David Petraeus on Ukraine, Iran, China - and the Next Global Conflict

The single most catastrophicly imaginable event would be something between the US and China. If you think of the US as the guy in the circus keeping a lot of plates spinning simultaneously together with allies and partners who help us in certain of these and the plates represent threats, challenges, issues on which we need to uh take the lead which we need to manage etc. And there's more of those threats and challenges. There's more plates in that tent than at any time since certainly the end of the Cold War, if not the end of World War II. But the plate that represents the US and Western relationship with China, that's bigger than all of the others put together. Uh, and we cannot let it even wobble.

General David Petraeus is a soldier scholar of extraordinary talent. Four-star Army general, battlefield commander, West Point graduate, PhD from Princeton, author of books on warfare, creator of counterinsurgency strategies and the surge in Iraq. He was famous for building relationships with local populations in war sites. After service in Iraq and Afghanistan, Petraeus became director of the CIA. He has held academic appointments at six universities. He is now an executive with a financial firm KKR. In 2023, Petraeus co-authored with historian Andrew Roberts Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Gaza.

It is a moment to consider a changing world as wars in Iran and Ukraine continue. The two most powerful leaders in the world meet in May in Beijing and the ongoing tension in different nations remains over cost of living issues. We will talk of many things including the wars in Ukraine and Iran, the competition between China and the United States, the threat of Russia to Europe, the ambition of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, changes in how wars are engaged, the impact of technology including artificial intelligence, and always the global economy and the cost of living. We will ask about qualities of leadership and the lessons of our time. John Petraeus, welcome back.

Good to be back, Charlie. Thanks. I have in my hands something that you will recognize. It is the paperback of conflict. Uh the book that you wrote with Andrew Andrew Roberts um the evolution of warfare from 1945 uh to Gaza. I want to start there because there are two hot wars still on. Um Iran and Ukraine. Where are they? What's happening?

Well, Ukraine uh given that I'm a supporter of Ukraine and strongly believe that the kind of aggression that Russia has pursued should not be rewarded uh is relatively heartening and encouraging uh because of the extraordinary innovation by Ukraine by its those who design the unmanned systems, those who manufacture them and those who employ them and the relationship among them which enables const constant improvements in software and hardware and then the manufacturing capacity expansion. Uh Ukraine now has an advantage over Russia on the front lines. Uh it's no longer as important that they are outnumbered five to one by the Russians, heavily outgunned in say artillery and traditional fighting systems because that's less relevant in an era in which right now the Ukrainians are inflicting over 90% of the casualties on the Russians with unmanned systems. Artillery can barely get in range now anymore because it's so threatened by this area. It's called the kill zone. It's at least 35 or so kilometers on either side of the front lines, which aren't lines anymore. There's no trenches because you can fly through trenches. There's not even fighting positions in the more rural areas because if you have a way to shoot out of a position, a drone can fly in. And so what's happened is the Ukrainians are now inflicting somewhere around 35,000 killed and seriously wounded on the Russians which is just a little bit less than actually what the Russians are able to recruit uh in a given month and that is a very very significant achievement as you would understand.

Beyond that, the Ukrainians really are the ones exercising the most initiative uh on the front lines. Uh they are actually achieving incremental gains to be sure uh but more incremental gains over the last two months than the Russians achieved. And there's the possibility that they could even craft a way of achieving greater gains if they can isolate certain areas of the battlefield as they have done at least once in an area around Bova. Uh beyond that, they're now expanding the range of their drones so that they're getting into the the an area beyond the front lines into the areas where the Russians in the past um really weren't that threatened and they can have their logistics trucks and resupply and all the rest of that go on without interdiction. And the Ukrainians are now interdicting that they may in fact be able to isolate the entire Crimea Peninsula by threatening what goes across the Kurt Straight Bridge from Russia to uh Crimea and then also interdicting the other route into Crimea which comes from the north in the from the southern part of Ukraine into northern Crimea. They're interdicting that route as well. And then finally, on a near nightly basis, they're carrying out very impressive attacks into the Russian Federation, hitting their oil depots, uh the storage locations, and also their refineries. At least 40% of those have now been hit. U by no means all destroyed and but damage uh to at least 40 of those. And that shows uh continued expansion of that threat uh by the Ukrainians against the the Russians. And of course they're threatened right into Moscow itself, critical infrastructure. And very significantly on the morning of the annual economic gathering that President Putin hosts in St. Petersburg, they actually blew up one of the storage locations there. It was quite a a site. uh it's on all the social media and again uh if you will punctuated the beginning of that particular gathering. So all of a sudden you're seeing the uh innovative capabilities of Ukraine manifest themselves in very heartening ways and at the same time you have the European Commission provide 90 billion euros to Ukraine that will probably solve their fiscal and economic challenges for at least a year year and a half. uh the expansion of the production of drones from three and a half million last year to 7 million this year uh and advances already now in autonomous systems as well. So in that regard that particular war has taken a turn uh for the better from the perspective of someone who strongly supports Ukraine uh and again very much does not want to see Russia prevail uh in that.

Why doesn't Vladimir Putin sue for peace?

Well, he may actually do that. I think you can foresee a time where the cumulative effect uh there's also it's obviously has a huge drag in their economy. Uh he's diverting the national welfare fund uh to be used by the military-industrial complex. Uh and again the you can see a moment where he may need a sessation of hostilities as much as or perhaps even more than um Ukraine does once the uh limits on oil exports are reimposed on Russia. We lifted those uh perhaps understandably about a worry about the price of Brent crude. So they're right now able to export much more oil than otherwise would be the case and at a higher price. Although the toll of the strikes on the Russian uh oil production, storage and refineries uh has limited uh how much uh of the benefit they're able to gain from that. So you can see a moment where he may indeed have to do that. uh and I've actually counseledled I've argued that that should be what we are all trying to achieve together as as much as a year ago when you could see various ways that we could help Ukraine. Ukraine will make advances on its own just as we have as I have just described and could bring that moment uh that possibility uh to reality.

My impression is that uh the Ukrainians offered this technology, drone technology to President Trump and he turned it down.

That's my understanding as well. Um and given how effective their counter drone technology is in in particular, they're knocking down probably about 95% of the the significant drone attacks. So there are these tactical attacks which are all up and down the battlefield. On a given day there's probably, you know, a thousand engagements by Ukrainian drones and the Russian and not quite the same number in the other direction, but just vast quantities of drones at the tactical level. But what we're talking about here are the ones that are coming in the night. The large the improved version of what Iran provided to Russia, Shahed drones. Uh they're faster. They have a bigger payload than what the Ukrainian the Iranians have and they are remotely piloted which is something the Iranians don't have because they don't have that communications arink uh they are taking down again about 95% it's a combination of very sophisticated sensors radars and acoustic sensors integrated into a highfidelity air picture common air picture that all can see and operate on. uh and then electronic warfare, some ve very targeted guns, other systems, but a lot of it is drone interceptors, the vast majority. I went out on a mission with a drone intercept team back in early February on a frigid night outside Kev. Uh and the skill of the pilots, the fidelity of the air picture uh and the rest of that all put together uh is really almost breathtaking. uh that those systems have been offered and are being used uh in the Gulf States. President Zullinski wisely made a visit there after the war with Iran started and it was clear that the Iranian drones were difficult for the Gulf States and for the US to contend with. Uh and they are working well. But you also are reminded that you need the other elements of the overarching comprehensive uh integrated ecosystem that enable the drone intercept teams. Uh but but I think it's something you've you've heard me before. I've said on your show before repeatedly uh that I felt that we should have learned much more rapidly and much more from what is going on in Ukraine. That is the future of war, not what's going on between Iran uh and the US and the Gulf States and Israel in the Middle East. There are drones there, but the numbers are nothing like that. All of them put together wouldn't equal half of one day's use of drones by the Ukrainians. They're using over 10,000 drones per day now on the Ukrainian side, and it's increasing.

Is it fair to say that the the future of warfare is changing in Ukraine today?

Very much so. And it has been really, Charlie. If you remember in the beginning it was traditional uh combined arms warfare, tanks, infantry uh infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, air defense, all the other elements uh that make up combined arms warfare. And although it was stopped around Keev, it did make progress in other areas. And in fact, the Ukrainians using combined arms warfare retook a fair amount of ground in the fall of that first year. Uh this secondyear offensive didn't go as well. But then now you've seen the introduction of unmanned systems and that literally is changing warfare as we know it. Combined arms cannot survive. Tanks can't survive on this battlefield. As I said, artillery can barely get in range in the death zone before they have to get back out or get under cover. Uh so it really is is almost all unmanned systems. Although in urban settings there are still a lot of direct fire engagements because it's more difficult obviously for drones to get in and operate. But in the more open more rural areas uh again it's very very hard for anything including a soldier uh to survive outside.

Is unmanned what we call autonomous?

Not yet. No. Right now the state-of-the-art is is largely remotely piloted unmanned systems but you can see already the beginning of the introduction of what we will call autonomous systems. So these are systems right now they can finish an engagement let's say so if the pilot gets to lock on a particular say an Iran a Russian drone uh they can intercept it the rest of the way on their own if that's necessary. There are some other systems that can also if the command and control link is broken can carry on the mission but based on the algorithm that is on board but within a year uh maybe even less we're going to see the introduction of sizable numbers of Ukrainian drones that have onboard uh computer capability in other and it's an algorithm that has been programmed uh and it will give the direction to the drone and you won't require uh a remote pilot anymore. And that is very very significant because then you can see the advent of swarms of drones, many many dozens or more of drones simultaneously coming at a target. And we really don't have a defense for that right now. All of the counter drone systems right now are largely individual. It's a gun taking down one. It's an interceptor taking down another uh electronic warfare can get some or at least break the link, but now that won't be effective.

By the way, we're seeing something in southern Lebanon that's proving very challenging for the Israeli Defense Forces and that is firsterson view. So, it's you have a goggle on goggles on and you're flying it and you're seeing what the drone sees. And these are often the suicide drones. They're one-way attack drones, but they have fiber optic cable spooling out the back and you obviously can't jam the command and control link then. And that's a real challenge. It's also a challenge on the battlefield in assuming came from the Iranians.

Absolutely. Yes. I'm pretty sure those were provided by the uh the Iranians. And again, it's not a capability Iran has been able to use in the war on the Gulf States or US or Israeli uh targets because the range is too far for that kind of fiber optic cable. It's probably best around 30 kilometers, maybe a bit longer than that. But obviously that the targets in Israel or in southern Lebanon are are well within range of that. And you've seen real problems for the Israelis in that regard.

Are they finding themselves more vulnerable than they imagined?

I I honestly don't know. I have not talked to them uh in in recent months uh about what they expected. Uh this does seem to be a bit unexpected though because in some cases they've not been able to deal with them. Um and again you've got to have a layered defense system. Uh and in this case uh it's going to have to be guns or there's various options that you have. You can even use the Ukrainians use drones with shotguns on them because again the area uh the pellets can take down a drone. You really need every possible and conceivable counter for this kind of warfare. Uh until we get to say high powered microwave which is coming but it has a short range. It's only 2 to 3 km. So, it's really a point defense system rather than an area defense, which is what most of the longer range air and ballistic missile defenses are.

So, the question is, if the United States becomes urgent about this, how long would it take this country to catch up?

Well, first, what we should do, and I think this is now taking place, Charlie, I mean, there's a huge sprint. Uh there's 55 billion in the defense budget just for the purchase of unmanned and autonomous systems. That's a huge quantity of money. Um, you know, the that's many many times order of magnitude uh what the entire cost of the production of the Ukrainian systems is noting that they're very very cheap but also very very effective in part because labor costs are very low uh in Ukraine. But so there's a lot of learning now going on from Ukraine. Uh there are some systems made in Ukraine that are now made in US, Poland and Taiwan. Eric Schmidt's system uh is among those. Um and but the key is to get it into the battlefield onto the battlefield in Ukraine. Because that is the state-of-the-art uh across the board when it comes to unmanned systems warfare. Uh so we can do that. Uh but unfortunately we were slow. The systems we introduced early in the war that were so exquisitely capable for the first few months or maybe even a half a year they were there, the Russians developed counters. So it's constant back and forth. And what a country needs to do now is not only have a sizable magazine, if you will, of of systems to use in the early weeks or months of a war, but if it's going to drag on for a period of time, you've got to have agility in your manufacturing so that you can make the software and hardware changes necessary uh to contend with the counters that are developed by the adversary.

So what's happening in the Iran war?

Well, we are in a little bit of a strategic culde-sac right now. Uh, and by that I mean that any route out of this has at least potential downsides. I think when we were last together I observed that uh it's paradoxical but possible that Iran could emerge from this war quite weakened militarily, quite degraded militarily. Again, the the 20,000 or so individual strikes have taken an enormous toll on Iran's military capabilities, though they still clearly do have drones and missiles, enough to cause problems uh for our bases, the Gulf States, and Israeli targets and fast boats on the straight of Hermuz. The fast boats have been problematic. You know, all the rest of their navies been sunk. Uh, but there still are these capabilities that are problematic and again the use of drones uh fast boats with heavy machine guns and so forth. And the challenge is um how can a deal be crafted that returns freedom of navigation to the Gulf and the straight of Hermuz without Iran having some kind of authority to charge tolls or navigation fees, whatever the title might be. And by the way, they're even now looking at imposing that on the uh cables that go along the bottom of the floor that carry that carry data and so forth. Um that how do we get that agreement? And then also though subsequently get agreement on the,000 lbs of 60% enriched uranium that's presumably buried under the rubble of one or more of the destroyed nuclear facilities of Iran. Uh how do you do with the mediumenriched uranium? Is there a right to enrich uranium for Iran in the future? What about Iran's support of proxies? And of course on our side, we're going to have to agree to uh lift some or all the sanctions uh on Iran, lift our blockade on their blockade, which prevents ships from going into or out of their ports, which dramatically obviously degrades their their economy. Um, but you know that it appears that the Iranians sense uh that President Trump has less staying power, if you will, than they do uh because they're not facing midterm elections. They're not worried about an affordability agenda. They're not worried about losing the House. All of these concerns that are legitimate, real uh and concerning uh understandably for the administration. Uh, and so this is the challenge. Um, how do you get out of this situation uh without some long-term undesirable uh element being present?

Well, it is said that the present regime, you know, after those who were killed in the air strikes is tougher uh more rigid than the previous regime.

That is the assessment. Um keep in mind that the new supreme leader is of course the son of the old supreme leader and we don't know how what condition he's in. We don't. He he the new supreme leader was wounded in the strike that initiated the campaign against Iran that killed his father, his mother, and his wife and again seriously wounded him. Uh the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leadership appears to be the uh the center of the new leadership together with the Supreme Leader and they he was always close to the IRGC and again they seem to be willing to tough it out longer and of course if their people don't like it and come out on the streets and and demonstrate um the Iranians know what to do about that.

They have a what you have just described what you have just described is a circumstance in which apparently the American president is more anxious for an agreement than the regime in Iran.

I think that is a correct excess assessment and I think it is their assessment. Um and you know the signals that have been sent um despite sometimes you know saying the opposite of of what appears to be the case um it appears that again the president very much needs this deal. Uh his party is anxious about getting it. Obviously the uh inflationary effects uh will accumulate more over time and there's an awareness reportedly by the administration that come one July if the strait hasn't been reopened and is really functioning again that's when you see the real issues set in with respect to the uh reduction in the global supply of crude oil uh and LNG to the point that some countries then will have to pursue what are called demand destruction uh policies. In other words, saying don't come to the office two or three days a week uh because we want to save the uh fuel that would be required for transportation.

Suppose there was an agreement tomorrow. How long would it take for uh there to be the kind of flow that would have an impact on oil prices?

Well, if there was an agreement, prices would come down uh pretty quickly in anticipation of where they might be anticipate because again, keep in mind these are prices of the future of of crude oil. So again, Brent Crude, West Texas Intermediate, but again, it will take weeks, months, uh, depending on the level of confidence of those who own these ships and the cargo on them. When I insurance company that's protecting them be because again this isn't I was it was explained to me by the CEOs of the two largest energy companies in the world that this is not about um the cost of risk insurance. Uh this is about lives of crews and until they're absolutely confident they're not going to uh begin the the full transit uh that we need to see again. So but it will then regardless it's going because again the strategic reserve releases they have largely been been completed uh around the world. Uh there's the reserves in various locations including the United States I'm told are the lowest in a quite a very long time. Uh and even though some oil is still getting out the Saudis are able to send as much as 7 and a half million barrels a day out through the Red Sea, the port of Yanbu. Amiradis can get 1.5 million out of the port they have on the Gulf of Oman at Fuera. Uh nonetheless now the cumulative effect of the reduction in supply uh of crude and LNG and and then all these other products Charlie again fertilizer many countries have already missed having the fertilizer they needed for the planting season um and and on and on you know helium of all things this big source of helium is the Gulf states that's what's used in the process I believe of etching microchips um and it just is not available elsewhere. So there's a lot of beyond just uh oil gas products of oil and gas even other uh commodities and goods and services that come out of the Gulf States uh have been very very heavily affected.

By the way, there's huge implications for the Gulf States out of this. I've been out there twice just in the last eight weeks or so and it is very clear they are already uh beginning the execution of actions to increase resilience in the future. Harden um reduce single points of failure. So increase redundancy uh take it underground new building codes uh not just the as well as the purchase of more and more comprehensive defenses and probably retaliatory capabilities but also initiatives to reduce the dependence on the straight of Hermoose. Uh so you'll see in fact the Amiradis already have a second pipeline that's nearly done to Fuera. You'll see other countries like Qatar, which by the way lost 17% of its LNG capacity uh to an Iranian strike for three to five years that's out. Uh they're going to have to run a pipeline very likely through Saudi Arabia and then down to Oman uh to have an alternative route out. And by the way, they just don't run a pipeline. They then have to have a liquefaction plant uh at the end of it at the port in order to load LG uh onto these huge LG carriers. But there's going to be innumerable uh initiatives like that and there will be countries that really benefit from this. Oman I think will be one of them. Uh and there may be some in the Gulf uh where again they were hoping to get a much bigger piece of the so-called India M East Europe corridor uh effort that is ongoing may not benefit quite as much from that.

Did I read somewhere that the Iranians have hit the UAE more than they have hit Israel with drones?

That's likely. Yes. Uh yes, I think they they've been hit more than all the other Gulf States put together and I think more than uh the Israeli Defense Forces as well.

You served as as the director of the CIA. You love the CIA. Um, were they aware of what the Iranians might do and did they advise the president and was he clearly aware that this is a possibility?

Yeah, my understanding is that the the answer to that is yes. Uh and in fact it is publicly known uh it's been reported that the senior director for Iran for the national security council staff quit uh partly because uh he didn't feel that uh people were listening sufficiently at least that is what has been reported look I mean we've long always known that one of the reactions by the Iranians to this kind of uh campaign would be to close uh the straight of her moose Sometimes that's dismissed a bit because it would mean that they would uh suffer pain as well. Although keep in mind that their ships were still going out of the Gulf uh until we put the blockade on them uh on the transit into and out of their ports. Uh so again, it's always been there. The question is how carefully did people listen to it? Did they take it seriously or tend to dismiss it? And that those questions I obviously can't just don't know.

I mean the other part of that question did the Iranians were they aware of of what a powerful weapon it was to have control over the straight of Harmuz?

Some are even saying it's it's it's more important than having a nuclear weapon. It it will have potentially a significant deterrent power in the future in the way that threatening to use a nuclear weapon uh might as well. Uh although we've seen obviously a number of wars over the years which include participants that have nuclear weapons where the war takes place below the nuclear threshold including the war in Ukraine. And although Putin threatened at various times to use tactical nuclear weapons, the minute that President Xi of China and Prime Minister Modi of India publicly said he shouldn't even think about that, that threat I think really was uh enormously reduced. Uh so this threat to close the straight when reopened could be something that gives a degree of leverage to Iran. But of course you have to see what the condition of Iran is at that point in time as well. I mean their employment unemployment as a result of this has been staggering. Uh they also have massive problems already with mismanagement of water to the point that they were considering telling two or three million people to leave Thrron because they can't provide them with water. They have so many challenges uh many before this started and yet they do seem to have a degree of resilience uh that is less manifest uh in say arguably the United States.

Do we know who's running Iran?

The thinking, Charlie, is that it is the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps with the Supreme Leader. Not clear who is the primary uh and who is the not primary in this case. Um, but it is very clearly the IRGC uh that has moved into the most significant role uh and together again with this new supreme leader.

Is the cleric are the clerics still a power base?

Yes. Uh they are but again the IRGC more so now I would contend than uh the clerical side of things. Is noting that of course the Supreme Leader is a cleric.

Is the United States strategically overextended?

I don't know that I would say that, Charlie. I I I mean, what is clear um because again, we're not engaged in the war in Ukraine. We have been supporting it uh pretty substantially, but the Europeans have very much stepped up in that regard as we have drawn back. Um and you know we have a modest number of forces in the Gulf. Yes. To be sure there's a very substantial part of our uh aircraft carrier task force uh assets and some other very select assets. But it's again, look, when I was commanding central command, Charlie, we had 250,000 uh soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and another 250,000 contractors, which is many, many orders of magnitude larger than what we have out there right now.

How about our stockpile of weapons?

That's what I was just about to say. What we have done is used up a substantial proportion of our most high-end ballistic missile interceptors. Patriot SM23 uh the shiporn version and a very substantial number of our most exquisite uh submarine launched, ship launched and air launched cruise missiles uh among others. So there is a huge effort ongoing in the defense industry. Remember, President Trump rightly called all the major uh corporation leaders together at the White House uh talked about the need to dramatically increase production of these systems. There will be huge sums in the defense budget for this. Uh that together with the purchase again of huge numbers of unmanned systems, some remotely piloted, some autonomous. Um so again and some of that would be very very valuable uh in a contingency in the Indo-Pacific keeping in mind that the most important mission of the US military together with our allies in Japan, Philippines, Australia uh is to ensure deterrence is solid in that region. Deterrence rests on two elements. Of course, it's the potential adversar's assessment of your capabilities on the one hand and your willingness to use them on the other. And obviously, our capabilities in certain of these categories um have been reduced, although our leadership has reassured us that we have enough to do what we need to do out there. But, but again, you always want to have more. Uh needless to say and then there's a little bit of concern about the statement by the president on the plane on the way home from the summit with President Xi uh which indicated that the pending arm sale huge arm sale to Taiwan uh might be used as a bargaining ship in some fashion.

Now understand which is a break with tradition of every previous president. Yes. And again, this is always a very tricky, very sensitive subject, needless to say, because we have a policy deliberately of strategic ambiguity. Right. Um, but you'll recall that President Biden, for example, on four occasions said, "Of course, we'll support Taiwan." And then Jake Sullivan, his national security adviser, would rush out and say, "There's no policy to our policy of strategic ambiguity uh in our commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act and this, this, and this." Uh so we have to be very careful there and I I think that that there is that sensitivity uh to that. Uh but but again given the elements on which deterrence rests we also need to transform our capabilities more rapidly in light of what has happened in Ukraine in light of what has happened uh in the Gulf as well.

Is it possible that she looked at what happened in Ukraine, uh, what you described in early in this conversation, and says, "I'm not so sure I want to rush into Taiwan."

I think that could be uh, one possibility. Uh, it depends though, I think, on how much the Chinese have been acting on the lessons of Ukraine. Uh keeping in mind that again the overall lesson is that a massive number of small unmanned systems can cause massive problems for a small number of uh large platforms heavily manned exquisitly capable but getting pushed further and further back uh say in the Pacific. Uh if they have acted on this aggressively that could give a degree of of confidence depending of course what's going on in Taiwan what's going on uh in the region uh the manufacturing capacities of China certainly would indicate that they could act on this kind of insight they have been supporting Russia very aggressively with the components needed for its uh military-industrial complex But on the other hand, Charlie, keep in mind that the Chinese military hasn't even fought, hasn't even been in war since 1979, and that didn't go that well against Vietnam, the newly independent Vietnam. Uh and beyond that, uh, they've just gone through a period in which almost all of their senior leaders have been been fired. A very substantial number of the most.

Do you know why they were fired?

It appears to be uh a combination of factors, Charlie. Uh concern about corruption, which has just been endemic, of course, in a variety of different ways throughout the system um and malfeasants and then also perhaps um some indicators of a degree of lack of complete loyalty. Uh and of course what President Xi has done more than any Chinese leader since Mao at least has been to consolidate power in an unprecedented manner. The the the elements of other factions within the Chinese Communist Party have all been eliminated. Uh you know the one the most unceremonious was um one of his predecessors was ushered off the stage at the big gathering in Beijing. Uh so it's it's a number of the all of the above. But what that means is that you have new leaders who have not been in their positions that long. There's a reintroduction of the party uh influence in a way that they haven't had for some time. Uh, and it has to give question. It has to generate u worries I would think about how it would perform. And of course they still even h haven't fully consolidated uh their Goldwater nickels reforms if you will. In other words, going joint uh creating different command structures, regional uh commands and so forth along the lines of what we did uh all the way back before operation desert storms several dec number of decades ago.

Xiinping also early on mentioned the theidities trap. explain to us what that is and why it's his sense of the moment in the relationship between America and China.

Yeah. The Thusidities trap really comes from Graham Ellison's uh professor at Harvard. Professor Harvard um and big mentor frankly of mine and and friend and so forth. The Chinese leaders are very much seized by this book. Um and Graham Ellison has made a number of trips over there. Uh the title of the book was destined for war without a question mark. Um uh can China and the United States avoid the Thusidities trap which again refers back to uh a time in the Palpeneisian wars when uh the rise of Athens as a power um threatened the existing power uh Sparta uh and they went to war. It was inevitably uh they fought that uh again there had to be action taken against this rising power before it got so big uh that the uh the existing power could could no longer deal with it. Uh and and of course there were I think it was 15 different historical case studies of previous examples um to butress this the argument that he had. Uh although to be fair none of those were in the nuclear age uh and some other modern uh developments that might call that particular historical inquiry a bit into question. But the bottom line is that he raised it um and he's aware of it and he's aware of the dynamics between the rising power in this case China uh the existing power uh the United States. Uh and look we do need to be concerned uh obviously the worst development in the world for the economy would be for the number one and two economies of the world uh to go to war. We have to ensure that crisis doesn't turn into actual conflict. And that's why frankly the kinds of summits the one that was held in December in Busan, Korea, the one that was just held in Beijing are very important. We do need to talk. Yes, this is a fierce competition uh severe competition actually in the world words of Jake Sullivan and former national security adviser. But we have to make sure that competition again doesn't ever erupt into actual conflict. In my view, the way to do that is to ensure that the elements of deterrence are rock solid, noting that we should never do something uh that is needlessly provocative. Um but uh we have it's a very very sensitive relationship and issue. talking is good. Even though frankly the most recent of those summits uh did not result in um anything particularly hu hugely significant. The really big issue the US access to strategic minerals has not yet been resolved beyond the agreement that lapses in November. Yes, they're going to buy some more Boeing aircraft. um some of our agricultural products we have not uh really resolved whether we'll allow access to the most high-end chips. So the big issues in the relationship are still to be resolved but there will be another uh summit here in the United States in the months that lie ahead.

The reason that I asked this question I is clearly whether Xi Jinping sees China at a state of parody uh with the United States. Uh and secondly, is there any possibility of miscalculation on either part on the part of the United States or on the part of China of each other?

Well, there's always that possibility, Charlie. Um, I don't think on the US side that it would lead to conflict. Um, but certainly it's possible uh especially again with the rising power um that believes that it is actually achieved advantages. Again, it has igopolistic or monopolistic power over some critical um sectors of the global economy. Strategics, rare earth minerals, magnets. Remember when the response by China to the 156% tariffs was, "Okay, we're going to stop the sale of magnets, uh, the automakers all came to Washington in a panic and said, "Without magnets, we can't make cars."

I know. I see. I It shows you how stupid I am mechanically. I had no idea that they use magnets in cars.

Welcome to the 21st century, Charlie. Um but also the same is true of a variety of other um elements that we buy from from China including much of the battery technology, solar panels, uh again you name it. There are numerous areas in which they have gained enormous leverage over sectors including again in some cases arguably monopolistic if not igopolistic uh power.

Which leads me to the the so-called race um of artificial intelligence and how the Chinese and the Americans may be approaching it differently in terms of what they emphasize and in terms of the direction they're taking.

Well, I think as a general um assessment, it's correct to observe that the US is a generation ahead of China when it comes to artificial intelligence, large language model power. But then you have to remind yourself that a generation in AI could be as little as nine months or even less. In fact, when I asked the leadership of Anthropic at the Aspen Ideas at a small gathering during the Aspen Ideas Festival last summer, um I asked them to to give me in layman's terms where we are with LLMs. And they said, well, the current large language model is about the level of a great graduate student, but within 9 to 12 months, it will be at the level of a great PhD, and nine months or so from there, it'll be at the level of a Nobel laureette. Well, they're already at the level of a great PhD. All of them generally are. You know, Claude, the latest version is really extraordinary. Uh the same is true of the other LLMs that are comparable. And in fact, Anthropit had Mythos, which is this unbelievably powerful uh AI LLM that can find zero day deficiencies that eluded human uh exploration for them for decades. You could break down the security system that powerhouses had uh of all kinds of systems that perform essential functions in the daily life of Americans. It's another tool to do that. Again, there are various other capabilities obviously already in existence. This puts that on steroids. And oh by the way, wait until we get quantum computing or even near quantum uh when you can crack uh something that is encoded uh is encrypted and you can crack that uh in a matter of hours or perhaps even minutes uh when it used to take by brute force many many months and all the capacity that say the National Security Agency or some other comparable organization uh could provide.

Right. So tell me this. Do you fear nuclear more? Or how would he rank them? Nuclear, biology, climate, or technology?

Well, I think the breakthroughs in technology are going to be extraordinary. Um again, nine months or less from now, we're going to see LLMs that have the power of a Nobel laurette. There still will be obviously certain capabilities that only humans truly have. Uh Fed Zakario gave a great speech on this uh in one of his commencement addresses at Bard College. Yes, exactly. Noting that of when he mentioned AI of course the groans and and jers what pie did is he talked about human intelligence not artificial intelligence that's exactly right although he had to say artificial intelligence first and then get the booze out of the way and now let's talk about which is a reference to the fact that whenever anybody mentions artificial intelligent well not everybody when they mention artificial intelligence in commencement addresses the students boo them. Yes. Exactly right. Yep. So, but so obviously that's a concern. Um I mean nuclear weapons, we have managed to live with those since the actual only uses in warfare which of course brought to a close the Pacific theater in World War II when the US used them on Japan. Uh the biological is also very very worrisome. Ebola is m exactly right. Um and it seems to have a strain that's less susceptible to the existing uh drugs and so forth. Um so how do you choose between these Charlie? Uh I'm just not sure how you do that. I think and we can all see the impact of climate and you see that as well. I you know that is increasingly uh evident but it will take longer. I mean, I I think the cataclysmic event that could result from these other three in the near term, unless you're in the eye of a hurricane or something like that, that is much more frequent now than it used to be. The storm of the century is now every other year. But all of these are again hugely worrisome. Um and of course in some cases we have yet to determine um whether and how we should regulate. Uh there are certain regimes that we have had at least when it came to nuclear weapons although many of some of these are gone to be sure uh the arms limitations talks and so forth but we're still in early days with AI um and nobody wants to lose the AI edge uh so we don't want to overregulate it um and yet who knows where that leaves Uh so look Charlie, there's a lot of things about which we all should be worried. Um some we should worry about more when we reach our station in life than others. Um but I think everyone has to keep that in perspective.

I take no pride in this question because I'm stealing left and right. Um what is it you worry about in the middle of the night when you wake up?

I think it comes back to it's all China all the time. Uh again, the single most catastrophicly imaginable event would be something between the US and China. If you think of the US as the guy in the circus keeping a lot of plates spinning simultaneously together with allies and partners who help us in certain of these and the plates represent threats, challenges, issues on which we need to uh take the lead which we need to manage etc. And there's more of those threats and challenges. There's more plates in that tent than at any time since certainly the end of the Cold War if not the end of World War II. But the plate that represents the US and Western relationship with China, that's bigger than all of the others put together. Uh, and we cannot let it even wobble.

What do you think, Xi Jinping? What's his goal?

Obviously, it's Taiwan. Well, he wants reunification. It's his last bucket list item. And what we need to do is make sure that every morning when he gets up in Beijing and looks wisfully out there and says, you know, I dealt with Hong Kong, the weaguers, Shenhan, Tibet, but that's my last goal that he concludes not today. And that's what we need to do with deterrence and it's the most important mission of our US military.

And if you were giving advice to uh the president, the secretary of defense, what would you be advising them?

Well, first and foremost is to make sure that the elements of deterrence there are rock solid. Part of ensuring that is to learn much more rapidly and much more from what is going on in Ukraine and to try to be at the cutting edge of those developments just as is Ukraine uh with all the capacity that we can bring to bear.

Thank you so much. It's all pleasure and I I have a a thousand other questions. I appreciate your time and we'll do it again.

Charlie, always great to be with you. Thank you. Bye. Join me. Become a subscriber to Charlie Rose Global Conversations and make it a better experience. Click this link to subscribe.