BLA, TTP, The Afghan War and Balochistan update - Rafiullah Kakar - #TPE

Hello, Assalamu Alaikum. It has been a long time, and much has passed that these, our sort of semi-regular podcast updates, unfortunately, I always introduce them by saying they happen under bad circumstances. Bad news is coming. So then we bother Rafila Kakad, asking why this evil is happening? Before that, you yourself look very smart, very dapper, very young. So how are you, sir? Yes, thank you very much. Thank you, Shahzad. This is a compliment from your eyes. Beauty lies in the eye of the beholder. Yes, sir. Ah, sad news. Personally, for my mental health, I am completely disconnected from the news. But the news coming from Balochistan is very troubling. So, what is it for people who are disconnected? Those who are not getting the news on TV. What is the latest situation? What is happening? Yes, thank you very much, Shahzad. As you know, the conflict landscape of Balochistan is quite complex. There are two basic types of conflicts happening right now, and the intensity of both has increased. One is the fight that the Baloch separatists have started against the state of Pakistan, which we have been seeing intensify significantly over the last year or two. So, in the last month or two, I think the new development in this is that along with attacks on cities, the main trade highway between Pakistan and Iran, the Quetta-Taftan highway, has seen such an increase in attacks on convoys of trucks transporting LPG, minerals, or anything else over the last two-three months, that business there has almost come to a standstill. They are attacked on the way. Before this, remember that mineral transporters were attacked before as well. But now this scope has increased. It is also important that the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has been completely closed for all kinds of trade for over a year. So, the economy and livelihood of Balochistan fundamentally depend on border trade. There is no industry here. So, one border is completely closed. Secondly, with the border with Iran, whatever little trade was happening, keeping in mind the sanctions on Iran, has also significantly reduced. So, from this, you can estimate what the economic consequences will be. The second most disturbing and important news is the emergence of the TTP in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan over the last three to four months, and with such intensity that the mountains of Quetta – Quetta is a valley, and there are mountain ranges to its east and west, a small opening to the south, and to the north. So, to the north is where the Pashtun belt is. So, in the northern mountain range, armed groups have occupied the mountainous areas for the last three to four months, and allegedly, they claim to be the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. And they have gradually started harassing and abducting people in the villages and rural areas around the mountainous region. For the last two-three months, there have been protests many times. People have demonstrated. Unfortunately, no help or support has reached them from the government or the state. And then its major escalation, you saw that last week. A month ago, there is a village here, Kili Mangla, near Quetta. It is only 5-6 kilometers away from the cantonment. Such incidents involving TTP happened there. The elders of the village, their sons, and a few other people were warned. One person was released. Some people were killed. Then, after that, in Hanna, in a village called Kili Babai, where the current incident also happened. A similar incident occurred there about two-three weeks ago. People protested. So, the latest escalation is that at the same time, fighting took place in this village in Hanna, where people came out in their defense. Then 11 people were abducted from there. Three or four were martyred on the spot. And along with this, this mountain range connects to Ziarat on the other side. There is also a project called Manghi Dam being worked on. There, a Levies force, which has now merged into the police, was attacked, in which unfortunately 11 were martyred on the spot. 21 were abducted, taken away. And those 21 Levies personnel were also martyred. And then, a day later, the local tribes, using their influence and back channels, and by collecting donations from each other, went and received their dead bodies from there. The road connecting Quetta to Karachi, sorry, the road connecting Quetta to Punjab and Pashtunkhwa was closed due to a sit-in. The main Quetta Airport road was closed due to a sit-in. There were three sit-ins going on, and perhaps the second one ended today. One sit-in is still ongoing. So, this is the situation. You see, in one month. Along with this, there is a third important trend, which is that the state has allegedly organized many people from the former Afghan Army of the Republic of Afghanistan, who were senior officials, they went abroad. The lower-tier Afghan police and army personnel hid in these border districts. Now they have been organized in an armed form, and they have been settled in places like Laki Marwat, Bannu, Sibi, and such places, and these are mercenaries whom the state is allegedly patronizing and using as a front line in operations against TTP or other so-called counter-operations. Now, what has happened because of this is that whether they work for the state or not, we don't know, but these people, in the areas where they have been settled, these mercenaries, consider them death squads, they have started harassing the local people. So, in the last month, this has also happened that people have come out against them in Laki Marwat and other places. Then some were removed from there, then in Sibi and the irony is that the drive you are seeing right now against Afghan refugees, saying they should be expelled, where poor Afghan daily wage laborers, the poor Afghans have been expelled, these armed groups have been settled there, and they have been given guns and weapons, and there have been fights with the local people. So, there have been one or two sit-ins against them as well. So, all of this, you can consider, are recent developments in Balochistan in just the last month. When we have often discussed, and the comparison is made between BLA and TTP, you say that they can learn from each other or copy techniques. But as such, there is no coordination or anything like that. But the way it is being reported in the news, a nexus between BLA and TTP is being reported. Based on what you have just explained, it almost seems like they might start fighting each other for territory. So, how do you see this BLA-TTP nexus? Is it really a nexus? Yes, this is a very important question. See, first, it must be understood in which areas TTP operates and in which areas BLA operates. BLA primarily operates in the Baloch belt. And TTP primarily operates in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan. So, as such, they do not have any territorial conflict with each other. It is possible that if they need logistical help from each other's areas, they can provide it. But as such, they do not compete for territory. Because their traditional strongholds are quite different. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that if they need help in each other's areas, they might provide logistical support to each other. For example, in the northern mountain range of Quetta, the Takhtoo mountain range, Takhtoo is an area that connects to Shaban, which further connects to the traditional Harnai and Marri mountain ranges. So, BLA has access there, and TTP has now settled in the Takhtoo area. So, in this way, their areas border each other, their territories, but as such, they do not compete. Therefore, whether a strong alliance is formed or not is somewhat inconsequential. At most, it could be that if one needs minor logistical support in the other's area, then both can help each other. It would make sense for them to cooperate with each other. So, the escalation we are seeing, the coordination you are talking about, that both are almost attacking together or around the same time, from the outside, it absolutely seems like you, journalists, and other groups, you will be there, I will be there, I will also be there. So, the updates that keep coming, that an attack happened here, so many people died, an attack happened here, so many people died. So, immediately you start feeling, what is happening? It is so major. So, can we discount any coordination? B, the recent escalation in the last week or two that we have seen, we have done many podcasts on this conflict, we have also told the history, we don't need to repeat all those things. This escalation, and it is clearly an escalation, why is it happening now? Yes, see, again, as I said, I see these two conflicts separately. Their trajectories and dynamics are also different. In the Baloch conflict, there has been no such abrupt, sudden escalation. We have been seeing that for the last year or so. It has already escalated over the last year, and I think its culmination was the attack on the Jaffar Express, and after that, it is continuing on the same trend, at the same pace. So, there is nothing particularly new about the Baloch conflict. Although it has increased in the last two weeks. Meaning, those 18 police officers, then the attack on the Levies. I know news was coming daily, but even if we look at the numbers, there has been an uptick in the last two weeks in terms of. No, but that uptick, those attacks on the police or Levies are often by the TTP. The Baloch conflict is ongoing, but it was already happening with the same intensity before. It's just that in the media, in Pakistan proper, because of censorship, censorship. Now, when both are coming mixed, it seems more. The Baloch conflict is proceeding at its own pace, and nothing new. For example, a month or a month and a half ago, bombings in Quetta, taking over parts of cities every month. So, such things, like taking over parts of a city or a police station, keep happening. So, this uptick, this entire thing, is TTP violence. These 21 police personnel martyred one day, 11 the next day, all of this is related to TTP violence, which is in the Pashtun belt of Quetta. So, now let's come to the timing or the reasons why this happened. If I summarize it briefly, TTP's strongholds were in Waziristan and parts of pockets of southern Pashtunkhwa. Over the last three to four years, since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, we have gradually seen an increase in attacks in the name of TTP in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan. But there was a unique aspect to it. One, they were targeted at security forces, FC, and cantonments. Second, there was a geographical trend. Two districts bordering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and also the Afghan border, but bordering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are Yop and Qila Saifullah, where targeted attacks were happening. And one is Qila Abdullah, which is near Quetta, a district on the Afghan border. So, small-scale targeted attacks used to happen in these three. Now this escalation has happened, and the trend I see emerging is that in the last year, I think, in the north of Balochistan, in Qila Saifullah, their influence has gradually increased there, and from there, I think, and perhaps from Qila Abdullah as well, they have come to this mountain range of Quetta. This is a very ideal place for any kind of guerrilla warfare. You have access from three sides, from the Ziarat side, from the Kuchlak side, and Quetta comes within your radar. So, they have suddenly appeared here. But the disturbing or surprising thing is that for the last four months, common people like me, everyone knew that they had come here. And in these four months or five months, I am surprised that the state not only took no action, but the affected people held sit-ins. Now, citizens can only do this, raise their voice, hold a sit-in. They blocked the main highways for two to three days, and the state came, gave false assurances, and left. And after that, no action was taken, and you can consider the drop scene to be what happened last week. And this is one major reason why, Shahzad, you are surprised. You had a podcast, you had given it before. Drop your questions. If you look at the questions below, 80% of the questions from Balochistan are this: people are not ready to accept that there is any TTP at all. They think this is all the state's own doing, and this is a drama being staged. Because for them, it is too bad to be true that in the mountain range 5 kilometers from Quetta, an armed group has been settled for 4-5 months, local people have been protesting for two-three months, and you can do nothing, and you say that we have defeated India, we have defeated so-and-so, and here, 5 kilometers away, this is happening to you, and people have been warning you for two-three months, and you are unable to do anything. So, it has given rise to the perception that people there are not ready to believe that this is an organic thing. When Sardar Akhtar Mengal came on the podcast, he was saying things like this, that in districts other than four or five districts, when our forces go, they go with protocol, and when BLA moves, they move freely. So, if we assume that our intelligence, our army, has complete control, and it is a conspiracy theory, then they can also deal with BLA, but they are not able to deal with them there. There is a vacuum. If people are going into these areas, they themselves go with protocol. So, I don't think they are able to establish a permanent presence in that way. So, when you leave it open, how difficult is it for TTP? I get the conspiracy theories as well, because Pakistan has historically used mercenaries. But the situation in Balochistan, as you have described, and as many experts have told me, I am not that surprised. If you leave such a vacuum, and your policing ability is so poor, then how difficult is it for TTP to make inroads? Yes, see, my own assessment, I will share it with you. I have shared the perception of the common people, and I am trying to explain the reason for it, why people think like that. So, this is one reason. Secondly, of course, the legitimacy of the state and the crisis here matter, what is the legitimacy of the state? Because the legitimacy of the state has ended in Balochistan. If they do even two things right out of fifty, people will interpret it in reverse, thinking that if they are saying this, then there must be something wrong with it. Now, my humble opinion, my understanding of TTP or its. See, first of all, frankly speaking, I am not surprised. And it has been discussed in podcasts before you, and as a humble student, I think there is nothing about the TTP issue, both BLA and TTP, that a humble student like me has not written in Dawn or The News ten times in the last 10 years. Regarding the TTP issue, I am very clear that over the last 40 years generally, and especially over the last 20 years, the project of Talibanization that we have carried out in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan, in the pursuit of strategic depth, in the pursuit of controlling Afghanistan, its roots have become so strong that now that organic project can become self-sustaining. You have built entire factories of this thinking here. So, now, with the Taliban coming to power, they have also got a reverse strategic depth. Now they have reverse strategic depth, that they can go there whenever they want, regroup, and carry out such guerrilla activities here. These are people who are familiar with the terrain, who have been allies of the state, whose logistical channels are all established here. So, number one, because of this history, Pakistan's history of sponsoring Islamic militancy, both as a tool of foreign policy and domestic policy, I am not surprised. Second, an important thing to understand here, and this, I think, partially answers the skepticism of the people, is that if the state itself has not done it, then what explains this delay, and TTP reaching the mountains 5 kilometers away, and no action from the state? A fundamental reason for this, and this is a disturbing thing, Shahzad, is that the state's current counter-terrorism approach has a fundamental flaw: it is reactive, and secondly, there is a caste system within it. What is that caste system? The helpless and unsupported Levies are left on the front line to fight. Levies were never meant to be a counter-insurgency force. It was a community policing model for day-to-day law and order situations, and you know, the poor policeman in Kalams is given five to ten rounds, with which he has to protect himself and maintain law and order. Now, what has happened is that when casualties increased on the paramilitary FC and army, the basic reason behind the plan to merge the Levies into the police was that we would use them for counter-insurgency. So, first of all, this idea was wrong. Levies were never meant to be a counter-insurgency force. And if you were to use them in counter-insurgency, then brother, give them the equipment, train them. Now, what happened at Manghi Dam, you know, the Levies fought all day. They fought all day, and neither FC nor the army could reach them for support. 11 were martyred, 21 were taken away and killed like animals, martyred. And now, these poor people, those they are fighting against, have modern weapons, and these poor people, as I told you, at the traditional check posts, the Levies.

The person has 10 rounds or five rounds are left. So, you have basically left them like sacrificial goats. Because the casualties in the security infrastructure need to be minimized, and you have left these untouchables on the front lines, like helpless sacrificial goats. Now, what happens is that FC also has some informal SOPs. What are SOPs, and this is not just in TTP, but also in the Baloch belt. They only arrive when the incident is over. Meaning, BLA has occupied a road, blocked it. Snap checking happened, an attack on some camp. Yes, FC will arrive three or four hours later. Similarly, if there was an attack on Levies. After the attack and all the damage is done, then they arrive. Well, the army doesn't come at all. Their SOP is probably that they won't arrive unless there is a formal, full-fledged military operation. So, in this counter-insurgency institutional structure, this caste system, whatever it is, has been created under wrong SOPs, and the one taking the most burden on the front line is the least equipped. Because of this, I think they will move forward, and this kind of dangerous and regrettable incident will also continue to happen, and you are giving ample opportunity for conspiracy theories to the common man, saying, "Hey, you couldn't reach there. Who stopped you? What was preventing you from sending air ambulances and helicopters for your favorite death squad leader? And here, 21 bodies were lying. Your ambulance couldn't reach. Their relatives collected donations and brought the bodies like animals in 76, 86 model vehicles and Datsun pickups. So, from this, you can estimate. I was watching a video, and I cried a lot. A poor Levies man, with a salary of 40-50,000, when his ammunition ran out, he wrote on a slip the names of those he owed money to. For his funeral, he borrowed 2,000 from a grocer, borrowed 28,000 from another shopkeeper, and that blood-stained slip remained in his pocket. That poor man. So, I understand that this doctrine, in which you have merged Levies into the police like sacrificial lambs and left them there, neither equipping them, nor coming to their aid, nor giving them the impression later that the state treats them like its own children. Its result is coming. In Ziarat district alone, more than 300 Levies personnel have resigned in the last two days, saying, "Why should we risk our lives for 400?" When you started with the TTP, we talked about the ideological basis. It is a 40-year ideological project, Zia-ul-Haq, we have told its entire history multiple times. But here we need to differentiate a little, whether people believe it or not, how much support BLA has. Regardless, it is undeniable that there is some ideological support. So, the Baloch people also support the cause ideologically. Whereas my understanding from afar, obviously I am not an expert, is that TTP does not have that kind of grassroots support. Even when they were being resettled, we saw protests across party lines in Swat, apart from PTI. Even Jamaat-e-Islami protested. Center Mustaq also arrived, saying, "No, we don't want TTP." Even when they bring TTP through deals, they don't come. So, TTP does not have that kind of ideological support network in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Right, absolutely not. See, not only in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but TTP also does not have such a presence in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan. This is precisely why their first fight was with the community, because the community resisted them with your help. Now, in those villages in the north of Quetta, where people came out and fought, these are such innocent people, they don't even have a knife or a dagger, and they are fighting against snipers. So, absolutely, you are spot on, and this is the fundamental difference in this conflict between BLA and TTP: BLA is leading a popular insurgency, and TTP's insurgency has no popular roots. Precisely for this reason, its first casualties are also common people, and the resistance you see against it, both in Balochistan as well as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is because it has no support base among the common people or the masses. And everything that is happening now, you will not link it to the Iran-USA or the global situation, or any connection. No, I absolutely do not see any such link with Iran or its conflicts. However, I do see a partial link with Afghanistan, in that Pakistan has flexed its muscles there. Bombing happens in Afghanistan. My estimation, based on the ground situation I have seen, is that perhaps the Afghan Taliban have also moved towards asymmetric warfare. This is a complete reversal of the India-Pakistan situation. Because India considers itself strong in traditional military power, we have continued the fight through asymmetric warfare proxies since 1990. So, I have now understood that similarly, the roles have reversed in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is laterally strong, so by bombing and using brutal force, the Taliban are now advancing in proxy warfare, and we have also, God willing, re-packaged the good Taliban. We are also mobilizing former Afghan army fighters, and this is what we discussed in the last podcast, and I want to highlight this when people like us say that Afghan policy and the state's wrong policies, and we say that moving on is not that easy. Why do we emphasize that brother, why did the mistakes of the past happen? It wasn't a big deal that Rafiqullah Kakar understood that this would be the result of Afghan policy. Didn't the very intelligent people in Islamabad and Pindi understand? They understood, so why did the mistake happen? Because Afghan policy is decided by two or three generals, and this is actually the root cause. As long as two or three people will decide the future of the entire country, even in the future. Now, about trade, I told you, you have closed the trade of the entire Pashtunkhwa homeland for a year, stopped Afghan trade. What sense does this make? Now, take this policy. I assure you, forget the Pashtun leadership, the Baloch leadership, Akhtar Mengal, Mahmood Khan Achakzai. Ask Punjab PPP, whose government it is, Mr. Bilawal, Mr. Shehbaz Sharif, ask all of them if they even know that the state has organized and armed former Afghan army personnel and is using them as machinery. And if they know, would they support such a policy? Never. But still, it is being made, and they become mouthpieces. So, as long as this process continues, these mistakes will keep happening in new forms. These machineries, these new, the new repackaging of the good Taliban, this is its continuation in a new form. This has now become our regular role-play. So, Rafiq Sahib, we have invited you. So, now I am sitting, wearing stars. Today I am also looking like a lawyer. Sir, you say very good things. You have very good understanding. But you are saying that this happened because of our mistakes. You are a good person. So, you think everyone is good. But the world is not good. If we show you the evidence now, we have files. Whether we do it or not, they would have done this anyway, because Afghanistan receives support from India, and India is behind all of this. And India has declared that we will make 1000 cuts. Ajit Doval has said this. Afghanistan, India, Afghan Taliban, and India are embracing each other. Now, we also have mistakes, we admit there are mistakes. But whether we do it now or not, whether we respond or not, the decision has been made in Delhi that the Afghan Taliban will be used to create unrest inside Pakistan. So, sir, are you asking for my assessment or advice? What am I telling you? The stick is ready. Yes, yes, first. See, I would say about India doing this, you should not be surprised. You have enmity with India, so you also try to harm India wherever you can, and they will also harm you. The question is, in the last 50 years, with Afghan communists, Afghan secular nationalists, Afghan Islamists, Afghan Republicans, Afghan Taliban, if you couldn't get along with any of them, and if you did get along with most of them, instead of having a history of relations with India, then sir, is there some mistake on your part? Because you are not getting along with anyone. You are not getting along with those whom you considered your own for 25 years. You are not getting along with those against whom you fought proxy wars. So, if there is not even a single political faction in Afghanistan that is acceptable to you, it means there is some mistake in your policy that needs to be fundamentally revisited. And learn from India. What magic wand does India have that even its opponents get along with them? You also make them get along, instead of pushing them towards India. Sir, we accept all the mistakes, all the mistakes are ours, we accept everything. But what now? Now, if India is doing this, should we stop it or move forward? Have you entered the character? What are you suggesting? Should we let our people die? No, you are saying we should open the doors, it was our mistake, so let them kill our people? Never. No, sir, absolutely do not open the doors, do not let people die. Do not repeat the same mistakes that happened in the past. For that, unfortunately, if you were stuck knee-deep in this swamp 20 years ago, today you are stuck up to here in this swamp. So, now the easy way out for you is, after this meeting, you will also be on your knees. You are speaking openly, right? No, I am speaking for your welfare, for your betterment. Yes, please tell me. So, number one, I understand that you are not in an easy situation. You are stuck in a swamp, you can neither get out easily nor go back. So, for that, you will have to make big concessions, take big major steps, if you really want to improve the situation for your strategic objectives. To improve the situation, first of all, we need to address the internal challenges. Then we will confront the external enemy. What are the internal challenges? Number one, as we said before, as long as the Afghan policy, as long as the India policy, as long as the internal security policy are made by two or three people sitting in a closed room, and the rest of the civilian leaders just repeat it like parrots, the matter will not progress. So, first of all, bring it under democratic oversight. For that, democracy will be needed. So, second, why is democracy necessary? See, I gave you the example in Balochistan. You said this is a conspiracy theory. You shared that 90% of the questions are this. And why is that? You have appointed such incompetent people who, in a way, don't even know how to form a government. They say, "There is a method to madness." 21 people have been abducted, and they have started giving celebrity tweets saying that the operation has been successfully concluded, and so many troublemakers from India have been killed. Oh brother, your 21 people are still there. So, Shehzad, can you believe this? Balochistan has been a province for how many years? 55 years. In the history of 55 years, and before that in the colonial period, in 100-200 years of history, the situation in Balochistan has never been this bad. And two or three people sitting, who are responsible, have brought the entire system, Balochistan, to this point. Do you remember, before this government came into power, in one or two of our podcasts, I told you where they would take it? So, now they are taking it there. So, the legitimacy of the state is necessary because, firstly, the public is no longer ready to trust the democratic policies you have. Remember this, sorry, I am theorizing, but this is an important point. A very powerful theory came about state power, Michael Mann, he had a concept that the state has two types of power: despotic power and infrastructural power. Or in layman's terms, we say that you do not keep the oppressed class in slavery only by force. You manufacture their consent, you take their agreement in that slavery. Now, what I am trying to say is that you cannot win against these insurgencies, one of which has historical roots and is popular, only by using despotic force. You need public support, you need infrastructural power, which means consent, or it means the public should be with you. Now, you have imposed people on the public whom they are put off by seeing. There is no way you are going to win this war with such incompetent people. So, second, you have to democratize the political space. You have to bring in real public representation. Afghan policy should be brought under its purview. Then, when we come to the actual material, it can be discussed what to do with the Afghan Taliban now. See, my opinion is that as long as the Afghan Taliban are there, it is inevitable for TTP or other extremist groups in their name to emerge in Pakistan and in Pashtunkhwa in particular. So, withdraw your support from the Afghan Taliban. Use whatever pressure tactics you have. But these tried and failed methods, like you want to bring regime change there, who are you to bring regime change? You have made mistakes in the past. Now show some patience, and that patience is: let the Afghan people decide what they want. Yes, use your carrot and stick policy. But what you are using now is not carrot and stick. You sent back 2 million Afghan refugees. You sent them back in such bad conditions. They will all become potential soldiers for TTP. So, I think you absolutely have to change your policy with the Afghan Taliban. You have to take strict measures. But you also have to show patience. Just as you cultivated for 20 years, 40 years. This software will not be updated in a day. Similarly, as we have been telling you, this good and bad is one thing. They also do not have software that they can fix in a day. Their entire system runs on this. They have fought for 20 years, 25 years on this very issue. So, you have to proceed very tactfully, and for that, I think, first, the basic prerequisite on the domestic front is that you have to open up the space, democratize it. You have to bring in real public representatives. You have to make the people of Pashtunkhwa, in particular, your partners. It cannot be that a local resident who has been living in Sarawan for 500 years is beaten up and dictated to by a former Afghan army soldier at gunpoint in his home. A similarly armed person comes and dictates to someone living in Babri, and then the people will not be with you. See, you will only realize the carrot and stick policy now, what you are talking about. So, why are you referring me to that? The Chief Minister of Balochistan has already declared me to be on a very dangerous list of people. So, brother, we are just, you know, we are establishment outcasts, aren't we? So, who can have a problem with our podcast? We are accused of being establishment and whatnot. Regarding TTP, leaving the Afghan Taliban aside, if we come specifically to TTP, Iftar Firdous also came, and I asked him the same thing, you know, when it happens all over the world, let's say if it's Israel-Hamas, I have a very nuanced position. I say that militarily nothing happens, this and that, but maybe because I have also suffered at the hands of TTP. I have grown up in the era of TTP. I don't find TTP redeemable at all. These deals that were happening, the resettlement, was beyond my understanding. So, the local TTP, or the local TTP strongholds, if the conspiracy theories of the public are also that the state is allowing it to happen, then at this point, pardon my French, but isn't there any other option but to go into TTP and eliminate them? Is there any other option? No, sir. See, I have no doubt that no dialogue can be held with TTP on any meaningful or respectable terms. The experience of the last 20 years tells us exactly this. Now, when dialogue cannot happen, then I think the measures of carrot and stick, that you have to deal with kinetic measures, and then you also have to take those non-kinetic measures because of which they are strengthening, and a bit proactive, as I said, this reactive nature of the policy, that you only get your senses after 50 Levies personnel are martyred after staying for four months within 5 kilometers of Quetta. So, proactive, and I think that also goes back to that political issue. If you get respite from Marang Akhtar Mengal or Lashari Rasani or Mahmood Khan Achakzai, then you will get time for this. You are after peaceful activists like Iman Mazari, and you have left this work. So, short of that, I think I fully agree with you on this. But it has to be a sustainable solution. It has to be a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic measures so that you can cut its roots forever. Not that you cut one root, one branch, and another plant grows. Which is what we have been doing for the last 30-40 years. Hadi Iman's incarceration has been 115-116 days. We have been condemning it throughout. Cannot condemn the fascism enough. They should be released as soon as possible. Samuddin Baloch also tweeted recently that they are being harassed, their homes are being harassed. Cannot be condemned enough. People had sent many questions. As you have hinted, 900 questions have come. So, let's see how much time there is. But the sentence announced for Marang, we will be able to do it.

A podcast then. So what do you mean, does everyone know what the opinion is? Give it. No, I think it is extremely regrettable and shameful, and the most dangerous thing is that you have given this message to the Baloch youth that there is no option available for you to struggle through peaceful political means. Now, what options remain after that, I do not want to comment on that. But its responsibility falls on the state and this system. It falls on this artificial government which is deliberately pushing the youth towards militancy and then they complain why the situation in Balochistan is deteriorating. So I think it is extremely regrettable, and whatever the judicial process was, it was a sham trial, and after the 26th and 27th amendments, the mockery that the judiciary has become, in my opinion, is another clear example of this, and the case of Dr. Mahang Baloch is similar. Sir, rapid fire, Assalamualaikum Rafi bhai, once you said in a podcast that we are seeing the TLP and TTP forming an alliance against the same NAB Pakistan, and we are seeing this happening in full action in Hanna, Urak. I think we have already discussed who are the terrorists killing locals in Hanna and Ziarat. Are they really props from the military, as the majority of the locals believe, so that the Pakistan Army can grab the land, or are they actual TTP and BLA, as the military claims? Well, this is an important theory. The local theory is that the state is doing this to capture the minerals there and to capture the lands of the local tribes. Now, again, the state has already captured the minerals, and the people's skepticism is not without reason. First, lands were seized and usurped in the name of DHA, and then in these northern areas of Quetta, near the cantonment, the lands of local tribes, especially the Bazai tribes, were captured. And besides this, the minerals, you know, the minerals bill that was passed from the Balochistan Assembly, and after that, another movement is currently going on with great fervor in Balochistan, but it is not coming to the forefront of the happenings. That is, from Gwadar to Washuk, the state, the artificial government of Balochistan, has allotted more than 8 lakh acres of land of local tribes to corporate sector companies, giving them exploration leases, and to federal state-owned enterprises, without the local tribes of Balochistan. Remember, unlike any other part of Pakistan, 70-80% of the land in Balochistan is unsettled. Now, because the government did not settle it, but that does not mean that no one owns that land. The local tribes are the owners. So now you are allotting millions and millions of acres of their land without asking them. They don't even know. So this skepticism of the people stems from these things, that the minerals have already been captured. You have allotted about 8 lakh acres of land to someone, and no one even knows. Well, the seizure of lands in the name of DHA, so people are linking this to the possibility that perhaps this is being done to increase this capture and to harass people so that they leave these areas. My own opinion is that the capture has already happened. There is no need for such a big drama for that. The work that could have been done very easily, the government passed a bill in the assembly through Form 47, then made allotments, so that would have been necessary only if there was some major resistance. At this time, then it would have been believable. So, therefore, my message is that the capture has already happened. There is no need for so much trouble for that. The recent report of the World Bank on Pakistan's fiscal federation demands a detailed session with him. Okay, sir. Many people in Balochistan are losing trust in the state and at an alarming rate are becoming increasingly angry with it. At the same time, insurgent groups appear to be gaining more support from local communities, and the recent report suggests that an increasing number of young people are joining. The question is, is there any hope? Unfortunately, I see no hope; rather, I see the situation deteriorating. What were the economic activities? They say that you often talk about the lack of economic opportunities for the people of Balochistan. So, what were the economic activities in Balochistan before Pakistan was formed that were sustaining it, and considering the population, even before Pakistan was formed, there were no significant economic activities in Balochistan. And before Pakistan was formed, the British Empire was ruling Balochistan. So, if your understanding is that even after Pakistan was formed, the British Empire is still ruling, or some empire is ruling, then there is no room for complaint. Then I agree, and unfortunately, I have also reached this conclusion, that the government is indeed an empire, and Balochistan is run like a colony, just as the British used to run it. So, this colonial mindset has only two objectives for Balochistan: strategic, how to advance its strategic interests through Balochistan; and the second is extractive, as the British used to do, to extract minerals from wherever possible. As for the welfare and well-being of the people of Balochistan, this state does not see it. It only sees the mountains, the coast, the sea there. So, unintentionally, you agree with the question asked that yes, this is indeed a colonial rule, neo-colonial. Will the Afghan Taliban ever stop supporting TTP and BLA? Should Pakistan support NRF or other anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan to pressure and force the Afghan Taliban to take action against TTP? Will they stop the conflict or only expand it? Yes, I think it will be very difficult for the Afghan Taliban to completely disown the TTP. Yes, it can happen, but it can happen only when the Afghan Taliban lay the foundation of a new state in Afghanistan. What will happen from this is an important point. When a militia runs a government, it does not have a stake in long-term institutional building. When you do not have a stake in long-term institutional building, you do not have friendly relations with your neighbors or any other objectives or interests. When you build a state, you have long-term visions and interests, then it is in your interest, in your self-interest, that you do not let Afghanistan become a stronghold for the TTP, or for that matter, any other extremist group. So, I think this can happen if the Afghan Taliban move towards state building under their rule, and for that, Pakistan will not be able to proceed with its current hawkish approach. You will have to use a combination of carrot and stick to bring the Taliban to the point. Because this is not like software where you press a button and it gets updated. The days of carrot or stick are over. Tensions and verbal clashes between PTM and other Pashtun nationalist parties like ANP, PKMAP, AP, and NDMP are also at their peak on social media and in public opinion. What is the main reason behind this growing divide, and who bears greater responsibility for the escalating tensions? Yes, this is a very good question, whoever asked it. This is a bitter reality. Hanif Khan, Mr. Hanif Khan, has asked a very good question. This is a bitter reality, and I think in this regard, perhaps Pashtuns are counted among the most unfortunate nations of Pakistan in this regard. And I say this because, for example, when there is conflict among Baloch, the Baloch who are nationalist or sympathizers of that ideology at least say that if people are losing their lives for a cause, then in the Pashtun belt, and I think this is the result of the state's decades-long policy. First, the British divided the Pashtuns so much, then that division was institutionalized. Then the state's project of Talibanization, social engineering, is the result of this. Unfortunately, Pashtuns are standing on the side of the killers, and Pashtuns are also standing on the side of the killed. And this explains why Pashtun politics is so polarized. Because Pashtuns are standing on both sides. Now, the TTP, the Afghan Taliban, are also Pashtuns. The police officers who are being killed daily in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are also Pashtuns. And the state and its policies are entirely responsible. But these people are fighting on the front lines. So, in these circumstances, maintaining a state of mind and taking an objective position is not an easy task. Because your own people are on both sides. So, whatever position you take, someone will be displeased. And therefore, I think it is difficult for Pashtun nationalist groups and PTM to come to one page precisely because the state's urbanization project has been so successful that now both the killer and the killed are Pashtuns on both sides. So, the difficulty now is that when you stand with the oppressed, for example, when you stand with the victims of the daily terrorism in Swat or Pashtunistan, when you stand with them, you have to stand against the state, which is an easier position than a Pashtun nationalist position. They still take it, but they also have to stand against the TTP and the Afghan Taliban. Some people are not ready to take that position; it is not a comfortable position. Also, there are genuine risks involved, there is proximity to the people, so many political parties also exercise caution, and then due to the state's wrong policies, this confusion, the conspiracy theory you mentioned, these factors also come into play. Sameer Zafar, you have sent 15 questions, but not a single one is relevant to today's discussion. Do the Baloch people really have a soft corner for BLA even after seeing their attacks on their own people? Yes, they probably haven't understood this. Look, in the eyes of an ordinary Baloch, BLA does not attack its own people, and I think this is their claim. But BLA has convincingly instilled this impression in the minds of the Baloch people with relative credibility. They carry out targeted attacks, and they do not kill civilians, even government officials, to the extent possible. So, in the case of Baloch, in the case of BLA, this does not hold true. This is debatable. But I am telling you the perception of the ordinary Baloch. In the case of TTP, this is absolutely correct. And but TTP does not count on public support the way BLA does. What could be the reason that according to French media, Dr. Marang Baloch has been nominated for the Nobel Prize in Europe, not just once, but now for a second time, while in Pakistan she has been sentenced to life imprisonment? Well, I don't know the reason for that; you should ask her. But I can say this much: among those who have been nominated for the Nobel Prize, I think Dr. Maharang Baloch is a stronger candidate by any measure, not a lesser candidate. But of course, the Nobel Prize has its own politics, its own Western agenda, let's leave that debate for another day. Taimur Bangash, your question has been addressed. What is the blueprint for a new social contract among the people and the state, especially in the context of Balochistan? I think you should watch our podcast on the 18th Amendment. But would you like to say something briefly? There is nothing brief. I will say this much. The Balochistan issue could have been resolved politically 20 years ago under the conditions that exist today. It cannot be resolved today under the conditions that existed 10 years ago. Today, you will have to make more concessions. You will have to abandon the patronage of artificial people. You will have to recognize their right to resources. Even today, there is a political solution to the Balochistan issue within the major concessions, but after 10 years from today, even these will be insufficient. And I would like to add one point. This is a regrettable thing. Khawaja Asif sahib, Rana Sanaullah sahib, stand in parliament and become very innocent, blaming that the past mistakes are everyone's fault. Today, the situation is... brother, leave the past. Today, you are doing every act that increased this conflict in the past, that caused this conflict to begin. For example, you are capturing silos today. You are passing mineral bills. You are allotting millions of acres. You have taken back the right given by the 18th Amendment to the gas of PPL. Artificial political engineering, which has traditionally increased conflict, you are doing that today. You have imposed the worst artificial government in the history of Balochistan. So, when they become innocent and say that what happened in the past, brother, leave the past. Today, do not do those things that further increase this conflict, then perhaps the situation will improve. Why can't the Pakistani government weaken the capabilities of militant groups like Turkey did? I don't know what Turkey did, so I am not an expert on Turkey. Shahzad, please ask this question: In which districts does BLA currently have control in Balochistan, where they can assemble freely, even in the cities? In which districts has the state lost its writ? I think the bitter reality is that in Quetta, Quetta City, Cantonment Red Zone, and other cantonments, the state's writ exists within the cantonment limits. Beyond that, the state's writ has become very weak. BLA comes out whenever they wish. Please ask him, has he seen Gujarati men doing the old Garba dance? Is it the same dance I saw him doing in old videos? Which of your dancing videos are leaking? He is speaking the truth. Pashto Atan is remarkably similar to Gujarati dance, and I have also seen that Gujarati dance, so I know. A friend of mine, when I was studying in America, there was a wedding at his house, he invited me to the wedding, so when I went to the wedding, they were dancing, and I saw, wow, this looks very similar. So when I joined, the steps were exactly the same. The steps of Pashto Atan are exactly the same. Whoever said this is correct. The steps of his feet are the same. The other moves are different. So this is Gujarati dance. I don't know the reason for it. But yes, there is a definite similarity in Pashtowan. Should Pakistan change its stance towards the UAE? The change has already happened, whether we do it or not. Yes, look, Pakistan's stance towards the UAE, especially after the recent Iran conflict and the situation that has arisen, I think it is inevitable, and I believe Pakistan has taken the right stance. The UAE's stance is wrong. Pakistan should try to cooperate for all the right and wrong reasons. A very large number of our poor segment, unskilled labor, work in the UAE. So, in a way, the hardship that has befallen these poor people, the state should also think about it and take measures for them at the diplomatic level. In recent years, how has the unity of different people in Quetta or any other multi-ethnic city of Balochistan been affected by the BLA and TLP/TTP insurgencies? Yes, this is an interesting question. I think the ethnic fault lines have not been affected much. In a way, unity has increased. Yes, this has happened. In the last year and a half, these alleged attacks by BLA, especially on trucks, now in the transport and truck industry, there is a large number of Pashtuns here. And in border trade too, Pashtuns are in large numbers. So, due to the attacks on them, this grievance has increased here. But some of these are claimed by BLA, some are not. So, in the last few months, five or six months, Pashtuns and Baloch have become somewhat bitter in their statements. But there is no major fault line; rather, in a way, they have become more united. Especially the younger generation has united beyond ethnic lines. And Pakistan will get rid of a huge chunk of debt after the success of Reko Diq and CPEC in the coming decades. This success should happen first. No, there is no success yet. When it happens, then we will see. Can we solve the Balochistan issue with the single-dimensional mindset of force that we have been trying to solve for the last decade? I'll save your time. No, ask him, is it the last push or the resurgence? No, it's not the last push. TTP is clearly in a resurgence, and BLA, I think, has very steadily maintained its capacity. These are full podcast topics I am telling you for the next podcasts. How to control human rights violations in Pakistan? How can we possibly control military intervention in Pakistani politics? What are the solutions to multi-faceted Balochistan? So you have big answers, two podcasts for every answer. Just keep naming them. Since the governments have all but failed to govern and deliver services, is it a good idea to privatize schools and hospitals? No, what is your opinion? Not this time. No, I am absolutely not in favor of privatization, and the basic reason for this is that public health systems and public schooling systems fail because of the complete failure of accountability in the government system. Now, for the same political economy constraints that prevent accountability in government institutions, precisely for those reasons. You can privatize, or you get the benefit of good privatization, only when you can regulate the private sector. So, when you cannot hold your institutions accountable, cannot regulate them, then what do you expect from those same institutions that they will regulate the corporate sector? You can take an example of this. There are some success stories in low-cost private schools in health and education. But they are often non-profit, like TCF (The Citizens Foundation). When you involve the corporate sector, your regulatory capacity is very limited. So, I think where it is needed, you will have to do it very targetedly, otherwise, it will backfire on you. I want to give an example. In 1990, banks were privatized in Pakistan with the hope that they are inefficient in the government sector, they do not provide credit, they do not give loans to businesses. So, if they are privatized, there will be more credit, industry will grow. Today, you see that instead of improving, the indicators of credit, access to finance, are still where they were, and the privatized banks are increasing their profits, but no one is asking this question. Our Kamal Munir sahib from Cambridge has also done great academic work on this. So, I think we should proceed with great caution and care on this. What do you think the tribal people of Balochistan people go for deputation, arbitration with TTP or the establishment, because this is the dish made by the establishment which is happening? I think the same, what do people want, arbitration with TTP or deputation? The simple answer is that if TTP or for that matter any non-state actor is engaged in violence, it is not the job of the people to form an army against them and fight against them.

It is the state's responsibility. Let the state do it. This TTP is really a challenge to the Pashtun district in Pakistan, it is really an organization that the Pakistani forces cannot confront. This skepticism, I think, is coming from everywhere. And the reason for that, as I told you. But I don't think TTP is so big that the state cannot counter it if it wants to. I think please, please ask him to analyze the recent policeman kidnapping in Ziarat and Urak. I think we have done this. Unless you want to add something. If Pakistan is having a genuine threat from neighboring countries, as the state media and policymakers claim, why aren't the policymakers bringing stability and trying genuinely to bring stability in Pashtunistan and Balochistan? At least they don't have to fight internal threats as well. True. What should we discuss about this? Please ask him about the long-term strategy or long-term goal that the establishment or army is trying to achieve by supporting the Taliban everywhere in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Is the objective to give the whole region to the Taliban in the long term? No, brother, why would we give it to the Taliban? Hello? Yes, no, I, yes, okay. No, we have already discussed this. Is the issue of Balochistan so simple and straightforward as the government and public represent, or are there many elements here working behind the scenes? Of course, there are many elements. So, several forces are fighting. Is Balochistan not a target for international, local, and national self-interested parties? That's true. It will happen, I guess. They are asking that the international factor is also involved, isn't it? It cannot be ignored. If it can also be simple, the international factor, in any kind of situation we are living in, its possibility cannot be ruled out. So, I have no objection to this. It will definitely happen. The question is, why does that international factor not succeed in Lahore? Why does it only succeed in Quetta or Peshawar or D.I. Khan? Warlords in Pashtun areas, each tribe, Ghilzai, Kakazai, Kakar, Tareen, etc., are heavily supported with vehicles and weapons. Where will that land, and what further consequences will that have? Yes, he has asked a very local question. The question is valid. So again, this is what I am saying, the state's skepticism, one of its pillars is also that there are a large number of local, small tribal leaders, princes, with 30-30 guns, in convoys of vehicles, and often these are ex-Afghan army personnel, their armed guards, small groups, and they are roaming around without any hindrance in Quetta and Balochistan, and the state, the state's patronage, they have it. And then when the state, people are surprised, how is this happening? So, these people, they have the state's support, and because of this, the situation deteriorates, and then if the state claims that this is the reason for the situation, people are not ready to believe that they are all your people. Sir, I say this with respect, your Oxford English is beyond our understanding. Please write in Urdu so that common Pashtun and Baloch tribes can also understand you. Sir, start writing in Urdu. Poppy cultivation is at its peak. Why is it being supported? This will bring ruin. Yes, look, there is no doubt about this. Poppy cultivation is at its peak in these areas because that is its economics, and the reason for the economics, one is what I told you, that you have closed all avenues of lawful employment, and then poppy cultivation happens, and poppy cultivation also happens because there are certain segments within the state that allow it. So, business is like water, wherever it finds a path, it will make its way. But all this, it is happening because of the state. Is there any hope to bring the Baloch youth back under the shadow of the constitution? There is always hope. As I said, but for that, very major, substantial concessions will have to be given, then some possibilities can be created. Whenever any question is asked from the government and law enforcement agencies regarding the current situation in Balochistan and KP, the answer is brief, behind this is the fitna of the people of the world and the fitna of the Khawarij. Is it enough to just answer that these two fitnas are behind it? No, in my opinion, we externalize everything, and this is our problem. There must be some internal issues. What can, what role can your fellow Kakar, Nasir Khan Kakar, what role can Balochistan youth play in shaping the province's future beyond politics and protest? This is a difficult question. Look, first of all, I don't think politics or protest is a wrong thing. It is a part. In the society you are living in, if bodies are picked up daily, then protests will happen. Yes, everyone has to play their role according to their share. Those who are young, who are studying, they should study. Learn skills, learn crafts. If you have any skill, you will be useful to your area, your nation? Can we, without being organized and intelligent, compete with an organized and powerful opposition? And it is a philosophical question, can we compete without being intelligent and organized? Tell me, brother, I don't know what the question is. Being intelligent and organized cannot compete with anyone. You argue that the state's biggest blunder in Balochistan is suffocating peaceful organic political expression following the June 2026 life imprisonment sentence handed to Dr. Moha Baloch and a closed jail trial has the state officially slammed the door on constitutional activism by criminalizing the province's most prominent non-violent movement? Yes, brother, yes, I agree 100 percent. Absolutely, what you have written, I cannot agree more. Why is the state dealing with the militancy in KP and Balochistan in the same way, even when we know the reasons behind both are completely different? That's right, brother. They should be different. Yes, absolutely. It's like if your car tire gets punctured and needs to be replaced, you will put any tire you find, or will you look for the specific tire for that car? Or if you have a disease, you won't take any medicine that is in front of you, right? You will diagnose the disease and treat it accordingly. This point is important because some artificial people in Balochistan are trying to create a sentiment and narrative that, you know, this is a conflict and it should be dealt with in the same way because those people themselves are beneficiaries. So, I absolutely do not think that these two are the same. They are of different natures and should be dealt with differently. Did you see that documentary about the HIV hospital? Yes, BBC, brother, yes, yes. Pakistan, in my opinion, deals with every problem in the same way, right? That they just have injections, whatever the problem is, okay, let's put it in, let's go. That's why the entire nation has HIV. What comprehensive policy framework would you propose to address the interconnected challenges? Sami Kakar, multiple podcasts, this will be a very long answer. What are the drivers of the current insurgency in Balochistan and how is it different from previous insurgencies? I think this has also been discussed, but if you want to say something briefly. No, I think these are good questions, but we have already done separate podcasts on all of them. I cannot do justice to all of them. Yes, when the state does not let go of control over mineral-rich lands, what can the local people do? Yes, I think it is a reasonable question. Local people have no option but resistance and political protest to stop the state's exploitative campaign in a peaceful political manner and to oppose it through all political and constitutional means. I think the people of the state listen to all our podcasts. So, you people go and check the question section to see what questions come up if you give people even a little opportunity to speak, what do people say? It is quite evident that there is virtually no real democracy in Balochistan. What peaceful and practical paths can they pursue to overcome these challenges and emerge from the darkness? Many Baloch youth have already chosen the path of armed struggle, believing it to be the way to achieve their goals. That's true. This is a worrying matter, and in Balochistan, and I think in Pashtun youth as well, the way you are pushing them, you are giving them this message that, brother, the path of peaceful struggle is not an option, and this is the dangerous thing. Many districts across the country are experiencing poverty without producing armed insurgency. What makes the Baloch belt different? Again, I think you should read our multiple podcasts. Why has the Pakistani state's response to the recent Pashtun sit-ins been seen by many as so harsh and unresponsive? Look, in my opinion, it's not just this, the current government's response to any protest and generally is very harsh. The protest at the Jamrud border lasted for a year and a half, not a single demand was heard or fulfilled. Dr. Mah Rang Baloch's protest, etc. I think this is a defining feature of this regime, that protests are dealt with with such brutal indifference, and now we see this in Kashmir and Gilgit. Is Dr. Mah Rang Baloch's life imprisonment a paradigm shift in state-society relations in Balochistan? No, it's not a paradigm shift. It's a continuation. A paradigm shift was visible long ago. This is its continuation. In Balochistan, people did not allow state representatives, ministers, to come into their areas. They showed greater resistance. Do you think a similar political response will come in the Pashtun belt? Yes, look, in the Pashtun belt too, there will be resistance against the artificial representatives sitting in Form 47, but it will happen gradually. In the Baloch belt, they cannot even go to their areas. What are the major bottlenecks in political governance in Balochistan and Khyber? Now, again, books can be written on this. I think we should repost clips from all the old podcasts. How should the responsibility and progress and challenges of the Pashtun community be divided between the Pashtuns themselves and the state? If you had to give a percentage, what ratio would it be? Sorry, can you repeat the first part? How should the responsibility for the progress and challenges of the Pashtun community be divided between the Pashtuns themselves and the state? Sir, whoever wants to do it, let them do it. I guess, what do I edit? No, it's an oversimplified statement. These are structural issues that incentivize a particular behavior and discourage another. So, I don't want to get into such oversimplified binaries. But TTP or the Talibanization, the problem of the last 40-50 years, primarily the American empire of that time and then our state's Afghan policy, I hold them primarily responsible. Can we really bring about change when there are so many different ideologies and political narratives? I mean, can political parties create meaningful change under these circumstances? Mahmood Khan Achakzai has said that he wants one person from every household to join a national Qoumi Lashkar because the situation is becoming increasingly difficult to control. Do you support the idea of forming a Qoumi Lashkar? If always, this is across Balochistan, but to shut down one to two months. Do you think it could help achieve peace by putting great pressure on the government and the establishment? Poor people will starve, brother. Look, our and I am sure Achakzai sahib's belief is also that the state's monopoly on violence should be the state's, and as good citizens, we will continue our struggle and efforts within the constitutional framework of the state. And what Achakzai sahib said, what I understood from his words is that he is not talking about an armed militia, he is talking about a political one. But whatever its meaning, I don't think there is a need for armed or such lashkars. Lashkars have ruined everything. We should have a relationship between citizens and the state like a modern state. The monopoly on violence is the state's. The lashkar people have looted us together. These are all the situations, we have reached here because of these lashkars and groups. You didn't understand, this was a very philosophical song. It was an anti-colonial song that they have looted us. Fair complexions, colonialism. Colonialism, you people don't recognize it. Sir, there are many questions, but let's take the last question from your brother. Abdul Bari Kakar, your family, meaning tribes, are asking, what's the way forward for peace in Balochistan? Look, let's conclude on this. We have talked about this many times. You need a comprehensive but differentiated strategy. You need a separate strategy to deal with militancy like TTP and Daesh, which will involve kinetic measures as well as long-term preventive measures, and you will have to make the required changes in your foreign policy. For the Baloch insurgency, you primarily need to move towards major political concessions and recognize people's rights over their local resources. I think short of this, our situation will worsen, and now, along with the Baloch belt, the occupation of these resources has also started in Pashtun areas. So, if the situation remains the same, I don't see much ray of hope. Sir, who will win in Spain Belgium in 10 minutes? I am not such a fan of football. I follow cricket with interest. We have never discussed it. So, I don't know about Spain Belgium. I think Spain will win, if I have to guess. We will bother you about cricket again sometime. Let's see if you, cricket, you come to the UK, we will play cricket. I am no longer in condition to play here. No, no, it's okay. In this country, you will look very fit in front of them. They have also introduced walking cricket, right? For old people above 60, it is played in the UK. Sir, not just walking, there is a separate league for over 60, a decade between 60-70, and then everyone below 50 is playing. So, it's a very inclusive environment. You should come sometime, you will discover your talent. In the league above 50, I will prepare my force documents so that we can get these old people above 50 and above 60 out. We will come, sir, we will come. I think we have to come now, given the way you talk. You will probably get me banned from entering Pakistan. Sir, you come secretly and leave secretly. No one knows. Thank you, everybody. Thank you for watching. Take care. Goodbye.