us sometimes to know what to believe and what not to believe. I first accompanied Lee Kuan Yew to Xinjiang in the year 2000, just before he stepped down as Prime Minister.
It's okay. That's not Xinjiang. Yeah. Uh, I was surprised when I went there to find that road signs were in Roman characters, in Chinese characters, and in Arabic characters. So I asked accompanying Chinese officials. I said, "When did that happen?" They said, "Mao Zedong wanted it." In fact, when the Communists took over, they restored the names of many places to their Uyghur names. But of course, the Chinese attitude is, you're a minority, you threaten me politically, I smash you, like they did with Yakub Beg in the 19th century, the Qing Dynasty. But if you don't threaten me, then I'm very generous to you. In fact, I treat you better than Han people. So the population policy never applied to the Uyghurs. And that's why there are many more Uyghurs today, in proportionate terms, than Han Chinese or any other group. So there's certainly no physical genocide. In 2010, August, I went to Xinjiang on a trade delegation, and I went to Kashgar. In Kashgar, I saw women in Central Asian burqas, which is a whole basket put on top of their head. I was shocked. I asked a Chinese official, "Say, why do you allow this?" They said, "No, it's a custom." When I was in Mui, they took me horse riding. I can't ride a horse to save myself. So they said, "Don't worry, a young girl or boy will hop behind you, a Kazakh, and they'll gallop the horse." And it was very exciting. I tried to speak to her in my poor Mandarin. She could not understand me. So again, I asked the Chinese. I said, "Why aren't you teaching them Chinese?" He said, "No, they're nomads. We leave them alone." They did not realize then, it was two weeks before September 11th, that the Salafists had been working on their minds. And from 2010 to 2015, there were a spate of terrorist incidents in China, to a point where the Han people in Xinjiang had to arm themselves. I also knew this from my cousins in China who used to go to Xinjiang, and then during that period, they said it's no longer safe. And now they're all over Xinjiang again because peace has returned. So this whole story that there's genocide in Xinjiang, to me, does not reflect what's happening there. Yes, they have been draconian in making sure that Salafist influence is controlled in China. But all countries, including Singapore, face this problem. And it's interesting that no Muslim country today has condemned China on the Xinjiang policy. But when I was, uh, cruising in Croatia, someone told me what an Italian professor in Chengdu said. It's quite interesting. Take it in the right spirit. You know, he said, "The Chinese, the Americans are not known to love Chinese. They're not known to love Muslims, but somehow they love Chinese Muslims a lot." So that's my answer to your question. Yes, please.
Thank you very much. I'm Sonia Punarikman, a member of the external advisory board and of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Thank you very much for an utterly inspiring speech. I have tried to keep track of Chinese development, reading a lot, but, yeah, I will certainly not, uh, have reached the point of Matei. Uh, I have a question which is a political philosophical question. How would you, um, estimate the Chinese capacity to deal with discontinuities and to integrate that into the Taiwanese question? Perhaps you will now tell me that I don't understand anything of Taiwan, and I would take that. But it is a democratic state. Is that not the case in your opinion? And if so, um, how would, uh, in a Chinese reading, uh, to be dealt with with this democratic development as a different one as China has experienced, uh, in order to perhaps assess the whole question of independence in a different way? Is that at all feasible? Thinkable, etc. We had a similar development with Hong Kong, hadn't we? Uh, where there was this solution of, uh, "one country, two systems." And, well, I don't think that China really lived up to that. But, uh, perhaps you see this differently. Thank you.
China never accepted the Treaty of Nanking, which ceded Hong Kong in perpetuity to the British, as being a valid treaty. They never accepted that. The issue was not put to the test because a large part of Hong Kong on the mainland side was leased to, uh, Britain for 99 years, and even by British law, that land had to be returned. And when that land is returned, Hong Kong is no longer viable. In 1984, 1982, Margaret Thatcher visited Deng Xiaoping and mooted the idea of another 50 years of British rule. She was badly advised. Deng Xiaoping, with great accuracy, spat into a spittoon, you know, and Margaret Thatcher was so rattled when she left the Great Hall of the People, she tripped on the steps, and they knew that that's not negotiable. So in 1984, they had the Joint Declaration. Now, the Joint Declaration is asserted by the British as a treaty which bound China post, uh, 1997. China never accepted that. The Joint Declaration is called a Joint Declaration because you make your declaration. I make my declaration. We put it out together in order to facilitate a smooth handover on June 30th, 1997. It was not the treaty. If it was a treaty, like the Treaty of Nanking, it would have been called a treaty. So the Chinese are saying, once we have a smooth handover, sovereignty has returned to China. But China, in its declaration, said that it will promulgate a Basic Law, which it legislated in consultation with Hong Kong people, under which "one country, two systems" would last for 50 years. In that Basic Law, a national security law in Hong Kong must be enacted. So for 20 over years, it was never enacted, which means that in terms of performance, Hong Kong failed to keep up its side of the bargain. So the mainland then imposed a national security law on Hong Kong, but still requires Hong Kong to make subsidiary legislation, and that's right now being done. I lived in Hong Kong during that period, uh, and my wife and I no longer felt safe. I saw the way the social media was systematically demonizing the police, and the Hong Kong police is nothing like police in Paris or Los Angeles or New York, and they were extremely well-behaved, but they were made to look as if they all had horns and tails, which was utterly not the case. But there was a game being played: cui bono? Who benefited from the Hong Kong unrest? It led to the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen because all the pundits said that she would lose to, uh, Han Kuo-yu. Yeah. But because of what happened in Hong Kong, the whole table turned. So I have a very interpretation of Hong Kong, and it's based upon my own experience living there and the sort of things which were happening. That when they stormed the legislature, I think it was Nancy Pelosi who said, "Oh, what a glorious sight." Until January 6th happened, then it didn't look so glorious after that. So the double standards were so thick, you could cut through it with a knife. Yeah.
So, on Taiwan, China has told Taiwan, "You can keep the army so long as you accept the idea of one China. You can interpret it the way you want. It means that you're not going independent. And one day, when we unite, maybe I'll drop PRC, you drop ROC, and we can call it China." So it is an internal affair. It is one of reconciliation. You know, when Annalena Baerbock, the German foreign secretary, visited, Foreign Minister visited, uh, China recently, State Councilor Wang Yi, who was a former foreign minister, he said something which to me was very moving. He said, "We supported German reunification. We hope Germany will support our reunification. Germany was divided because it was an aggressor. China was divided because it was a victim. So the moral cause of German reunification is, on any balance, greater than German reunification." I thought that was a very powerful message that Wang Yi put across, but it was hardly reported in your media.
Behind you. >> Oh, it's me. Is it? >> I think it's >> Okay. Thank you very much for your speech. Uh, my name is Farhan. I'm from Indonesia, your neighbor. So, uh, I'm interesting with you, I'm interested in your speech that you said that we are moving towards a multipolar world, and we hope it's going to be a very peaceful process. And I'm interested, what's your view about Southeast Asia? Because in my mind, I have like two scenarios for Southeast Asia. Like the first scenario is like, Southeast Asia will be like the Latin America for the US when they rise, which means they're going to be the hinterland for China, the backyard for China. Or in a more optimistic scenario, I think that Southeast Asia will be the hub for the world, because now Europe, US, they're going to East Asia, then they are finding places to find common places, Southeast Asia. And what's your view? What do you have any other think about Southeast Asia in the future when we are seeing the multipolar world? Thank you very much.
Well, ASEAN is is very important, and ASEAN can be a weak pole in a multipolar, not a strong pole, because ASEAN hasn't got ICBMs and nuclear submarines to threaten other people. But Southeast Asia is diverse historically and geographically. It's between the great civilizations of East Asia and South Asia. We have this wonderful saying in Sabah, you know, "tana ain," the land below the winds, the trade winds. That's Southeast Asia. And it welcomes people from all over the world. No one feels unwelcome in Indonesia or in Phuket or in Singapore. You can be from Mars, you'll still be welcome in Southeast Asia. This is our culture. But our integration into a larger Chinese-dominated economy is inevitable. And historically, every time China was united, there was a great China trade which gave prosperity to the kingdoms of Southeast Asia. And we are seeing a replay of the historical cycle. China's trade with, uh, ASEAN overtook China's trade with Europe and America some years ago. China's trade with ASEAN is greater than US trade with Europe and will reach $1 trillion this year. And, you know, the Chinese, China is a cold country. They all want to have homes in Indonesia. Yeah. Because the climate is balmy. The food is good. The people are friendly. So I see a relationship between China and Southeast Asia which will endure. But they know that in Southeast Asia, we are promiscuous. We don't want monogamous relationships. Now, Xi Jinping, not Deng Xiaoping, in the year 2000, I was there at an ASEAN-China summit. He proposed a free trade agreement with ASEAN. At that time, ASEAN countries were still reeling from the Asian financial crisis and did not know how to respond. But in the end, we agreed. And when the framework agreement was signed in Nanning in 2002, Zhu Rongji said, "China does not seek for itself an exclusive position in Southeast Asia. China has never changed that position." In other words, "By all means, be friendly to the Americans, Japanese, Europeans, but please take into account my own interests. If you hurt me, I'll hurt you, but I will not make my enemy your enemy." Which is increasingly what the Americans are telling us, that America's enemies are our enemies. And the use of long-arm jurisdiction, which is causing a lot of angst all over the world and leading to de-dollarization, but it'll take time. But there's a big difference between the way China handles Southeast Asia with the way the US handles Southeast Asia. In the case of Europe, because you no longer have a strategic, uh, impact on Southeast Asia, you're welcome in every country. So Europe is a free rider in Southeast Asia.
In terms of business management, my question to you is, what can the European Union do to improve a real understanding of Confucian culture in terms of business management, and also looking at the future of business management? How can we understand better and implement better the Chinese contribution to business management in terms of yin and yang? These are enormous contributions which I think China can make to the future of, uh, business management. How can the European Union help in promoting a better understanding of culture in this sense?
Well, I, I think, uh, European cultural and educational institutions can play a big role. Uh, I've been an advisor to EADA Business School in Barcelona for over 10 years, and I just came over from Barcelona after delivering the commencement speech to the 2023 MBA class. EADA has one-third American, one-third European, one-third Asian in the student population, and just in their daily interactions, people by osmosis learn from one another, what it means, uh, to to live on the daily basis with diversity, and it stimulates mutual respect. And a school like EADA should do. And I think more and more European institutions should somehow incorporate the diversity of the world into Europe. Now, Europe's management of its own internal diversity is fascinating and provides inspiration to the rest of the world. But that internal integration cannot be done without connection to the world outside. And the world outside is diverse. And when we see how diverse the world is, it makes it easier for us to manage our own internal diversity. I did a short posting of my meeting with, uh, Alex yesterday on Facebook, and someone asked, "What is transnational governance?" I said, "Well, it's mostly about Europe's internal governance. But," I added, "Europe's internal governance, if it succeeds, is good for the world. If within Europe you fail, then we will fail in the world." So from that perspective, I wrote, "We have an equity interest in the success of the European experiment, but you should not conduct this experiment without reference to the world outside."
Okay. I think I think we have time for a couple more questions only, and there's approximately 1 million hands. Um, Miki, I saw you first.
Hello. Thank you. I'm Miki Janati from Italy, and I'm a project associate at the School of Transnational Governance. So my question is, again, you touched upon Taiwan and how this is not an expression of an imperialist kind of way of seeing the world, but a way of seeing a just order in the world. But of course, in international politics, you know, different states can have different kinds of ideas about a just world order, and what can be seen as something just can also be seen as something imperialist or expansionist. So I think the key here is to, to really, um, to really succeed in what you say, to build trust between the parties, to convince them, or just saying it's in fact something not, uh, another step in a power politics, but something about a just world order. So about trust, uh, how do we, what are the concrete steps that we can, uh, envision to build trust between, uh, Europe and China?
It begins by being interested in the other, which means respecting the other. And once you do that, you begin to see the good on the other side, and then it's more difficult for you to be angry with the other party. You know, people get enraged when they don't understand the other side, then you can kill. But when you realize that the other side has the same hopes and fears as you have, with family and children to worry about, then it will cause you to pause and perchance to say, "Oh, maybe, maybe we can explain why they are behaving that way." Well, China has taken a dangerous but very interesting step to make proposals for peace in Ukraine. The peace proposal is just a statement of principles. So it's not likely to get anywhere for the time being. But at some point in time, the various parties will be exhausted. Right now, they're still giving war a chance. At some point in time, they have to give peace a chance and have to be a ceasefire. I don't think there'll be a peace agreement for a long time. There'll be some kind of a partition, which is the reason why Henry Kissinger hinted at it when he said Ukraine should join NATO, not only to protect Ukraine, but to protect NATO from Ukraine, which means almost the colonization of Ukraine to maintain the peace. Now, the Chinese envoy said, "Because mathematically there's no solution." He said, "We can't talk peace unless the parties in their hearts open up a little space for the other." In other words, it's not just the work of diplomats. It is in the propaganda when we get people to hate the other that are you prepared to loosen up and say, "Look, see possible good in the other?" Then the process of negotiation can begin. But it will not begin until both sides are exhausted by war.
Right to the gentleman in this trip. >> Thank you. My name is Umberto. I'm a visiting fellow here. Uh, I just wanted to ask you, I mean, we speculated a lot about what the world with a more, uh, dominant role for China would be in the future, and you mentioned briefly the war in Ukraine. Um, I was about to ask you, what is your take about China's non-opposition to the invasion of a sovereign country? So, I mean, if you think about the perspective that Europeans have, we have seen similar situations like the Russia's invasion of China in the '30s and the '40s. This resonates very deeply with us, what has happened between Ukraine and Russia. So I was wondering, what is the way in which China is seeing this conflict in a way that does not bring it to openly condemn the invasion of a sovereign country as a neighbor?
From a geopolitical viewpoint, China wants Russia to be a separate pole to stand up to the US. So if there's regime change in Russia and Russia becomes a part of a Western alliance, then China will come under much greater pressure. So from that higher perspective, China would not want Russia to fail. So economically, China will support Russia. But militarily, Ukraine is a distant war for them, over which they don't think they have complete understanding and about which they don't think they should get too involved, except as a peacemaker, if there's room for a peacemaker. That's what they do. Uh, they don't support invasion. They've said that in their first principle. But at the same time, they say there's a history to it, which was NATO's relentless expansion to the East, which the Chinese have always opposed because it bifurcates the world and it is divisive and aggressive. So China is saying, "Look, if you want peace, you can't just look at a snapshot. If you, you could look at the entire video. Then, when you look at the entire video, you'll find a way to the future. But if you just look at a snapshot, you won't find a way to the future."
I am informed by the powers that be that we can keep going. So, uh, since we're having such an interesting discussion, maybe I'm looking at the powers. Two more. Two more questions. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Let's jump.
Hi. Hi. My name is Gawen John, and, um, uh, I'm a Jeamon Residential Fellow this year at the UI, but normally I teach, I am an associate professor of Italian Studies at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. And, um, I was, um, born and raised in Hangzhou in the PRC, but I've been living in, um, these states and Canada for a while. So my question, um, touches upon China and Europe's engagement in Africa, and how that engagement can shape, can potentially shape the future between these two geopolitical entities. I think in the discussion so far, we have touched upon their relationship in the Pacific Rim and Eurasia, just right now. So I'd like to, you know, uh, consult your take on their engagement in Africa. And we know the context is that Europe, taken as a whole, is the top investor in Africa, and China is making strides. And the media, the Western media at least, has been covering a lot on their conflicts, but sometimes collaborations as well. So that's my question. Thank you.
In my, uh, script, I covered Africa and the Middle East, but I didn't have time just now to, uh, to go into it. To me, uh, Europe and China share common interests in the Middle East, which is to help the Africans develop. Because of the color revolutions, migration from Europe has been growing. It's becoming a big problem for Europe, for Italy, for France, for many countries. Uh, so there is every interest for Europe to help Africa develop, to stabilize Africa. But Africa will not be stabilized in your own image. Africa will be stabilized, can only be stabilized if you take into account its tribal character. If you ignore the tribal character of of Africa, democracy will fail. Just as if you ignore the tribal history of Europe, you will fail in Europe. Yeah. So, China today is building much of Africa's infrastructure, and they're doing it in their own self-interest to extract minerals, trade, but also to win goodwill, because it's 54 votes in the UN, and these votes are important to China. So I'm an advisor to a Chinese company that's become Singaporean, investing in a very big iron ore mine in a West African country, for which they have to build a 600 km railroad. And once that railroad is built, the whole country will be transformed, because then the inland spaces can gain access to the sea, which is the internet, then you can trade, then the value of your labor will be much greater. So by right, China and Africa, sorry, Europe and China should work together to help Africa develop. So I was very troubled to read President Von der Leyen recently saying that Europe helping Africa should be in competition with China. She suggested that, "Why? And Europe, Africa has not a good historical memory of Europe, which has enslaved it, colonized it, and now you're telling me who my friend should be." So they resent it powerfully. So if you interview any African leader, they will tell you, "Rubbish. We will deal with China on our own terms because China is helping us, and there's none of the historical baggage." So Europe should be working with China in Africa and in the entire Middle East. Now, the Americans have a different agenda. For them, it's just big power contest. And here in the Middle East and on Africa, I think the American and European agendas diverge, and Europe should seek greater autonomy and be more circumspect in its own self-interest in working with China.
>> Last question. Thank you.
Thank you, sir, for your insightful presentation. And I'm Kunha Yang. I come from China. I'm now a PhD researcher at the Department of Law at UI. So my question is about, sorry,
>> AUI >> At UI. Yeah, I'm sorry. So my question is about from the Chinese perspective, about Europe's in China's future. As the EU is adjusting the Chinese strategy and proposing a de-risking strategy rather than a decoupling that the US one, and the EU is trying to make this de-risking to the G7 level, more like a circle surrounding China. So what do you think from the Chinese perspective, it is a kind of opportunity or challenge? And what kind of reactions may incur from the Chinese side to this de-risking strategy? Thanks.
Many years ago, I was a visiting scholar at Peking University, and when I was there, I was invited by the China's National Defense University, PLA, to give a speech about US-China relations from a Singapore perspective. One question was about the deployment of 2,000 US Marines in Darwin. So I told the Chinese, "You must expect that at the bedrock, the relationship between Australia and the US is a profound one. You need only visit the War Museum in Canberra to know that it is a relationship watered in blood." In the same way, I think China should know that the relationship between Europe and America is a profound one, particularly white America. But America's demographics are changing, and more and more Americans do not resonate as much when they see the Pentagon or when they visit, uh, Florence, because they have a different history. So American politics will change. But this common basis that what created America was as a daughter civilization of Europe, that is very deep. So China should have no unrealistic expectation that it can ever divide America from Europe. But it can tell Europe, "Look, we have different interests. Let's work on all your interests, those which are aligned to America and those which are more important for yourself. Take a practical approach and be patient." So I see China as wanting a strong EU. They will support EU autonomy, even in defense, but they know that will take a very long time. And they support a strong euro because they resent the exorbitant privilege which the US dollar enjoys today, which enables the US to have 800 military bases around the world.
Fore speech. Fore! Fore!chch! forchech. forchech.