Special Committee on Philippine Maritime and Admiralty Zones (April 24, 2025)

Hearing of the Senate special committee on maritime zones and admiral is called to order. Secretary, may we know the presence of the additional resource persons to attend today's committee hearing, if they are around?

Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

Uh, yes sir. Our additional resource persons are attending today, specifically from the Namria. We have Deputy Administrator Effin Karandang joining us online; uh, from the DOSD, uh, they are represented by uh, Project Technical Specialist Miss Johanna Marie S. Gonzalez and Mr. John Paul Dariel Paniz. And from the DICT, we have Assistant Division Chief Engineer Gladis Deo Campo, sir.

Wala yung mga secretaries?

Ah, sir, they are all on official travel, sir. Kaya sila naha-hack. Wala silang ano.

Let's uh, let's resume. Yesterday, we had the opportunity to hear various testimonies from several of our senior military, naval, security personnel. They revealed a range of activities that have been discovered inside this country. Nakita natin kahapon yung ginagawa sa Subic, yung Palawan 5, yung ginagawa sa Makati, sa San Antonio, at sa iba't ibang lugar, pati sa mga malls na hindi ah, hindi nila ah, pinatawad. Maging 'yung mga drones, nakita natin kahapon ah, nakita natin yung hy na nakita sa sa San Marc, San Pascual ah, Masbate. Nakita natin yung isang military grade na drone na presumably galing, nakita sa Pasukin, at marami pang iba. So lahat ng kabanatang ito ay nagpapakita ng iisa, iisang pakay: to gather information about our people, about our armed forces, and about our defenses. Kaya sila nag-espione. Nagtanong yung media kahapon, "Papaano niyo masasabing ah, galing at Chinese origin? Eh Chinese nga si nagsau-submit, nagre-report, nagbabato ng mga information." At saka ngayon marami na hong kasong naka-file: Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Regional Trial Court of Palawan. Marami ng kaso, sabay-sabay po yang'y naka-file, at lahat phan ay nagtuturo na iisa lang ang nagkukumpass nito. Iisang bansa lang ang nagkukumpass nito. Walang iba po kung hindi ang People's Republic of China.

We had the opportunity to see some of the technical equipment that were used to enable the collection of information. Nakita niyo yung drone, hindi lang nadala dito yung MC uh, grabber kasi nasa husgado. We saw this was one of the most sophisticated equipment that can be obtained. Ah, itong mga drones na ito kasi umaangat, ah, sinisignalan ng satellite, nagbabato ng impormasyon. Nakita niyo kahapon ah, kung anong klase yung information na na equipment na binabato nila.

Before, before we proceed, gusto nating makita ano ba talaga ang ebidensya? Ano ba ang mga activities na hindi pa dapat, hindi pa napapag-usapan? At alam ko bago tayo maghiwa-hiwalay ngayon, kayo po ay magugulat. Marami pa hong mga revelations ngayong araw na ito na hindi pa lumalabas sa social media at maging sa mainstream media, at hindi pa alam ng ating mga kababayan.

But before we proceed, I'd like to take the opportunity to call one more presenter, presentor. Pero sino yung bago? Administer the o comsecung bagong dumating. Please stand. Dost, di sino pa? Namia. Ay nasa kotse ata ito Maria. Nasaan siya? Hindi ba ni-require natin ng Securities and Exchange Commission to submit reports today?

Ah, yes, sir. Nasaan sila?

They have submitted a partial report uh, on the incorporators and they will submit within the day, sir. Pero wala sila ngayon. Nandiyan ba ang? Can you be visited para maano kayoag kayo sa likod? So can you please stand up? Sino yung mga bagong resource persons? I'm sure you're you're authorized to speak in behalf of your department. Authorize kayo ha. Pag tinanong ko kayo mamaya, ilan yung na-hack? Anong epekto n na-hack? Anong huri? Anong uri ng impormasyon? Kaya niyong sagutin yon? So hindi undersecretary ang kailangan dito. Kaya niyong sagutin? Naniniwala kayo yung sasabihin niyo it would be reflective of your departments? So you're speaking in behalf of the DICT? Ikaw naman, you're speaking in behalf of DOST, authorized? Ba't wala bang ASEC kayo doon? May ad nasa foreign trip din lahat. Lahat ng ASEC, USEC nasa foreign trip. So hindi mahalaga ito sa kanila?

Ah, coms, administer the oat.

Yes, sir. Kindly raise your right hand please. Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this investigation? You may put your hands down.

Chairman, the oath has been administered.

Thank you. We, I'd like to take this opportunity to call one more presenter, presenter, the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, who would be making the presentation. So who is going to make? Attorney Rena uh, identify yourself and your agency and your position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, I'm Deputy Director General Francisco Ashley Sidillo, in charge of uh, cyber and emerging threats. I am accompanied by two of our lawyers from our agency's legal service. We have a twofold presentation uh, Mr. Chairman, one dealing with uh, cyber and another dealing with uh, espionage and uh, we will be making one after the other presentation. It will involve secret documents, confidential matters. You may uh, withhold the information by the chair.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, Mr. Chairman. Please proceed.

Honorable chairman, fellow public servants, thank you for the opportunity to address this important hearing on espionage and cyb security challenges facing our nation. Before proceeding with the substantive portions of my presentation, I want to clarify the sources of the cyber threat intelligence that informs this assessment: one, domestic security, sorry, domestic cyburity operations or data collected and analyzed in the course of our cyberthreat intelligence and cyburity operations; number two, intelligence shared by foreign counterparts; number three, commercial cyberurity companies that provide cyberthreat intelligence reports. This multisource approach allows us to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the threat landscape while mitigating the biases or blind spots that might exist in any single source of intelligence.

Under Executive Order 54, series of 2024, issued by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency has been reorganized to address evolving threats, including cyburity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. NIC's primary roles in addressing cyber and CBERN threats include cyber threat mitigation, cybern threat response, national coordination to act as focal point for integrating intelligence and coordinating counterintelligence activities across government agencies, as well as technology development.

We are mindful of the committee chairman's essential questions that he had posted yesterday that should frame our discussion today, and I will address them directly. Against whom have these espionage and cyberth activities been committed? The targets of cyberthreat and espionage activities in the Philippines span both government and private sectors: one, government targets: executive branch departments handling diplomatic, defense, and maritime affairs; agencies involved in South China Sea Policy Formulation; military and law enforcement communications networks; as well as local government units in strategically significant locations; two, private sector targets: like critical infrastructure operators, particularly in energy, telecommunications, and transportation; defense contractors and suppliers to the armed forces of the Philippines; research institutions working on maritime resources and territorial disputes; and financial institutions with ties to government projects; three, individual targets: senior government officials with access to classified information; military officers in command positions. In fact, Mr. You held one hearing previously uh, and uh, called for one such senior military official; diplomats engaged in territorial negotiations, as well as researchers and academics specializing in geopolitical and security issues.

For whom are these activities being conducted? Two major strategic developments could possibly undergird China's espionage, surveillance, and related activities in the Philippines, representing a significant shift in China's approach to information warfare, intelligence gathering, and global influence operations. These developments have particular implications for the Philippines due to its strategic location and ongoing territorial disputes with China. The first is the 2015 Chinese, Chinese defense white paper, with the focus on winning informationized local wars. And the second is the 2017.

Can I, can I uh, but in itong white paper nila? Does it uh, specifically mention the Philippines? Kung ano ano yung gagawin nila?

Not the Philippines in uh, in specifically, Mr. Chair, but this is generalized, but this has been their guiding uh, strategy, Mr. Chair. Ano pa yang white paper na iyon, 2015, Mr. Chair? The other one, Mr. Chair, is the 2017 National Intelligence Law, which mobilizes Chinese citizens and organizations. The 2015 Chinese military strategy marked a critical evolution in China's military doctrine by emphasizing the following key components: first, information dominance, prioritizing control of information space as a prerequisite for military success; second, is system of systems warfare, integrating all military and civilian information systems; third, is network centric operations, leveraging advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and fourth, civil-military fusion, blurring the lines between civilian and military technologies and infrastructure.

What are its practical implications to the Philippines? There are four: one, is that the development of sophisticated cyber capabilities that could target Philippine government, military, and critical infrastructure; second, are enhanced electronic warfare capabilities for potential deployment in disputed areas like the South China Sea; third, is investment in advanced surveillance systems to monitor military activities and communications; and fourth, the creation of information operations capabilities to influence public opinion and political discourse.

Marahil, Mr. Chair, ito na po yung magtatahi nung mga nakita po natin kahapon. Can you repeat that to underscore that? To influence the creation po of information operations capabilities to influence public opinion and political discourse. So sa tingin niyo yan ay ginagawa ngayon ah, in terms of makikita po natin ito, Mr. Chair, sa social media uh, because we believe that uh, Chinese organs are amplifying divisive political discourse in our country.

So siguro matagal ko ng gustong tanungin to e. Meron bang mga indicators being observed, you, NSC, you can bat in suggesting foreign interference in the 2025 elections, particularly targeting candidates with strong pro-sovereignty or anti-China positions? Meron bang na, na nakitang ganon na yung tina-target eh yung mga anti-China at tinutulungan yung pro-China? Meron ba nakitang ganong pattern, MSC or NIC, you can batin? Sino sasagot? Kahit hindi full yung sagot niyo, quantify yourself.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, good morning. I'm Assistant Director General uh, Jonathan Malaya from the National Security Council, and thank you for your inviting us, Mr. Chairman. Uh, Mr. Chairman asked to your question if uh, there are information operations being done in the Philippines uh, that are Chinese state-sponsored. Um, as mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by um, DDG Ace of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, it is, it is um, there are indications, Mr. German, that uh, information operations are being conducted that are Chinese state-sponsored in the Philippines and are actually interfering in the forthcoming elections.

So ang ibig sabihin nito, may mga ongoing operations ang China para suportahan yung mga kandidatong gusto nilang manalo. Yun yun ang diretsong tanong ko. At kontrahin naman yung mga kandidatong ayaw nilang manalo.

Yes, there are indications of that, Mr. Chairman. And at itong mga ganitong mga pangyayari, hindi ito naintindihan kaagad ng sambayanan dahil ito'y nakahalo na sa social media. Hindi mo na alam kung alin dito yung totoo. Is that correct?

That's correct, Mr. Chairman.

So may we know just if uh, just give us an inkling of the indicators that the NSC has observed uh, suggesting foreign interference in the 2025 elections, again, particularly anti-China positions? Ano yung halimbawang indicators? Marami yung namba-bash, marami yung sunod-sunod yung mga indicators nito. Ang nakikita po kasi namin, Mr. Chairman, is that um, there are many narratives na lumalabas, for example, from Beijing that are being amplified by third-party uh, individuals, the mga proxis nila, Mr. Chairman.

So based here in the Philippines or in China?

Uh, based here in the Philippines, uh, Mr. Chairman. And they do, they usually occur during survey periods?

Uh, yes, Mr. Chairman, that's correct. Um, in fact, Mr. Chairman, ang napapansin kasi namin ah, when there are um, statements coming from the Beijing, they are amplified by uh, local proxies here in the Philippines. So kung ano iyung script na nanggagaling sa Beijing, yun din naman ang sinasabi nila dito sa Pilipinas. Uh, so we can see that, Mr. Chairman, doon sa um, for example, the Balikatan exercises are happening right now. So you will see narratives coming from Beijing that the Balikatan exercises is a threat to uh, regional peace and stability, and you'll also hear that that kind of statement coming from uh, local proxies who are following the script coming from Beijing, Mr. Chairman. And of course uh, your agency and other agencies as well have identified the local proxies. May listahan naman yan eh, kung sino yung mga local proxies na yan na lumalabas na sinusunod kung ano iyung compass galing sa China.

That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Kasi consistent yung mga narrative nila, mag-iingay pag malapit ng ah, eleksyon, pag may survey, lalong-lalo na pag may ah, sinusuportahan silang kandidato.

Ah, NIC, you can proceed. Thank you, NSC.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. The other strategic development is the 2017 National Intelligence Law, mobilizing Chinese citizens and organizations. This law fundamentally transformed China's intelligence apparatus by: one, compelling mandatory cooperation, which requires all Chinese citizens and organizations to assist intelligence operations; a second facet is its global reach, authorizing intelligence activities both domestically and abroad; third, is legal protection, or providing legal cover for intelligence operations conducted by Chinese entities; and fourth, it's focus on offensive rather than defensive intelligence activities.

What is, what are its potential uh, impact to the Philippines? One, Mr. Chair, Chinese companies involved in Philippine infrastructure could be legally obligated to gather intelligence; two, Chinese tech companies operating in the Philippines may be required to facilitate surveillance or data collection; academic and cultural exchanges could serve as platforms for intelligence gathering, and this has happened uh, already even in other countries, Mr. Chair. There are now several countries, for example, that have banned their Confucius Institutes. They still exist here in our country, Mr. Chair. Lang ano, is this the ano fix na ba itong slide mo, baka meron pang iba, hindi lang napapalabas nung technical natin? Naka-?

Ah, fix po siya, Chair. I'm just read, I'm just reading through my uh, presentation. And one, one intriguing question: Do they have the ability to influence not just Filipinos staying here domestically, but even overseas OFWs? Ah, yung mga kababayan natin nasa abroad? Meron ba kayong nakitang gawain na ganyan?

And so far as our OFWs are concerned, Mr. Chair, wala pa po tayong documented or actual case of that. But if you're talking about uh, Chinese diaspora even here in the Philippines, kahit sabihin po natin, assuming the best of them that they are not inclined uh, if they have relatives, if they have interests back home, those are sources of leverage for uh, their government. Kaya kahit po ayaw po nilang makipag ah, cooperate, kasi andito po sila, gusto po nilang manirahan ng tahimik dito, kaya pa rin po silang i-compel. Kasi po yung kanilang mga kamag-anak, kanilang mga interest back home are sources of leverage of their own government.

Mr. Chair, siguro ang mas maliwanag to sa mga nakikinig ngayon: Hindi lahat po ng ah, Chinese o Pilipino-Chinese ay masama. Hindi naman lahat ay gumagawa ng espionage activities. Meron lang tinutukoy ngayon ang iba't ibang intelligence agencies na may katibayan naman na ang kanilang ginagawa ay hindi para sa interest ng Pilipinas, kung hindi para sa akin pa ang interest ng Pilipinas. Is that the right assumption?

Ah, tama po, Mr. Chair. O kaya hindi ito, hindi ito blanket ah, condemnation of uh, people of Chinese origin. So may mga nakakatulong, may mga tung nakatulong sa sa kalakalan, sa negosyo, sa pagbibigay ng trabaho. Pero hindi lahat yon. Ah, ang tinutukoy dito yung may mga ginagawang uh, pagmamanman, pagtitiktik na laban sa interes ng Pilipinas.

Tama po yan ah, DDG.

Tama po, Mr. Chair. Please proceed.

Combining these two and coming up with a comprehensive threat assessment for the Philippines, they create a multi-layered threat landscape. Una po diyan ay sa information domain threats. Ito po ay nagkakaroon po tayong nakikitang sophisticated cyber espionage campaigns targeting government agencies. Nabanggit na po natin yanakailan. Nandiyan din po yung potential for data exfiltration from critical infrastructure. Kasama po diyan ang information operations designed to influence public opinion on South China Sea disputes at saka po ang surveillance of military communications and operations. Sa physical domain naman, ang implikasyon po nito ay intelligence gathering through dual-use infrastructure projects. Nandiyan din po yung monitoring of maritime activities in disputed waters. Pinakita na po kahapon. Collection of signals intelligence through communications equipment. Pinakita na rin po kahapon. As well as the mapping of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. Other strategic implications include enhanced Chinese situational awareness of Philippine military capabilities and plans; potential compromise of sensitive diplomatic communications; also the ability to influence public discourse on China-related issues; and intelligence support for gray zone operations in disputed territories. These strategic developments represent a sophisticated approach to information warfare and intelligence gathering that extends well beyond traditional military domains, creating complex security challenges for countries like the Philippines that have territorial disputes and complex relationships with China.

Doun naman po sa tanong, ano naman po ba ang mga impormasyon na nakalap na nila? The compromised information varies by target, but includes those from the government sector, the private sector.

DDG, can we identify some of the government agencies or departments targeted and successfully hacked? Baka hindi nila alam yun. Pwede bang i-reveal yon?

Yes, Mr. Chair. I can jump into that, Mr. Chair.

Yes, yes, City eh. So ito po muna, Mr. Chair, ah, breaks down the mga inatake po ano, by industry. So ang pinaka, kung titingnan niyo po yung pinaka dalawa sa pinakamarami po ay galing po sa manufacturing at saka po sa government sector. Ah, pumapangatlo po diyan ay ang, ang financial services, technology uh, sector and as well as the telecommunications sector. So sila po ang top five ah, na pinakainaatake na industries dito po sa Pilipinas. Pagdating naman po sa ahensya, and ito po, Mr. Chair, eh may kinalaman lang po sa mga ahensya na potentially mapinsala po ng mga Chinese-related activities. Ano po 'yun? So we're talking about ano-ano pong ahensya? So sa slide po na yan, Mr. Chair, kung makikita po natin, there were 79 incidents involving AMLOC, Barm, BIR, Civil Service, CHR, Department of Agriculture, DFA, DICT, DLG, DBM, DOJ, DOST, DPWH, National Irrigation, Namria, and National Telecommunications Commission, Mr. Chair. May representative tayo na Namreya, baka hindi niya alam na na-hack na sila. This is only for the period April, April to December 2024 at hanggang January po 2025.

And can you give us an indication as to the extent of the damage done?

Ah, siguro po, Mr. Chair, balik po ako sa isang slide. Ito po siguro ang pwedeng patotoo kung gaano po kasensitibo po yung mga ah, naging operations po na ito. For example po sa isang ah, operation ng isang Chinese threat actor, July 4 to 5, 2024, nagkaroon po ng pagpasok sa isang IP address sa Pilipinas. Itago na l na lang natin po sa dot.gov, goov.ph, pero ito po'y Zimbra Mail Service. Nagkaroon po ng exfiltration ng datos. Ah, ang bigat po nito is 3.63, 3.63 GB of data. Tayo po'y nakipag-coordinate po sa unit involved po dito at ito po'y may telltale sign of Chinese tactics, techniques, and procedures, Mr. Chair. Another one, and it has been attributed to a Chinese threat actor uh, named Aquatic Panda. Nangyari po ito noong August 10 hanggang December 21, 2023. Nagkaroon po ng connection na bumabato po papunta sa isang Hong Kong-based na IP address. Ang napinsala na naman po ay itago na lang natin sa isang dotd.gov.ph, PH na Zimbra male service din po. Approximately 1.62 uh, megabytes of data were exfiltrated at nakipag-ugnayan din po tayo sa ah, concerned na unit po dito. Ang pangatlo po, Mr. Chair, ay attributed naman sa Mustang Panda. Nangyari po ito last year, May 23, 2024. Kung ito, Aquatic PDA, Mustang Panda, yung aktor dito ay galing ng China?

Yes po, Mr. Chair. So yung hina-hack nila eh nasa Pilipinas, and presumably this is a big government department.

Sa high-level government agency po. Alam naman nila?

Alam po nila na-compromise na lahat yon.

Opo. And the purpose is ah, sa ngayon, Mr. Chair, ang makikita lang po natin is kukuha lang, kung napasok na po nila, kukuha lang po sila kung ano nilang pwede nilang higupin doon at saka po nila ah, isu-subject yan sa further analysis kung ano pa po yung pwede nilang magamit po doon sa mga nakuha nilang impormasyon. Halimbawa, DOST, nandito ang DOST, nakakalap sila ng uh, datos tungkol sa mga bagyo, tungkol sa ating mga sensors, ating mga liar equipment. Kaya ba nilang pakialaman 'yun?

Uh, hindi pa po natin masasabi sa as of now, Mr. Chair, but as they are, these are already useful information, Mr. Chair. Ibig kong sabihin ah, to inflict damage, pwede bang gawin nila? Halimbawa, signal number two na palabasin nila signal number one pa rin. Nag gagawa doon ng DOST. Ang pag-asa, mas mababa 'yung category pero humahagupit na 'yung hangin. Kaya minsan kaya nasisisi 'yung pag-asa, bakit ninyo dineclare na signal number 3 yan? Nilagay niyo one pa lang. So pwede ba yun gawin?

I'm not very familiar with uh uh, weather science, Mr. Chair, but if if I understand correctly from your question, siguro po ang pwede ko pong mai-relate sa nakikita po namin based on the premise of your question. Ang DOST po, for example, after po nilang mapasok, naging springboard po sila sa pag-hack po sa iba pang mga ahensya sa ilalim ng DOST. Lalong-lalo na po yung mga ahensya ng DOST na may kinalaman po sa research and development. So nung napasok nila yon, parang Avatar, nandon sila sa loob na, na sumisid na sila sa iba't ibang ah, bure ng DOST na walang kaalam-alamang DOST. Ah, nagbigay alam po tayo sa kanila, Mr. Chair. In fact uh, mismo pong kalihim po ng DOST ang pinagsabihan po natin dahil po ah, I'm not sure if I should it here, Mr. na Hindi na.

But can you confirm that representative of the DOST, sabi mo authorize ka?

Ah, well uh, confirm this po with our executive director po for the information regarding the hacking po.

Papaano? Papaano?

Ah, we will, I will confirm po, sir.

Ay, wala, hindi mo kayang sagutin dito. Dapat yung executive director ang pinapunta rito 'di ba? Sino ba executive director? Dapat siya 'yung nandito. Tinutulungan na nga kayo eh 'di ba? Ire-relay mo pa? Babalik uli? Walang mangyayari 'di ba? Please proceed.

Ah, DDG, thank you, Mr. Chair. So sa pangkalahatan po, balik po ako doon sa isang previous slide ko. So 234 bridges. Ah, ito po, Mr. Chair, sa nakita lang po namin ito kamakailan. Hindi pa po ito kasama last year, Mr. Chair. Ito very recent lang po ito. Ah, hindi na lang po natin papangalanan yung ahensya kasi mataas po ang ahensya na ito. It's high level. Pero kung titingnan niyo po, ito po ang mga nangyaring insidente: 234 data breaches na na-uncover po ng ating ahensya. Meron pong 32 na agencies ang meron pong sensitibong impormasyon na nakabulat po sa dark web. Meron pong 91 credentials. Ibig sabihin po, ito po yung ginagamit sa mga ahensyang ito para po mag-access sa kanilang mga websites at sa kanilang mga databases. Yung mga pwede silang pasukin pa uli kasi naka-open na e 'ba?

Yes, Mr. Chair. So hindi, hindi pa to nagawa ng paraan na masarahan. Ganun ba?

Ah, Mr. Chair uh, ang ginagawa po namin as soon as ma-uncover po ito is pinagpagbibigay alam po kaagad namin sa mga respective agencies.

What can they do?

Uh, depending po on their cyber capabilities ah, iba-iba po kasi yung iba hindi pa po matured ang kanilang cyb security operations. Medyo kulang po ang kanilang magiging akson po, Mr. Chair. Compromise lahat?

Opo. Lalong-lalo na sa research and development uh, DOST and the same is true with DICT. So 91 compromised credentials. Ano ibig sabihin niyan?

Ah, Mr. Chair, ang credentials po kasi ginagamit po 'yan para i-access po ang mga websites at password.

Opo. Basically password po at saka iyung mga databases. Kung nakabulatlat po yan, pwedeng-pwede po silang pasukin. At depende po sa ah, role na ginagampanan nung credentials na na-compromise po, pwede pong high-level access po yun, Mr. Chair. Po bang ganitong ah uh ah uh ah breaches ah, yung compromise credentials, kung ito gaya nung mapang pinakita mo kanina, kung ito ay galing sa China, Chinese operator, pwede ba itong ibigay sa isang local proxy counterpart o ikaw na mas malapit ka diyan, mas real time ka ah, pumunta ka na doon sa tabi ng building sa Taguig ng DOST ah, diyan mo na, diyan mo na sila ah, i-operate? Pwede yon?

Hindi na po kailangan, Mr. Chair, kasi po meron pong usually po ang sa techniques, tactics, and procedures po sa mga ganito, as soon as they have established initial uh ah uh breach ah, kumokonekta po yan sa tinatawag na command and control server. So kahit po saan yan usually ah, nandon po yan sa estado na nag-conduct po ng cyber espionage, pwede na po nilang diktahan po kung ano man yung napasok nila, pwede na nilang utusan yong kanilang malware na naipasok para po maglateral ah, movement, Mr. Chair, at magkaroon po ng actions on target na tinatawag. So kahit walang kamalay-malay 'yung mga departments dito sa Pilipinas, akala nila normal lang 'yung mga nagco-command, nagco-command doon. H'wag mo ng i-release yang yang 13-month pay. Bawasan mo ng sweldo si ganito. Pwede 'yon.

Ah, in, in theory, Mr. Chair, pwede po siya.

Mm. Gagalit ngayon sa secretary yon. Pati yung mga ibang program na dapat ipatupad na kaagad eh dine-delay 'ba? In fact, Mr. Chair, hindi na nga po nila kailangang pakialaman yung datos. Pabagsakin lang po nila yung, or i-deny lang nila ng access yung mga ahensya. Malaking disruption na po yun sa ah, day-day operations po ng mga ahensya natin. Kahit yung mga, kahit yung mga anong tawag doon 'yung biometrics nila, pagpapasok sa umaga, hindi na gumagana. Hindi alam na nung HR kung anong gagawin. Absent si ganito, kaya yon.

Yes, Mr. Chair. Ayun. Ganon ka kabigat yung pwedeng gawin nila.

Is this still continuing? We'd like to believe that this is still continuing, Mr. Chair. Kaya po importante po na ipaalam sa ating mga ahensya at saka even sa pribadong sektor na dapat po tuloy-tuloy po yung kanilang cybersecurity efforts. Kasi po ah, mabilis po magbago ang pamamaraan. Ah, in fact po, every few minutes merong naiimbentong bagong malware, Mr. Chair. Yung malware po ang kinakailangan para magkaroon po ng hacking. So at the rate that we are uh...

At the rate that malware is being developed, kailangan po talagang ah paigtingin at pagalingin pa po ang ating ah cyb security operation sa iba't ibang ahensya po.

Has there been an effort, siguro sa executive branch ito, to relay all of this to the various departments, kung ano yung pwede nilang gawin?

Ah yes, Mr. Chair. Ang una pong ginawa ng kasalukuyang administrasyon ay ilathala po yung national cybers security plan. Ah but uh, in conjunction with that, Mr. Chair, naniniwala po kami na dapat po magkaroon ng isang focal agency for cyb security, which sa kasalukuyan po ay wala pa. That's why uh, the administration is working on an executive version, and we hope that uh, the the Senate and the House will support the the version being uh pushed by the executive po para magkaroon po ng isang dedicated national cyb security agency.

Mr. posibilidad ba na 'yung mga maalwan na na-hack o napasok ay meron ding ah local spy na nandoon bawa sa departamento ng DICT o DOST? Hindi nila alam, isang kaopisina nila is working for a Chinese operator. Ah, hindi alam ng mga kaopisina nila na ganun din ka kasa-kasama nila mananghalian. Siya na pala yung nandoon. Siya yung local ah yung focal person doon sa loob ng Kagawaran. Is this a possibility para mas maalwan sa kanila?

Ah, not just a possibility, Mr. Chair. In fact, yan nga po yung preferred mode of uh ah uh compromising any organization. Ang tinatawag po na insider threat. Mas madali po para sa kahit anong cyber threat actor na ico-compromise po ang isang naandoon na sa loob. Uutusan lang siyang magsaksak po ng ah halimbawa ng isang USB. Ah uutusan po siya na mag ah karga po ng isang type of malware. Ah halimbawa po, mas madali po yan actually, and in fact, mas epektibo po yan. In fact, Mr. Chair, ganun po ang nangyari. Ah kung naalala niyo po yung pagnanakaw sa central bank ng Bangladesh, ah ang sistema po na yun ay closed system, yung SWIFT para po sa financial transfers ng mga bangko. Eh since closed system po yun, hindi siya maha-hack sa loob. Ang nangyari po, may isang empleyado, whether we do not know kung voluntarily or involuntarily, sa kanya po pinadaan yung pagha-hack. Kaya po napasok ang central bank po ng Bangladesh at nanakawan po sila ng hundreds of millions of dollars. Some of which found its way here in the Philippines.

Mrs. Check, mas madali sa China o kung sino man na mag-operate ng ganyan kung meron silang ah planted na empleyado na doon sa loob. Nandun na mismo sa loob ng halimbawa DICT, DOST, o papaano natin made-determine yung mga yon? Syempre Pilipino rin yon na-compromise na. Is there a way of uh determining na kung sino ong mga to? Are you are you now uh doing an effort to to unmask kung sino-sino ong mga to? Kasi mabilis eh. 'Yung isa 'yung isa nakita ko dun sa isang presentation mo, nagsabay na 'yung DOST at saka DICT. Ah may sa probinsya pa 'yung isa, yung iyong previous slide. Kasi kung totoo 'yan, meron tayong spy sa mga ahensya, ilabas na natin yung mga mukha nila ‘ba? Wala silang karapatan maging bahagi ng civil service uh roster natin.

Mr. Chair, ah meron po tayong dalawang ah ah regulasyon kung saan sa pamamagitan po na ito pwede po nating ah ma-prevent po ung ah binabanggit niyo po na sitwasyon. Ito po ang uh Executive Order uh 608, patungkol po sa uh pagbibigay po ng security clearance, at is 'yung kalaki po nito ang ah memorandum circular 78. Hindi naman po ito, this does not fully guarantee, kasi this does not apply to all uh government employees. Pero we are mentioning this, lalo na kasi we would like to remind all our government agencies that for those personnel or employees that have access to sensitive systems and information, dapat po dumaan po sila sa ah security clearance system po natin na pinapamahalaan po ng National Security Council na tinutulungan po ng NCA.

Mr. Chair, is there an internal security clearance system within the ICT? Meron ba ngayon? Yes or no lang.

Um, for sa for the cyb security bureau lang po sir. So you have a cyb security bureau which is an internal unit?

Opo. O ah, external yon? Um, internal. Anong trabaho? Anong trabaho non?

Umm, before sir, mag-hire po, may nagba-background check po kami for the cyb security bureau po bago ma-hire, background check. Pero pag nagtatrabaho na, nandoon na? Umm, wala sir na ano, wala.

Oho. Okay na. Cleared ka na. Cleared ka na forever hanggang mag-retire ka. Ganon sa ano sa DOST ah, there is a national security clearance system within DOST po sir? Sa sinong nag-i-implement non? Ah, I will have to confirm first. Hindi natin masasagot to eh, ico-confirm mo pa. So siguro yun ang kulang dito, the dig, the clearance system should be continuing. Hindi po pwedeng ah entry level pumasok tapos tuwing lunes manunumpa na lang ako ay ganito. No plug ceremony. So we have to do something uh about that, kasi may nakita ako kaninang slide eh, yung magsabay yung DIC at DOST.

Go ahead. Go ahead.

Ah, Mr. Chair, uh I was also reminded by our Agency Legal Service that the two uh guidelines that were mentioned earlier, EO 608 and MC 78, only covers the executive.

Yes, Mr. Chair. So wala sa ibang, wala sa legislative, wala sa judiciary.

Wala po. Mr. Chair, please proceed. Meron akong tanong siguro eh. May mga wala dito yung security and exchange commission. May mga volunteer groups gaya nitong Xiausing Volunteer Group, Philippine China Association of Promotion of Peace and Friendship Incorporated. Ano to? Uh, papaano na scrutinize mo to? Kasi kanina we're talking of individuals entering the government service. Papaano naman yung grupo na entering mainstream society na natulong din? Papaano to naki-clear?

As of now, Mr. Share, uh we really have to rely on the uh diligence and the vigilance of our uh government agencies kasi sila po, not just the government agencies rather, but also the local government units kasi sila po talaga ang unang sasala bago pa po makarating yan sa ating national security and law enforcement agencies. So uh, Mr. Share, mahirap po na sagutin kung sino dapat pupunta yung ganitong grupo unless po they have a certain agency has a clear mandate of law na sila dapat ang magpoproseso sa isang grupo. For example, kung magrerehistro po bilang negosyo, may dadaanan pong mga ahensya po yan, katulad po ng SEC natin. Kung mga ano naman po, kung mga foundation, ah ganun din po ah kailangan po nilang magrehistro, so on and so forth. But beyond that, Mr. Chair, unless vigilante po at ah aware at ah nagdiligence po ang ating mga ahensya ah diyan po siguro papasok na yung mga ah tinatawag natin, the things that fall through the cracks.

Mr. Salamat, uh understand. Admiral Gaban, you're about to leave, meron kang gustong idagdag?

Uh yes, uh Mr. Chair, thank you very much. First of all, uh honorable chair, please allow me as the commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard to manifest our greatest gratitude and deepest gratitude to the honorable chair for being the champion uh for the passage of the maritime zones act and the archipelagic zones act. The two measures, the two laws actually clarified uh finally the extent of our maritime territory and jurisdiction as well as our rights and obligation as a sovereign maritime and archipelagic country. This enable the Coast Guard to do its role better to secure the sovereignty and territory of this country. That's why your honor, this uh uh hearing is very very important for the Philippine Coast Guard and it is the reason why I am here to highlight how important this is. So thank you very much uh your honor for championing the maritime course of our Maritime country. I have with me your honors the uh commander of the Coast Guard Investigation and detection management service. He has full authority to respond to any question which will be asked by the honorable chair on behalf of the Philippine Coast Guard. Thank you, Mr.

The committee is ready to uh dispense with your presence. Uh I know that you have a lot of uh things to do today. So we thank your attendance. We direct some questions later on to Commodore Tco.

Salamat sir. Salamat. Thank you very much. No excuse. Thank you. Thank you.

Ah, go ahead. DDG, yung yung on a scale of 1 to 10, ganon kalaki na ang damage na lumapat sa ating mga sangay ng pamahalaan? Ganun kalaki na? Huwag mo ng banggitin yung mga government agencies.

Ah, Mr. Chair, ang pinag-uusapan po kasi natin dito ngayon ay tinatawag nating offensive cyber operations. Dalawang klase po yon: cyber espionage at saka po destructive cyber attacks. Uh marahil po maraming nag-iisip wala pa naman tayong nakikitang uh very destructive cyber attacks kaya okay lang po siguro tayo. Uh we would like to uh make the submission, Mr. Share, na hindi po dapat tayo kakampante dahil ang cyber espionage po, a precursor lamang of what may be potentially destructive cyber attacks waiting to happen. Mr. Chair, ah meron po tayong tinatawag na prepositioning activities. Ah napansin po natin ito ah sa dalawa out of the three ah hindi na lang natin po papangalanan ah telecommunications ah networks, yung tinatawag po natin na mga customer premise equipment, yun pong mga routers po. Meron pong mga nakapasok na doon na cyber threat actors, pero kung titingnan niyo po, tahimik lang silang aun nung na-monitor po natin. So it begs the question, what is their intention? So kung ita-translate niyo po iyan sa ibang larangan, for example, what if these threat actors are also prepositioned in critical sectors or critical infrastructure? Just waiting for the right time or uh the right opportunity to conduct attacks. Kaya po ah ang submission po namin ngayon, Mr. Chair, is dapat tuloy-tuloy po yung ating cyber threat intelligence, yung atin pong cyber threat hunting at yung pagpapatalsik po ng itong mga cyberthreat actors pag nakikita po natin sila sa loob ng ating mga networks.

Mr. Chair, ah I'm about to wind down, Mr. Chair. I have three more slides. Ah pero bago siguro yun, balikan ko iyung hindi ko natanong kanina. One is directed to NSC and one is for NICA. How is how are the NICA and NSC addressing the infiltration of Chinese disinformation through troll networks and social media in an election year? Monitoring lang ito. How do you address this? Yung infiltration ng uh Chinese disinformation? Is this ongoing?

Ah yes, Mr. Shirman. Uh we see indications of that currently um that there are uh activities being conducted, no in particular, Mr. Chairman. This started actually way back um when we saw the passage for example, Mr. chairman, of the maritime zones law and the archipelagic seal act, which the honorable chairman was the head and champion of this laws, which the Philippine government um saw as a very significant legislation. The reaction from China, Mr. Chairman, was of condemnation. The Beijing said that they condemn and firmly reject uh the the said laws because it gravely infringes on their territorial integrity, and then we saw after that, Mr. Chairman, certain Filipino actors affirming and amplifying that kind of statement, for example, based in the Philippines. Itong ito yung mga influencer, maraming follower, pag sinabi, nagsalita, viral agad.

Yes, Mr. Chairman. Uh there were uh statements coming from these individuals, Mrs. Chairman, and they usually conduct their forums in Quezon City and they said that the passage of the law makes the Philippines idiots. Ang sabi nila, Mr. Chairman, it's the idiotization of the Filipino because the law actually makes diplomacy harder to achieve a win-win solution to the South China Sea problem. And uh there was uh a lot of statements also concerning the chair uh Mr. Chairman, no condemning the action of the Philippine government and of the chair. So mula noon, Mr. Chairman, nakikita na natin yyung amplification of these types of statements uh by local actors here in the Philippines. Kaya pala araw-araw ako naba-bash ha? Tagal na.

So second question: are there confirmed cases of Chinese influence operations aiming to polarize the electorate or undermine public trust in National Security Policies and Territorial Defense? Meron bang kasi iba yyung ano eh, iba yung high level na influence gaya ng nabanggit mo yung yung ah Maritime Zones Law? Ah ito, meron na naman yung nalagay sa Google Map yung West Philippines Sea, biglang meron na namang nagsalita ng ganon. So are there confirmed cases? Sigurado ba sa kanila galing iyon?

Ah, Mr. Chair, ah as an annex to the uh submission of the NSC, ah kami naman po sa NICA, Mr. Share, uh without delving too much into detail because this uh some of them are currently the subject of ongoing uh operations, there are certain personalities that uh are tied to a nexus of the Chinese official and unofficial network here in the Philippines. Uh they have been identified, mga Pilipino na yan, mga Pilipino po, Mr. Chair, na nakikipag-usap po sa mga identified uh Chinese personalities, both official and unofficial dito po sa ating bansa. Ah pangalawa po, Mr. Chair, ah and this is also the subject of our Cyberth Intel operations, Uh we are trying to establish uh links online. Kasi po ang nakikita po natin, it works both ways, Mr. Chair. Meron pong bagsak galing sa China na ina-amplify ng mga kababayan natin na meron at meron din naman po na ah that are generated by the influencers dito sa Pilipinas who are either anti-administration or anti uh or are pro-China. T's ina-amplify naman ng mga identified uh, when we say mouthpieces, Mr. SH, we're not just talking about personalities but also their their social media channels. So it it's working both ways, Mr. Chair, parang pinagsabong na lang tayo.

Yes, Mr. Chair. So ang nangyari diyan, pinagsabong na mga Pilipino, pinag-away lahat tayo na hindi naman naintindihan nung iba, nagre-react doon sa halimbawa sa isang post na halimbawa galing sa mainland China, tinalo through ng nandito, naka-base, nagre-react na, humaba na yung istorya, ganun ba nangyayari?

Ah yes, Mr. Chair. And how do we how do we address this?

Uh, Mr. Sher, ongoing campaign season, because if it falls within the perview of uh the election season, ah dapat po ang Commission on Elections ang ah umakto po kung papasok na po siya doon sa tinatawag nating ah election campaigning. Uh however, beyond the elections, on a day-to-day uh regular basis, uh even kami po are hard up in answering the question, sino ba dapat ang namamahala sa pagpupulis ng ating public sphere? Kasi po ah again, it impinges on a lot of issues. Ah nandiyan na po. It becomes now a question uh of ethics. It's now it now impinges on the question of freedom of speech, so on and so forth. So nagiging murky na po ang usapan na iyan. But uh we agree to the extent, Mr. Chair, that there must be a way to distinguish between what are uh shall we say uh discussions that should be well within the public sphere and uh what are emerging as misinformation or disinformation operations, and there is a way, Mr. Chair. There is a technology component to it. There is a law enforcement component to it, and there is also a regulatory component to it.

Mr. Chair, other presentations, meron pa?

Ah, Mr. Sher, I would just like to close with one last slide and then I will turn it over to our legal service. Mr. Chair, ah sa legal service, uh my question would be this: May nakasuhan na ba tayo rito? Yun ang sagutin mo mamaya.

Yes sir.

So, Mr. Chair, uh malaki po ang insentibo, hindi lamang po sa mga bansa, but even for criminal syndicates to engage in cyber attacks. Uh in 2022 po, it's estimated already to be at 7 trillion. It's a 7 trillion industry. Uh it's projected to grow to 10.5 trillion this year, and in 2028 it will be 13.82 trillion. Now sa Pilipinas po, ang sabi ng Philippine Statistics Authority in 2023, our digital economy was valued at 2.08 trillion, representing 9.4% to 4% of our national GDP. The average cost of a data breach in the Philippines has increased by 23% since 2022. In one case, it cost an organization upwards of 40 million. These figures do not account for the incalculable costs to national security and public trust when government systems are compromised. In closing, we support, Mr. Share, the uh effort of the legislature to pass uh pieces of legislation that will uh strengthen our anti-espionage uh regime as well as our new regime for what we call now as foreign malign influence and interference. With that, Mr. Chair, I turn over the floor to our agency legal service. Uh ang we we call it under the denotature uh my Mr. Chair, MyFi?

Opo. Malign influence and foreign interference.

So hindi na ito WiFi?

Hindi opo. Maligned influence and foreign interference. Foreign interference. So ibig sabihin ah, sinisira yung ah, iniiba yung, binabaluktot yung dapat pag-usapan sa pamamagitan ng cyberspace. Yun yung yun yung impluwensya. Pero nakakagulat yung sinabi niyo kanina na malaki rin ang dagok sa ating ekonomiya. So papunta rin siguro ito doon sa mga scams. Yung mga online scams. Maraming naloloko sa atin. Kahapon tinanong ko 'to sa NBI eh. Yun ba mga Chinese na nahuli sa sa iba't ibang lugar eh, ito ba ay self-sufficient na napopondohan nila yung sarili, baka ginagamit na yung mga online scams, etc., etc. Tinanong ko yun kahapon eh. I think I got a partial positive response. So bahagi ba yun ni DG ng ng nabanggit mo kanina naing ekonomiya?

Opo, Mr. Chair. Hindi lamang po yung sa mga nabibiktima po sa scam. Yung mga kumpanya po, for example, na nagiging biktima ng ransomware at meron na po sila, not all of them have reported pong pagbayad po nila ng ransom doon po sa mga cyber criminals. Yun pong cost of remediation, yun pong pagsasaayos ng kanilang mga ICT systems after po nilang mapinsala. So yun po, if you factor all of that in, wala pa po doon yyung cost to our national security and public confidence. Malaki na po yun na dagok uh economically. Uh, Mr. Chair, the term MyFi, malign influence, foreign interference. Anything more to add, DDG?

Ah yes po, Mr. Chair. Ang amin pong agency legal service ay meron lang po idadagdag.

You recognize Attorney Rowena Acudili?

Yes. Good morning, Mr. Chair.

Good morning po everyone. Again, Attorney Renaudili po from the NICA's Legal Service. This is just a short presentation po, Mr. Chair, and as mentioned by our deputy director general, the NICA support Senate Resolution numbers 1267 and 1328 to investigate the recovery of submersible drones and other possible spying or foreign interference activities in the country, as we consider this as a national security matter. For our inventory and open source intelligence, a total of seven submersible drones have been recovered from and or cited in different parts of the country since 2022. Five of which were recovered in Luzon, particularly in Pasukin, Ilocos Norte in July 2022. Uh the color of drone recovered is black. Uh coast of Zambales last September 2022, we have no information on the color. Kalayan Island, Cagayan last August 2024, ah color black. San Pascual, Masbate in December 2024, color yellow. And Subtang, Batanes in January this year, also color black. One cited in the waters of Bohol last January this year, color gray and red; however, this was not recovered, Mr. Chair, as the info only circulated online and uh we have not recovered the drone. And lastly, we have one in Initao, Misamis Oriental last October 2024, and we also have no info on the color. The common features of these submersible drones are that they are all unmanned and submersible; they are all capable of gathering and transmitting data; and they are not armed with weapons or explosives. On the other hand, Mr. Chair, since last year there are a number of espionage incidents involving Chinese nationals. We will submit this report to this honorable committee because some of uh the information are still being exploited. Mr. Chair, is that part of the arrest made by the National Bureau of Investigation that includes? Mr. Chair, the uh incidents reported by the NBI. So yung tanong ko kanina, ah pending question, may mga na-filean na ng kaso as to the foreign interference or malign influence?

Mr. Chair, wala pa po tayong nafa-file na case on that because kailangan doon, we have no effective law in place as of now.

Mr. Chair, what about Commonwealth Act 616?

Uh, Commonwealth Act 616 speaks about espionage, Mr. Chair, and if we're going to look into the law, Mr. Chair, Uh we can see that it is focused on national defense and um siguro po kailangan lawakan natin ang coverage non to cover national security concerns and not just your your proposal uh make that an agency proposal is to amend CA 616. Matagal na yon ah, American time pa iyon.

That is correct, Mr. Chair. This was about applicable provisions of the revised penal code.

Same thing, Mr. Chair. Hindi rin po siya effective because our revised penal code was enacted in the 1930s and CA 616 was enacted in 1941 to be exact, Mr. Chair. So there are provisions that are already obsolete na po, dahilan kaya wala pang nafa-file na ng kaso. As to SPG uh, we took note of the cases filed by the NBI this year, Mr. Chair.

NBI, ano iyung kasong kasi may baril yung isa kaya Comelec? Ganun sigurong in-invoke niyo ano yung kasong finilan niyo doon sa mga nahuling espia doon sa regional trial court branch 36 of Tarlac, sa Palawan, etcetera.

Good morning, Mr. Chair. Yung lahat po ng kaso na pine-sent namin kahapon was ah filed for an espionage case sir. Espionage case po.

Anong Anong batas ang in-invoke niyo?

Commonwealth Act 616 po. 616 din na sinasabi ni Attorney Rowena na kailangan i-update.

Mhm. Yes, Mr. Chair. Especially the penalties, baba.

Opo sir. And would you would you recommend that this be considered as non-bailable offenses as well?

Uh that would be a good uh proposal, Mr. Chair, considering that this is a national security offense. Baka magpiyansa lang yung mga yon. Pagpiyansa niyo, hindi na makikita yung mga yon ‘ba?

Anything more to add?

Ah, NICA.

Yes, Mr. Chair, uh may I finish my presentation? Mr. Chair, and as mentioned, Mr. Chair, the recovery of the submersible drones capable of gathering and transmitting data and the monitoring of several suspicious activities of foreign nationals in the country call for the review of our existing laws to further secure our territory, maritime and cyber domain. K agency expresses its full support to Senate Bill number 2951 or the Counter Foreign Interference Act that the good chairperson has introduced as well as Senate Bill number 2980 or the new Espionage Act. The intelligence community welcomes this very important legislation as this will impose stricter penalties for violators of espionage law and will penalize foreign interference in the domestic affairs of the country. That would be all, Mr. Chair. Thank you po.

Salamat. Uh, anything to add? Uh, NSC, wala na.

You have a few minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh we just like to join the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, Mr. Chairman, in uh also supporting the bill that you filed on foreign malign influence and interference. We noticed, Mr. Chairman, that uh not all offenses are covered by the laws that we have right now. In for example, Mrs. Chairman, there were instances in Australia wherein foreign agents were trying to bribe an official of the Australian government, but because they had their foreign intelligence, foreign malign influence law, they were able to file cases against them uh through that law. In the Philippines, we don't have that. All we have is espionage, which is theft of sensitive information. But if the act is to influence the decision-making of public officials, then we will have to find some law up to to to cover that kind of offense. So definitely, Mr. Chairman, we support the position of NICA to have that and of course, Mr. Chairman, the updating also of the uh espionage laws no which uh we feel are very important uh for the Philippines. So we thank Mr. Chairman, the the chair for being for championing this laws, just the uh Commonwealth Act 616, but an existing administrative order relative to the classification of documents, ah dapat siguro mabago, mabago rin yon. So ano-ano ba yung mga classification ng documents? Matagal-tagal na rin itong ano ah, matagal-tagal na rin itong sinusunod natin pero antiquated na yan. So kailangan din ah mabago yang naturang batas na yan, yung classification of documents, kasi may iba na yan eh, nasa nasa ano na eh, nasa cyberspace na. Papaano? Hindi naman nakalagay sa ano yan eh, physically sa cabinet ah yung mga cabinet nung araw kaya classified as confidential, classified as restricted, wala na yun. Nasa nasa cloud na lahat yan eh. So perhaps there is likewise a need to to update that uh on the basis of uh new technology.

Anything more to add?

Wala na. So siguro gusto nating pasalamatan lahat yung dumalo. Uh we have heard uh the presentation today of NICA, joined in by NSC and briefly by the Philippine Coast Guard. And keeping in mind what transpired yesterday about how China makes use of the cyber realm to prey upon other countries, I would like to now do what I suggested yesterday. Mayro'n pong mayro'n pong nakalap na impormasyon din ang aming tanggapan na gusto kong ilabas sa pagdinig na ito na makakatulong sa mga ahensyang naririto sa kanilang ginagawa, lalong-lalo na sa lumalawak na cyber cyber activity na ginagawa laban sa atin. Ito ay isang gawain ng isang foreign power na nagpapatuloy maging sa oras na ito. Ah bago ko po ibahagi ang aking sinasabi, gusto kong balikan iyung mga pahayag ng ambassador ng China, call back to mind what Ambassador Wang had to say about the friendship that he feels and the Chinese government feels toward the Philippines. Ambassador Wang has spoken not just of the close friendship, quote unquote, that China feels for the Philippines, but of the strong bond. Kaya sinabi ko kanina, hindi naman lahat ng Chinese citizens kalaban natin, of the practical cooperation, friendship that between the two countries. Ambassador Wang told a Philippine, Philippine High School children back in 2022, “The friendship between the Philippines and China will last forever,” and quote. He

Offered profound hope that young people will carry the banner of China-Philippines friendship, and let the China-Philippines friendship be passed from generation to generation. Kaya nga tayo ah nagce-celebrate pa rin tayo ah ng Chinese New Year dahil sa pagkakaibigang yan.

Keeping those warm professions of friendship in mind, let me now share a body of information with you. It is a result of a thorough investigation into malicious activity. At ito ngayon. At ang ito pong gusto kong ibahagi ngayon ay impormasyong bunga ng masusing pagsisiyasat sa mga kaduda-dudang gawain na sa aking palagay ay hindi pa naisisiwalat sa anuman o alinmang pagtatalakayan. It would buttress it would reinforce what the other agencies have been saying a while ago.

Meron akong gustong ipakitang kontrata. Gusto kong ipakitang isang kontrata. Can we flash that on the screen? Can we can we enhance that? Ito po ay isang kontrata na pinasukan ng isang korporasyon, Infinitus Marketing Solutions Inc. Take note: Securities and Exchange Commission. Ah ito po yung pangalan nung noong kumpanya sa taas kung makikita niyo ah nakalagay po sa agreement na binilugan, binilugan. This contract made and entered into August 2023 in the city of Makati, Philippines, by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Media and Public Relations, Chinese Embassy, Mr. Wu Chinki, with office address at 4896 Antonio Arnaiz Avenue, ah Makati, Metro Manila, referred to here and after referred to as client, and Infinitus Marketing Solutions Inc., represented by Mica Pinton, Marketing Director, with business address—nandiyan naman po—Balero, Makati, as the provider. Makikita po natin dito, merong isang service agreement. Siguro magbubukas-isip din ito sa ating mga security agencies na nakakapasok din sa service agreement ang isang embahada ah patungkol sa isang trabaho. At ang trabaho po rito ah ay siguro papakita ko ‘to mamaya ah siguro, can we go to the next slide? Can we go to the next slide? Ayan. Ang trabaho po, babayaran ng kliyente, nakalagay po doon, payable to Infinitus Marketing Solutions, bank deposit, magta-transfer, magbabayad po. Ang kliyente po, ang People’s Republic of China. Babayaran nila—paki-zoom muna, paliitin mo muna—ayan. Babayaran nila through a bank transfer sa Union Bank, account number blah blah blah. Nakita niyo po yung account number dito? Meron silang agreement. Ang trabaho ng Infinitus is to provide keyboard warriors. Keyboard warriors. Ano po ang ibig sabihin ng keyboard warriors? To play a vital role in the overall effectiveness of the management project. So may mga may mga salary dito, may increase depende siguro ito sa anong nakalagay diyan. We acknowledge we aim to acknowledge their hard work, dedication, and continuous commitment to delivering exceptional results. So loyalty was mentioned. Malamang-lamang itong keyboard warriors ay mga kababayan natin, mga Pilipino. Kasi ito yung tinatanong ko kanina, hindi lahat naka-base sa China. So ito po ay ah nagtatrabaho sa Pilipinas. Nakita na natin yung address kanina sa Makati rin. So nagpo-provide sila ng services. Yun ang pinasukan ng China, People’s Republic of China, through their embassy sa isang korporasyon sa Pilipinas. At ‘yan yung gusto kong ah saliksikin ng Securities and Exchange Commission, kasi ang daling mag-register sa inyo, ang daling mag-ah incorporate, kahit online mai-incorporate pero hindi naman natin alam kung ano yung ginagawa, keyboard warriors.

Can we go to the next page? Next slide please. We go to the next slide. Hindi pa, hindi pa ‘yan. Isa pa ‘yan. Gusto kong ipakita rin. Gusto ko rin palang ipakita rin para patunayan na ang dami kong dokumento rito. Ang haba na nito kung ating uusisain ito ah baka abutin tayo ng isang linggo rito. Gusto kong ipakita, gusto kong ipakita ngayon—napakita ko yung kontrata kanina, yung tseke—gusto kong ipakita yung tseke ah na ito po. Can we have a bigger check? Ah gusto kong ipakita ito. Can you place it in the [Musika] middle? So, so makikita niyo ito. Makikita niyo po ito na nagbayad ang Embassy ng China. Nagbayad ang Embassy ng China sa Infinitus Marketing Solutions ng 30,000. Ang bangko, Bank of China, Bank of China, for the activities mentioned in the contract, in the service contract. So ito ay nagpapatunay na itong checking ito, dated dated 2023, ay for services rendered doon sa contract ng Invictus, which is Infinitus, which is a Filipino registered, organized corporation. So ito’y nagpapatunay na China mismo ang nagbabayad at ang mga nag-o-operate ay siguro hindi naman nila alam na yun yung gagawin nilang trabaho. Ito na yung pinag-uusapan natin kanina. Meron bang mga tao na base rito sa Pilipinas na nag-a-amplify noong mga trabahong binabanggit kanina ng NCA, ng NSC, at maging nung iba’t ibang ahensya? Mamaya po ipapakita kung anong scope nung trabaho na sa pinagbayarang ito para malaman din natin at ng ating mga kababayan na hindi ito simpleng kontrata. Ito pong kontrata at kababayarang ito ay pagyapak sa dignidad ng mga Pilipino, pagyapak sa dignidad ng Pilipinas. Lahat po ng lumalabas ngayon, karamihan yung akala natin ay viral, yung akala natin ay pinag-uusapan talaga ay base pala sa mga ganito. Ang nagbayad ay China para atakihin ang maraming personalidad. At nabanggit ni ADG Malaya kanina eh baka kasama rin ako doon. Kaya pala lagi akong pag mag-o-open ng Facebook eh naba-bash na rin ako. Wala, kahit wala akong kinalaman doon. Hindi po kasalanan noong mga kababayan natin siguro na nagtatrabaho doon kung ano ‘yung ginagawa nila. Wala naman silang intensyong sirain ang Presidente ng Pilipinas, ang miembro ng Senado, ng Kongreso, ng Hudikatura, at lahat na. At kung ano po yung iutos sa kanila, yun po ay base doon sa kontratang pinakita ko.

Can we show the contract again? The first page. Ayun. So can you enhance that? So si Infinitus ay tumutupad lamang sa kontrata. Can we have the second page? Can we have the next page? The next page please. At meron pong keyboard warriors. Siguro yung mga kababayan natin doon ang naging keyboard warriors. Hanggang ngayon ongoing pa ho ito. Hindi lang ito doon sa Infinitus. Marami pa ho ‘yan. Marami pa ho ‘yan. Isa-isang folder po ‘yung dala ko. Marami pa ho ‘yan. Hindi lang ‘yan. Ang akala natin ay ‘yun ang tunay na sentimyento nung mga nagpo-post at nagre-react ay subalit pala, nagpapatunay na binayaran, binayaran ng People’s Republic of China para sirain hindi lang ang kredibilidad ng isang tao o namumuno, kung hindi ng ating bansa. Pwede nating itabi ito at magsasalita ako doon. So nakita niyo po yun? Nakita niyo po kung papaano kung papaano tayo araw-araw na niyayapakan ng isang foreign country, kung papaano po tayo inu-urak. So nakita natin yung yung uh services na ginagawa nung Infinitus, hindi po ito normal public public public relations ito ah, normal PR campaign. Ang ginagawa po is to openly provide information and convey the policies of the Chinese government. The money from that the Chinese Embassy paid was hidden and sinister. It was to finance a troll farm. Troll farm po, a covert disinformation and influence operation against the Philippine government and the Filipino people. Tingnan po natin yung cover nung kanilang ah report. Nagsu-submit po sila ng report monthly sa Chinese Embassy. Tingnan po natin yung cover ng report. Hindi po yanung yan. Makikita niyo po dito sa November 2024 po ito. Bandera po yan ng People’s Republic of China. Yung nasa kanan. So meron silang social social monthly report, issue management on social media, sa Facebook. Nasa baba po yung Infinitus, yung pangalan ng troll farm na binabayaran, binabayaran ng China. Pinagmamalaki po nila doon sa report ng Infinitus na meron silang hundreds of, nung maaga pa lang, hundreds of fake social media accounts they have created using fake personas. Nagpapanggap ng mga ordinaryong Pilipino, teachers, estudyante, negosyante, members of the armed forces, each fake persona pretending to be one of us. So ang ibig sabihin po, yung lumalabas sa Facebook, yung lumalabas sa Facebook ay hindi totoong tao. Hindi po totoong tao. Ito po ay troll. Nagpapanggap ng mga maestra, nagpapanggap na OFW. Kaya lang ang ating mga kababayan ay nalilinglang pag sumali sa conversation. Merong teacher sa ganitong lugar na nagalit kay ganito, sasagot, hahaba na, na-involve sila sa discussion, hindi nila alam, finance ito ng People’s Republic of China through the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines. At ganun din yung tanong ko kanina kung papaano ito nakaka-impluwensya sa eleksyon. Marami dito, basher pa. Papakita ko po sa inyo yung sinasabi nila. They both pinagmamalaki nila sa kanilang foreign masters sa China about 50,000 people entangled in their web of deceit. So meron ng mga sumali doon sa mga usapan, 50,000. Totoong Pilipino na yon. Hindi alam na yung kanilang sinalihan ay istoryang gawa-gawa ng China through Infinitus. Pinatunayan ko sa inyo, nagpakita pa nga ako ng tseke na kabayaran ng Chinese Embassy sa Infinitus. Those ordinary social media users do not know that they befriended, that they friended or followed fake personas directed by China. Finrend nila pero finrend nila. Hindi nila alam na hindi tao ito. Makikitang malinaw na ang pamahalaan ng China sa pamamagitan ng Chinese Embassy ay nagbabayad ng mga Pilipino upang magtrabaho sa troll farms upang tuligsain at sirain ang administrasyon, ang Kongreso, at ang ating pamahalaan. Papakita ko po yan sa inyo. Can we have the blue slide? Hindi po yan. Yung blue slide. Yung ah social media. Yan yung sa ilalim. Yung sa ilalim, yung blue slide. Hindi yan. Yan. So makikita niyo dito yung social media army accounts. They call them army. Yung total accounts niya sa Facebook and Twitter: 330 Facebook accounts, 300 total Twitter accounts, 30. Tapos yung total friends nila na tunay na tao, 53,322. Merong 11 na taong nag-o-operate including the team leader. So nandito po yan, makikita niyo yan. So ganito po. Isa lang po ito. Isa lang po ito sa operations nila. Marami pa hong iba sa iba’t ibang rehiyon sa buong Pilipinas. Kaya yung iba ang salita ay yung lenggwahe na doon sa lugar. Akala nung mga kababayan natin doon, tunay na tao at tunay na sentimyento ang kanilang naririnig. Hindi nila alam ang nagbabayad pala noon ay China. Yan po ang nakakalungkot.

Can we have the second page? Yung important highlights of the month. Highlights of the month. Highlights of the month. Medyo maliit ito. Ito po yung mga comment nila. Highlights of the month. Ayan. Ito po yung report nila. Army propagated special video explainer about the cons of the typhoon missile system of the US being deployed in the Philippines. Army spread excerpts from the blog of Hosha Moonlight officials about the dangers of Bongbong Marcos regime in the Philippines and the history of its dictatorship family. Number three team shared controversial article published in the CNBC media about the world’s auto giant makers need to partner with Chinese auto makers to survive in the global market because of its dominant stature. Siguro ito bunga na rin nung tariff war ngayon between China and the United States. Itong pang-apat team also did massive comment operations on the FB pages of Surigao Congressman Robert Ace Barbers because of his negative statements about China regarding the issue in the South China Sea. Ito si Ace Barbers, muntik na magkasakit dito. Hindi na niya masagot siguro yung kung saan nanggagaling pero yung attack sa kanya, local dialect. Ganon ka prevalent itong nangyayari.

Can we have the next page? Ito po yung mga response. Can we enlarge this? Can we enlarge this? Ayan. Makikita niyo yung sa mga blue. Ayan, China. Ayan, kino-congratulate nila ito. Congrats China for taking good care of the environment. Nice to know about this place of good news, ambassador. In reaction to a post made by the ambassador, China made the pledge to the world to make the planet earth a better place to live in. China’s all the resources. Can we have the third blue slide? Join this exciting vo contest and win great prices. May contest pa. Participate in this exciting contest from the Chinese Embassy Philippines FB page. So nakaka-inlove pa sila. So ganito ganito yung trabahong nangyayari ngayon na malamang hindi alam ng ating mga kababayan.

Can we have the third slide? O po. Sinabi po ng ah ng Chinese Embassy. Ayan po, tama yung slide na yon. Yan, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines ah, Juang Shilan. Post a blog, China amazing story. What’s your view about China’s factor in your life? Create a blog in the Facebook duration, etc. etc. Chinese President called on all parties. So makikita niyo how they shape, mold mindsets through social media. Can we have that slide with pictures? You may picture lahat. Ayan. Kita mo ‘to. Si ito si si Ace Barbers. Walang kalaban-laban dito. Ayan oh. Nag-post siya. Ayan. Pagkatapos niyan, ano na siya? Ah can we have the third slide? Ito po ay galing doon sa Infinitus. Post po ito ng Infinitus. Lahat po sila, si Congressman ah, Mayor, Bullet, Halos lahat po sila. Yun lang o. Ayan. So makikita niyo dito, maging yung pag-aresto doon sa mga POGO ay nag-react sila. Nag-react sila para masuportahan yung kwento ng China na walang kaalam-alam yung ating mga kababayan. Akala nila normal na tao, ay troll pala yon.

Can we have the next slide? Ito po, November 26, 2024. Bago-bago lang. Kung makikita niyo ‘to, ang ang pinupunto noon, November 2024, si Bongbong Marcos, pinagpapatuloy ang ginagawa ng pandaraya ng kanyang ama. As the saying goes, the fruit does not fall far from the tree, like father like son. So ang inaatake naman dito ang Presidente ng Pilipinas. Hindi ko alam kung anong nangyari itong November 26, 2024. Pero ang alam ko, pinirmahan yung maritime zones law, November 8, 2024. Hindi katagalan. So ang tinitira dito ngayon ay ang Presidente.

Can we have the next slide? All of the instructions are coming from the Chinese Embassy in Manila. Tone and voice. Ito po ah, November 12. Ito, four days after the signing of the maritime zones law. Tingnan niyo po ang ang sagot ng mga troll. China has all the right to oppose this because it runs counter to their territorial stand. This new maritime laws and protocols will just worsen our conflict with China. Ang sumasagot po nito, nagpo-post po nito, Pilipino. Akala nung mga nagre-react din, ang akala nung mga nagre-react din ay tunay na sentimyento nila. Ito po yung troll farm. The Philippine government should not have passed this law because they very well know that it will only intensify our conflict with China and other Asian neighbors. Number, China will not will not be the only country to be affected by the new maritime law. Laws are other Asian neighbors who also have territorial disputes, claims in the South China Sea will be affected. Gumagawa po sila ng ng narrative. May sumagot pa isa. Unbelievable. That was my reaction when I first read about this new maritime claims by our country. Why would our government do acts that would further escalate our tensions with China? So lumalabas po dito, peke po ito. Hindi po ito tamang sentimyento ng ating mga kababayan dahil pinakita ko yung tseke, binabayaran naman sila. Among the objectives of this sinister operation is to convince—ito po ay lumabas din sa kanila—to convince Filipinos that without China they would be, and I quote, dirt poor people in a backwater country. Kung wala daw ang China, tayo ay mahirap na mamamayan, nasa isang backward country na puro putik. Siguro ang tinutukoy dito yung lagayan ng kalabaw. Wala na pong pinakamataas na insulto siguro ang pwedeng nating maramdaman. Sinasabi nila kung wala ang China ay wala wala ang Pilipinas ngayon.

Can we have the campaign objectives? Yung next slide. Campaign objectives. Campaign objectives. Wala. I have it here. So nakalagay, ang nakalagay doon, while—hindi yan, hindi yan—while insulting the Filipinos, the troll farms army is also paid to, and I quote, always support the Chinese ambassador and the embassy pages. Apparently they are also insecure that they pay for fake followers and praise themselves on social media. So pinaikot-ikot na po tayo rito. So pinaikot-ikot tayo dito. We have a Chinese government paying via its embassy in Manila, Philippine nationals working for a troll farm to attack our country, to attack the administration using fake names and with clear guidance to keep secret what they are actually working for. Not unlike the POGO, they recruit and pay or coerce our own citizens, in this case, to attack our country’s policies, ‘yung ginagawa ng Navy, ‘yung ginagawa ng Coast Guard, ‘yung ginagawa ng Sandatahang Lakas, behind a fake social media account trying to manipulate the Philippine public. This fake social media accounts have criticized the President, criticized cabinet officials—ito nga hindi alam nitong mga ah representative na mga gabinete dito—uh, criticize outspoken legislators, criticize the Philippine government. For what did they criticize them? Ano po iyung bakit tayo kini-criticize? For having the nerve to stand up in defense of the West Philippine Sea, for having the nerve not to allow our own seas to be taken by force. Doon po sila nagalit. Doon po sila. Doon po sila nag-aalma. Ayaw nila na mapabalik ng buong-buo na hindi naman nila nakukuha pa ang West Philippine Sea sa Pilipinas. Itong nangyayari pong ito is an outrageous behavior. It is a violation of every international norm. Sayang wala dito ang Department of Foreign Affairs. It is certainly not the way that friends treat friends and it is a Chinese Embassy talk of friendship. Hindi tayo dapat magbulag-bulagan at isantabi ang ating mga natuklasan. Kahit itanggi ng China ito, malinaw na ang nakita natin ngayon. Ang nakita natin kahapon ay hindi isolated events. Nakakasiguro tayo na hindi pa tapos ang China sa pagmamanman nila na ginagawa sa ating bansa. Ngunit salamat sa matatapang na sundalo sa Navy, sa Coast Guard, at iba pang mga ahensya na nagtatanggol sa ating seguridad at kasarinlan, sa mga tahimik na nagtatrabaho upang hindi lamang tayo basta sukulin ng China at patahimikin sa isang tabi. But the question is, why do they instruct their trolls to criticize the Philippines’ effort to defend itself? The answer is simple and obvious: China does not want the Philippines to have the means to defend its territory and sovereignty. Ayaw nila. Ayaw nila. Ayaw nga nilang magtuloy at ROTC. Ayaw lahat nila yan. They manufacture fake social media content against the Philippine government policy, pretending to be motivated about concerns about peace in the region. They do this, as we saw yesterday, yung pinakita ng Navy at ng NBI. At the same time, they undertake against the Philippines a massive campaign of targeted espionage. It adds up to a multi-front operation, kagaya ng sinabi kanina ng presentation ng ng NICA, to manipulate and ultimately destroy the Philippines’ ability to oppose China. Ano ngayon? This activity is still ongoing, and this activity, I cannot emphasize enough, is happening everywhere. It is happening here in Metro Manila. It is happening in the two departments represented here, the OST, the ICT. It is happening in the provinces. Nakita ko sa isang slide. It is happening in the water. It is happening on land. It is happening in Subic Bay. It is happening in the coast of Palawan. Gusto nga nilang kunin Palawan. It is happening in the West Philippine Sea and even in the streets of Manila, kagaya npon sa mga malls. Worse, we see China is now recruiting citizens from our neighbor states. Meron kahapon pinakita ang NBI na may mga nahuling Cambodian kahapon, trying to hide behind the faces of our fellow Southeast Asians, trying to undermine our Southeast Asian community from within. China has every interest in keeping us and our brothers in this region isolated and divided. There can be little doubt that what is going on and what we are now uncovering, it is also doing to other countries in the region. Maliwanag po ito na hindi dapat tayo magbulag-bulagan. Maliwanag po ito na dapat we cannot close our ears and eyes and isolate ourselves that this will be okay. Mawawala na po ito, that no real damage has been done. The NICA has presented a while ago an economic estimate as of the damage already inflicted, that hindi rin po totoo, that there is nothing to fear from a handful of men with drones and a handful of men with spy gear out there. We understand that why they are doing what they are doing, and that is to maximize their ability to harm us. Their wave of spying is an attack on every Filipino. Talagang hindi po tayo tinatantanan. Ang sabi nga sa Bisaya, nasabtan ng mga kining mga espiya sa ilang gibuhat na ang ilang abilidad sa paghimo makada kini ang pagsulay sa pag-iniid, usa ka pag-atake sa matag Pilipino. It is an attack on the institutions of our state. We see spies linked to China everywhere, affecting even the most important centers of power, corroborated by the NBI. It is an attack on our freedom. It is an attack on what we deserve. It is an attack on the ability of every Filipino citizen to enjoy free press, learn the truth, speak and be heard, and stand up for ourselves and stand united. Kaya po siguro tayo ngayon at this stage in history ay tayo ay nag-aaway-away. It is an attack on our brave men and women in uniform. But make no mistake: The information that has been collected, has been collected, puts our sons and daughters, or brothers and sisters directly in harm’s way. How can our sailors, how can our Navy, our Coast Guard protect themselves or protect us when the Chinese exactly know where they are? Hindi pa nagroradar tayo. Alam na kung kailan aalis. Alam na kung nasaan sila. Where they are going and where exactly what exact time they would arrive. Most importantly, it is an attack on our future. It is nothing less than a concerted effort to ensure that China has the intelligence it needs to pen us, to force us to submit, to accept what they see fit to offer us. It is to conquer us without fighting. The Chinese have attempted to say, through their representative, that this is not happening. You have seen today the evidence and yesterday that it is happening. The Chinese have attempted to say that these incidents are happening, but they are isolated. You have seen the evidence that they are connected. Pareho po yun sa drone. Pareho po yun sa Subic, yung sa Grande Island. Yung nangyari po, yung nakuha ng drone sa Initao sa Misamis Oriental, and they are happening at Beijing’s explicit behest. They have attempted to say that these are no big deal and if the Philippines knew what was good for it, they should stop making a fuss. Dapat daw hindi na may nag-alam niyo po, may mga email ako natatanggap, dapat hindi na raw ituloy itong hearing na to. We will not sit idly by because China tells us to do so. We know that they are trying to corrupt and bribe to enable their subversion and hide their tracks. We are certain the Chinese are not finished on us. Thanks again—uulitin ulit-ulitin ko ‘to—to the brave men and women of our security forces who have discovered all of this, pati na rin ating mga mangingisda, maraming salamat, gathering sensitive information and watching the movements of our territory. We are experiencing this outrageous and disrespectful treatment at the hands of our Chinese neighbors. Bakit po? Bakit po nila ginagawa ito? Our neighbors who routinely stress that we are friends who desire respectful relations. Bakit po nila ginagawa ‘to? Ginagawa po nila ito because as Filipinos, we have the temerity to stand up to the Chinese. What you are doing is wrong. What you are doing is wrong, and we will not accept it. Sa lahat po ng naririto ngayon at kahapon sana’y akoy hindi tayo matakot sa isang malaking bansa. Lahat po ng pinaglalaban dito, lahat po ng nakita natin ay atin. We will do what Filipinos have done when faced with the arrogance of the aggressor’s power. We will resist. We will resist, kahit po nagkakaloko-loko na ang laman ng ating social media. Naniniwala po ako na makikita rin ng ating mga kababayan kung ano yung totoo. I know that you are with me in this committee when I say we are prepared to say enough is enough. We can do so by taking immediate steps, like, for example, the law that we have filed, Senate Bill 292591, which would punish foreign interference in our country by means of hostile intelligence activity. Papataasan po natin ang kanilang penalty. Sisiguraduhin natin na non-available. And we can do it by standing up a foreign influence task force, by standing up a foreign influence task force to root out and stop efforts like this. Siguro magsama-sama na yung ibang ahensya. I, I admire, I support the current efforts of the executive branch to have a cohesive front to this, to confront uh this activity. We can we can do that by updating our espionage law, which is now more than 80 years old. Creating a strong and effective law on spying will ensure that those who found, those found to have conducted this harmful activities against our country will be held accountable. Maraming salamat po sa ating mga security and investigative agencies. By taking all the steps, kagaya po ng ginawa ng National Bureau of Investigation, pinapakita natin, pinapakita ng ating NBI, pinapakita ng ating Navy, pinapakita ng NICA at NSC, that we condemn what China is doing. And we call upon China—nakikinig ang Department of Foreign Affairs—to immediately halt its hostile and illegal espionage efforts against the Philippines. And we ask the executive branch likewise to take all measures necessary to protect the country from China’s continuing depredations. By taking these steps, we will be dealing the first, but not the last, powerful counter-blow that a nation has long felt it could hit us with impunity. Hindi naman po tayo siguro magpapasuntok na lang. Perhaps more importantly, we will be showing China and the world that the Philippines is not quietly submitting to China’s coercion and abuse. We are instead raising our voices in unison to defend the fundamental dignity of our people. We are raising our arms in defiance to those who seek to deny our dignity, to claim our lands and seas, and to rob us of our future. Paglaban po natin ang Pilipinas. Ako po ay nagpapasalamat sa lahat ng ahensyang naririto. Sana po hindi magtapos sa hearing na ito ang ating gawain. Patuloy po natin ipaglalaban ang ating soberanya. Maraming salamat sa Philippine Navy. Maraming salamat sa Coast Guard. Maraming salamat sa National Security Council.

Council. To the men and women in uniform, including the Philippine National Police Maritime Group, to the NIK, to the other government agencies including the NBI. Salamat po.

Let us continue to confront this crisis, and I'm sure we will win. Maraming salamat po, at kung wala ng gustong magsalita, Mr. Chairman.

Yes. We recognize uh Director Mala Asek Malaya. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Um, what you have just um shown to us this morning, Mr. Chairman, is very consistent with how the uh People's Republic of China operates. Um, in fact, Mr. Chairman, the information space is really the battleground. Now, um, there is a concept, Mr. Chairman, of United Frontwork activities by the Communist Party of China, and this dictum of the three warfares. The first warfare is media and information warfare. The second warfare is psychological warfare, and the third warfare is legal warfare. And what you have just shown to us, Mr. Chairman, here is an example of how media warfare and information warfare is being used to advance and information warfare and um is being used to to advance its interest in the cognitive realm. Ang labanan po kasi ngayon, Mr. Chairman, is a public opinion no, and uh as when uh when we saw, Mr. Chairman, yung pinakita niyo sa amin dito, it really resonated with us in the security sector, those who have studied how the People's Republic of China operates. Uh, it's what we call in the security sector as influence operations, no, so there are it it is part and parcel of what they call as United Frontwork and using also uh the Chinese diaspora in the Philippines, local polies and local leading figures to advance their cognitive objectives, Mr. Chairman.

Laya. I think lunch will be served. Other uh closing remarks before we suspend today's hearing? Without objection on the part of my uh colleagues probably hooked online, this comm special hearing of the committee on maritime zones and maritime and admiralty zones is here suspended. Salamat.