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Well, one of the first things I did, I opened a checking account and I was 12 years old. I have never been a company director. In school, studying engineering, well, I didn't know how to read balance sheets or financial statements. I went down there with the sales team and told them, "Go out to the market tomorrow 20% up." Then I went to negotiate with him and got him to pay in advance with the order and a 10% discount. Then the discount was very well received. Then they came to see me that we had to make the difference between Israel and Malboro very high. I sent them flying. No, man. I made a change there with Televisa for Air Time. No, no, no. That year we beat Malboro, I think by 300 points. He told me they were going to buy us and that it was worth nothing because Malboro was theirs. Well, what do you think I did? I raised the price of Malboro by 20%. We are going to squeeze Malboro and its market share will fall. They took three months to return. >> Carlos Slim is one of the most influential figures in the business history of Mexico and the world. A civil engineer from UNAM, architect of Grupo Carso and América Móvil, and a tireless philanthropist through the Carlos Slim Foundation. Over more than six decades, he has demonstrated that it is possible to build in adversity, grow in crises, and multiply opportunities for millions of people. But beyond his role as a global businessman, Carlos Slim is also a son, father, grandfather, and patriarch of a family that has made values and unity its greatest strength. >> What I thought was that it was better to have 10 businesses of A one than one of A10. >> The Telmex venture, well, it was on another level. Tell me a little about the rationale behind pursuing this opportunity. >> Look, I honestly didn't feel like getting into it. That's when the 95 crisis came and the market got complicated. Then it was when we decided to make Telcel amigo, we subsidized the phones to sell cards. When we started in Mexico, mobile telephony had 30,000 or 35,000 customers. In mobile telephony, we agreed that in 3 years it would go from 200,000 phones, to 230,000, and we reached 85,000, right? I think we are around 82 million phones now. The good thing we did at Telmex was that we separated Telcel from Telmex so they would be competitors, because it was classic that they tried to make cellular not work because it would affect the other, right? We made them compete, both of them. >> Hello and welcome to a new episode of Cracks Podcast. I am Yoso Trava and I interview the brightest minds every week to leave you with something unique and practical that you can use in your daily life. Today I have a special interview, today I have a special forum. Today I have an interview that I celebrate because I have been pursuing it for years and today it will probably be one of the interviews that marks a milestone in Cracks Podcast and I hope it also marks a milestone in your own life. The lessons I will share today, or rather, the ones my guest will share, are lessons from a life of entrepreneurship, construction, values, and above all, legacy. Today I have engineer Carlos Slim as my guest. Today we will not only talk about business or current events, but about principles, learnings, mistakes, and successes that have marked his life and a legacy that transcends numbers to be etched in history. This is the first part of an interview divided into two episodes, so I hope you enjoy this very special conversation with engineer Carlos Slim. Engineer, welcome to Cracks Podcast. Thank you for receiving me in your office. No, thank you, thank you for coming, for being here, and for all the work you are supposed to have done, because you told me you were going to work. >> We work a lot. I've had to sit with you in several situations and have you give me a good dressing down. Yes. Well, the last one was in >> I'll tell you, the last one was after Mexico Siglo XXI, the last one we were talking about at the Soumaya and you asked me >> two weeks ago, >> two weeks ago. That was the last one, and you asked me how many times Imbursa's share capital had multiplied since its founding 60 years ago. Transcendent. >> But well, that was a detail that >> no. What happens is that we are going to complete 60 years on the next, uh, December 1st. You are invited. >> Thank you very much. And we are going to talk about >> 60 years that went by very quickly >> that great history. Uh, but, well, something that has become very clear to me over the time I've studied you, known you, consumed your press conferences, and so on, is that you have a great facility with numbers, and you don't just apply it to business. That photo of the questions you asked me, if you are good with numbers, as if you were hesitant, but well, you apply it to one of your great passions, baseball. Who, in your opinion, is the best or the two or three best baseball players in history? >> Look, uh, baseball lends itself very well to numbers, because there are numbers for everything, right? Uh, for pitchers, strikes, this, that, that. There's a lot for everyone. Uh, but I also like to take it and look at it in athletics, to see, for example, that there is already a person who, after all these athletics tests and competitions, even though there was a car ahead and they were a bit protected, which helped him >> uh, ran it in less than 2 hours and 42 minutes. But on the other hand, there are the ultramarathons, in which the Tarahumaras were very important. We sponsored a 100-mile race in Los Angeles many years ago, and the Tarahumaras were wearing their, their, uh, Nike shoes. Nike was the sponsor. Uh, one of the three who was running got lost, went back to find the path, and still won. This was an example of how the Tarahumaras, who are so accustomed to this, are, uh, unbeatable or were unbeatable in that sense, right? There is a book called "Born to Run," which by the way is very good. It's been, I think, 15 or 20 years, I don't know how old the book is, and it mentions the Tarahumaras. I read it in preparation for my first and only marathon, which I ran in 2023. Yes. >> Where did you run it? >> In Chicago. >> Did you do 3 hours 10 or >> no? No, a little more. More like 4:09, >> but it's something I never thought I would do in my life, so it's checked off the list. >> Well, very good, >> engineer. Well, beyond >> you were saying about baseball. about baseball. Exactly. >> In baseball, uh, one would have to differentiate between pitchers and batters. Uh, fielding is more difficult, but in the case of pitchers, those from many years ago, those from over 100 years ago, they were accustomed not only to finishing games but to playing many games in a season. They used to win 40 games, and well, the one who played the most games was Cy Young, uh, but I would say there are two great ones there, no, three great excellent pitchers, and uh, Mathewson, this Johnson, uh, Satchel Paige from the Negro Leagues. Satchel Paige was fantastic, an extraordinary character who would sometimes, uh, pitch the first few innings without fielders and put on shows to attract attention. And among the batters, among the batting players, excuse me, and in pitching, one cannot forget Nolan Ryan, who has many strikeouts, which is another part, it's no longer about how many games he won or how he won, but that he was a great pitcher who, after 27 years of pitching, had more than nine strikeouts per game, which is a record. Only four pitchers, as I recall, have pitched more than nine, uh, strikeouts, have had more than nine strikeouts per game, which is an extraordinary record. Randy Johnson was surpassing him, he was at 9.5, close to 10, I don't know, I don't remember how Randy Johnson finished, but he has been a great pitcher and relatively recently. And among the batters, well, without a doubt, Babe Ruth, uh, as a batter, looking at it from an integral point of view, uh, from a batting point of view, Ty Cobb and Rogers Hornsby, and of course, there are many who later became a bit complicated, right? Ted Williams, uh, of course, Lou Gehrig, uh, the one who didn't have a great number of home runs, uh, hit many home runs, but played few years, who has an unbeatable record is Joe DiMaggio. Joe DiMaggio hit in 56 consecutive games. That's a record they haven't come close to. They've reached 44, but for 56 consecutive games, he hit. There was an interruption, and then he reached 71 or 72 games with that interruption. No, the interruption wasn't necessary. And the curious thing is that it was a very special year, it was 1941, in which Ted Williams batted .460, which before Ted Williams, many had batted over .400, well, not many, several. And in 1941, he batted .406. However, Joe DiMaggio played in 56 games, hitting. So, Joe DiMaggio received the recognition, not Ted Williams. The record of 56 consecutive games with a hit is more difficult than batting .400, but since 1941, no one has batted .400 or even come close. They don't bat .320. It's incredible that the new players bat so little. However, they are hitting more home runs. >> Engineer, this interest in numbers manifested at a very young age and largely due to your father. What can you tell me about your relationship with your father? >> Excellent. Fortunately, I had excellent parents, excellent, because from a young age I sought freedom. I had a lot of trouble with, uh, uh, any kind of restricted measures and things like that. We lived in a park in La Condesa, we lived across from Parque México, and from the age of 5 or 6, I would go out to the park alone, right? Not to mention. Later, later, we moved to Polanco when I was 7 years old, right? Almost 8. So, those first years, several of my siblings and I were in a very small school that was two blocks from the house, which was customary back then, that we would study in the nearest school, right? That school was on the corner of Sonora and Avenida México. We lived at Avenida México 51, a few meters away, right? So I studied kindergarten there, I remember kindergarten, how we studied it, where we studied it, what they gave us. Then first, second, and my father, I suppose, wanting to give us all a better academic education. My siblings were not in that school, they were already in another school. He enrolled us and put us in a school that was the English school for boys, which was on the corner of what is now Reforma. A school in those large old mansions where there were 60 or 50 of us in the class, very strict teachers, but above all, we were semi-boarders and you couldn't talk at meals. So, all those kinds of things were irrational and unacceptable to me. I was 8 years old. So, well, I returned after about 8 or 10 days to tell my father and mother that I couldn't stand that school, that I couldn't do it, and my father had the intelligence to send me back to kindergarten. He had already paid, he had considered, surely he asked which was the best school, they told him that one, he enrolled us and everything, and when he saw that it affected my character, my personality, my life, that I totally rejected it, he sent me back to my school. So, to show you the magnitude or the formula, not the formula, the way of thinking more about forming us than the academic part. The academic part at that time, moreover, was very strict and rational, it had a military and religious origin, I think. So, the education of that era was about memorizing, not reasoning. It was about discipline, about not arguing what was said, not giving opinions, etc., etc. It was a very rigid education, let's say, right? What influence do you think it had on you, and mainly on your non-academic, but human formation, which is what you just mentioned, but more entrepreneurial, because I know that from a very young age he started teaching you how the business world worked. >> Rather, it was that my father, in a very intelligent way, I say, thought about our formation. For him, school was important and that we go to school, etc., but the most important thing was formation, and that included what I said a while ago, principles and values. Those were, uh, uh, like unmovable, they were firm. So, from that point of view, I think it was very clear that he was more concerned about our formation than about academic learning, right? Or about grades. I don't know if he ever saw grades, but it wasn't a concern, but rather formation. So, uh, that's on one hand, on the side you're talking about, about, uh, teaching us to work, yes, there was obviously, in that sense, he was more concerned about that than about the academic itself, right? So, uh, my father arrived in Mexico at the age of 15, he went to work in Tampico, his brothers were there. They all worked in a stall in the market, in a market in Tampico, where, by the way, there was a very important figure, I don't remember his name now, who arrived very early at the market, who seemed to own the market, and told him, "Come on, wake up, get to work, it's time." So, it was hard work, a hot climate, and at night he would go to school to try to learn, uh, to read, to learn Spanish. It was very difficult because at that time it was from Arabic to Spanish, it was the Ottoman Empire, right? Later, from 1918, when the Turks were defeated in World War I, it became a French protectorate. So, Arabic and French were spoken, right? But that was after '18. My father arrived in Mexico in 1902. So, there, the formation was very hard work. Later, he came with his brothers to Mexico City. I don't know if in 1904, 1906. Very quickly, very quickly. He was there, I think, a maximum of 2 or 4 years. And there was the Volador market, I don't know if you've heard of it. >> Okay. >> The Volador market, obviously I didn't know it. It was a market that was where the Supreme Court is now, towards the National Palace. There was a very important market. Uh, two blocks ahead, there was another market for perishables, for vegetables, for seeds, this, that, that came from La Viga, came by boat, etc., etc. Before this, uh, before the Volador market, or I don't know if it was contemporary at some point, there was the Parián market. That market, the Parián, was in the Zócalo. In the Zócalo. There is an excellent painting in a history book of Mexico City written by Fernando Benítez, in which he beautifully describes the painting, uh, uh, and in that place, Fernando Benítez says that the indigenous women sold perishables, they sat down and didn't move, they stayed there, selling perishables, Fernando said. No, there is the viceroy arriving, who is going to the cathedral and everything, and the people didn't even notice, according to the painting, they didn't notice what was happening, they continued to buy and sell things. So, in that market, my father had a stall, he took a stall, I think around 1906. In '11, uh, the older brother had savings, and they agreed and opened the business. It was called La Estrella de Oriente (The Star of the East). It's a business that is already large. It's a large business that basically sells wholesale and semi-wholesale, and they kept the stall in the market, which was something, I think, very intelligent because there they sold retail, they sold what was sold, they had better purchase prices, and well, that was, I think, a very important decision to have kept the two commercial stalls they had there. And this opened this large business. That was in 1911, May 19th. And in '14, my uncle, I think he no longer wanted to continue in the business, and he sold it to my father. They had invested 11,000, 11,000 pesos. He sold it to him for 30,000 pesos. If you are an entrepreneur, director, or leader in a company, this interests you. From October 15th to 17th, Business Masters Live returns to Mexico City, the event that is transforming the way entrepreneurs in Mexico build and scale their businesses. For the third consecutive year, more than 20 mentors will be face-to-face with you for three intense and immersive days. 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Spots are running out. October 15th to 17th, CDMX. We are just a few days away from this great event, and spots are running out. The VIP, in fact, is practically sold out. So take action, contact my team, and see you at Business Masters Live. >> So, he tripled it in 3 years. My father bought it for 15,500 pesos per month, and honestly, it's striking how, in the midst of war, my father, who was 26 years old at the time, bought it from his brother. This was in 1914, World War I began in 1914 and ended in '18. Victoriano Huerta came to power, because after the assassination and execution of Madero, Victoriano Huerta took power, there was great national pressure against him from all sides, and in 1914 they made him leave. He left because he couldn't withstand the military movements, and Carranza arrived in Mexico with Obregón, took the National Palace, and suddenly they knew Zapata and Villa were coming, and they went to Veracruz. So, all that was happening. I imagine my father in 1914 seeing all that pass by and making the investment to buy it from his brother, right? So, it's like, he didn't have family here, well, he had his brothers. So, he had already fallen in love with Mexico. In a letter he wrote to my brothers in 1953, he states that upon arriving in Mexico, he arrived in Veracruz. It was a journey from the Lebanese mountains. From the Lebanese mountains, down to Beirut, from Beirut, I don't know where, he took the ship, then I don't know where the other ship stopped, arriving in Mexico, in Veracruz. And he says that more than the pleasure of having arrived in Mexico to see his brothers or even to do business or make money, to work, what had enchanted him most in this country he had arrived in was the great freedom, especially religious freedom. It was the golden age of Porfirio Díaz. The golden age of Porfirio Díaz, I think it was from around 1890 to 1908, no, '06, I don't know when, right? We know he left in May of '11. So, I would say that my father worked very intensely there, and for some reason that I have studied and pondered, I think to get the lesson, he closed it in August 1929. The crisis was very strong in October when the markets crashed. He closed in August '29. The business was a large, very large business, which worked very intensely. There is a regulation he has, etc., etc. And he closed it. Later, he became a member of the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce. At that time, the Great Depression came. '30, '31, '32, '33, '34. In '34, it's said that it eased a bit with Roosevelt's plans, but by '36, '37, the depression was back. That depression lasted a long time. Many say it was resolved by the World War, because the World War brought about a huge change, and after the war, there was very important growth. So, in the 40s, my father decided to open a store to teach us to work, but the three men, no, not me or anything, it was for the three men. So, I would go there to see, when I was 6 or 7 years old, 6 years old, to see him work, I wasn't going to be serving customers, they hadn't paid attention to me, but he took me there, right? So, all that was interesting. >> Now, you lost your father when you were very, very young, 13 years old. >> How did it affect you? How did it shape you? How did it make you become the person who later built what you have built? Look, I had a very positive childhood with my parents, as I was saying, to have a little cry there and have them change my school, that's like, I don't know, it was something that is not easy for a father to do, for parents to do, that after they put you in a school to get a better education and to learn more and so on, to take you to another school. No, that was, in my opinion, a very intelligent decision by my parents. Then, for example, we moved there to the Polanco park across the street. We still have the house there. >> I've seen it. >> Well, right across from there, my father would sometimes see us playing baseball and he would take his walk and wouldn't interrupt the baseball or anything. It was the friends from Edgar Poy's building, the Goldsmiths', and Emilio Castelar's, and so on, and we would get together to play baseball. I was one of the younger kids, perhaps the youngest along with another, there were about 15 or 20 of us, I don't know how many. So, look, another thing my father did, uh, my brother and I, who were the ones who played, there were three of us, the older one than me and me, uh, we played baseball there, this, and they would go to Cuernavaca. My father, during Easter week, for example, would let us, he would let us stay in Mexico to play with our friends. He would let us have the car, but he would let us stay in Mexico. He felt it was more formative because he saw that what we were doing, playing in the park, was healthy, so he let us stay to play. What I'm saying is that these were very, uh, astute, formative decisions by my father, how he, uh, not strictly, "Come on, you have to do this and you have to do that and so on." Although in some things there was firmness, of course, right? So, the early years were, well, very easy, right? Very pleasant, uh, a lot of freedom, etc., etc. And when he passed away, it affected me greatly. I didn't go to the movies for two years, I practically didn't go out, I went to school, but in the end, one has to overcome it and become stronger. So, I often mention it here in the letter, crises force you to be stronger. So, after I finished high school, fortunately, I went to the UNAM preparatory school in San Ildefonso. Everything changed then, right? I made new friends again, there were all sorts of classmates, there were many more women. The other was a boys' school. So, it was a change at 15, 16, a significant change after 2 years, and then, uh, all the, how should I say? I had already learned many things from my father, right? For example, he made us keep a notebook to track our Sundays and expenses. Or he entrusted me with keeping a copy of some receipts for some properties of my father, some rental properties, I had to keep track of receipts. So, I think he paid me 20 or 25 pesos a month for doing it, and since I crossed things out a lot, he would tell me, Carlos, you have to do this promptly, without crossing things out, and your pay will be deducted. I had that. I must have been 12 years old. And around that time, at the same age, you started investing your own money. >> Before, how did it start? Well, I used to go to the store, right? To the store, uh, I think I saw it there, right? I realized that there was merchandise, there was, for example, of all the merchandise, there was a sample. There was a code to know how much each thing was worth, right? So, there was a code, and that's how it was seen, right? Well, this costs this much or it cost that much. So, things like that. Uh, then, unfortunately, I think it hurt my father, as he already had diabetes, he had to close the business. He closed the business, he put the merchandise away, it was his property, the building was very large, he left everything there in the warehouse, and about 3 years later, in '52, I think he closed around '50, '49 or something like that, one of the stores caught fire. They had a hardware store, it was September, so they had fireworks and things for September, and a section caught fire, something happened in the store, and boom, the fire opened up terribly. And all of my father's merchandise burned. And unfortunately, the owner of the store died because she went to try to put out the fire and the fire caught her. So, my brother and I were working there, we were organizing things, there was another person in charge, uh, that type of thing, I learned, but I had my Sundays, I had holidays or birthdays, there were monetary gifts. So, uh, one of the first things I did was, uh, I opened a checking account and I was 12 years old. So, uh, >> Your initiative. Yes, of course. Uh, well, uh, my mother would write me a check to go get the expenses, to cash the check for the expenses. So, I would go to the bank, I became friends with the teller and, uh, who did several functions, and I told her, "Hey, what can't I do here? Get a checkbook." She said, "Yes, I'll get you the checkbook." So, she made me the checkbook with a 500 peso investment, not a deposit. 500 peso deposit. I arrived with my checkbook, and I didn't use it for anything. So, I arranged with my mother to give me the check for tuition, I would deposit it in the bank, and from there I would take it to pay. By the way, an important banker from that bank was there, and I told him, "Sir, could I open a checking account?" He said, "No." And I showed him, "No, no, Carlitos, until you're of age," and I showed him my checkbook, I was 12 years old. Then I realized that the checkbook was useless, it didn't give you interest, it didn't produce anything. I just bought stocks, I started buying stocks. Hm. I started buying stocks, uh, of Banamex, 30 shares. I started making my own balance sheets. In January, when I turned 15, I made a balance sheet with the stocks I had, the assets I had, and the liabilities, right? >> A personal balance sheet. I did it, I did it, I was doing it every month in that era, which is what my father taught us, what he asked us to keep order and do this. So, I started doing it to keep it organized, and it worked very well, it worked very well. >> I want to fast forward a bit. You go to university, you are a teacher, you take your sabbatical year, and then you return and start investing more formally. Until that moment, you had >> I had been investing all my life until '65. Until '64, it was investments. Yes. My sabbatical year was in '64. In '63, I went to Chile for a course, etc., etc. And in '64, I took the year off, in '65, instead of investments, I started business activities. >> You buy Jarritos. >> Yes. >> What made you change from being a passive investor to someone who wanted to operate? It was natural, it was planned. Look, I had set up my, uh, my store at home, it was called "El Cielo" (The Sky). Nice name, right? Which I should use, because I would go downtown, to the historic center, I would walk alone, right? Well, at that time, there wasn't so much of a problem, right? I would walk alone everywhere, and I saw a store with a lot of people selling candy, so it turned out to be a kind of wholesale deposit for merchandise, and people would buy there at semi-wholesale prices for street vendors or for small shops or for who knows how many things, and I saw that everything was very cheap, right? For example, uh, from those Adams chewing gums that cost, uh, like 3.60 instead of 5 pesos, the Yoyo chocolates, the Tinarines, the Salm, everything, this store bought them from the manufacturer and became distributors for the manufacturers. So, that's why they had a good price and sold at a good price. So, I already had experience with that. Uh, then, uh, well, even Monopoly, what was called The Game of the Tourist, do you remember The Tourist? Mm. >> which was later called Monopoly, The Tourist, well, you played there, you bought properties and sold them, and you passed through one place and another, etc. No, I had thought about business activity for a long time. >> And once you buy this first company, I understand that in the same year, in '65, you founded Imbursa, the first iteration of Imbursa. That's why you're going to celebrate 60 years. And you start not only by concentrating on one company and dedicating yourself to being the bottler, but you start building a portfolio. What was the logic behind starting to diversify so much? Well, look, first, I've never been a company director, so rather I have business activity, right? Of having the executive activity, you arrive at 8, you have your meeting at 9, then at 10, then at 11, etc., you have your program, you're making sure things are working every day, etc. I have always had more of an entrepreneurial character. In business, there are roughly four types of people, right? Obviously, in medium and small businesses, it's the same, right? The entrepreneur, the executive or general director, the investor who is neither a director nor an entrepreneur, but invests because they trust you, invests with you, and is on the board, etc., etc., but is not an executive or the third. And the fourth are those who are dedicated to representing before business organizations and associations, and who have more of a political than a business character. So, what I thought was that it was better to have 10 businesses of A one than one of A10. Do you understand what I mean? >> So, that was one of the reasons. So, for example, the bottling company, we bought it from a friend of my brother's. He had 40%, I had 40%, and another friend had 20%. In Imbursa, we went through many levels. Before, I had already been a stockbroker. Uh, I already had knowledge. You learn a lot there because at that time you did everything, operator, liquidator, business analysis, although there were two very good little books, there was one called "What is the Stock Market?" and another called "Invest Before Investing." Look, I remembered them, they were very interesting. "Invest Before Investing," "What is the Stock Market?" So, I learned a lot there because, well, in school studying engineering, I didn't know how to read balance sheets or financial statements. Then they would tell you that the asset was equal to the liability. Yes, how can the asset be equal to the liability plus the capital? So, there you realize that the capital is the asset minus the liability equals the capital, etc. You start learning many things, right? >> And when you started building this portfolio, I also see that you have a strong predilection for finding or discovering hidden value. Companies that might seem problematic or stagnant, you would take them and see something that others didn't. What you see is how to solve it. That is, a company that has certain problems or characteristics, you realize how to solve it, rather than others realizing it, because everyone realizes it's not good, right? The trick is to see how to solve it. So, uh, well, that was later. >> Tell me about the acquisition of Galas, which I believe gave you the impetus to solve an operational problem by seeing the concentration in one client who leaves you, which leads you to your great cash cow, Sigatán. In Galas, we joined the board. Don Santiago had passed away, the lady who was the owner of the company was there, she had a very young son, and she had, uh, uh, several, how should I say, on the one hand, desires, and on the other hand, in some situations, anxieties, right? For example, she told me that what she wanted was for the company not to close so that the workers would have jobs for many years. So, like these companies, she mentioned one, right? That it would continue to operate, so that the company would continue to operate. The company had many problems that were exacerbated by a strike that lasted about two and a half months, between 2 and a half and 3 months, during which all operations were suspended. It was a very aggressive strike. Uh, everything got complicated with the strike, right? That strike in the company had two organizations, Galas Mexico, Galas de México, and another that was like a maquiladora for Galas de México called El Arte. So, Galas had a union and El Arte had another. So, the Galas union was the one that went on strike. El Arte entered into that strike. Uh, it was a company of about 300-something people, and the truth is that things got very complicated, right? And we got involved to try to help, uh, by talking with the workers who were being affected, who were leaving people without work. The people, I think, were starting to oppose them, and finally, the strike was able to be ended. Uh, the lady, as a recommendation, one of the options was to sell it to La Moderna, which was the client for 25 or 26% of the company, it was the one who bought, excuse me, bought from all the sales. There were 17,000 clients, which we later reduced to 12,000. It was a single one, it was 25-26% of the sales, which was Rally, the cigarette pack of Rally. No, which was sold, well, Rally and, uh, the other brands, uh, that Fiesta had, etc., right? And, uh, well, there was all this situation, and so we proposed to the lady how she would see us partnering and buying 60%. And she accepted very quickly. So, what we did was to put it in as capital, not to buy it, but to put it in as capital. It was 10 million pesos. The debt was around 30-something, 35 million, something like that. Uh, but there was a lot unpaid. Social Security hadn't been paid, Hacienda hadn't been paid, the landlord hadn't been paid. In general, payments hadn't been made, of course, partly due to the strike and partly before the strike, and there was one strike and the other not. No, total, uh, we entered, the truth is, we did it very well. In four months, we fixed it. I would never have imagined it, but in 4 months, we fixed it. Uh, we reduced many, many clients because it turned out that they were selling ice picks to the vendors, but I told them, "Hey, but this isn't part of it." So, there it went with product demands, right? We organized ourselves very well, and the company started working very well. We negotiated with Social Security, they gave us time, with Hacienda, they gave us time. Coincidentally, Ramón Aguirre, who is still a great friend now, was before the head of the department, I'm talking about the era of Echeverría, López Portillo was already entering in '76, still in Echeverría's first term. So, we went to talk to La Moderna, it was the second client. Very positive, Don Antonino, well, with regret he tells us, "Well, how many, how many labels do you want me to buy?" Well, with great, I don't remember the figure we gave him, but you told him, well, 20 million. Well, I'll buy 40. These kinds of things were what helped us a lot. >> Wow. Then we found that there was corruption, we found that there was a supplier who was corrupt. So, we froze, we renegotiated prices with them, etc., etc. So, they were doing very good things, working quickly, uh, all the printing that hadn't been done was recovered. We caught a good period because we entered in May, around there, so there was time because the season was, uh, calendars and wrapping paper for October, November, and December, which were fundamental for the company, right? So, that gave us time, and curiously, on August 31st, we had June, July, and August, 3 months, on August 31st, the director of the Bank of Mexico and the Secretary of Finance came out at night to say that the peso was going to be devalued. It was the only announcement, and the next day President Echeverría ratified it. The peso had remained at 12.50 for 22 years. The peso was worth 12.50 since the devaluation of 1954 during Ruiz Cortínez's era. Uh, during Easter week, by the way, every Easter week, people bought dollars for many years. No way. >> So, in 1976, that devaluation comes. So, I went down there with the sales team and told them, "Go out to the market tomorrow 20% up, raise the price by 20% and go out to sell tomorrow."
The dollar went from 1250, but no price was set. It hovered around 22, rose to 28, dropped to 18, and was around 20-22 pesos. When we went out to sell, we already had the paper and ink. I went to talk to Claudio González, whom I didn't know, who was furious because we weren't paying suppliers. So, we had given him a guarantee that we would pay, and he insisted that we were going to go bankrupt, that the company wouldn't survive. So, I went to negotiate with him, it was my first encounter, I didn't know him, and I got him to pay in advance with the order and a 10% discount, a very good discount. That was very early on. I still remember it. One day I will remind him. I'm talking about 1976, 49 years ago. That's when I met him. So, hey, buying paper 10% cheaper. Paper was fundamental to the company, everything used paper, labels used paper, calendars used paper, everything used paper. So, getting the discount, we got the discount on inks because we had that issue. We managed to defer tax payments. We also had a debt with the lender who had financed some equipment. We also arranged an extension, we paid everyone, we paid them, but we did take care of the support from, by the way, Kimberly, I gave guarantees of some land I had, and despite that, nothing, until I told him, "Well, I'll pay you, when I place the order, I'll give you the check, I'll pay you, and I got the 10%." That was a very good discount. So, it turns out that in August, we started to go out in September when we went out to the market to sell calendars, to sell this, and we had the material, we had the inks, we had the price of the paper, etc. So, by September, the company was doing very well, we had very good sales, we had expenses very well controlled. We had started to pay, very well, very well. It was very fast.
And then Moderna tells them, "I don't need you anymore." After that, there were two crises, one that I learned about was with Arte and not Galas. At Galas, we had a good relationship, there were two young men and another one there who was a bit complicated, but there was openness in conversation and in everything and in work and everything. And at Arte, the FAT people and some very aggressive, radical movements of that era started to stir. At Moderna, there were problems, there were problems everywhere. So, I find out that things are very heated there, and so I tell Carlos, "Hey, how bad is it?" Why doesn't he ask Luis Flores? Luis Flores was a guy in charge of binding, I don't remember what area it was, he had played American football for Pumas, so he was respected, right? He wasn't burly. And this. So, I said, "Hey, tell him to ask, to do a survey, because they respect him, right?" So, it turns out the survey was very even. I say, no, if it's even, we're lost. They still told me that one of the workers had been a former union leader, that they beat him on the subway, it was on the subway, they mistreated him. So, flat out, this was a very good strategy I came up with, I spoke with the two young men from Galas, I told them, "Hey, how would you feel if the Arte personnel came to Galas? Would we recognize their seniority?", etc., etc. And that Gala would be the only company here. Yes, they went for it. So, the next morning we set up a counter, well, a table, and as they arrived, we invited them to join Galas. 90% to 93% joined Galas, their seniority was recognized, this was also the basis of the company, right? And so, the remaining 8% who opposed it, it was a Saturday morning, we brought in a bricklayer who was very good at building a wall. We said, "Well, how do we do it, where are we going to place those who stayed, those who didn't join Galas, those who stayed at Arte?" So, well, no, if we remove this bridge here, we built a wall, a small room there so that they wouldn't... not a high wall because it was... and they entered through 5 de Febrero, a place near San Antonio Abasto. There was a door there, they entered through there, we put up the wall and I don't know what. So, Carlos, my cousin, who was very, very capable, the one in sales, calls me, he says, "Hey, the manager is crying there because they are threatening him and the department manager is terrified." I say, look, tell Luis Flores to go there. So, he arrives there and rudely says, "Alright, who wants to split? Be content with this." And everything calmed down, everything calmed down with Luis Flores, who told you. "Alright, who wants to? Everyone is here together. Alright, one by one. Alright, line up." Ah, the problem was over. So, 10 or 15 days later, everyone was paid their severance, and the problem was resolved. And later, I don't know how many years later, we found out that Moderna was going to have its own... of... of innovation. They already have everything, they took our people because Galas was going to be sold to Moderna. They were afraid, I think, of all the labor problems and such, and so they set up another one. So, I went to talk to Basagoiti, I already had about 12% to 14% of Sigatam invested, for reasons, yes, of investment, and perhaps also for that reason we spoke with them very positively, that we wanted to strengthen the relationship with Sigatam. Sigatam had 25% of the market and Moderna had 75%, but Sigatam had another problem. It sold Marlboro, we didn't print the cardboard boxes, meaning we didn't have the equipment to print the Marlboro cigarette packs, which were important. It had 6% of the Marlboro market, it was just starting. So, in 81, we bought it, expensively, expensively, because in 82, the devil took the whole market, everything was given away. Everything was given away. The only one buying was me. In fact, he told me, "Hey, but how are you buying? My father bought from his brother at 14 with the revolution, so why shouldn't I buy shares that are being thrown away?" Companies were worth 1%, 2%. Moderna, which was a huge company, our competitor, was worth about 5 million dollars, which was nothing, nothing. The real value would have been 400 or 500, and the market didn't want to know anything about shares, and everything was for sale. I bought 40% of Moderna, 39.5 to 40%. So, we had Igatam and we had 40% of Moderna. So, they were crazy, they thought Philip Morris had bought it. They didn't realize the company was worth 5 million dollars, or six, I don't remember how much.
And that business was a very noble business due to the nature of the business itself, right? The cash flow. Sigatam hadn't paid dividends for 17 years, I think, or something like that. Moderna was in a booming situation. Sigatam wasn't doing very well, although we turned it around very quickly because, for example, Delicados was no longer supported, Faros was no longer supported, they were left to die. Then we even made it a filter for Faros to compete with Rally, but with different prices, and we pushed Marlboro very hard, and it grew, it grew. I used to tell our Philip Morris partners, by the way, I have very good memories of them, and I think they do of me too. I used to say, "Hey, do you think we'll reach 40% in 5 years?" He said, "No, if they're not lame," he told me, "It will take us six, in six years we'll reach 40%." We went up every year, we didn't stop going up. There wasn't a year we didn't increase our market share. What do you think was the key? Well, first, we supported Marlboro. Second, the price of Marlboro wasn't too far from Rally's. If you have a very big gap, then you often saw smokers carrying Marlboro packs with other cigarettes, for example, right? Or with other cigarettes, but as the pack is put on, as the phone is put on now, they carried their Marlboro pack. So, Marlboro started to hit very hard. Then we pushed all the other brands we had. We looked a lot for distribution. That's very important. We achieved our distribution through those things I had learned as a child. For example, in the Mercedes area, there were many distributors, redistributors of candies, bam, bam, and cigarettes. So, people went there. In contrast, the others went for the idea that they would sell cigarettes to tobacconists and shops and everything. So, what do you think helped us? Well, I think it was neglected, and we became more aggressive, we put in advertising. At that time, there was the era of the French plan from Televisa, which only sold to the big players. Then we entered. We did several things, and for example, in '86, the very best champions from British American Tobacco came to compete. So, they came to see me, that we had to lower our prices, that we had to, excuse me, that we had to make the difference between Rally and Marlboro very high, because otherwise Rally would end and the brand that had been the leader would disappear, right? I sent them all away. They told me we would have to go and beg them, to get on our knees, I don't know what, no, man. We made a change with Televisa for airtime. I bought some coins for football, and they gave me the coins and the money for television time. We all put a lot into television. No, no, no. That year, Marlboro, I think, gained 300 points. And there was something very important, look, it's a very important experience. More or less at that time, about 52 billion cigarettes were sold. As the price and tax went up, all of this helped a lot, the taxes went up and advertising was removed. First, TV advertising was removed, then billboards, then differences, and then the pack started to be penalized, and then advertising on radio couldn't be done, etc., etc., and it became a socially undesirable item, so per capita consumption dropped by about 60%. However, we were still earning better. Because you didn't spend everything on marketing, right? Because the price went up. A large part of the drop in purchases was because the price went up, and we even reached, if I recall correctly, Marlboro to about 50%. I think we reached, purely in Marlboro alone, 45-40 or 50% of the market, purely Marlboro, right? I say up to 70% of the market. Pass me the gift that Philip Morris gave me. You have it. Recently, the current top boss and CEO, who when I met him was the director in Poland, but a very good director, he did me the favor of bringing me a gift, a jacket and in general a very nice gift. Let's see if they find it, I'll show it to you. No, he sent me a gift box, and when I opened it, it said Marlboro on one side and Carlos on the other. It's a very warm gesture, right? From these friends.
Engineer, this business that has made Sigatam much more profitable, it continues to open doors for you, and that's when you buy the insurance company. We had 72% of that business, and Philip Morris had 28%. There was a very foolish moment when some idiot from Philip Morris told us that they were going to buy us and that it was worth nothing because Marlboro was theirs, not Sigatam's, so it was worth nothing. This was one of the stumbles we had, and we had a great relationship with them, but this director, executive, went and told us that, but we had a very interesting program at Sigatam, it was 10-year contracts, revisable every five. So, he came to see us at the time of the review to not renew it for 10 years. So, we had five years. So, he said that nothing would be paid, I don't know, very aggressive in a plan to say Marlboro is ours, so it's worth nothing, and Sigatam. So, what do you think I did? I raised the price of Marlboro by 20%. So, I said, let's squeeze Marlboro, and its market share will fall. It took them 3 months to come back, so it was a very important step. After that, in the market, we had liquidity, so we were able to, in fact, Sigatam even gave us a dividend. Sigatam also had an important, strong position, I mean, financially it was much better. And look, Loreto y Peñapobre was worth a million and a half dollars. We bought 23% of Firestone for $160,000. It was a very irrational situation where nothing had value. Telmex was worth, I think, $160 million or $200 million in '90. Pass me the story of Grupo Carson, right? So, everything was, Reinos was worth nothing, all the aluminum companies were worth nothing. Moderna, as I told you, was worth 5 million. Kimberly dropped a lot, everything dropped a lot.
And this idea of continuing to invest in times of crisis when everyone is running to cover themselves, selling, even leaving the country, you always relate it back to that lesson from your father. Which one? The one about buying from his brother in times when everyone was afraid. Ah, look, I actually found out about that. After that, well, it's a very good story, right? But after that, I have it very clear, I have it very clear, right? But besides, it was obvious, they didn't say I was wrong, etc. Then, for example, the investment fund we founded in '81 had returns of over 20% in dollars for about 15 years, right? So, this is a story I wrote about the group, and here I have the prices. Well, here's how we bought [Music] del Sur, then condominiums, real estate, the companies we made, and here are some companies, look, Anderson Clayton in December '82, when they were very undervalued, it was worth $1,900,000. Celanese $11,800, Cementos Mexicanos $26 million. Semexer El Centenario $700,000 was worth the whole thing. Loreto y Peñapobre $1.4 million, Cadi $5.1 million, Moderna $4.8 million, Reinos Aluminio $0.6 million, it wasn't reasonable. Then by '94, Kimberly, which was worth $27 million, is worth $3,690-something. Moderna, which was worth $4 million, is worth $2,870. Even X, which was worth $11,800, is worth $100. Cementos Mexicanos, from $26 million, rose to $7,800 million. So, it was irrational. I'm talking about 12 years. And tell me, engineer, when Telmex, excuse me, was worth $172 million in '82, $316 million in '84, and in '94 it was worth $29,000 million, which is false. No, no, it was irrational that it could be worth that. And when people told you, "Don't do it," no one tried to dissuade you. Ah, well, I didn't listen to them. We also didn't buy on credit, meaning, what happened is that we maintained liquidity. For example, the investment fund I mentioned, when stocks were very cheap, 70-80% of the investment was in stocks, and when stocks became expensive, we reduced it to 60% stocks, right? Meaning, it became more conservative, and when prices were a giveaway, it became more aggressive. The Telmex deal was on another level, it was something much bigger, much more ambitious, it required, as it did, joining with the French, joining with the Americans. Tell me a bit about the rationale behind pursuing this opportunity.
Look, honestly, I didn't want to get involved. So, the government was promoting it, seeing who would get involved, and first they had promoted Fernando Senderos because Manuel Senderos had been the Chairman of the Board. The Chairman of the Board was first Truyet. When Truyet died, Manuel Senderos took over, and then when the government took the majority in the Cheverría era, in the Cheverría era, they had 48% in preferred shares, they turned them into ordinary shares and bought 3% and then they had the majority. That was the process, right? In '72, it became a state-owned company, and then they did things there, both before and since it became Mexican in '58, it was private but foreign. It became privately Mexican in '58, and the state took the majority by buying 3% in '72. Well, poor management all the time of the company, very, very poorly managed all the time, and we thought about not getting involved. So, they insisted, "Hey, we need you to get involved." They are promoting that there be several businessmen, and they opened it up to foreigners. Now, Telmex wasn't being sold, 20.4% was being sold. 20.4% was being sold. At the end of the day, three of us entered. We spoke with the foreigners, and first with the Spaniards. There was no way to go with them, they were very difficult. And finally, we went with the French and the Spaniards. We were on the verge of not entering because they wanted to make the decisions. I told them no, that we Mexicans here would make them, we had the majority. So, it was going to fall apart, we weren't going to enter. I said, "Well, look, if the president of SBC and the president of France Telecom decide something contrary to what we propose, I agree because they know, they have experience, only if we reach that level." I had relations with both of them, very good, excellent people, right? He is still a great friend. He is SBC, which was Southwestern Bell and is now AT&T, and the other from France Telecom as well. So, we finally set it up like this, we never had. One day they came to propose something foolish because we developed prepaid, and we developed it from the piggy banks. So, they told me, "No, prepaid is very dangerous because it cannibalizes." No, no, no, I sent them away. No. Where did this idea of prepaid come from? It's a stroke of genius that comes from solving a complicated operating system, which was emptying the piggy banks. Yes. That was the problem because the piggy bank would fill up and then it wouldn't work, they didn't have money, so it wouldn't work. They had to bring a full bag of 20s. This is French. In France, they were already using prepaid cards. So, the devices were changed so that you could pay with a card. We are going to sell 28 million of these little cards in a month, huh? And now we sell anything because public phones don't work anymore, and IFETEL hasn't authorized us to remove them yet. Now, regarding Telmex, there was pressure from the International Bank of the Treasury, from everywhere, why we weren't getting involved. So, I asked my children, they said yes. Back then, how did you involve your children in the business? Look, the first involvement was when we bought Igata, when I told them how they saw that we were going to buy a larger company, that I don't know what. Well, one said, if we're going to keep seeing you, if we're not going to see you, no. Very good observation, right? But well, as I told you, I wasn't a director who stayed there all night and day involved in the company, right? And regarding Telmex, the truth is that there were several things there. First, they started buying many shares from '87 and '88, a brokerage house bought about 10.5%. Then the government increased from 51%, I think to 56% or 50%, it increased the share price, right? The share that was worth 200 million or 300 or 400 was taken and sold for 8600. That was the price. The truth is that everything was so poorly done that there were many things. There were 2,200,000 customers without service. 3 years of waiting list. Two and a half years. Two and a half years. Many things wrong. Many things wrong. And you never said, "This is so bad. Why continue? Why do it?" of a company that we made fantastic. Besides, the staff worked very well, to the point that we competed against the two largest in the world. Look, we competed against AT&T, I don't remember anymore, it was AT&T and Avantel. One was linked to Vancomer and Alfa, and the other to Banamex. So, imagine the two largest in the world and with the two largest banks in the world, they told us they were going to collect money with shovels, and many were afraid that they would crush us and that we wouldn't be ready in time for them to connect, right? Ready by January 1st, and everyone wanted, some of my people and the French, I think, that we change the prices and conditions in May and everything. No, wait and see what the others will do, I told them. So, they entered very clumsily. Instead of agreeing with them and using a single network, each one made their own network. It turns out there were three networks, what stupidity. The good thing we did at Telmex was to separate Telmex from Telcel so they would be competitors, because it was classic that in France, for example, they tried to make cellular not work because it would affect the other, right? We didn't make them compete, the two of them. We entered with Telcel, since Yusacel and the other were already in the market, meaning they had a year's head start, I think.
And the genius of prepaid returns, but now using what you call the Gillette model? Yes, yes, I called it that. When the '95 crisis came, the market became complicated. That's when we decided to do this, it was called Telcel Amigo, which was the idea, the Gillette idea was that we would subsidize the phones to sell cards. That was at the beginning. So, you bought the device, you made the device more accessible. So, having the device, you bought cards. This worked, especially in the United States, where none of them wanted to invest. Everyone said it was foolish, that prepaid was foolish. With what arguments? Well, probably cannibalization and less revenue. Foolishness. So, we launched it in Mexico. Look, when we started in Mexico, mobile telephony had 30,000 or 35,000 customers. In 1991, we agreed to make a three-year plan. That was something that helped me. I made my three-year plan so that people would know what to expect, right? So, they wouldn't say, "No, man, it's the same." Or say, "No, they promise and won't deliver." So, we said what each thing would be, and in mobile telephony, we agreed that in 3 years it would be 200,000 phones, it reached 230,000, and we reached 85 million, right? Now, I think we're around 82 million phones, and in the United States, we started with about 100,000, 130,000, and we went up to 25 million, then it adjusted to about 22 million, but in the United States it was very, very important because the service was also very expensive, but anyway, this Telcel, everything they've wanted against it, including the duopoly, the government of the duopoly. Well, and it has also happened in the rest of Latin America, right? There have been countries where even José Mujica was against you, right? Ah, no, the opposite. First, he greeted me very affectionately. I had the opportunity to talk with him on a trip to Uruguay, where I'm going to go again now, right? The truth is, we shouldn't be in Uruguay because in Uruguay, telecommunications are government-owned, and they don't give you permission for anything. They don't give you permission to offer pay television. They don't give you permission for such a thing, right? If Uruguay controls telecommunications, I don't know what participation it has, but very high, it's not open to competition. Engineer, in one of our conversations, I asked you what your worst investment had been in all the years you've been an investor, and you told me it wasn't the worst investment made, but the worst divestment you had made. Tell me about the decision to sell the 4.5% of Apple you had.
Look, I don't remember the percentage. Who told you? You. 4 C. I think I exaggerated. How much could it have been, Dad? Ask Legaspi. I don't know if that day he told me it was 4 and it's the same if it was two, three, or four. It's many billions. Tell me about that decision to divest. We bought them very cheaply when, we saw in a magazine that it had more liquidity than it was worth, and it was a bit random, something like that, a very difficult situation before Steve Jobs came in. So, the But we sold them with a profit, of course, a good profit, but not what it would have been. I don't know if we would have stayed until now. Another case was Amazon, which in 2008 or 2009, around there, was worth nothing. This, well, it dropped a lot in value. This, well, these are mistakes, right? Mistakes, for example, right now when I see the price of Tesla, it seems irrational. It's, I think, at 150, 180, or 200 times earnings. I've never seen a company of that magnitude in that field worth 180 times, it's worth, I think, a trillion and a half, I don't know how much in dollars. There are people who say that the market can remain irrational longer than one can remain liquid. What do you think about that? Going against the market, sticking to your convictions. Let's see, there are two ways, one is not to buy for your own sake, one is to sell, and another is to go short. So, I think that, well, various decisions can be made. There's a saying, right? A thought that a cousin told me a long time ago, many years ago. How many years? Well, many, 60-something years. There's a saying, it was an Arab saying that says, "When you don't know what to do, do half." So, when it's more or less. If you have doubt about what to do, do half. So, if you do half and it goes down, you say, "Good thing I sold half," and if it goes up, you say, "Good thing I kept half." Have you made short investments? Yes, I have, but I haven't had much interest in doing so for many years. Yes, yes. Would it be Tesla or which one? Tesla. I know you also have a bit of a rivalry with Musk. No, no, no. No rivalry. This, eh No, but it's worth 180 times its earnings, right? It dropped to $300. it went back up to $440, it's worth a trillion and a half. Now he's come out and said that what's valuable isn't the cars, it's the robots and the artificial intelligence they will bring. Well, he's deceiving everyone because China has had robots for 20 years or so. I think robots have existed for many years.
Engineer, after so many years as an investor, as an entrepreneur, what characterizes a good investment? What are the two or three points that tell you, at first glance, it looks good? Look, I'll tell you what a stockbroker I respected a lot, named Duro Pérez, who worked at [unintelligible] and was a stockbroker, managed certain companies, was very insightful. So, people would ask him, "Excuse me, engineer, do you see this stock as good? If it goes up, it's good, if it goes down, it's bad." That was the answer. And elsewhere, he had several bills pinned in his cubicle. So, when someone told him, "No, no, I bet you it won't." "Alright, come and see the charts. Do you still want to bet?" He would say, "No, I think investments, very specific ones, are irrational. You need to have a portfolio, I think it's more reasonable, right? And then it depends on what things and in what circumstances. There are circumstances where you have to buy, it's irrational, you shouldn't buy, and others where it's irrational not to sell, right? Honestly, if I had investments in that technology, in that field, I think it wouldn't make sense to get caught up in those prices. And I'm not talking about Tesla, I'm talking about all of them, Nvidia. Suddenly, boom, it went to the sky. 4.5 trillion and 3.5 trillion and 4 trillion. Look, and in this, I agree, Warren Buffett is doing it, he's selling, he's becoming liquid, and here in the market, you find very cheap stocks still. Very cheap stocks, very cheap companies, some with good dividends, and there are some that are very cheap. For example, telecommunications companies in general worldwide are very cheap. Engineer, I was reading the principles of the group, and one of them caught my attention, which is operating with the advantages of a small company, but today in 49 countries with 360,000 employees, how do you operate with the advantages of a small company? Look, it has been a failure. One of our principles is not to have many hierarchical levels, because when companies have hierarchical levels and large corporate structures, directors don't get involved in operations, but in the corporate structure. So, from small companies, for example, that become large, it's because they develop. Well, Inbursa, Inbursa is a very small company, in terms of profits, it's the third largest bank in Mexico.
Has there ever been a time when you felt like a limitation for any of the companies? That's a good question. My children, grandchildren, etc., agree to contribute to the foundation to make it even bigger, because we are already involved in the idea of combating extreme poverty. Ideally, we would achieve two things in Mexico: one, grow at 4-5% of GDP, and another, no, look, what I had many years ago, I wrote a letter, and now I've redone it. Do you want to read the letter? Entrepreneurs are creators and temporary administrators of wealth, generating development and employment, and we leave with nothing. We must leave a better country for our children, but it is more important to leave better children for our country. Engineer, what do you still have left to do? I have something very important that I've been thinking about for many years. I think that gives us the opportunity to ask you one last question. If you could write a message in the sky for millions of people to see, what would you say? Thank you very much for listening to this episode, and before I go, don't forget that if you want to receive a very short but value-packed email from me every day from Monday to Friday, you can register to receive Oso Trava Daily. Every day I will be sharing some news, some lesson, some tool that can help you improve your business, grow your company, be more productive, and have a more fulfilling life in general. So, if you don't want to miss out on this value-packed information for you, simply go to cracks.la/correo, leave me your email, and very soon it will be in your inbox. That's all for today. I am Yosotrava, and I hope you have a crack week.