Transcription
[Music] You are listening to an Art Media podcast.
I think that the Israeli cabinet has deliberately decided to prefer the goal of defeating Kamas over the goal of bringing back the rest of the hostages after completing 80ish% of the mission. It's terrible to speak about it in these terms, but 207 out of 251. Now the paramount goal from the perspective of the Israeli cabinet is to defeat Hamas over bringing all the hostages back home. The IDF chief went to the government and said you know what if this is what you want to do take out the aim or the goal of getting the hostages back or downgrade it. Now to what extent a dialogue there with uh one Ron Durmer and the chief of staff was the chief of staff saying to Ron Durmer and to the head of the Musad why are you here in this room? Why won't you go and negotiate right now before we begin this operation? So this is the level of opposition that you're hearing.
[Music] It's 3:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 16th here in New York City. It's 10:00 p.m. on Tuesday, September 16th in Israel as Israelis watch news of the ground operation on Gaza City unfold. First, before we get into today's episode, a little bit of housekeeping. It's been just over a month since we launched Inside Call Me Back and we've been blown away by your support. So, thank you. It does mean a lot. And some of you have also told us it has been a little confusing to tell the Call Me Back feed apart from the inside Call Me Back feed. So, to keep things simple, we're making a small change. On Mondays and Thursdays, the regular Call Me Back episodes will continue to be released, but we will move the inside Call Me Back episodes to Fridays. So, those will now come out on their own as a separate standalone episode where Nadav, Amit, Seel and I will answer your questions. No action is needed on your part. If you're subscribed, the Friday episode will just show up in your members-only feed. And if you want to join Inside Call Me Back, just follow the link in the show notes or go to arcdia.org. And while you're at arcmedia.org, please also to remember to subscribe to Amit Seel's newsletter. It's noon in Israel. Again, it is something we rely on on a daily basis. You should too, and you can sign up for it right there at arcdia.org.
Now, on to today's episode. Yesterday, Monday, the IDF began its highly anticipated ground incursion into Gaza City after extensive air strikes overnight. The IDF once again instructed civilians of Gaza City to evacuate and head to a designated humanitarian zone in the south. According to an IDF statement this morning, more than 40% of Gaza City's population of roughly 1 million people has already left. Today, the hostage and missing families forum in Israel declared "a state of emergency" amidst fears that the invasion of Gaza City will jeopardize the 48 remaining hostages. IDF spokesman Effie Defrin said at a press conference, "We are aware of the concerns of the hostages' families. We will do our best to avoid harming the hostages."
On Monday, President Trump told reporters that he read a report that Hamas has moved Israeli hostages above ground in Gaza City to pressure the IDF not to move forward with its plan. If Hamas is using the hostages as human shields, President Trump said, "All bets are off." As Israel expands the war in Gaza, members of the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation met in Doha on Monday to discuss Israel's strike on the Qatari capital last week. The summit released a joint statement urging all states to take all possible legal and effective measures to prevent Israel from continuing its actions against the Palestinian people, including "reviewing diplomatic and economic relations with it and initiating legal proceedings against it."
Also on Monday, Prime Minister Netanyahu admitted that Israel is facing increasing isolation economically, stating that Israel will need to pursue greater economic self-sufficiency and become a "super Sparta." To discuss the IDF's incursion into Gaza City and what this means for the direction of the war, for the fate of the hostages, and for Israel's global standing, we are joined by Arc Media contributors Nadav, Amit, and Seel. But before our conversation, a word from our sponsor.
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A dove and a meat. Good to be with you guys on otherwise. I'm live from Sparta. Yeah. What's it like in Sparta? I consider renaming the newsletter. It's noon in Sparta. Yeah. You know, I think it's very treacherous of you, Amit. And it's very typical of, you know, the treachery of the right wing in Israel. Not to not to give credit to the prime minister. You're live from Super Sparta. You know, Sparta isn't enough. Sparta isn't enough. I know. I just have one question. I mean, do you think that in the original Sparta there was a military service exemption for 1/5th of the population? I I'm not sure about that. But but you know that Sparta failed because a large percentage of its population were actually slaves and that's one of the reasons that that Athens actually won that. So that's another way to ask the question you just asked. Uh I mean in a certain way. Well, it sounds to me it sounds to me like to answer these questions, we need the release of a new book, Sparred Up Nation. Well, the good news is Israel is not as isolated as we think it is economically, but that's probably a conversation for another day and an episode another day or maybe an episode on what's your number or other podcast that focuses on the economy.
I want to jump into this uh military operation. Nadav, I'll start with you. Can you give us an overview of the military operation and what it aims to achieve as far as you you and your reporting know? So uh late at night um so at the evening uh yesterday Israel started bombing uh Gaza specific targets in Gaza. Israel in these bombings has uh two operational goals. The first of which is of course to hit Hamas targets in Gaza. The second is to basically make it absolutely known to the population in Gaza, the civilian population in Gaza that they need to evacuate because right now there are at least half a million to 600, 650,000 Palestinians still in Gaza and the IDF is saying that Hamas is trying to use them as human shields and make sure that they remain in Gaza. And as long as so many civilians are in Gaza, uh the IDF's hands are to an extent tied. Now uh right after that in the early early morning or Israel time, ground troops have started operating in Gaza City. But this time the idea is to go for the what the IDF calls the infrastructure of Hamas. But the story but just to be clear Nadav when they went we're in November December of '23 they were there they killed a lot of Hamas terrorists and then they left yes they did not remain in those territories it's what it so they didn't hold the territory they but yeah but they were there not for like two days they were there for for weeks in these areas uh at certain areas they did go down to the tunnels knew much less about the tunnels than it knows today. And it also did not have the tactics to fight in the tunnels as it has today. You know, certain equipment that is now it's now using in order to fight in in the tunnels. Now, the overreaching story here that both the prime minister and the chief of staff talked about this evening openly on the record is that this is the most controversial operation that I remember and Amit might correct me in that regard in the history of the IDF probably. I you know besides the IDF chief standing in the center of Rabin Square in Tel Aviv with a loudspeaker saying don't do this, don't go into Gaza the IDF has done everything it can to recommend not only to the Israeli government it was also speaking to the Israeli public through the media although most of the cases uh they didn't speak on the record but they also went to the Knesset so the chief of staff went to the Knesset spoke with uh the state the the Knesset commission for intelligence for instance telling them uh basically that the IDF is opposed to this kind of an operation in Gaza and that it suspects that it will lead or it might lead with to serious harm to the hostages but it's not the only reason right and uh the chief of staff said today it's my it's my commitment it's my obligation to the people of Israel Dan so this is and he's underlining not to the government to the people of Israel to say the truth as I see it. I'm paraphrasing, professionally speaking, the IDF spokesman said the same thing. And the prime minister in his press conference that just ended a while back said something he was asked about the chief of staff not wanting to go through with this operation and he said something like uh there are always those who hesitate before an operation which is definitely you know definitely not backing each other here. Now the fact that this is so controversial is is really the cover story of everything because for Netanyahu and again I think Amit would be able to say more about this. If somehow they find the breaking point of Hamas as Netanyahu and his defense minister who's actually only serving Netanyahu say then that's going to be for them a huge political victory. They're going to say hey you know Israel's top brass was against this. They said it's a catastrophe and somehow we managed to to pull a victory against Hamas or to pressure Hamas to disarm or something like that. But if it doesn't, you know, there's a lot resting here and mo mainly and these are the people I'm thinking about uh when we're speaking are the families of the hostages. The families of the hostages know and it's just a fact according to all the moderating sides and the IDF that there is a deal on the table and that Israel is trying to improve that deal that there isn't any other way to describe it wants a better deal and the IDF is going into Gaza and they are being told not by Hamas they're being told by security officials you your kids are out there and Hamas is using them so one can only imagine and I think we can't grasp what they're feeling right now and how they see this even with their approachment to the Israeli government in that sense.
Okay, Amit, what is the timeline for this operation and then what are the challenges pivoting off some of the things that Nadav just said for for this from a military from a societal and political perspective? So, so the time frame uh was originally two months, one month for preparation and one month for actually taking what they called a uh an operational control of Gaza City. That was the plan on August 7th, which which meant, if you remember, that the due date to actually having occupied all of Gaza City was October 7th, 2025. However, the IDF chief of staff opposed fiercely the idea of what is defined as operational control because his interpretation from a military perspective for operational control is just above the ground. Exactly as Nadav described the last two operations in Gaza City by the IDF that took only I think two major tunnels but left the the rest in in quite an operative shape. So what the plan is now is to actually take care of both Gaza, the overground Gaza and underground Gaza. And this is to take give or take 3 and 1/2 months which would bring us exactly to the end of 2025. That's what we heard from senior Israeli sources last week in the mid-conference and I think it it conjures with the idea that Witkov articulated last week I think that the war is going to end around the end of 2025. Uh so the idea if I'm taking it a step forward is that Israel is not going to take care of every part in Gaza in Gaza Strip. Why? Because we talk now about three areas, right? We're talking about three areas. Gaza City in which the IDF is operating as we speak. Second, the refugee camps in central Gaza that this is the only part in Gaza Strip that was not attacked by the IDF with offensive ground during the war. And the third part is the humanitarian area in the Muasi that no that no one is going to attack of course. So the plan unfolds in front of our eyes, taking care of Gaza City, dismantling each and every infrastructure of Hamas, thus destroying the city underground and overground, and then having a siege on the refugee camps in central Gaza and ending the war. That's the plan. and and and in 95% of the Gaza Strip which are not in the control of Hamas after the operation to have an alternative regime um consists of American U Arab etc. Yeah. Amiradis, Egyptians, who knows? Okay.
So Amit, everything the way you laid it out it all seems very reasonable and even perhaps achievable and yet it is so controversial and we've seen some of that controversy manifest itself in the way that Nadav described where the senior brass of the IDF is so um hostile in many ways publicly hostile to this plan so maybe I'll ask you Nadav first why are they so opposed to it and then Amit I'll have you respond it's the professional opinion of the Israeli the entire defense almost entire defense apparatus that it's uh not achievable and not reasonable. And let me explain why. First of all, uh right now Israel is allowing the population in Gaza to evacuate including in cars. Dan, do we understand that it means that every Hamas terrorist that wants to leave town is leaving or has left? It also includes the hostages. Actually, I think that Israel hopes that Hamas is going to evacuate the hostages, but that means that Hamas will be moving out of Gaza and the operation started with no real evacuation of the majority of the Palestinians. Gaza. People who see the videos uh sometimes on uh the defense minister's uh Twitter page can see that Israel is bombing in Gaza and you can physically see civilians being rattled because uh the bombs are hitting a building next to them. H this is not how the IDF wants to fight this war. The IDF doesn't know what would be the prices in terms of uh you know the the people who will need to sacrifice their life for that. It's going to fight in an urban area uh which is right now filled with with civilians and again the IDF has been ordered to do two things not one thing and another. It was ordered to do two things and the government never gave it an order of importance to get the hostages back and make sure that Hamas doesn't control the Gaza Strip militarily and in government. Now many people hearing us will say how can you compare you know they'll say 20 hostages alive compared with Hamas threat a strategic threat to Israel and I can understand the argument there but I need to say that it was up to the government to say look we're prioritizing and we're ordering this is an order then this is not a PR note and the IDF the IDF chief went to the government and said you know what if this is what you want to do. I'm asking you take out the aim or the goal of getting the hostages back or downgrade it. Downgrade it because I can't maintain this now because for the Israeli public then getting the hostages back poll after poll is more important than anything else. And that's a truth whether or not people listening to us all of them like it or whether they do this is the positions that you see on on channel 12 channel 13 on on Ynet everywhere they they conduct basically polls. I don't think I even saw a poll in channel 14 that showed something completely different if this is the case and the IDF is composed of reserve soldiers and it's been fighting for two years the IDF professional recommendation to the government including in the last was take the deal at hand. Take the deal that we can achieve right now. Get out the hostages. It will allow us to fight more freely against Hamas and try and and solve this first of all diplomatically. Now to what extent a dialogue there with uh one Ron Durmer and the chief of staff was the chief of staff saying to Ron Durmer and to the head of the Musad why are you here in this room? Why won't you go and negotiate right now before we begin this operation? So this is the level of opposition that you're hearing. And I think that a lot has to do with the IDF frankly being worn out from two years of war from the Israeli society and from uh reserve soldiers serving 200, 300, 400 days and because of that what they worry about is that you know Hamas will move to the central camps the hostages will move to the central camps and we'll meet here in November, December or January and then afterwards then Hamas will return to areas that Israel has already left because it's not really holding to the territory, you know, really, you know, street to street and then we'll have this conversation again after the entire Gaza City is ruined as a result of the war and this is the home of 1 million people right now. So, I know that many people will push back against this, including people listening will say, you know, strategically saying you need to to beat Hamas. It's it's crucial that Hamas will not control the stripe the day after. But uh this is not what most of the chief of staff, not all of them by the way, not all of them think. I should also say, but there's a consistent, you know, 40% or more and within the Jewish population more than 40% closer to 50/50 in terms of the hostages and the rest. So I I want to put it fairly. I don't want to, you know, this is I think you're making an important point here and I I appreciate it that that you're basically saying on the issue of whether or not it's worth doing a deal that will have the practical effect of keeping Hamas in power. On that question, at least among Israel's Jewish voters, there's more it's more evenly divided. A and B, I would add to that, Nadav. I suspect like we saw in the leadup to the Brexit vote in 2016, like we saw in both Trump elections here in the US in 2016 and 2024, there is a shy vote. There's always a shy vote in polling. And I would bet the shy vote is in Israel, we call it chass voters because the far right party always get significantly more than in the polls. So, I would say that there's there's probably I agree with you. It's probably closer to 50/50 among Jewish voters on this question. And there's probably some voters sentiment that's that's not reflected in the polling that probably people feel like they don't want to say they're against the deal. But there's pro I'm not saying it's a big number, but I'm just saying it's I mean that's why this is so complicated because you're right on the question of do we want the hostages back? Should we do a deal? The vote it's always overwhelming. But then when you ask the question, I'll give you an example. What does it mean? I just want to stress that according to every deal on the table right now and according to Hamas formally, they do not control the Gaza Strip. And what we are arguing about or trying to get, which I think is very important, is for them not to have the weapons to call the shots. But formally, they have already said we're willing not to control the strip. And that I think that's important. That's an important victory for Israel. I I'm just not sure that the constitutional law in Gaza Strip would actually I mean the interpretation would be that he who holds the you don't think that they Supreme Court of the Palestinian jihadi movement I I think they will go to the Supreme Court the Supreme Court in Jerusalem. Um, but but here's the thing. Um, first of all, I agree with Dan that I think that most of Israelis would not like to see the war ends when Hamas is still still ruling Gaza. However, when you go to wars, it's quite problematic to go to wars even if it's 60/40 because we know the watershed line is right versus left, Bibi versus anti-Bibi, etc. So this is not the ultimate way of engaging yet another step at the war, another phase at the war after two years with 60/40 or 50/50 or 40/60. So this is one thing which makes it very challenging to say the least. The second thing is that it should be explained why the tension between the IDF and Netanyahu. One thing is the hostages, but I think it goes way deeper than this. The IDF chief of staff said repeatedly that if you want to defeat Hamas, one month would not suffice. You you need much more time. He talked even in a year or something like this, we might agree that it's 3-4 months. However, according to what Ron Durmer said, Ron Durmer's main motive to oppose a midterm deal of releasing only 10 hostages was that Israel doesn't have the time to initiate after the those two months. another step at the war. So even according to Durmer, we don't have more than two, three months. So the the operational schedule of the IDF does not meet the the the diplomatic schedule of of Minister Durmer. However, from what I see, I I think that the the there is a joke about Netanyahu that he wakes up uh according to the um to the to Eastern time. He suffers from a constant jet lag in Israel because he works only according to to the to the time in Washington. As for Washington, Washington is 105% with Israel. I would say that each and every plan written in Washington or introduced in Washington is an Israeli plan that every step in Israel is pre-coordinated with uh uh President Trump. And that's why I think there is full support for Israel to assassinate the Hamas leaders in Qatar and then to initiate a full military invasion to Gaza City and this dictates the rules and that's why Israel would go into Gaza City. Now I expect two things to happen. One is that it can be paused if a new deal is brought because Hamas is under the impression be it accurate or not that Israel is going to take Gaza City and that taking Gaza City means the end for Hamas regime in Gaza after 20 years. This is one thing and the second thing and it's totally different from what we saw from beginning the beginning of the war as a result is that Hamas terrorists are not running away from Gaza City from the battlefield but they are going to the battlefield according to the intelligence there are 10,000 terrorists brought to Gaza from central Gaza from the refugee camps they see it as the final battle as their own Masada and they are going to fight for their for for life or death. Which makes me a bit more optimistic. Why? Because if Israel breaks the soul of Hamas, the fortress of Hamas and the symbol of Hamas, it might be a a a good news in terms of what come what comes next. I I just want to add to that that I agree with Amit that Netanyahu is after a deal, you know, and and with with Durmer thinking that the war will end until the end of the year, it's absolutely the case. What they want is a deal and they're using the operation in Gaza City as leverage. Okay, it's obvious that this is what they're trying to do. And it's also obvious to me that they'll be willing to stop if Hamas will say, "Okay, you know, we agree to the terms." But it's all about Hamas agreeing to the terms, Dan. You know, everybody was saying, "No, no, we we're going to vanquish them. We're going to finish them." No, it's about Hamas agreeing to have some sort of a disarmament. Now, who's going to monitor the disarmament? We've been through these points. Nobody. Nobody. Because if there's going to be an agreement, the IDF is not going to go house to house in Gaza or in the central camps in the Gaza Strip uh and and check house to house, tunnel to tunnel if they actually disarmed. So, so a lot of it is about positioning and and much less of this is about substance as to will they fight? Will Hamas fight in Gaza City? Um, you know, I'm hearing the same kind of intelligence that Amit is hearing. I wonder what will Hamas actually do. Will they fight? They can still escape. And this is one of the reasons they are keeping the civilians in because they need the civilians to escape with them in order to flee to other parts of the Gaza Strip. Now, Israel is not only evacuating the population to the central camps and to the Muasi area. It's an area on the shore. It's now evacuating them to the areas of Khan Yunis that have been depopulated during the war. So it's basically, you know, the Gazan population here is moved from one place to another in a completely destroyed piece of land and the international criticism of Israel is a factor in Israel's cabinet. It's not me saying that, you know, senior ministers or ministers who are also speaking with with with Amit are saying the amount of damage that we're taking, the amount of of fire that we're taking internationally is not worth anything. we're going to get in Gaza City. And these are senior ministers within the the Israeli cabinet who are saying that right now. And even Netanyahu in his Sparta speech started answering that. I think he failed in his answer and he needed to clarify, but he started answering that argument. Let's take a break for a word from our sponsor.
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Okay, Amit, how do you respond to the uh perception out there that following Israel's Doha operation and what we heard about Hamas using Hamas and Gaza using the hostages as human shields that by Israel still going forward with this operation, I'm not saying this is accurate, but there is this perception that the Israeli government has effectively given up on the rest of the hostages in light these two events, how do you how do you respond to that? I I think that the Israeli cabinet has deliberately decided to prefer the goal of defeating Kamas over the goal of bringing back the rest of the hostages after completing 80ish% of the mission. It's it's terrible to speak about it in these terms, but 207 out of 251 uh the the the now the paramount goal from the perspective of the Israeli cabinet is to defeat Hamas over bringing all the hostages back home. By the way, I don't think that Netanyahu believes it's this it's there is an imminent threat to the lives of hostages that who will be brought to Gaza serving as human shields. Because usually if you want someone to serve as a human shield, you give the other side the notice where the human shield is. But neither one hostage can can become a human shield for an entire city nor 20. However, when you decide to invade Gaza City, where according to the intelligence, six out of the 20 hostages uh were held, you actually decide that it's more important for you to defeat Kamas over bringing them back home.
Nadav, zooming out to the region, and you've you've been speaking out about this to events of the past week. Obviously the Doha operation, this conference that I referred to in the introduction of the Arab states, just how do you see this phase playing out geopolitically? I want to say something about the Doha strike and I'm interested in your views, Dan, and and what you have to say. I mean, I I think and I'm speculating here, but let's say it's just a bit more than speculation. I I think that Netanyahu wanted it to be vetoed by the US president. I think Netanyahu didn't want to go through with the Doha operation to begin with. I think the Israelis did notify the White House uh and the White and and President Trump. They wouldn't have done so beforehand. And there's no way there's no way they would have done this. Yeah. With with a US base 30 km away. There's no way they're not going to do this. As you know, it's already a consensus. I saw my colleague Barak Ravid writing about this. You know, um it's a consensus that the White House and President Trump knew in advance. I I suspect that because of the velocity of the process of making that decision, you know, meeting in the morning, uh the IDF says, you know, we're willing to go through this, but why now? You know, you have the meeting to discuss a deal. We think you should discuss that deal, too. Why hit them now? The Mossad head, who's a loyalist of the prime minister, uh, a nominee of the prime minister, the closest person in the entire defense system to the prime minister, sits down and writes a letter to every worker in the Mossad. I've never heard about anything like it. Explaining why he objected to this strike hours after the strike. Dan, I think that Netanyahu wanted uh the president to say something like um, you know, not now. I think Netanyahu calculated Qatar's influence and clout in Washington DC and I think he didn't get the type of negative. I remind you, Dan, in October 11, why why would he then why would he initiate this process if he wanted to get vetoed for domestic consumption of course in October 11 in that famous meeting in which the Israeli cabinet is considering striking and killing Hassan Nasrallah, it's Prime Minister Netanyahu who calls President Biden and actually makes, you know, actually a request for an American October 11th, 2023. Yes. Uh but this is just a speculation. This is to say that right now everybody in Israel understands that it backfired. How? Even Netanyahu understands it. It backfired. Why? Because Qatar is now being hugged uh by moderate Arab countries. Uh Qatar has got a get out of jail card from President Trump who both met the prime minister but also said, you know, there will be no further attacks. He said that I think twice or three times since the attack. So they got immunity for Hamas in Qatar. It doesn't I'm not even talking about this failing right? I'm just talking about the risk assessment here. And of course with moderate Arab countries, you have Egypt leading the charge against the Israelis. The basic dynamics was not successful. It was a gamble. And I think that it was a gamble. But but Nadav, every one of these operations, taking out Haniyeh and Theron in the summer of what what 2024 was a gamble. Taking out Nasrallah was a gamble. The operation in in Iran in June of this year was a gamble. We can go on and on the list of gambles. I mean operation gambles that paid off. These are not gambles. You know if we would have sat here and we would have asked diplomatic city speaking regionally speaking was there a downside to trying to hit Haniyeh in no one would have said that. You know in the discussion the security chiefs didn't say let's not hit Haniyeh in Theron. They were all for it. They were all for Hassan. They wanted to do it in October 11. This time, you know, considering that there is a deal on the table and you're going to break into Gaza City uh the day after and you want to leverage this to get a surrender from Hamas. Anyway, it's it's an agreement. You know, we can discuss it, but I don't think that Netanyahu would have ordered it. And I'm crediting Netanyahu for thinking that he might have thought that the president is going to veto it, but this is only a speculation. Uh I I I beg to differ. I I think in Netanyahu is not under the impression these days that President Trump is going to say no or don't. He wanted to attack and he wanted to score. Um the main idea in my opinion was not only to eliminate the Hamas leadership but to actually divorce the Qataris live on television preferably on Al Jazeera stating that you are no longer I mean no soup for you, no negotiation for you. Yeah, it's better. It would be better if it succeeded. Um, but but I think we should separate two different things. One is the timing and the second is the uh crime scene. Do you attack for the first time in Israel's history or do you take responsibility for the first time in Israel's history for an assassination attempt in a country that is not defined as an enemy state? Um the only incident I can think of is the ENTB operation in 1976 but it was to rescue or what about going after the Munich the Munich terrorists in you know they went to European countries. Israel never took the responsibility to credit in Jordan. Israel never Israel would never Israel would have never taken the responsibility unless it it failed. That's that's the main thing. Israel was Israeli Mossad agents were exposed. But but to say 5 minutes after the the assassination attempt to take responsibility to say it's the IDF, it's Israel even before you know if it succeeded or not. This is not only an assassination attempt. This is something deliberate against Qatar. And from a strategic point of view, the IDF wasn't against it. Yes, the Mossad was against it because the Mossad is the having the I don't know the Exactly. Exactly. May maybe maybe getting tickets for the quarterfinals in the World Cup in 2022 from the the best seats in the stadium helped the Mossad leaders to actually oppose the assassination. Maybe I'm just speculating. But um I mean I just I just want to say this for a moment because I I take your point uh Nadav that you you could argue it wasn't a diplomatic gamble had Israel tried to take out Haniyeh and Theron and failed but it would have been a blowup if it first of all would have made Israel look incompetent. So it would have looked like Israel look like they're they're, you know, not to be as feared as we now know they are having been successful many of these operations. And it would have I I think you would have gotten a lot of blowback internationally and including from within the region that Israel is like, you know, this wild cowboy, you know, galloping through the region. What the hell are they thinking? Uh they need to understand that they're fighting a defensive war and that we're here to help them to some degree fight that defensive war, multi-front defensive war. But if they start taking these brazen actions, I mean, I could see the press playing out, you know, had it gone the other way. But if Israel is taking these brazen actions and destabilizing the region, what the hell are they doing? It's many of the criticisms that you hear today. I take your point that hitting Doha is different than hitting Theron. However, I think, let me put it this way. Don't underestimate the the the old cliche that success has a thousand fathers but failure is an orphan. Had this operation been successful, I'm I think people would have been impressed. The region, many regional players would have been impressed. They would have put out perfunctory statements being critical is of Israel as they've done repeatedly over the last two years uh various developments but they would have they wouldn't have done this gang up that they've done now and I think one of the reasons the pathway for the for the gang up on Israel was failure. Yeah, that's that's very possible. But uh you've been in the same conference uh together with Amit and myself uh in Washington DC in the last week and it was the Amit conference and it's it became a really important uh meeting point for uh people from from across the region. By the way sometimes countries that don't have relations with Israel. Uh and I've spoken with with Arab officials there. I'm talking about Arab officials that come from from countries that do have relations with Israel. And here's what's different than hitting Theron and succeeding or failing. Uh we embarrassed the Gulf countries, the UAE, Bahrain, we embarrassed Egypt. Why is that? Because Qatar is an important country. Because of Al Jazeera, I think it's very unfortunate and my views on Qatar are very known, I think. uh but it is an important country in the Arab world and what they're saying let let me portray it this way this there's something really popular uh in Israeli social networks and Israelis are always saying let's be you know we're going to be the crazy the nutcase in the neighborhood okay and everybody's going to fear us it's a very Israeli kind of it's a strategic perception of the Israeli social network let's be the crazy nutcase in the region okay great you know but there's The difference between being this crazy nutcase of the neighborhood and being, you know, the the crazy nutcase in the neighborhood that nobody not only doesn't want to interfere with, doesn't want to, but everybody wants to disassociate with and maybe call call the police in this case, call on Washington DC as the Qataris did and say, "We want a guarantee from you, Mr. President, that it will never happen again." And then the president did say that. So they are threatening our relations with them and that's a basic legacy of Prime Minister Netanyahu. And by the way, what we're not talking about is how his really historic achievement could not be denied by anyone of getting a peace treaty with Arab countries without having any sort of compromise territorially with the Palestinians. And now this is under risk. And his second achievement which you wrote at length about is is making Israel this globalized startup nation. Nobody can take this away from from Netanyahu that it happened during his term. People can say, "Yeah, but it began, you know, in the Rabin era and the all of course." Okay, great. But it was during Netanyahu, during Netanyahu's economy and now he's talking about autarkic markets and and super Sparta and he needs to correct to explain that. you know, these are his positive legacies which are beyond any doubt and he's risking those to some extent for Gaza City. That's that's a big thing. I mean, before we wrap against the backdrop of what Nadav just said and then also what we're talking about the the fallout from the Doha operation and then the risks diplomatically speaking with the UN vote for a Palestinian state coming up, I think it's next week. How do you where does all this go? Are you worried? Yes, I'm worried uh because of a miscalculation and the phrase that you don't extinguish a fire with gasoline. That's exactly the attempt here. uh the French and the British governments want to recognize the Palestinian state and then Netanyahu threatens in unilateral steps back which means some kind of sovereignty which might be one challenge too far for Israel's economy and statehood. I am I mean I since I think that the number one achievement for Israel's diplomacy since the six-day war was the Abraham Accords the the accords that changed the perception that peace with the Arab world must go through Ramla and through evacuating Jews from their homeland. I think that we should be very very cautious when it comes to the to the Emirates and when they warn us that this is one step too far for them not for us. I think that other measures measures should be taken. So I I I know that there are two things that are going that are going on as we speak. One is to try and somehow talk President Macron out of uh his crazy attempt to recognize the Palestinian state as a result of October 7th. However, since I'm going it's going I think it's going to fail because it's more about domestic French policy rather than it's going to fail. What how is it going to fail? You say it's going to fail. It's going to fail. I mean the attempts to talk Macron out of this initiative. Oh, I see. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. I see. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. French diplomatic sources have told me, we published it uh that even if there's a deal, okay, I agree with Amit's point about this being totally for domestic consumption in in France. Even if there's a deal, said these officials in France, we're not going to let go of unilaterally recognizing a Palestinian state. So, it's off the table. Yeah. Okay. So, so this is one thing. And the second is try to actually change the Israeli revenge. So the unilateral steps are not going to be annexation with all the implications but something more minor like moving territories in Judea and Samaria the West Bank from areas that are Palestinian controlled to areas that are Israeli controlled but not something that is I mean uh uh permanent but it's going to happen in two weeks. Specifically speaking in three days in September between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur after the Netanyahu speech on September 26th and before Yom Kippur. Okay. Uh Amit, Nadav, we will leave it there. Uh much to follow in the next few days. So I'm sure we'll be back in touch with you guys. And until then, I hope you guys hang in there. Thank you. Thank you so much.
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