Transcription
We are in a period of significant danger because we had that period of overconfidence that was a setup for those, those, those disappointments of the unanticipated length and difficulty of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
How's everybody doing? Hey Scott, thanks for the opportunity. You, if you and if you and Josh for the opportunity to be with all of this great group here and congratulations all of you for for being a part of this program. And and it's a tough act to follow, you know, Professor Karkhan and Condoleezza Rice, you know, but uh I'll try. I'll try to I'll try to keep up the pace here and I'm actually here. What's on your minds as well. So, I'll try to be brief here, but but I think, you know, there's part of the conventional wisdom you hear a lot about today is that we're in a dangerous period of time, and I think it's true. And I think it's true because when I look back into the kind of across my career, when I came into the military, it was in the middle of the Cold War. And and I had the opportunity to serve in Germany, and I was in Germany in 1989 when when East Germany lifted travel restrictions to the west, and our regiment was actually patrolling the East-West German border on that day in November of 1989, staring down East German border guards one day, and then in the next moment, at one moment, and in the next moment, seeing the seeing the barriers opened, and then tens, and then hundreds, and then thousands, and then tens of thousands of East Germans pouring across the border. They were, but they were, they were bringing bottles of wine and and bouquets of flowers to give to our troopers. There were hugs and tears and joy, and the Cold War ended, right? Without us firing a shot, right? So, that that was a a occasion and and and and and really a source of confidence for us, right? Confidence in in our future. The post-Cold War period seemed to be a period of peace. And and it that was followed, of course, though, by a hot war very soon after the end of the Cold War, when Saddam Hussein decided to invade invade Kuwait in in August of of 1990. And that same cavalry troop that was staring down these German border guards one moment, and then getting swamped by people hugging them the next moment, deployed to Saudi Arabia and participated in Operation Desert Storm, which was an a lopsided victory over the fourth largest army in the world. And those two twin events, I think, the end of the Cold War, that lopsided victory in Operation Desert Storm, ushered in, as I mentioned, a period of confidence, right? Confidence in in really three critical areas. Confidence in in this idea that that the arc of history had guaranteed the primacy of our free and open societies over closed authoritarian systems. Related to that was this the idea that great power competition, great power rivalry was a relic of the past. And then particularly based on the the lessons, or maybe the wrong lessons, of the Gulf War, there was a a belief that our technological prowess, our technological military prowess would guarantee our security well into the future. And in the 1990s, I think that that confidence became overconfidence, and maybe even a kind of a touch of hubris in that period of time. And we vacated critical arenas of competition based on this belief in our primacy well into the future. I mean, there were some some people at the time in the 1990s were saying, "Hey, you know, don't don't don't buy into these assumptions." Charles Krauthammer, for example, wrote a great essay called The Unipolar Moment. And it's like we forgot the moment part of that, you know? We thought it was just going to be a unipolar world. And I think this was a setup. This overconfidence was a setup. It was a setup for a series of shocks and disappointments in the 2000s. Of course, you know, foremost among them, the mass murder attacks of September 11th, 2001, when terrorists used box cutters and and airplanes to bypass our our military prowess and conduct the most destructive terrorist attack in in history. And then what followed that, I think, was you were were the unanticipated length and difficulty of the wars in Afghanistan and and in Iraq. And of course, a lot of people always still wanted to debate, should we have done it? It being the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I think we should spend some more time discussing, hey, you know, who the heck thought it would be easy? And and I think I think some people thought it would be relatively easy to do regime change in Afghanistan or uh and and especially in in Iraq, based on some of the wrong lessons learned from that 1991 Gulf War. And I think what people forgot about that Gulf War is that the objective in that war was very narrowly circumscribed. It was just, hey, give Kuwait back to the Kuwaitis. Go back to status quo ante. And but then changing the Iraqi government was much more complicated than that. And and I think also what fed into this idea that that wars could be fast, cheap, and efficient was this belief again in our military prowess, our technological military prowess. And so we had flawed ideas about the nature of war. We talked ourselves into believing that the consolidation of military gains to get the sustainable political outcomes was kind of an optional phase of war. And so what I'd like to talk with you about is how do we regain confidence after that period of overconfidence followed by strategic shocks and disappointments in the 2000s, confidence in our ability to compete effectively in national security and to fight and win in in wars. And so, I think what you can do as as part of this boot camp and then in in your in your future studies and your reading and thinking, is really think about how do you develop your own theory of strategic competence. What are the components of strategic competence? Because I'm, as I mentioned at the outset, we are in a period of significant danger because we had that period of overconfidence that was a setup for those, those, those disappointments of the unanticipated length and difficulty of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, maybe the lack of confidence, and I heard Professor and talking about this, and confidence in who we are as Americans, our common identity as Americans. In the same period of time, in the early 2000s, big transitions in the global economy are happening, right? Especially associated with China's entry in the World Trade Organization, a loss of manufacturing jobs, especially in in the Midwest and and and in the so-called Rust Belt. People felt like they were left behind. Uh, how about, you know, how about a financial crisis, right? 2008, 2009. Toss in an opioid epidemic. And then how about the effects of social media and and how social media really exacerbates people's sense of disenchantment, uh, disenfranchisement, uh, and get and and in pursuit of of more advertising dollars, gives people more and more extreme content to get more and more clicks, right? So, we've had all these effects that have really affected our confidence. So, that overconfidence that the 9/11 is, I think now has led us to really a period of pessimism, disenchantment, and a lack of confidence. So, how do how do we get our confidence back in our ability to achieve favorable outcomes? Uh, and I think we have to do it by by really focusing on competence and competent foreign policy and and approaches to national security. And it is, of course, it's it's a pressing issue, uh, because, as as I mentioned, you know, So post-Cold War unipolar moment is is long past. And what we're facing now is a period in which we're seeing an axis of aggressors coalesce. And And what I'm referring to is really two revanchist or revisionist powers on the Eurasian landmass of China and Russia, who have pulled into the fold the only, you know, theocratic dictatorship in in Iran and the only hereditary communist dictatorship in the world in North Korea. And what we're seeing is an unprecedented degree of of of these this axis aiding and abetting each other's efforts. And we can talk more about that in Q&A if you'd like to. But, you know, what about strategic competence? And I think I think what as you develop your theory, you want to you really want to think about what what Clausewitz said about theory. It's not the accompany you to the battlefield and help you make the specific decisions for you, but it ought to help you think clearly about complex problems. And I think the young Clausewitz would fit really well in this group here, you know? He's He knew a lot about about war because he went to war at the age of 14. And then [clears throat] had the opportunity to to reflect on on his experiences and and write the book, write the book on war. But so what is your foundational understanding of strategy? And And you should think about that. What are the components of strategy? I'll give you some ideas and then we can talk more about it. These are definitions of strategy and and of course, you know, the the military definition really has to do with ends, ways, and means. And and how you apply means to achieve your ends, and there should be a logical connection between them. I think it's important to to look at what we're doing today in the world and to to ask, you know, what is the strategy to achieve a a well-defined goal or or an objective? Often times, you can't figure it out, and there's a problem. It's probably because there's a a lack, a lack of strategy. I think in the military, even the true test of strategy is if a platoon leader or a company commander can explain to his or her soldiers how the risks that they're going to take on an operation and the sacrifices they may be called on to make, uh, are are are in service of achieving an outcome that's worthy of those risks and and and worthy of those sacrifices.
So, I mentioned this a little bit. >> [clears throat] >> You know, we we in the 1990s, I believe, focused almost exclusively on change. Uh, changes in the geopolitical environment and and changes in technology that had given us these tremendous military advantages. And what we neglected in that period of time were continuities. Uh, continuities that we can we we can learn from history. And I know Secretary Rice talked to you about this, and Professor Cocken did. And the importance really to to really understand, you know, how the recent past produced the present as the first step in trying to anticipate the the future. And and when we're looking at war and warfare and strategic competence as it relates to war, I I think you can't go wrong if you apply the method that that Sir Michael Howard recommended to us in terms of how to study history. And what in which in a great essay that I recommend to all of you called called The Use and Abuse of Military History. And so, we should study military history in width, in depth, and in context. And in width, across a broad scope of time, so you can excuse [clears throat] me, identify changes in the character of war or the character of warfare, but also so you can be sensitive to to those to to those continuities. And and I would recommend that, you know, there really maybe four uh fundamental continuities in the nature of war that we neglect at our at our own peril. And the first of these is, you know, war's an extension of politics. Okay, it's like that's like the Geico commercial, man. Everybody knows that, right? Clausewitz said, you know, war is war is an extension of of politics. But, war is political, and what that means is that that war should be aimed at achieving a sustainable political outcome. And again, that also means that if you're going to war, the consolidation of gains to get to that political outcome is not an optional phase. And if you look even at ongoing conflicts today, that's where the problem is, right? How do you get to a sustainable political outcome in Gaza, for for example? How do you create space for an alternative to for Hamas to emerge such that there can be some kind of a political settlement, because you're not going to get it with an entity like Hamas, a terrorist organization like Hamas that is committed to destroying Israel and killing all the Jews, right? So, how do you get to a different political order in in Gaza? You hear, of course, a lot about wanting to end the war in Ukraine. But the war in Ukraine is is essentially being fought over territory, populations, and resources. How do you get to a a political end to that war? Well, I don't think you get to one really until Vladimir Putin concludes that he can't continue the war at an acceptable cost and risk. Essentially, concludes that he could be losing. Because, of course, you can't disconnect the political outcome that you want from what you're doing militarily. And I think in recent conflicts, we've actually done that in in Afghanistan and in Iraq. I mean, if you think back as we're about to get to the fourth anniversary of the disastrous, I would call it self-defeat and humiliating deadly withdrawal from Afghanistan. Um, you know, what we were doing in Afghanistan was completely disconnected of what we're doing militarily from what we're trying to achieve politically. This is going back even to the Obama administration when we stopped designating the Taliban as an enemy, for example. We're not fighting them actively cuz we convinced ourselves in a delusional way that really the problem was with Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Our problem really wasn't with the Taliban. Uh, we we we created the enemy we would have preferred in Afghanistan by [clears throat] assuming that that the Taliban was completely separate from other Jihadist terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda. Uh, and and so we diluted ourselves as so we could have this we could pursue the strategy we wanted, uh, which was talking to the Taliban in in Doha, for example, the Taliban political council, which we stood up, uh, while we stopped actually going after the Taliban, you know, aggressively. What was the incentive, uh, for the Taliban? We we announced years in advance, uh, the, you know, the our schedule for withdrawal out of Afghanistan, and of course, what we're doing militarily was doing nothing to to uh, to incentivize the Taliban to come to what we would regard as a as a as an acceptable political settlement. Uh, war is human, is the second continuity. People fight for the same reasons that Thucydides identified 2500 years ago: fear, honor, and interest. So if your strategy doesn't address the political dimension of war, how to consolidate gains, doesn't address really what are the emotions and ideology that are driving conflict, that strategy is going to fail. I would say the third continuity is that war is uncertain. War is uncertain because it's impossible to plot out what you want to do linearly in war, because war is, as Clausewitz said, a continuous interaction of opposites, interaction with you and your enemies. Uh, and and and in this complex environment. And so your enemy has a say in the future course of events, your enemy has authorship over the future, and so progress is never going to be linear. But again, you know, how do we get to the point where we're we're announcing years in advance exactly the number of troops we're going to have on the ground and so forth? It's cutting against the nature of war. And then finally, war is a contest of of wills. You have to be able to sustain your will, and I think for, uh, for in our recent wars, uh, we have been unable to do that, and and we've we've sort of succumbed to a mantra of ending endless wars and so forth, in large measure because a series of American presidents did a poor job of explaining to the American people what the American people need to know, uh, which is what is at stake. You know, what is at stake in this war, and then what is the strategy that can deliver, uh, a favorable outcome at an acceptable cost and risk.