Transcription
Hello there. I'm Tom Switzer from Switzerland. Always lovely to have your company. And today, a regular guest, Professor John M. Shimmer from the University of Chicago. Hi there, John.
>> Hello, Tom.
Now, we're going to do something different today. I'm just going to start off with one question, but then I'd encourage our viewers, that's you tuning in right now, to ask a question. And you can do that via the live chat and uh we can't get through all your questions but we'll try to get through as many as possible so we could put to John. But I'll start with the news of the day, John, because we're recording at about 6:15 on the US East Coast, that is Thursday late afternoon, early evening. Earlier today, President Trump threatened Iran, um, to hit them hard, very hard militarily, and take all of their oil and gas by the end of the day. He said that he had uh a deal lined up uh that would be announced very soon. Meanwhile, Iran says that they have made any decision on any deal. Um, John, what's going on here?
Well, Tom, let's go back to Tuesday. Tuesday uh is when President Trump said that the Iranians had shut shot down an Apache helicopter, a US Apache helicopter in the Strait, and that he was going to retaliate. And Tuesday night, uh, and I'm giving this to you in terms of East Coast time in the United States, Tuesday night, uh, President Trump, uh, ordered the American military to attack Iran, and they did. And Iran, as promised, retaliated, uh, they argued disproportionately. The Iranians have made it clear that they will uh retaliate more forcefully than the initial attack by the United States. Whether that happened, I don't know, but they did forcefully retaliate. This is Tuesday night. Then yesterday, Wednesday, uh, the United States retaliated again. Uh, and the Iranians retaliated again. And today, Thursday, as you said, Tom, at midday, uh, President Trump promised he was really going to up the ante this time. Not well, not only were we going to retaliate with air power, but we were going to seize Car Island, take over Iranian oil, and basically uh assert our tremendous influence on the world oil market, not only because of what America produces, but also because of what Venezuela produces. And now we're controlling uh Iranian oil in this story. So it looked like we were really upping the ante at midday, as you pointed out. Then, out of nowhere, President Trump said he was calling off the attack and uh instead, uh, we're close to negotiating a ceasefire, a real ceasefire, uh, and he uh anticipated that that would happen in a few days' time. So there's no more escalation, and uh, we're back to where President Trump is arguing that we are close to a ceasefire. Um, and that's the basic situation. If you want to ask me what happened here, as I've long argued, Tom, we cannot go up the escalation ladder and defeat the Iranians. And you want to remember, we went up the escalation ladder on Tuesday, they matched us. We went up the escalation uh ladder on Wednesday, they matched us. And the idea of now attacking Car Island is fanciful. I mean, if attacking Car Island made sense and taking over Iranian oil made sense, we would have done it a long time ago. The reason we didn't try to take over Car Island is because it makes no sense from a strategic point of view. The point is that we're checkmated, and Trump fully understands that, and he's also, he also has to understand that he's got to shut this thing down. This just can't keep going on for economic reasons.
>> Yeah. When President Trump um made his threats uh early on Thursday, it was no surprise that his hawkish defenders like John Pod Horitz of Commentary magazine, General Jack Keane on Fox News, were thrilled that he finally uh threatened to escalate things militarily, and they praised him for this, and now they're trying to explain his about-face.
>> Well, Tom, the fact is, these people are fools. Uh, you can throw General Keane in the mix. You can throw Lindsey Graham in the mix. I mean, these people are living in a dream world. Anybody who's looked objectively at this, even if you're a hawk, even if you're a neoconservative, uh, should come to the conclusion that Robert Kagan came to.
>> Yes. Robert Kagan was a leading neoconservative who supported the inva, who led the charge to invade Iraq in 2003, and he's since been mugged by reality. Right, John?
>> Exactly. I mean, that we have no military option here. And when you listen to people like Keane and uh, uh, Lindsey speak or Pod Horitz speak, these people are, they're delusional. This, you know, there's, uh, the Wall Street, the Wall Street Journal in their editorial uh today actually said that uh, Trump needs to do what President George W. Bush did in 2007 and do a surge of troops, which worked very well for Iraq, according to the Journal, and that's what Trump should do. Follow President Bush's advice in 2007.
>> Well, we know how that worked out. But the, even if you think the surge worked, this is a fundamentally different situation. We invaded Iraq in March 2003 and had lots of troops there. So you had a foundation that you could build on for a surge. We have no ground forces in Iran, no foundation that we could build on. Furthermore, there are 93 million people in Iran. It is a huge piece of real estate, and the terrain in Iran is forbidding. The idea that you're going to go in there and it's like invading a pancake-like country like Poland is delusional, right? This is just crazy. And three times the population of Iraq. Here's a question already from Allan from uh Philadelphia. Uh, is all this just for stock options bets, John?
>> No. What's driving Trump? I, uh, I think Allan's question gets at the sense that there's a powerful economic dimension at play here, but I don't think uh, this is all about, you know, uh, Trump padding his portfolio or something like that. No, I think what's going on here is that President Trump and his advisors understand that we are heading toward the economic precipice, uh, and that this war has to be shut down sooner rather than later. In fact, people who are in the know about the economics of this situation say that even if you shut it down tomorrow, you're going to have significant economic problems down the road. The economic problems from this war are going to last for a long time. It's like the embargo, uh, the OPEC embargo of 1973. So, President Trump has to shut this down. And instead, he was talking at midday today, Thursday, about upping the ante. This would have, you know, had disastrous economic consequences. It would have sped the pace at which we were heading toward the precipice. Uh, and I would also note, Tom, I have long argued that it is in Iran's interest for President Trump to go up the escalation ladder and to prolong this war because the longer the war goes on, the more leverage Iran has.
>> And uh, therefore, I think it made eminently good sense for President Trump to say, no more going up the escalation ladder. What we're going to do is get a ceasefire. And by the way, you all know, all the viewers, that we're just talking here about getting a ceasefire. We're not talking about negotiating the final settlement on issues like, you know, nuclear enrichment. That will wait to the second phase. We just first have to get a ceasefire. That's what we're working on now. And hopefully, President Trump will stick to his guns this time, uh, negotiate a ceasefire, and uh, then we can get on uh, to hopefully working out some sort of deal or quasi-deal.
Here's another question here for you, John. Is there a way Trump can walk away from the illegal Iran war without triggering Israel's Samson option?
Well, I think there's no question that if we walk away, Trump just washes his hands of this, and there's no nuclear deal, and it looks like the Iranians may be getting a nuclear weapon. I mean, we want to understand, Tom, and your questioner, that uh, this war has given the Iranians a powerful incentive, if they didn't have one beforehand, they certainly should have one now, to acquire nuclear weapons. We also understand that they have a lot of highly enriched uranium, uh, uranium that's enriched to 60%, which can easily be enriched to 90%, which is weapons-grade material. And they have 400-plus kilograms of that, they could probably make 10 to 12 bombs. So, if we walk away and the Israelis can't deal with the problem I just described conventionally, the incentive for them to at least think and maybe even use nuclear weapons to take out a burgeoning Iranian nuclear program will be very great. So, there is real danger there. But I think about us walking away.
Next question, John. Is the likely and promised retaliation by Iran against surrounding countries and possibly US bases in Europe acting as a deterrent to further large-scale military strikes?
I think there's no question that the threat of retaliation against the Gulf countries and Israel and American military installations in the region is causing the United States to look for a way to get a meaningful ceasefire. If you look at what's been happening over the past couple of days with these exchanges between the Iranians and the Americans, the Iranians have been launching very effective attacks at American bases in Bahrain and in Kuwait. Uh, and I am sure the Saudis are going to great lengths to tell the Americans they want absolutely nothing to do with this. I'm sure the Saudis have signaled to the Iranians, we are not playing this game. The Americans are not using our bases to attack you. They're not using our airspace because the Saudis do not want to be hit by the Iranians. It's the Kuwaitis and the Bahrainis who are being hit at this point in time. Uh, so you see this phenomenon clearly at play, and it's having an effect on us.
Next question, John. Is there not a strong argument to be made that Trump will go for broke and attack Iran again, given that he has already made a number of foolish mistakes already? I mean, you can make the argument that the credibility and the prestige of the United States is at stake, and he keeps making these threats and he fails to follow through. That hurts American credibility and prestige, which, as you know, as a realist, John, is a useful supplement to American power. Uh, does the questioner have a point?
Well, I think the question is a very smart question because the questioner uh indicated that he thought it would be irrational for Trump to attack Iran. And the questioner, of course, is correct. And it may be the case that Trump, you know, has that particular thought process and lashes out at Iran. But two points very closely related. One, it's not going to work. And number two, therefore, it is irrational. And we're assuming at this point in time, uh, maybe I should say, we're all praying that Trump and his advisors will act in a rational, legal way and do everything they can to get us out of this uh mess that we're in.
Hypothetically, next question. Suppose a nuclear weapon is used against Iran, either by Israel or the United States. What effect could this have on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and globally?
I think it would have a devastating effect on proliferation. Uh, it would tell everybody that they should get a nuclear weapon of their own, uh, and make sure that that nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons that they have are survivable. Uh, and I think that's one reason the United States would go to great lengths not to use nuclear weapons itself and do everything it could to prevent the Israelis from doing that. But uh, I think it's very important that we don't cross the nuclear threshold here, either in Ukraine, where there appears to be a danger of uh, nuclear escalation these days, or uh, in the Middle East in the scenario that we often talk about, where either the United States or Israel uses a nuclear weapon against Iran.
Today marks the um, an important milestone uh, in the Ukraine-Russia war. Um, it's been uh, it's now longer than the uh, World War I. Uh, today's the day, John. And I can't think of a better person who's been able to explain the Ukraine conflict since 2022, or indeed since the Russian uh, incursion in Crimea in 2014, than you, John. So, changing uh, subjects here. This is Tony from Brisbane, Australia. He's actually British. And he notes that John Healey resigned as UK defense secretary today. He has been saber-rattling for a war with Russia, but then he found out the UK is potless and there is no cash for the military. What a debacle, John.
Well, uh, all all the European countries are suffering economically. Uh, and there's a real one-two punch behind this. The first punch is the 2022 war when it started, February 24th, 2022. You want to remember that the Europeans then began to move to cut off all oil and gas from Russia. Uh, that was cheap oil and gas. And that meant that they had to buy oil and gas that was much more expensive. So the economic sanctions um, and the cut-off of the flow of oil and gas into Europe hurt the European economies. Then the second thing that hurt the European economies was the February 28th decision to attack Iran and create this uh, oil crisis and gas crisis in the Gulf. Uh, and uh, that is damaging European economies, and it's going to do much more damage over time. There's no question about that. I followed the British economy, which was not in terrific shape before any of this even happened, and they're in terrible shape now. And it's not only the British economy, it's true of the German economy as well, and the French economy. Uh, and this means that those economies are not in a position to pick up the slack >> of providing money and weaponry to Ukraine as the United States tries to get out of that business. Remember, not too long ago, the United States said that it was willing to allow American weaponry to go to Ukraine. This is before the Iran war, when we used up a lot of that weaponry. But nevertheless, the deal that we were talking about before the Iran war was that the Europeans would pay for that weaponry. So the Ukrainians would get American weaponry, but the Europeans would pay for it. The United States would not pay for it. Uh, this put a huge burden on the Europeans. And again, when you talk about the economic problems that the Europeans have, uh, there's no way they can go on sustaining Ukraine over the long term in its war against Russia. And this is one of the reasons I've long argued and continued to argue that the Russians will win uh, an ugly victory against Ukraine.
>> Yeah. And on Britain and indeed NATO, as you say, it gets back to a fundamental point that Walter Lippmann, the great American foreign policy realist of the post-war period, said about reconciling ends and means, right, John?
>> Yeah, there's no question about that. That's true of the United States as well, Tom.
>> Yeah. Yeah. You know, I mean, if the word prioritize is no longer in the American vocabulary, but >> well, the United States spends more on servicing its debt than it does on defense, and it wants to rule the world.
Next question. Why are the Baltic states so aggressive and antagonistic towards Russia when they are so small and have no military? Do they really believe the Americans will bail them out if there is a war with Russia? John?
Well, the Baltic states and Poland, uh, they are just utterly convinced that the Russians are the font of all evil, uh, and that the Russians are bent on conquering them. And they view uh, Russian aggression as just part of the warp and woof of daily life in Russian thinking about how to deal with the world. And there's nothing you can do to change their thinking. Now, I'm with the questioner on this. If I'm playing uh, you know, Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia's hand, even Poland's hand, I try to work out some sort of modus vivendi with the Russians. And as you know, Tom, I don't believe that the Russians are bent on conquering the Baltic states or Poland. They've been there, done that, didn't work out very well, and they're finished with that. And Putin has made it clear that he's not interested in reestablishing the Russian Empire. But as the questioner implies, you cannot convince the Baltic states of that. They're convinced that the Russians are coming. And what they've done is they've taken a stick and poked the Russians in the eye because they think they have the American security umbrella over them and they can now get away with it. You see this in Polish thinking about how to deal with the Russians as well. The Poles think they're actually in quite good shape, or they have for a while thought they were in quite good shape because, again, uh, they're in NATO. They've got the American security umbrella over them. But what they didn't realize is that Donald Trump hates Europeans and he hates NATO, and he wants to reduce the American military footprint in Europe. He wants to weaken the transatlantic alliance. And at the same time, as you and I have talked about many times, Tom, there are powerful structural forces that push the United States to pivot away from Europe to East Asia.
>> Yeah. And when you marry that to the fact that we're, you know, deeply involved in the Middle East, and that one doesn't look like it's going to end anytime soon, you know, the American military footprint in Europe is likely to be reduced in a major way. And this is going to have hugely negative consequences for the Baltic states, for Poland, and for NATO more generally.
>> And as you've all too often said, America and NATO have just led the Ukrainians down the primrose path. Another question, good question, academic question. Doesn't offensive realism imply Russia would dominate Ukraine regardless of NATO? Why treat NATO as a cause, not trigger? John?
>> You, there's no question that if Russia could dominate all of Ukraine and dominate uh, East Europe or Eastern Europe at some reasonable cost, it would do that. But Russia does not have the capability to do that. I would point out to the viewer that uh, we've earlier talked about the fact that this war has lasted longer than World War I. That's correct. Nevertheless, how much Ukrainian territory has Russia captured in those four-plus years of war? Basically, of Ukraine, the eastern 1/5th of Ukraine. And they've had a devil of a time, mainly because of drones and also because of European and American support to Ukraine. Uh, the Russians have had a devil of a time conquering that slice, rather narrow slice of Ukraine. Uh, so there's no reason to worry about Russia uh, behaving as if it were the Soviet Union in 1945, having just rolled up >> the Wehrmacht and inflicted a decisive defeat on Nazi Germany. We're not there. If there's any country on the planet that's a challenge to the United States, it's called China, not Russia. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers. It's not a potential hegemon in Europe. China is really powerful and is a threat to become a potential hegemon in East Asia. And that's why if the United States uh, were smart, it would prioritize the three regions of the world and it would focus on East Asia and pay little attention to Europe.
John, there is a growing consensus uh in Western public discourse, and you see this in the columns of people like Fared Zakaria from the Washington Post and CNN, whom you know, um, The Economist magazine, The London Times, The London Telegraph, even The London Guardian. Uh, and the consensus here is that there's been a major turning point in the war, that Russia's offensive has stalled, that Ukraine is regaining territory, and Moscow is losing more ground than it can realistically capture. And their argument, and you see this a lot in The Economist, by the way, um, Ukraine has adapted militarily in ways that many analysts did not expect. And, you know, the Ukrainian forces are successfully combining armor, artillery, drones, infantry in coordinated offensives, and that is why Putin is now on the back foot. Your response to this emerging convention, well, this conventional wisdom in the West?
John, before I answer the nitty-gritty about the battlefield, let me just elevate the 60,000-foot view and point out that there are really three dimensions to the argument that the Russians are in trouble. Uh, one is that Putin is losing popularity at home. Uh, and there's a lot of movement to get rid of him. Uh, that's one dimension. Another dimension is that Ukraine is executing this long-range drone and missile war against Russia. It's hitting targets deep inside Mother Russia. And that is not only having a negative effect on Putin's standing uh, with his public, but it's also pushing the Russians to think about surrender, caving in to Ukraine because the damage is so devastating. Just on this issue, you want to remember, the Russians have done far more damage to Ukraine than Ukraine has done to Russia in these two bombing campaigns. And we see no evidence that the Ukrainians have thrown their hands up and wanted to quit uh, because of the Russian bombing campaign. So it's quite clear that the Russians are not going to throw their hands up and quit because of a much smaller-scale bombing campaign by Ukraine, assisted by the Europeans. But let's go to the battlefield. Uh, look, there's no question that the Russians are launching a very careful set of offensives all across the front lines. And the reason is that they understand that if they use meat grinder tactics, if they use frontal assaults, huge numbers of Russians will die. And that's not the optimum way to conduct this war of attrition. So they use small units and they capture territory at a rather slow pace. Uh, and it's in good part because of the tactics they use, and they use those particular tactics because of all the drones that are up in the sky. There's no question that drones, which were not u, a very important weapon in the initial years of the war, have turned out to be very important. And that has slowed down the Russian offensives. There's no question about that. But the Russians are conquering territory. They are moving forward. The idea that the Russians are losing territory to the Ukrainians and the Ukrainians are on the offensive is simply not true. It's the Russians who are on the offensive, albeit a slow offensive. Furthermore, if you look at the balance of manpower on the front lines, I would estimate that the Russians have a two-plus, uh, a two-plus to one advantage in manpower. Uh, and furthermore, if you look at the state of the Ukrainian army, they have a huge problem with soldiers being AWOL, not being present for duty. The estimates are that there are about 200,000 Ukrainian soldiers who are AWOL. Furthermore, they have a huge draft-dodging problem. The Russians don't have a draft-dodging problem because they have a volunteer military. Furthermore, if you look at the number of troops that the Russian, excuse me, that the Ukrainians have to populate the front lines, uh, they don't have enough troops to cover the front line. Uh, and therefore, there are places where the Russians can penetrate because there are no Ukrainian forces there to stop them. What saves the day to some extent for the Ukrainians are the drones, for sure, but there are limits to what the drones can do. Furthermore, if you look at the weaponry that's available to the Ukrainian army, the United States is not supplying weaponry like it once was. There's a Czech alliance of European states that was committed to providing weaponry uh to the Ukrainians, and a good number of European states have pulled out of that alliance. They're not interested in providing, or they're not capable of providing the weaponry anymore. The Russians have this truly impressive industrial base. They're pumping out weaponry like nobody's business. Nobody could test that. So when you look at the balance of manpower on the front lines, and you look at the state of the soldiers who were fighting uh, the Russians look like they're in much better shape. And the same thing.
>> It is amazing. The the Western media all too often highlight manpower problems in Russia, but they hardly ever highlight Ukraine's problems as you just did.
>> Yes. But just on on the manpower problem, Tom, the argument is that the Russians are losing egregious numbers of troops every day. They're being bled white. And of course, this is because they're engaged in uh, you know, these frontal assaults, these mindless frontal assaults that are grinding up soldiers and resulting in little progress being made in terms of moving forward. But that's a mischaracterization of what's happening. As I said, the Russians are not doing that. They're not losing that many soldiers. And the Ukrainians are losing lots of soldiers, and they don't, or they can't afford to lose lots of soldiers. Uh, so I, I don't know what these people are talking about. And then you pointed out that they've learned the art of combined arms. They're coming up with these sophisticated tactics. This is nonsense. Sophisticated tactics. I want to know what those sophisticated tactics are. Right. The Ukrainians and the Russians are both engaged in very, and using very small-scale units, right? They combine it with artillery when necessary, and so forth, and so on. But there's no magic tactical formula that the Ukrainians have suddenly found that the Russians, Russians know nothing about, that's going to allow the Ukrainians to put the Russians on their back foot. I, I just don't understand what people are talking about.
John, one more question on Ukraine before we conclude with Iran. Another question says, "What does John think about the recent dispute between the Polish government and the Ukrainian government about the Ukrainians honoring the memory of the UPA terrorist group? Why would Zelensky do something like this? How much control do the far-right extremists have in Ukraine?"
John, >> you know, just to go back in history to the period between 1941 and 1945, and even after 1945, uh, it's very important to understand that, you know, we focus a lot of attention on the killing that took place on the Eastern Front involving uh, the German killing machine on one side, the Red Army on the other side. Uh, and uh, I would not want to make light of all the killing that took place uh, between those two forces, but you also want to understand that there was a huge amount of killing that involved Poles and Ukrainians killing each other. Uh, and by the way, Ukrainians killing Jews as well. Uh, but anyway, uh, there were large numbers of basically fascist forces uh, inside uh, the Ukrainian uh, populace in World War II that sided with the Germans, and they killed large numbers of Poles. And I believe this is indisputable. Uh, as I've said on a number of occasions, I've actually done a lot of research on the German killing machine in Eastern Europe during the war. And I paid a lot of attention to what took place uh, between the Ukrainians and the Poles. And the Ukrainians killed, murdered is a better word, lots of Poles. And rest assured that the Poles are well aware of this fact, and they know who did it. And what happened is, as the questioner said, is that Zelensky went out and he honored two of these small armies of killers in Ukraine, and uh, this has enraged the Poles, as you can imagine, and they had given a very prestigious award to Zelensky that they're now in the process of taking back. And uh, uh, the Poles basically, basically ally want nothing to do with the Ukrainians at this point in time. And you therefore scratch your head, as the questioner did, and say, why did they do this? You know, it just doesn't make any sense. Why is he doing this now? I think, Tom, and I don't have any hard evidence to support this, this is me just surmising what's going on. I, I think Zelensky is in deep trouble, and he needs everything he can do, he needs to do everything he can to shore up his political position. And I think playing nice with these forces uh, is designed to help Zelensky shore up his position. You know, getting back to the previous question, uh, you know, a lot of people think that Zelensky's in the driver's seat now. He's feeling his oats. He's got the Russians on their back foot.
>> Well, that's what you think if you read the Western Press. Go on.
>> And the Ukrainian press. That, you're exactly right, Tom. If you read the Western press and the Ukrainian press, that's what you'd think. But I think that's simply wrong. I think Zelensky is desperate. By the way, this is a situation that's analogous to the position that President Trump is >> is in. I think President Trump is desperate. He's desperate to end this war. Everything tells me that he has to know that he's got to put an end to this war in in Iran. And Zelensky is in a similar situation. The situation on the battlefield is desperate, as I said, and number two, the support that he has gotten up to now from the West, from the Europeans and from the Americans, is beginning to dry up in a serious way. So, he's desperate, and I think his political situation at home, I have no hard evidence for this, as I said, I think his political situation at home is increasingly in trouble. And I think he took this move uh to try to rectify the situation, but it backfired uh vis-à-vis the Poles.
Okay, let's return to Iran. Next question. Iran engaging in the April peace talks for the ceasefire was a mistake. But how did that saga affect the war dynamic? Furthermore, what will push Iran over the edge to acquire nuclear weapons? They seem reluctant, John.
You know, who knows for sure what's going to happen with the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons. Let's assume we get a ceasefire, uh, and uh, the Iranians are then negotiating the final terms of a deal with the United States. And the Iranians figure out that if they make a number of important concessions on the nuclear issue, in other words, they don't go near nuclear weapons, and they're willing to accommodate the United States on the whole subject of nuclear enrichment. But the quid pro quo is they get really good uh, really good terms on the whole subject of sanctions relief. In other words, the United States is really willing to give massive sanction relief if they play nice on the nuclear issue.
You can easily imagine the Iranians going along with that. Uh, and there are two reasons for doing that in addition to what I just said about sanctions relief. Furthermore, they control the Strait of Hormuz, which is kind of like controlling a nuclear weapon. It's not the exact equivalent, but uh, the fact that they will walk away controlling uh, the Strait of Hormuz works uh, to their advantage. Uh, and then furthermore, the Iranians surely understand that if they get serious about getting a nuclear weapon, they run the risk that the Israelis will launch a nuclear strike at them. And avoiding that has to be high up on their priority list. So, you can tell a story where once we get negotiations going, if the Iranians get a good overall deal, uh, they'll basically write off the nuclear option.
John, we're running out of time, but here's a good question. How does West Asia look like in 2030? In five years' time, will Iran become a regional hegemon? And how will its neighbors try to balance Iran? And that's a very good question, especially in light of uh, uncertainty about the American commitment to the Persian Gulf in the next 5 to 10 years. John?
>> Well, you want to remember that the Israelis are not going away, and American support for Israel is not going to disappear.
>> Oh, hang on. But even though there is a lot of uh, angst in America among younger Democrats and Republicans about that relationship between Washington and Israel, John?
>> There's no question about that. And one could argue there will be a reduction in the American uh, commitment to Israel. But nevertheless, Israel is going to remain a formidable power in addition to Iran and the story that you're telling. And furthermore, Turkey is a formidable power in the region. Uh, and if Iran really got powerful and started to throw its weight around, uh, the Iran, the Iraqis as well would balance against the Iranians. Remember, Iraq and Iran fought a war between 1980 and 1988 in the Middle East. So, there will be balancing forces. Uh, but I actually think if Iran were to get a really good economic deal, I think it could go a long way towards working out u, a modus vivendi with most of the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, uh, Qatar, Oman, maybe not the UAE, but I, they could work out a pretty good deal there.
>> And they could continue to flourish. Ish, you know, once they started flourishing, they're not flourishing now. They, they, they could, you know, create an economic situation where they were beginning to flourish and maintain that. And if that's the case, they have no incentive in using military force and throwing their weight around the region militarily and undermining uh, that improved economic situation. So I think it's possible that uh, Iran will not try to pursue regional hegemony uh, because it sees balancing forces there in Turkey, Iraq, Israel, even the United States, and therefore what it will do is try to work out a modus vivendi and uh, and get economically rich. And at the same time, by the way, Tom, the key for them is just to buy lots of ballistic missiles. If you're Iran, in fact, if you're Hezbollah, what you want to do moving forward is you want to buy huge numbers of ballistic missiles, buy lots of cruise missiles, develop sophisticated drones, because if there's anything we've learned over the past few years, uh, from watching the Ukraine war and watching especially what's going on in the Middle East, having lots of missiles and lots of drones, >> uh, gives you a really powerful punch militarily.
John, I've enjoyed this uh opportunity to put the questions from our viewers to you. I hope you did too.
>> I did. And the questions were excellent questions.
>> Very good questions.
>> They were almost as good as the questions you asked.
>> Oh, I know. Don't start. But listen, uh, we'll do it again. That was a lot of fun. Just finally, though, someday you'll be in Hong Kong, but President Trump turns 80. He's two years older than you, old boy. Uh, what do you make of his cognitive abilities? What do I make of what?
>> Just his mental state. He's turning 80. To what extent is age a problem for him? Just like it was for President Biden.
>> Well, I will tell you that in my opinion, he looks terrible these days. But there are two possible explanations, and they're not mutually exclusive, for why he looks terrible. One is, if you look at what's going on in the Middle East and even in Ukraine, but mainly in the Middle East, he probably has many sleepless nights. He's probably deeply frustrated. And I think that one could say that the reason he looks so terrible today uh, is because of what's going on on the international scene. And by the way, Tom, he's not only been unsuccessful uh, when it comes to uh, uh, the Iran war, he hasn't shut down the Ukraine war, he's caused all sorts of troubles in our relations with India. Uh, he has terrible relations with the Europeans. Uh, he's, you know, up to >> South Korea and Japan with the THAADs and whatnot.
>> Yeah. Yeah. He, so he has a lot of reasons from a strategic point of view to look haggard. But then there's the question of age. You know, I pay attention to this being 78 years old, and we watched what happened with Joe Biden.
>> Uh, one, and by the way, President Trump is just under tremendous pressure. I mean, this is, this is a killer job. Oh my goodness. And uh, when you're 80 years old, right, the wheels start falling off. Anybody who's in their late 70s or 80 or in their early 80s can tell you that. I've never met anybody in those uh, age ranges or in that age range who uh, denies that uh, you know, you're not the same when you're 80 as you are when you're 30 or 50 or even >>
We've got to go, and thanks to our viewers for your excellent questions. We'll do it again. Have a great time in Hong Kong. All the very best, John. Thanks so much, as always.
>> Thank you, Tom. It was a great pleasure being on the show.