Transcription
[Music] I would now like to hand the floor to Dr Dean Julius. Dr Julius, please.
Thank you very much, and uh, good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I think this really is the the highlight of our evening. We've been waiting for this time when we would have the opportunity to ask some of our own questions, uh, to a person who's more capable of answering those questions than, uh, than I suspect anyone else we can think of. Uh, it's, it's my great pleasure and privilege to moderate this, this dialogue. Uh, and I thought perhaps I should start with a couple of, uh, big picture questions of the sort that, uh, our dialogues, uh, both today and and tomorrow, the round tables, are going to be thinking about. And then, um, we'll invite you to take it in whatever direction you'd like. I know I have seen that, uh, whatever direction the audience, uh, indeed.
Well, I, uh, someone pointed me to one of your appearances on YouTube, uh, and I was amazed at the, uh, variety of questions that were thrown at you, but also at the, uh, unexpected answers you sometimes gave. I suppose the question that I would start with, uh, is the, the dominant theme, theme that seems to be driving much of our geopolitical discussions these days is the shift in economic power, uh, from West to East. Uh, I think most of us felt this was a natural and indeed, uh, a positive shift as countries became richer, provided it was gradual and didn't upset too many of us in, in the process. But now, with the global financial crisis, many of the countries in Europe, in the United States, and North America, uh, are perhaps facing a very long period of very low growth, while China and other countries in Asia, uh, continue to grow healthily. And I think this raises the question of how will the world look in a decade, uh, and what challenges do, do you see, Mr. Lean, for both East and West as this shift accelerates?
The shift is inevitable because of the numbers of population. It doesn't mean that because China's GDP and India's GDP exceeds that of the US, that they are necessarily stronger. I mean, they've got more resources in their command, they can field larger armed forces, larger navies. But the fact remains that per capita, the US is still very far ahead. And then technology is also very far ahead. Head. But if it happens too rapidly, uh, Chinese may make a miscalculation. They may become more assertive and pushy, which would be contrary to their long-term interest, which is to win over the countries, the smaller countries in the South, onto their side. So they face a contradiction there. So the speed is, is a difficulty.
In your, well, the speed is one of the factors which may make them more assertive than it would otherwise be, because the trend, the long-term trend is inevitable. She numbers, and they're going to catch up, and it'll go back to what it was 200 years ago, when India and China together combined was about 50 to 60% of the world GDP.
And this, and this assertiveness, uh, in China, I think this is another area that I know the conference, uh, here has been exploring. There's a lot of nervousness about China's growing military spending and, uh, ambitions, especially on the naval side. Uh, if it's the case that American presence in the Pacific gets scaled down because of the US budgetary problems, and also because of the political, um, dissatisfaction with the Iraq and the Afghanistan, uh, involvement, if the US gradually scales down its presence in the Pacific, do you see this creating difficulties for Japan, South Korea, uh, the other, uh, non-Chinese countries in this area?
Inevitably, because the whole of all of them combined, Japan, South Korea, India, the whole of ASEAN, can't balance China without the US. The balance is not maintainable.
Will there be an arms race in, in Asia then?
Well, an arms race in which the smaller countries must lose. So it would all depend on China's aggression or lack of it. If, if we come to that.
Well, I'm not, is aggression, s is dominance more than aggression? Sun Tzu says the art of war is to win it without going to war. Yes. And maybe that's what, uh, what is happening with with Taiwan in this long era.
Inevitably. How do you see that playing out? Can you, can you foresee the situation there?
I don't want to sound a, uh, apocalyptic, but I don't see Taiwan being able to resist the pull of the mainland with or without American help. There'll come a time when the Seventh Fleet cannot intervene because of Chinese aircraft carriers. And China has always considered Taiwan a part of China, and they want China to be reunified. The fact that Taiwan was independent from 1989 to the present doesn't make any difference in a long history of China.
Yes. I'm reminded of, uh, Henry Kissinger's book that, uh, I know I've only recently read, and I know you know him very well, when he was relating the history of discussions about Taiwan, uh, with Mao, with Zhou, and with a series of leaders. The view from the Chinese side was, we can wait, but eventually we'll be reunited.
Oh, yes, of course. This, it is an a fixed and immovable object here. Gives us all pause for thought. Perhaps I can give, uh, the audience a chance to ask a few questions. Uh, I think there are some microphones roving, mov around. If, uh, if you raise your hand, someone will find you and, and perhaps you could, could stand and, uh, give us your name and, uh, background or where you're from, uh, as, as you ask a question. There's a gentleman, yes, right here.
Mr. Minister Mentor, it's a great honor and pleasure, as always, uh, to meet you. Serge Caragana from Russia. Now, I've never heard your views on the future of nuclear weapons in the world. Uh, we have started a discussion during our conference whether it's a positive or A negative feature of the future world, where they should be eliminated or they should operate under control. What is, uh, basically your views, not only as a, um, politician, but as a philosopher of strategic thinking?
Nuclear weapons between big powers, I think, is a plus because it stops major wars. Proliferation to the middle and smaller powers adds a high risk of conflict because their long-term planners may act rashly, and the world may come to grief. You imagine, I mean, not just Iran, but every Gulf State, Egypt, even the smaller states in Africa have got nuclear weapons. For the big states, it freezes the world, the configuration, political influence, as it is. For the small states, a very high-risk problem for the world.
[Music]