Transcription
And as, of course, the war keeps, uh, going, the world's on edge as well. Many regional observers say that Iran's resilience is thanks in part to the lifeline extended by two key allies: Russia and China.
Well, international affairs commentator Doug Herbert is joining me here on set. Doug, Russia and China, I mean, at least publicly, um, they both say de-escalation, don't they? That's what they say they're seeking. But Western observers say both countries are providing crucial support to Thran to keep it in the fight, as it were. I mean, what are they reportedly doing?
>> Helping Iran both politically and militarily, and otherwise, even if it's not always that explicit, very unexplicit. Uh, look, credit first where credit's due, right? Iran has shown its self-reliance, its ability; it prides itself on that culture.
Um, Iran has effectively, no matter what the Trump administration says, has effectively been the one that's been able to keep the Straight of Hormuz closed, a straight responsible for about a fifth of the world's shipping of oil and gas. Um, it has also shown that it has a high threshold for pain tolerance, especially economic pain. Um, the CIA recently saying that it could hold out for several more months, uh, before the economic bite would start to hit. So, let's put that aside. Iran has done a lot for itself to prove its metal in this face-off with two far larger military powers: the US and Israel.
What's Russia and Iran doing? Well, they're both helping through what's called this "access of evasion," evading sanctions. That is, helping to supply Iran with the materials, the dual-use technology components that it needs to basically keep its drone factories running, to replenish its military, to help it better target, pinpoint, um, American and its allies' sites throughout the Middle East region, to do damage assessments afterwards. All of that type of intel.
So, Russia specifically sending sophisticated drones, uh, Iran's way, uh, upgraded technology from the types of drones Iran supplied Russia that it had used in the war against Ukraine. Russia's taken those drones, upgraded them, sending them now and that technology to Iran. Iran using that, uh, those adapted drones, drone targeting technology, cyber warfare technology, signals and electronic, uh, intelligence technology. This all according to eur US and European, uh, officials, saying that even if Russia doesn't explicitly acknowledge it, there is this very, very developed now, uh, sanction-busting network and interconnected supply chain, if you will, between Russia and Iran and China.
Which gets me to China. What's China doing? China is, uh, helping Iran with, uh, things like radar systems, satellite navigation, electronic warfare technology, and here's another crucial element: China is also buying Iran's oil. We've seen what happens, uh, you know, when China buys, uh, Russia's oil. Buying Iran's oil definitely helps Iran. So, both China and Russia, part of this "access of evasion," interconnected supply chains, helping Iran to keep its metal in the fight, in its showdown with the US and Israel, even as both Russia and China also try to keep the Western allies on side and try not to do or say too much, especially China, to sort of alienate the US, which is still considered a partner it needs.
>> So, what's Trump's response to this? I mean, he's already sanctioning, isn't he, Chinese companies accused of helping Iran build drones and missiles? But, I mean, can Washington really just choke off that supply chain?
>> It can try, but it's not succeeding. China, last Friday, uh, basically, Trump said that he was going to apply sanctions to, uh, to, uh, Iran to impede its military drone capacity and all of that. And notable among the targets in those sanctions were Chinese companies, uh, doing the things that I just was talking about, plus some, uh, people and entities in both Barus and the United Arab Emirates. All of that: limited effect.
Why limited effect? Well, one, China is basically almost mocking these sanctions. It has explicitly ordered, according to, uh, the US, uh, media reports, has ordered Chinese companies to basically ignore, to shrug off the, uh, the, the sanctions. "Go about your business. Don't worry about those sanctions from the US."
Um, and remember, China itself and Russia – and I have to reiterate this – the reason the sanctions will have limited effect is they have developed a sophisticated network of trade and shipping to do an end run. That is, to circumvent any type of interdiction or restrictions or sanctions slapped on them by Europe or the US or whoever else. Russia has the Caspian Sea, a landlocked sea we don't often talk about when we're talking about the Straight of Hormuz, but it's been very effective as a waterway for Russia to ship, to ship crucial elements across. And China presumably has its own networks as well.
So, what can Trump do? He can get very mad. He can tweet a lot. He can Truth Social a lot. But in the end, the sanctions are only going to have limited effect because Russia and China have perfected the system of sanctions busting.
And bearing all of that in mind, um, Doug, uh, and to use a Donald Trump, um, term, if you like, who holds all the cards then?
>> No, China holds a lot more cards. Um, uh, that is not really editorializing; it's just if you look at the reality of it.
Uh, China, from its perspective, it sees a US which is on the back foot in a war of choice launched by Trump, where he's right now on the back foot with the economy, uh, gas and food prices rising in the US, and an American, uh, public that polls show again and again are overwhelmingly against this war, even in its early days. Um, and he also sees an energy crisis looming. Donald Trump may say that the US is immune from it, but we've seen the gas prices shooting up in the US. They're over $6 right now for, uh, for a gallon, which is about four liters, a little more, uh, in the United States, in the state of California.
Uh, Xi Jinping, meanwhile, what has he done? Sure, he still has a lot of fossil fuels in his economy, but he's been massively reinvesting and reorienting his economy towards renewables: wind and solar. Notably, that's something the US had been doing, but has stopped doing really at any, uh, quantity under the Trump administration.
So, you have a situation in which, even if obviously the US remains a dominant world economic power – China either neck and neck, either a little bit behind or even a little bit in front, according to which economic statistics – um, you still have a situation in which Xi Jinping feels like the clock is on his side. Feels like the US is doing everything in its own power seemingly to shoot itself in the foot. China doesn't have to do anything; he could just sit there and watch, uh, uh, Donald Trump essentially score own goals from China's perspective.
So, coming into this meeting, Trump would like to think that he could come in pressuring China, bullying China, telling China it has to apply more pressure on Iran to, uh, to basically end this war and end it now, to stop buying oil from Iran. But what is his actual clout? Xi Jinping knows that Trump is weakened. Sure, he's not going to want to alienate the US president. He'll, he's going to play a savvy game of cards. But if you ask me who has more cards going into this first summit by a visiting US president to China in eight years, I would say Xi Jinping. Um, almost just, you know, hands down, it's an obvious assessment.
>> A lot to follow then over the next few days. Doug, thanks very much. Doug Herbert, our international affairs commentator here on France 24.