Transcription
Welcome everyone. My name is Mahalaka Samani. I'm with the Community Alliance for Peace and Justice and I'm joined by my colleague and co-host Dr. Atika Badul.
Today we're looking at the state of the Iran-US relationship following the June 17th signing of the memorandum of understanding, current strains on theou and its regional implications. All this comes in the context of Ayatullah Khamenei's ongoing funeral in Iran that is already reshaping how we think about Iran's regional and global standing.
To help us make sense of recent developments, we're very fortunate to be joined by two prominent and highly influential public intellectuals. First, we have Dr. John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago and Dr. Seyed Mohammad Morandi, professor of English literature and Orientalism at the University of Tehran. Thank you both so much for joining us.
>> Glad to be here.
>> Thank you.
So Dr. Morandi, let me begin with you. Um, Ayatollah Khamenei's state funeral is taking place in Iran right now with millions upon millions of people in attendance, making it perhaps one of the largest funerals in modern history. And there are ceremonies that are running through July 9th across the country. In addition, there are also international delegations representing nearly 50 countries. Um, beyond the ritual of mourning, what does this moment tell us about Iran's internal stability, its succession under Ayatollah and its standing going into the next phase of talks with Washington?
>> Well, thank you very much for inviting me. It's an honor and a pleasure being with the three of you. Uh, I think today was a historic uh event. Uh, the turnout was unprecedented. I uh spent uh hours just going there and trying to get back. And uh, this is in addition to the fact that yesterday we had the prayers where again millions were participating and the day before people gathered uh to uh where he was uh placed. He and his family where he was placed in the Musalla in Tehran uh to pay their respects and and to commemorate his uh his leadership.
I think that uh while for me these enormous crowds were not surprising and uh some estimates put it at above 10 million today, I think that for many people outside Iran and perhaps many inside Iran, it has a special significance. The perception in the United States among elites uh or at least elites who are in power, not people like Professor Mearsheimer but elites who are close to power has been that Iran is is fragile, Iran is weak, Iran is vulnerable and uh every time Iran moved to uh show goodwill to the United States uh instead of interpreting that move as goodwill, the United States as a result would uh as a result of this perception would view Iran uh viewing Iran as vulnerable and weak would see this as a sign of weakness rather than as a goodwill gesture and that has been my understanding ever uh ever since I was involved in the nuclear negotiations in 2015. Uh, I was uh the foreign minister's media advisor, international media advisor and I was also the media advisor for the delegation four or five years ago when they tried to revive the nuclear deal and in on both uh uh instances in both in both these periods every time uh I I I witnessed firsthand every time Iran did make a goodwill gesture the United States simply became more aggressive and uh more hard-lined in its approach.
So I think the last four months uh in general have been uh very important in that uh inside the United States uh I don't want to go into that but across the world I think that perceptions on on Iran have changed dramatically. Uh, I think that ever since the genocide in Gaza began this this uh be the views towards Iran began to evolve. Uh, but uh and also to a degree after the 12-day war. But when this war began, the perception even among Iran's friends uh even in Moscow and Beijing, uh many people who I knew at least analysts and experts, friends of mine, sympathetic to Iran and in other countries, they thought Iran would fall very swiftly. And um those perceptions were shattered. And after the 39 days of fighting when the siege warfare began again they uh not as many but quite a few people thought that it would be Iran that falls first before Trump and then at when the at the negotiating table when Iran in my opinion got a pretty good deal although there are many in Iran including many people in the uh gatherings uh during the last two three days who said that the this deal is not enough and it's not the hard to make but any but in any case um the perceptions I think during this period of time changed gradually but today I think was uh a a major turning point because uh the this uh gathering of so many millions of people in Tehran at the height of summer and I think Professor Mearsheimer has I know he's been to Iran I don't know I don't remember what time of year it was but the summer in Tehran is not the best time to be out on the streets and uh going to this gathering was is very difficult people wearing black particularly difficult women wearing black very difficult so people on the streets for many hours today and some of them were there since 3:00 in the morning, 4:00 in the morning, some were there last night. So exhausted, exhaustion, the heat, the gathering and trying to gather in one place in a place like Tehran during ordinary circumstances, it's not uh very easy. Perhaps we've all spent some time in Tehran, but it's it's it's not easy moving around in this city. So despite all that, these these unprecedented number of people on the streets in Iran, I think sends a strong message to Iran's adversaries, but also to Iran's friends about the strength and resilience and uh and power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the high degree of uh legitimacy of the state in the eyes of ordinary Iranians. And so when you put all these together, the war, the siege, the negotiations, and Gaza and Lebanon, and who's siding with the victims, and who's siding with the with the genocidal forces, and then you add to all that the funeral, I think that brings about a sea change in opinion at least among a significant segment of uh uh people across the world. Even in the United States uh run have shifted based upon my own personal experiences uh to a degree.
>> Sure. Thank you so much Dr. Morandi and I think um I'm sure you must have heard Trump's comments on this. I think he was perhaps most surprised when he didn't know who all of these people were because I thought everybody hated Ayatollah, were his words of course. So I think he is perhaps most surprised by this incredible show of strength um and sincerity towards uh the late Ayatollah. Um Dr. Mearsheimer, I'd love to hear your response to Dr. Morandi, but I also um you know, let's talk a little bit about the memorandum of understanding as well. Since the June 17th MOU, uh we've seen significant obstacles um including the June 26th Israel-Lebanon agreement which linked Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon to Hezbollah's disarmament. We've also seen continued low-level tit-for-tat exchanges between Iran, the US, and Israel over the past couple of weeks. Taken together, do these developments suggest that there's merely a tactical pause before the risk of renewed conflict or do you believe that the Trump administration is actually looking for a broader strategic reset, a grand bargain of sorts with Iran as some in the administration have indicated?
>> Thank you for the question. Uh, let me make a number of points. First of all, I do not think that the United States is interested in restarting the air war, which is really what the fighting involved between Iran and the United States. It's very important to understand that between February 28th and April 8th, uh what you had was an air war. It was basically a 40-day air war. And then the air war stopped and what the United States then did was it imposed a blockade on the strait. So we went from this bombing campaign to a blockade. And except for a couple of tit-for-tat incidents, there has been no serious bombing since April 8th. And the blockade went from roughly April 13th to June 17th when the memorandum of understanding was signed. So we really have not had a serious shooting war between Iran and the United States since April 8th. And I do not believe the United States wants to start that air war all over again because it would just lose the fight like it lost between February 28th and April 8th. The United States did not win with its bombing campaign. And of course, it was not just the United States. It was the United States and Israel. And then, as I say, we went to the blockade and the blockade didn't work. That's why you had a memorandum of understanding that was signed on the 17th of June, right? It it was signed because uh the blockade didn't work. So, the bombing didn't work and the blockade didn't work. The point here is that the United States doesn't have a military option. So what happened is that the United States signed the memorandum of understanding as I said on June 17th and in my opinion that represented a clear victory for Iran. It may be the case as Dr. Morandi said that Iran did not get all it wanted but it got most of what it wanted and in my opinion it looks like a surrender document from the American perspective. The Iranians won on almost every point. But the key here is that it's not a formal settlement to the conflict. It's just a memorandum of understanding. It's a basis for negotiations moving forward. And the question is, how is this going to play out? I think that's the question that you're asking me. What do I think is going to happen moving forward? And as you pointed out, there's some evidence that the Americans are interested in renegotiating the deal. And this is hardly surprising because, as I said, the June 17th deal looks like a victory for Iran. Now, let me say a few words about the specifics as I see it. The initial agreement was designed to open the strait and stop the war. But as I said, the war except for Lebanon, let's leave Lebanon aside for the moment. Except for Lebanon, the war had basically stopped on April 8th. There was not much shooting after April 8th. Uh, but the blockade mattered greatly and the blockade went away. Now what's happened and this is reflected in some comments that JD Vance made is that because the strait is now open, the Americans feel or the administration seems to feel that the pressure on the United States to concede these various elements of the memorandum of understanding to Iran have lessened. There's not much pressure there anymore. So Vance seems to think and therefore maybe we can renegotiate the deal because the strait is likely to stay open. So that's the basic logic here. I would be curious to know what Dr. Morandi thinks, but I think this logic is fundamentally flawed because the Iranians made sure that the nuclear element of the deal would not come until the end. And the United States absolutely needs to get a nuclear agreement. And to get that nuclear agreement, the Iranians can force the Americans to make major concessions on all of those other elements that are clearly laid out already in the memorandum of understanding. One is the business of frozen assets being released. Two is the matter of reparations and this $300 billion fund. Four is total relief on sanctions and number five or number four is the toll booth. Those are the four big issues floating around. Now the Americans will try as hard as they can not to accommodate, not to agree to those particular economic demands. But what the Iranians can simply do is say if you don't agree to those economic demands, we will not reach an agreement on the nuclear issue. And the Americans absolutely need an agreement on the nuclear issue. So I think the Iranians were very smart to put the nuclear issue at the tail end of the negotiations because that will give them continued leverage now that the strait has been opened and that Iranian leverage has been taken away. So, I would imagine, and it's very hard to say for sure, that moving forward, it's unlikely that the air war, the bombing campaign is going to start again because it just doesn't make sense from an American point of view. And number two, I think because of the importance of getting a deal on the nuclear issue, the various other economic issues which are all to Iran's advantage will be fulfilled and that at the end you will probably get an agreement that reflects what is in the memorandum of understanding. Am I sure this is going to happen? Of course not. But when I look at all the elements of the deal and what's happened so far, that's what it looks like to me.
>> Right. Um, Professor Morandi, I'm going to come towards you. Um, along the same lines um, regarding the memorandum memorandum of understanding from the perspective, what are the biggest threats that you perceive um are um halting its um, you know, coming into full effect or its overall survival? Um, is it the US delivering the assets um uh the frozen assets of Iran um Israeli escalation which is a very important topic as far as uh Gaza or Lebanon are concerned um or Iran's own internal debates because we witnessed that the public mood seems to be a little uncompromising on the streets of Iran very much you know the sentiment is high and as you've mentioned many times um that they they do not want to have a deal like the JCPOA that has um actually hurt Iran in the past. So what would Iran need to see from the United States that would kind of sort of establish a grudging um you know trust um as to things moving forward in the right direction?
Okay. Sorry about that. That's uh the internet they slowed the internet today for the for the funeral. I guess because of a fear of drones or some sort of assault. Uh, I you raise a very important uh question. Uh, the JCPOA or the nuclear deal of 2015 did not go well for Iranians and uh in that deal the Iranians uh carried out their obligations but the United States refrained from uh doing the same. And this was not under Trump. This was under Obama. And uh despite many complaints from the Iranian government, the foreign minister uh and other uh high-ranking officials, uh the United States had no intention of fulfilling its obligations in full. It carried out some of them uh halfway and others uh less so, but uh for Iran that wasn't uh enough. It wasn't uh helpful. And uh so many believed that it was a a bad deal. Now uh whenever we speak of negotiations nowadays in Iran, the first thing that comes to mind for ordinary people is the JCPOA. And that makes negotiating with the United States even more difficult because whatever agreement you get uh the mistrust towards the United States is very high and for very very good reason. So I understand the sentiments on the street. They are they make very in any case this is the deal we have at the moment. Um I I think the real issue the the number one issue that exists between Iran and the United States is the Israeli regime. I think that the Israelis do not want an improved relationship between Iran and the United States uh at any level. And so I think they will do whatever they can to undermine the uh agreement. So true Lebanon is uh a big part of this and uh the first article of the MOU or the very first sentences in the MOU deal with Lebanon. The Israeli regime is supposed to withdraw and end the war and end the killing. And uh at the moment we have a a ceasefire although today they murdered a a woman uh a school principal, her husband and her uh maid I think uh in an air strike on their car. So it's not exactly a a a real ceasefire. It's sort of like the ceasefire in in Gaza where every day they kill a number of men, women, and children. But in Lebanon, it's not as uh as as murderous at at least for the moment. But they refuse to withdraw and um this is one uh way in which they can undermine the deal. Also, I have no doubt that uh they would not want to see the United States release Iranian assets or to cooperate with Iran in any way or form. Uh, the issue of the trade of Hormuz is uh another problem. As we speak, the United States is violating the MOU by trying to or or opening a corridor in the strait of Hormuz that is not controlled by Iran. And that violates the deal because in accordance with the deal for the first during the period of the MOU Iran is supposed to be the the the country that controls the movement of ships through the strait. So um I I'm I'm not totally optimistic about the deal to be very blunt. um but somewhat pessimistic that lead to a comprehensive agree I I think Professor Mearsheimer is absolutely correct when he said that the Iranians very smart in leaving the the issue of the nuclear program and the comprehensive sanctions or the maximum pressure sanctions for the second phase. So that uh that leverage would remain for the time being because right now the United States has partially fulfilled its side of the bargain. It has uh lifted the siege. It has lifted the sanctions on Iran's oil-related exports. But as I said, it's violating the deal in the strait. It's violating the deal in Lebanon because effectively in accordance with the MOU they are responsible for the Israeli regime leaving and also they've so far uh refrained from releasing Iran's frozen assets. Now um some say that there has been some movement on that front but uh at least for now they're the assets still remain beyond the control of the Iranians. So uh the nuclear program is important leverage and uh unless the Americans resolve these issues uh in the MOU for the first phase the Iranians are not going to negotiate the the nuclear program. So that is important leverage. Another um important point that has to be kept in mind is that Iran controls the strait of Hormuz and it can make the movement of ships through the strait more difficult. So Iran in accordance with the deal uh in the second month of the deal it uh the strait is supposed to be normalized in the in the in the with regards to the number of ships that go through. In other words, in a couple of weeks from now uh the strait should look a bit like what it was four or five months ago or let's say five months ago. So, the Americans have their own leverage. The Iranians have their own leverage, but I think that uh well, I don't think I'm I'm very confident that the Iranians are not going to be compromised and after the events today and what we're going to see in Iraq because we were going to have a funeral procession in uh the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala as well as later in as well as in Qom in Iran and then ultimately in this Chad the holy the city of Mashhad in northeastern Iran. So I think that the events today and in the subsequent days are going to uh Iran's result when it comes to the negotiating table in the in the next stage and I don't think we're going to have actually in and I don't think we're going to have negotiations at high level for the time being for this very same reason. Uh, we we've had technical negotiations in uh Tehran and we may have I think technical negotiations next week perhaps but since there's no movement in Lebanon the Iranians have said that for now for for the time being uh they're not interested in having direct negotiations between Dr. Khalib and Vance.
>> Right. Uh, Professor Mearsheimer, I'm going to bring this back to you. Um, and you've spoken extensively on the regional hegemony and um Israel um you know trying to make sure that some part some forces of United States remain within the region just so as to have as what you called I think a fire department ready for call um in many ways but United States has its own interests there as well that it would like to protect. So given the position of a strait of Hormuz is Iran emerging as a fourth center of global power and does the changing relationship with between the Saudis and Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, the bloc that seems to be forming um is it an opportunity um uh or a strategic problem for Iran as well as the United States, Israel um you know unity and then what is your take on the Saudi proposal to host a summit between the region powers um or the regional Muslim or Arab blocs that are that are present in the region?
>> Well, I think uh it's uh too strong to say that Iran is emerging as sort of the fourth great power in the world. Uh, I think there are three great powers in the world. The United States, China, and Russia. Uh, and I do not think Iran is a great power. Uh, or will be a great power anytime soon. I do think however that today Iran is in a much more powerful position in its neighborhood in the Persian Gulf or in the Middle East more generally than it was on February 27th. Uh, I think that if you look at what's happened over the course of the war, uh there's no question that Iran's position has improved greatly. Uh, as I said before, if you look at the June 17th memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, uh remember the United States is the most powerful state on the planet. And the memorandum of understanding in my opinion is a victory for Iran. So this tells you that Iran has done very well in this war. I actually think that before the war started, most people in the world, and this includes inside Iran, didn't appreciate how much potential power Iran had. And once the war started and the fighting began, it became clear that Iran had significant coercive leverage over the United States. Uh, and it had significant military capability in terms of attacking uh American bases in the region uh the Gulf States and Israel itself. Uh, so there's no question that today almost everybody recognizes that Iran is an impressive military power in the region in ways that they did not understand that on February 27th. But again, I think it's too much to say that Iran is on the verge of becoming a great power or anything like that. Now, what about the diplomatic environment? We're talking about the strategic environment or the military balance of power uh at the start here, but what about the diplomatic environment? This is a complicated situation, but I think that here there's no question that um Iran is in a much better position today than it was uh on February 27th. First of all, on February 27th, it looked like the United States had a formidable alliance structure in place with the Gulf States, with the six GCC states. There were American bases all over the region that looked like they were excellent platforms for projecting US military power. The United States apparently had a security umbrella over all of the Gulf States. Uh, but once the war started, it became very clear that the Iranians had the capability, the military capability to destroy or badly damage those bases. And furthermore, the reliability of the United States uh as a security ally for those six Gulf States uh melted away. It became clear to almost all those Gulf states that if anything, the United States with its bases on their territory acted like a giant magnet that attracted Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. So I think you have a situation now where the six Gulf states have a vested interest in working out some sort of modus vivendi with Iran and distancing themselves somewhat from the United States. The close relationship between the United States and the Gulf States that existed on February 27th has gone away and you're going to have a new set of relations between the United States and the Gulf States. And furthermore, those Gulf states have a deep-seated interest in not getting into another war with Iran because Iran's missile capability and drone capability is only going to increase over time and that is going to be more threatening than ever to the Gulf States. So I think the Gulf States will have a much more positive approach in their dealings with Iran than they had before February 28th. So that is very very important. I would also add that since October 7th, 2023 uh when the Gaza conflict started and the Israelis uh launched the genocide, uh Israel's position in the Middle East has deteriorated significantly. Countries like Turkey uh and countries like Egypt are deeply fearful of Israel. States all over the region see Israel in many ways as a greater threat than Iran. And I think this works to Iran's advantage. Uh, I think up until February 28th, the Israelis and the Americans were very effective at portraying Iran as the font of all evil, as the devil incarnate, as the cause of all trouble in the Middle East. And they did a quite good job of portraying Israel as the good guy. I think those days are over with. And I think fear of Israel across the region, all you have to do is look at what's happening in Lebanon, what's happening in Syria, what's happening in the West Bank, and of course, there's a genocide going on in Gaza. All these things make it manifestly clear that Israel is a threat to stability in the region in ways that Iran is not. Iran has not started any wars. Iran did not start the war on February 28th. Iran did not start uh the 12-day war in June 2025. Right? So, I think overall Iran's diplomatic situation in the Middle East has improved significantly. This is not to argue that they're in a perfect environment because it's a very complicated world in the Middle East and there are all sorts of coalitions and alliances and hatreds and friendships that you know make life difficult from a diplomatic point of view for Iran. But I think generally speaking, Iran is in a much better diplomatic situation today and it's in a much better military situation today. And again to repeat myself, I think this is reflected in the memorandum of understanding which was signed on 17 June which I think in many ways from an American perspective is a surrender document.
Thank you Dr. Mearsheimer. Dr. Morandi, let me just sort of uh build on that and just sort of ask you for the perspective on um relations with the Gulf States since um June 17th. Have you seen some kind of um reaching out by some of the Gulf States, especially the UAE, or do you believe that the UAE is still very much solidly in Israel's camp? And again, how do you feel about this emerging bloc? I think there was an article in Foreign Policy that dubbed it this "Sura Axis" that includes Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt in trying to sort of create some kind of a rapprochement with Iran. Do you also see it that way? Um, and I'll also come back to another question about um Ayatollah Khamenei's um response to this um memorandum of understanding. You were your internet was slightly glitching when you were responding to Atika. So we can come back to that.
>> Sure. Uh, the Iranians and these five countries in the Persian Gulf meaning Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia and uh uh Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Emirates. Uh, negotiations have been going on between Iran and these five countries. But they're basically one-on-one negotiations. They're not uh Iran is not dealing with them as a collective. Iran's relationship with Oman is a is different. Oman refused to participate in the war against Iran. Bases in Oman were not used to attack Iran uh to bomb Iran. So Iran's will so Oman has benefited a lot from this relationship and Iran has also offered to uh work together with Oman uh with regards to the strait of Hormuz. Of course, Oman is under a lot of pressure from the United States. You recall Trump threatened to destroy Oman or bomb Oman and that forced them to pull back. But the Iranians have continued to say that the offer still stands. But Iran also warned Oman. Said if you do not want to participate, we will control the strait ourselves. So that shows Iran's determination to to continue controlling the the strait of Hormuz. I think we can based on public knowledge we can see that there has been some change. First of all, we saw the Saudi delegation in Tehran uh for the uh funeral, but also when the United States would violate the ceasefire against Iran during the past few weeks which uh we all recall on I think a number of five, six occasions at least the United States violated the ceasefire and then Iran struck back. On these occasions, Iran struck did not strike Saudi Arabia. It did not strike Qatar and it didn't even strike the Emirates with all the difficulties that exist between Iran and the UAE. So, I think that does indicate that some some changes are being made. And I do know that uh when the Iranians went to the UAE to negotiate, the Emiratis were uh very flexible in in conceding certain uh issues to or at least repairing some of the damage that was done to the relationship with Iran. And were saying that the Israelis desperately trying to divide our country for us, meaning the Iran, which of the question and uh and on the last occasion they also hit uh uh uh Jordan, US assets in Jordan, which Jordan is another case. It's a different a separate file. So I I would say that relationship between Iran and uh the more the more important countries in the Persian Gulf have improved. That doesn't mean that there will not be some sort of relapse. Uh, that's quite possible. We saw when Iran broke the siege in um Yemen and a passenger plane flew to Sana'a, the capital of Yemen, the Saudis tried to block the the plane from landing and apparently Yemeni anti-aircraft systems uh drove them away and the Iranian aircraft landed and a second Iranian plane landed later. But the fact that the Saudis tried to again this is based on public information. The Saudis tried to prevent the Iranian civilian aircraft from landing shows that the problems between Iran and Saudi Arabia uh are are very much uh there in place. So uh we can say that there has been some improvement and there is a history of this after the uh eight-year war but when Saddam invaded Iran with the encouragement of the United States and near the end of the war during the last few months the United States entered the war directly on behalf of Saddam uh and downed and they downed an Iranian airliner killing 290 people, just a couple of the the anniversary was just two or three days ago.
>> So in after that war and during that war these countries especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait but all of them were involved they funded Saddam's war machine and hundreds at least 200 over $200 billion uh were provided and back then of course $200 billion was worth a lot more than it is today. So when Saddam invaded Kuwait uh and foolishly destroyed his own country and brought the region into created a new environment in the region where the United States was able to have a permanent presence. At that time these countries in the Persian Gulf decided or wanted rapprochement with Iran and Iran encouraged it. Relations improved and during the 1990s rel the relations between Iran and these countries were relatively they were relatively good not ideal but they were a lot better than in the 1980s. So it is possible for rapprochement to um to envisage rapprochement again and to have a a better uh relationship between Iran and these countries. After all, they do recognize that Iran, as Professor Mearsheimer pointed out, Iran is in a much stronger position today. Uh, I don't know what rank Iran would be in world powers, but uh today Iran is more assertive. You can already see that. For example, the Taliban is more flexible about uh girls going to school in areas which are culturally closer to Iran uh in like the Tajik areas or the Hazara areas uh at least uh at least to a point um or for example um the uh Iran will not is more assertive about uh Armenia uh because there's a lot of talk that Armenia may uh allow the United States to create a corridor and as a result uh Armenia may lose sovereignty over its border region with Iran. Iran has said it won't tolerate that in the past, but now Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey know that if Iran says it will not tolerate that, Iran has the means to prevent it. And and also in northern Iraq, we see that Iran constantly strikes at uh uh the separatist groups that are based there funded by the West and the Israelis. And in the past, they wouldn't do that. And the Iraqi government would constantly protest, but Iran is literally sometimes on a daily basis striking these bases, the bases of these groups. And the Iraqi government is much more tolerant. And the Kurdish government in Erbil in northern Iraq, the local government is much more tolerant about it than before. And I think it's reflective of the fact that they they see that Iran has uh the power to uh to uh to carry out such uh attacks and not to be feel threatened by the other side. So I I you do see a lot of changes and also when the Iranians begin uh claiming fees in the strait of Hormuz that'll also be very problematic for the sanctions regime because during the few weeks that Iran was uh before the MOU because during the MOU Iran has promised not to take fees for the for the two months before was getting fees from ships. They were to get whatever they needed dollars if they wanted yuan if whatever they needed the the ships would have to provide otherwise they'll just not have access to the Persian Gulf or they would not be able to leave the Persian Gulf and that causes a lot of damage to the sanctions regime and the maximum pressure sanctions that the United States has worked so hard to impose on Iran during the last few decades. So when ships in order to simply pass through the strait, they have to adhere to Iran's demands. Of course, the demands are the the Iranian fees, it's well structured, but in some instances, uh they have the the Iranians say we'll pay in dollars or pay in yuan or pay in I guess Bitcoin or whatever it is that they do. It makes it much more easy for Iran to uh to circumvent US sanctions in in many many ways. And finally, going back to what said about the u the the uh the agreement and negotiations, it's not clear to me exactly what he was referring to in his letter because obviously there's a context and the communications between the leader and the supreme national members of the Supreme National Security Council are are top secret. So I don't know the nature of uh of of his concerns but there are different interpretations in in broader society some of which I don't I don't uh believe to be accurate. Some say that he was heavily attacking the negotiators. There's no mention of the chief negotiator in the letter but what it does say is that what it does show is that there is a lot of debate in Iran. Iran in the letter effectively the leader was saying that despite me despite having in principle a different position, it's not clear on what his position was different, but he will uh allow the Supreme National Security Council to go forward with the negotiations but he expects that all of the Iranian demands in the agreement be fulfilled and the letter itself shows that the internal discussions and debates in Iran are are are very um um are very much a part of daily life. They're very normal and that uh the leader too when he sees that a strong majority have a differing view than he does, he will go along with their position and allow them to push forward the agenda.
>> Thank you Dr. Morandi. Dr. Mearsheimer, would you like to respond at all to Dr. Morandi before I ask my next question to you?
>> No, you should ask your next question.
>> All right. Um, so u you know nearly 50 delegations attended Ayatollah Khamenei's funeral this week um including Russia, China, India and others while Western governments were pointedly not invited. From a great power politics lens, what does this kind of gathering actually tell us about a hardening non-Western bloc? And could you also um sort of talk about China and Russia's role going forward given that a bilateral Iran-US track has now been established? Do you think they have been sidelined or will they continue to play a role and have leverage?
>> Well, I think that there is no question that over the past few years, both China and Russia have come to realize that the United States is a mortal enemy. Uh, it's very important to understand that although Trump has emphasized, President Trump has emphasized that he would uh like to improve relations with Putin and that he's interested in shutting down uh the war in Ukraine. Uh, he has nevertheless continued to support Ukraine. The United States has continued to support Ukraine under President Trump uh in ways that are designed to uh knock Russia out of the ranks of the great powers. Uh, the United States and the Europeans and the West more generally is interested in uh seeing Russia defeated in its war with Ukraine. The Russians now realize that I think Putin for a while had hoped that uh he could improve relations with the United States and uh settle the Ukraine war on terms that were favorable to Russia. But I think that Putin now understands that's not possible. And of course, the Chinese view the United States as a mortal threat as well. So what's happened here is that both uh China and Russia have come closer together over time. They're actually quite close allies. They work together. Now, a country like Iran is in a similar situation to China and Russia, as is North Korea. All four of these countries understand that the United States is a mortal enemy. Uh, just listening to Dr. Morandi talk, there's no question that the Iranians understand that uh the United States uh has its gun sights in Iran and would like to destroy Iran if it could. It would like to break Iran up into pieces the way Syria uh was broken up into pieces. Uh, so you have this situation where the Russians and the Chinese understand that Iran is a natural ally and the Iranians understand that the Chinese and the Russians are natural allies. So you've had a coming together of those three countries in recent time. Uh, and I believe that there is evidence that the Chinese and the Russians are helping the Iranians with intelligence and with weaponry and I believe that with the passage of time uh Chinese and Russian assistance to Iran will increase. Furthermore, in the case of China, China is growing increasingly powerful with the passage of time. There's even talk that at some point in the not too distant future, China may surpass the United States as the most powerful country in the world. If that is the case, China will try to increase its influence greatly in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf. As we all know, China gets lots of oil from Iran. Uh, China and Iran have a vested interest in having very good relations. So my basic point here is that once you get outside the non-Western world and you talk about balance of power politics, nitty-gritty balance of power politics, you want to think long and hard about the fact that China, Russia, and Iran all have a deep-seated interest in working together as much as possible to deal with the United States. And of course, in the case of Iran, uh it's not just dealing with the United States, it's dealing with Israel as well. As Dr. Morandi said, uh the Israelis uh have uh no interest in seeing the United States work out any kind of accommodation with Iran. And the Israelis will go to great lengths to do everything they can uh to undermine any possible rapprochement between Iran and the United States. There's no question about that. Uh, so from an Iranian point of view, you're not only dealing with the United States, you're dealing with Israel as well. As I like to say, Israel and the United States are basically a tag team. Uh, but the fact is that the United States is uh the key foe uh for Iran, for Russia and for China. So I think moving forward uh if Iran plays its cards smartly uh it will have a significant opportunity uh to get help from the Russians and to get help from the Chinese uh in its dealings with the United States and with Israel. And when you marry that to the fact that the US alliance with the six Gulf states is in tatters and US military bases in the Gulf are badly damaged if not destroyed. Again, I think Iran is in a position where it can uh enhance its security moving forward uh by forming alliances or by forming close relations with these various great powers and with countries uh in the Gulf as well.
>> I have a quick follow-up to that, Dr. Mearsheimer, and that's about Israel and America's relations. You said that America's relations with its Gulf allies is in tatters. Um, do you think there has been somewhat of a rupture that this war has created between Israel and the US given um Trump and Netanyahu's recent confrontations and being sort of very public about um you know telling Netanyahu who the boss is especially when it comes to Trump?
>> Yeah, there's no question there's been a rupture uh in terms of public opinion in the United States. There's actually been a sea change. It's remarkable how much hostility there is towards Israel in the body politic. And you even see evidence of this inside the Democratic party for sure, but even inside the Republican party. And I think Tucker Carlson is a bellwether on this. Although Tucker Carlson has just abandoned the Republican party, but he's been a lifelong Republican, but at the policy level, hardly anything has changed. It's just very important to understand that there's no question that President Trump has used very hot rhetoric when talking about Israel itself and Prime Minister Netanyahu in particular. There's no question about that. But in terms of the actual policy of the United States towards Israel, there has been hardly any change at all. And the reason for that is that the lobby is enormously powerful. You just cannot underestimate how powerful the Israel lobby is inside the United States when it comes to influencing the policy of the administration that controls the White House. Now, again, there's no question that Israel and the lobby have lost their ability to control the discourse. The discourse has gotten away from them. And the discourse is amazingly critical of Israel these days compared to what it has been in the past. There's no question about that. But that's just the discourse at the policy level. When you talk about what's happening in Congress, what's happening inside of the White House, the lobby is still deadly effective at getting the United States to support Israel. And this is what makes the whole question of what's going on in southern Lebanon so interesting. Uh, I mean it's quite clear that the Iranians have told uh the United States and you see this in the memorandum of understanding uh that uh Israel uh has to get out of southern Lebanon and it has to stop its military campaign against Hezbollah. And of course, the Israelis are refusing to do that. And the Iranians have said that they will not have direct negotiations with uh the United States uh in terms of settling the memorandum of understanding until the Israelis leave southern Lebanon. Now, whether that happens or not is a very interesting question because again, the lobby and Israel itself will go to great lengths to make sure that the United States does not force Israel to leave southern Lebanon. So that in many ways is the key issue that is looming out there regarding how effective Israel will be uh at thwarting American efforts uh to make the memorandum of understanding work.
>> Sure.
>> Thank you. Um, Dr. Morandi, I'm going to pick up on a few points that you mentioned and uh Professor Mearsheimer talked about public perception. I think there's been a you know a big change that we see in the United States and across the globe and Iran has often often been discussed in the West through the lens of sanctions or caricatures of their um you know their leaders. So yet despite these decades of pressure, we've seen major gains being made within Iran whether it's you know their education or science or technology with adult literacy of 85 to 89% and the youth literacy I think which was staggering in 98 to 99%. So um one of the fears in the global south um or the Gulf countries in particular has been the spillover effect where people or countries which are so to say developing or third world when they see that you can
outlast or grow independent. Um, in face of adversaries, they may want to take that road as well. So, what is, how would you explain that, or what lessons, um, and experience these countries may take, uh, from this recent war?
Um, and I also want to talk about, uh, a little bit about the Supreme Leader, uh, who, you know, you have his admirers and his critics. Um, but, uh, you know, his political and leadership style, I think, is often being misconceived, um, in the sense that people, uh, saw him in the robes and the turban, and that brings an automatic, uh, sort of stereotype to their head. But what people didn't realize was how well he, well-read he was, or that he was familiar with Western literature, or that, uh, more recently, I found it fascinating that he had seen Prison Break, which people were, the young Iranians were talking about online as well. He is a historical, complex, layered, uh, figure. How would you describe him to people who do not know him?
Well, first, um, I, I, I'd like to point out one thing, and that is that, uh, what Professor Mir Shimeimer has said is, I think, something that for decision-makers in Iran is very important, and that is that, and this is something that I've been, uh, talking about here in Iran as well, and that is that, on, on the one hand, there has been, as Professor Mshimer pointed out, a sea change in public opinion. The body politic of the United States has changed dramatically, uh, both among, uh, supporters of the Democratic Party, increasing among supporters or former supporters of the Republican Party, and independents. But the elites, the ruling class in the United States, they've remained completely unchanged, or at least almost completely unchanged. And, um, what Iran should do, and what I think it's trying to do, is that by using leverage, and that's economic pressure, mostly military pressure accompanies it, but ultimately, it's economic pressure. It is attempting to use, to, to push the elites, who are already under some pressure from society at large, which has turned against the Israeli regime. It wants to put pressure on the, the state, or on the elites, to make a decision between America's priorities and Israeli priorities.
So, when there's economic pressure on the United States, the United States agreed to the, uh, and actually, they agreed to the, in particularly after Iran was, when Iran decided to fire missiles at the Israelis, and Trump immediately gave the concessions that were blocking, that were necessary in order to come to an agreement, because there was, uh, the, the two sides were far apart on a number of issues. He gave those concessions, and we had the deal. Why? Not, I don't think it was because he was worried about a few missiles or some missiles striking, uh, Israel. I think he was mostly concerned that this would lead to further, uh, strikes and and warfare, and that would, uh, prevent the, any agreement, and thus the Strait of Hormuz would be closed for a longer period of time. And as you recall, when he agreed, when he was justifying the, uh, and his agreement, and and agreeing to this, uh, to this deal, he said that we are four weeks away from a fuel shortage or an oil crisis. Uh, so I think the Iranians appreciate that, and that is, uh, the leverage that they have over the United States to force the United States to make a move on in Lebanon, or to abide by its commitments in, uh, despite the wishes of the Israeli regime. I'm not saying it will happen, but I'm saying that, um, that is, I think, the objective. And of course, Professor M pointed out, it is all the nuclear issue. If the United States wants a deal with Iran, because they have no deal, and Trump always talks about how he's going to have a deal, if they want a deal, then again, that's leverage, and, uh, the United States will have to do certain things that the Israeli regime, uh, would not like.
So, uh, with the public, with public opinion as it is in the United States, and the economic pressures that exist, the Iranians, I think, have the opportunity, perhaps, to, uh, to create some sort of slight wedge, or somewhat significant wedge, between, uh, its, uh, its decision-making, its decision that the, the course it chooses to take, and the course, the course of action that the Israeli regime would, uh, uh, would rather take instead. So, that is one issue with regards to, uh, Iran's successes.
Yes, I think it's going to have an enormous impact. Uh, the fact that the United States has failed in this war, and, uh, Robert Kagan, uh, for example, the godfather of the neocons, calling this a catastrophic defeat, an unprecedented defeat, or military defeat, for the United States. I think that this is going, that, uh, is indicative of how, uh, important this, the events of the past few months have been, and I think what, what we see, what we saw today, contributes to that. So, you are going to see countries, uh, across the world rethink, to different degrees. You're not, I don't think you're going to see Venezuela suddenly tomorrow morning, uh, revolting against the, uh, against US domination. But I think it's going to be much more difficult for the Americans to retain control, such as we see in the Persian Gulf, and I think also in the Caucuses.
In fact, um, all the countries that participated in the funeral ceremony in Iran, they were threatened by the United States. The US State Department warned them not to participate. And heads of state, heads of state from multiple countries participated at a time when Iran is being threatened with military action by the Israeli regime, and and by Trump. He constantly threatens Iran. So, despite that, you see that heads of state, or high-ranking officials, from numerous countries, but largely from Central Asia, from the Caucuses, from the subcontinent, uh, from the Middle East, participating in Tehran. And that is, that these are the areas that are most important for Iran, whether, you know, China. So, uh, these are the, the countries that are, are of priority for Iran, because they're neighboring countries. Iran does business with them. Iran does trade with them. And, um, and so I think that this itself is indicative of the changes that are taking place, um, with regards to harmony.
Yes, I think there, of course, is a, is an understanding of Iran in the West. It's a dystopia, and life is horrible, and it's extremely impoverished. That is, is not a, it's not a huge exaggeration to, to say that a lot of people think that this is what Iran is like. Whereas in, in reality, Iran has a very, very, uh, sophisticated, uh, it's a very sophisticated country, very complicated and complex society. We have, uh, Azaris, we have Persians, we have Kurds, we have Arabs, we have Turkmans. I mean, Qom is an Azeri city, and Qom means from Qom. So, he is he is Azeri. President Pzishkan, his mother is Kurdish, and his father is Turkish. He's from Tabriz, an Azeri city. Marandi means from Marand. Marand is an Azeri city in Iran. So, um, Iran is a, is a very mixed society with multiple languages, and, um, and it is a country where, where its constitution is, uh, has created very strong state institutions that have worked effectively. I've made, I've given this example on multiple occasions. When was martyred at the beginning of the war, we didn't have a leader for at least a week, and yet the country functioned very well. So, the, and they also attacked the armed forces. It was, it was not normal conditions, but the state functioned. So, so we saw that, of course, there was a leadership council, but it's the president, and the head of the judiciary, and, uh, a member, a representative from the Guardian Council, who form a leadership, uh, committee until a new leader is chosen. But that's not an effective means for ruling a country. That's just to immediately transit power. They couldn't have the meeting for the Council of Experts to choose a new leader because the Israelis and the Americans wanted to bomb them. So, it was delayed for a while. Yet, the country functioned. The, the armed forces were striking back at the Americans, at the Israelis. Uh, the, uh, you didn't see, uh, people running into supermarkets and taking all the goods. Everything was normal. Uh, at, I didn't go to any, I didn't see any, uh, gas stations during the last, during the first last, first couple of days, but let's say on day three or four, when I was, I drove by, uh, different, through different neighborhoods, I saw gas stations. I didn't see any queues or lines, uh, at these stations. So, Iran was very normal, and I think that shows how sophisticated society is, and how strong the state institutions are.
The war itself. Uh, he, of course, he was popular before the war, but, uh, people in Iran saw that in the Iranian, in the Iranian political sphere, he was criticized heavily for decades because of his drone program, because of the drone program that he supported. He was criticized for his missile, for the missile program that he promoted. Different, uh, administrations tried to cut the budget for the military in order to hamper these programs. And, uh, during the, well, during one administration was very heavily, and he, uh, had a difficult time in moving it forward. Or the underground bases that were being created were ridiculed, uh, by many in political. I mean, the leader is not, in, in media in Iran, he's not openly, viciously attacked, but he's criticized. Or, or if he's, if they're going to insult him, they'll, they'll insult him in a way which is, uh, is subtle, but it's clear. It was always clear that he was being attacked for, for these programs. And then ultimately, it turns out that it was these programs that saved the country, that prevented the, the superpower from defeating Iran, and which led Iran to defeat the superpower. During the, after it became clear that Iran was not going to fall. Let's say after a week or so. I'm just making up these numbers. I mean, I think probably that's not completely inaccurate. But after a week or so, let's say, when it was clear that Iran was not going to fall, then they began to say, well, um, if Iran can survive, this will be, this will constitute a victory. But that's not how it ended. By day 39 or 40, Iran was bombing, was striking US and Israeli targets and retaliating in the Persian Gulf, uh, day and night, 24 hours a day, uh, destroying US bases across the Persian Gulf region, or badly, and badly damaging others. So, uh, he, it was his leadership, I think, with hindsight, was seen as, uh, as, as quite, is very wise, when it comes to military matters. And those who attacked him turned out to be wrong. And some of them actually came on television and said that, admitted that, that we were wrong. If, if one of, one, uh, politician who was on television during the war, or I think maybe after the war, I'm not quite sure when, but, uh, one of his critics was saying that, if the country was in our hands, if the armed forces was in our hands, Iran would have been destroyed, which was a, you know, very interesting comment for me, and a very intellectually honest comment for him to say.
But he was a very eloquent speaker, very well-versed in literature, um, his, his command of Azeri literature, extraordinary. He was a very close friend of the most important Azeri poet, perhaps in history. And, um, but also his command of Arabic and Arabic literature, and he speaks English. I said this one. I, I've never said this before until just very recently, just, I think maybe yesterday, and I'll just say it again. Maybe, uh, Professor Mir Shimemer and you, the two of you would be interested. Um, um, when I first, I, I, I got involved with media by accident, and it's a long story, but anyway, at some point after the 2009 elections in Iran, the presidential elections, which were disputed, and President Ahmadinejad won, and it was clear that he won. There was no, uh, fraud, even though I didn't vote for him, and I was no fan of his, but, uh, I, I went in public in international media and said that the, the, this is a valid election, the, the results are valid. And then I was invited by, um, Fakhravar on CNN, and it was supposed to be a 20-minute debate, and it was, and they were supposed to show it in full, but they only showed 8 minutes of it, um, and the really good parts were deleted. But it's still, those, I, those 8 minutes, I don't think went very well for him. But he was very aggressive towards me, insulting me, attacking me, making it very personal, and I'm not even in the government, but in case I never was, uh, a few weeks later, and he, he said, he, sort of congratulated me on a job well done. And, I, I don't remember exactly what he said, but he, he, he praised me, I guess, in a subtle way. And then he said, "I'm surprised at Mr. As, at the hosts of the program. I, from what I've read of him, from what I've read, from his writings, he didn't seem to be such an emotional and angry person." And I thought he was, I, I'm, I'm again, these are my words, that I, I expected him to be better than that, something like that. And, uh, so he reads, he reads in, well, he read in English, he would read novels in English. And, uh, so he had, this is the sort of person he was.
He was, of course, um, a major religious scholar in Shia Islam. Because the gates of jurisprudence are open, or the gates of Ijtihad are open, he, as a Mujtahid, he, his, he has had a very important impact on jurisprudence, especially since he deals with today's issues. Because in Shia jurisprudence, time and place are very important. In other words, the, the literature, the tradition that exists is, of course, key, but time and place is also very important. A ruling in Brazil, from a ruling in Tehran, and the ruling today could be different than a ruling, uh, five years from now, or 30 years ago. So, he had an impact on jurisprudence because he was dealing with a lot of issues. He, uh, promoted, for example, he, he promotes high-tech. He's been promoting high-tech. I keep seeing he does. He promoted high-tech industries, STEM, in stem cell research. Iran wasn't, was one of, is, I guess, one of the most advanced countries in the world, nanotechnology, and so on. So, he, he was a person who was very sophisticated. He, um, was a person who tried to keep everyone on board this ship. In other words, when one faction in Iran would be elected, he would try to make sure that the opposing faction would stay on the same ship, that they would cooperate together. So, you had Mr. Rafsanjani, and then you had Mr. Khatami, who was a reformist, and then you had Ahmadinejad, who was very different from Mr. Khatami, and then after that, you, so you had Rouhani, and then Raisi, and then now President Pzishkan. So, during these years, he has tried very hard to keep the different factions in Iran, the different political parties, working together. And, um, the result is what you see, what you saw on the streets of Tehran today.
Thank you very much, um, Dr. Mandi. Um, Dr. Commission, just to wind up, um, as a final question. The United States just celebrated its 250th Independence Day, and it has been sort of a beacon, um, sort of a role model in terms of freedom, democracy, uh, you know, freedom of speech, social justice, um, and how well we've done, you know, people debate, but at least we've tried. So, if you had to distill a central lesson of US foreign policy or policy in general, and one principle, or if you, how would you, um, you know, state that? And going forward, what are the changes you think the United States should make, as far as Iran or broader, you know, Global South or Middle East is concerned, so that we keep this power intact moving forward?
Well, I've been paying serious attention to security affairs for probably about 60 years now. Uh, and over the course of those 60 years, I would say I've learned two lessons that really matter in terms of thinking how the United States should approach foreign policy. Um, and the first is, I think that it's very important to understand the limits of military power. And I think that many people inside the United States, uh, at the elite level, uh, do not fully appreciate, uh, the limits of military power. Uh, I'm somebody who spent 10 years of my life in the American military. Uh, I went to West Point, uh, and I am a realist. And realists believe that the balance of power really matters. So, it's not like I don't think that military power matters. It does matter. But I think it's very important for any country to understand the limits of power. And I think if you don't understand the limits of power, you get yourself into trouble. Uh, and this is what happened to the United States when I was young, in Vietnam. It's what happened in Afghanistan. It's what happened in Iraq. And it's what's now happened in Iran. Uh, Donald Trump thought that the United States, certainly working with the Israelis, was in a position where it could use its awesome military power, uh, to get the Iranians to surrender and to do what the Americans wanted. And here we have a situation where, if anything, Iran won the war. And this is just another illustration to me, uh, of the limits of military power. And I think that the United States, uh, uh, here on its 250th birthday, should pay very important, pay attention to the very important argument that you can only do so much with military power.
The second thing I've learned over the years that I think is very relevant for the United States today is that it is not a good idea to run around the world, uh, and interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. Uh, it's not a good idea to engage in social engineering. Uh, I think there's no question that the United States is, in many ways, an admirable society. It has some deep-seated flaws, for example. Uh, but I personally think that liberal democracy, when it works, is a wonderful political system. But I think you get yourself into a whole heck of a lot of trouble when you go into other countries and you try to facilitate regime change, you try to do social engineering, and you try to make those countries look like the United States. If you go back to the Bush Doctrine, which was formulated right before we, uh, uh, invaded, uh, Iraq, that was on March 19th of 2003. The Bush Doctrine basically called for democratizing the entire Middle East, including Iran and Syria. It's very important to understand that Iraq was just the first stop on the railroad line. We were going to bring social change, political change to all sorts of other countries. Of course, we never got beyond Iraq at the time. But later on, in 2026, we decided that we were going to ferment regime change in Iran. And by the way, we were engaged in regime change in Syria and helped bring down Assad. My basic point here is that the United States should get out of the business of regime change. It should get out of the business of social engineering, and it should understand the limits of military power. And you asked the question, how does this apply to the Middle East? As I've tried to make clear in my previous comments here, I think it applies in spades to the Middle East. It applied to Iraq. It applied to Syria. It applied to Iran and other countries in the region as well. The United States should understand that using military power in the Middle East should be kept at a minimum. And number two, we should let people inside those countries decide for themselves what kind of political system they want to have, just like we would expect them to allow us to have the kind of political system we would like to have, and then get out of the business of social engineering. So, those would be sort of the two lessons I've learned, uh, over the years, uh, that I think, uh, should be put up in bright lights on America's 250th birthday.
Well, thank you so much. Um, those are indeed two very important points, and we discuss amongst ourselves as well as well as our interactions with, uh, you know, intellectuals like yourself. I'd like to thank Professor Mirandi, Dr. Shimmer, um, and we hope to continue these discussions in the future. I think it's very important for the people of our regions to kind of get over the obstacles, uh, you know, that hinder peace, um, or, you know, that that have been leading to constant wars. Thank you very much.
Thank you very much for having me. Thank you both.