Transcription
George, welcome back to the course on uh US uh China relations. We've really enjoyed your observations in the first three weeks of this course and we have just now completed uh four weeks of the course and in this week we've discussed how other countries view the US China contest and also we tried to conclude by asking what can be done to to minimize or mitigate the damage that this contest uh can do.
So I'm going to begin by talking about uh how India perceives this contest and India's role uh in this contest and and and I know that you were personally involved in the Naland project initiated by Amatia Sen. Sadly it's has lost its way and at the same time SinoIndian relations have no dived since the border incident of June 2020. Do you expect uh Sino Indian relations to get better or worse in the coming decades? And if you had to give an if you had an opportunity to advise Chinese Indian leaders how to improve their relations, what advice would you give to them?
[snorts] I don't see relations between India and China getting too bad because um what is that issue? the issue the boundaries >> maybe Pakistan >> um is it in China's interest to humiliate India or to weaken India I don't think so >> but China doesn't want India to be carrying water for other powers >> if it's just the border region I think they can negotiate it will take many years >> but these are very difficult terrain, not hospitable, >> not even inhabitable. >> So, and China has been able to settle it border everywhere else. >> So, I'm quite sure it can be settled with India. So, there's no necessary conflict at all >> between India and China the way we see some inevitable conflict >> between China and the US >> and each uh regards the other >> as ancient people. You can almost sense that each bow before the other. >> You notice that when sitting Ping meets Modi or Manuhan Singh >> is confusionist courtesy. There's no backs slapping hugging. >> It's very very control. >> Mhm. >> Almost a doing of the hat. >> Each knows that the other is an ancient people >> and not to be messed around with. >> Neither seeks to make the other what it is. But at the same time, you know, especially after June 2020, I've actually appeared on several Indian TV programs and being heavily criticized for trying to suggest that India moderate its policies towards China. There's a very strong anti-China sentiment building up and followed by India getting closer to the United States uh especially through joining the Quad uh US, Japan, uh Australia and India. How how do you see do you see any danger that the Indians might move much closer to the United States to counterbalance China? Would that work?
The Americans would of course want to um use the Indians against China. >> Mhm. >> But I think it's much more likely that India will use America against >> China >> against China for its own purposes. And if you look beyond the quad >> to the deep relationships >> of military equipment, >> the Indians will never give up Russian equipment >> and they're taking the delivery of the S400. >> Mhm. >> Yeah. >> So they will not rely on the US. >> Oh, they will they will not they have their own interests >> and they and they know that change in US administration policies can change dramatically. US attitude towards Pakistan has flip-flopped >> and for India Pakistan is is a constant concern. >> So I don't see relations getting >> exuberant genihine bye-bye >> but at the same time I don't see them going into full scale war that could be border skirmishes but but not beyond that.
But the other equally important relationship between China and his neighbors of course between China and Japan and you discussed it in the early weeks of this course. Uh what advice would you give today to Chinese and Japanese leaders on how to manage their relations going forward in the 21st century?
One must naturally expect that the Japanese people want to be a normal people. >> That they want to do the things which other nations in the world are able to do. >> The constitution that they have was imposed upon them by the Americans. >> They have to accept it. Uh they need the US nuclear umbrella. >> So there's a set of them which knows that without the US their position is shaken to its foundations. M >> but at the same time it leads to a certain subjection >> of their self-esteem by the Americans >> and sometimes when you watch the way the Americans treat the Japanese it is painful >> I watch the way Abbeby despite American insults >> wanting thing a close relationship with Trump which he finally succeeded in doing >> I thought very few countries in the world >> will be prepared to go that far to achieve a national objective. >> But Abbe is a nationalist >> and there is a slow movement in Japan >> not to be too close to the Americans and to become a more normal country. >> So the attitude towards China is changing but it's millimeter by millimeter. It will take time. >> Changing in what direction? How how is it evolving within Japan >> in a greater balance? You do not find the Japanese now automatically taking the position of the Americans or the Western powers. >> They're more calibrated now >> and Japanese corporate Japan knows that it's got vast interest in China. >> They could see the trends. For many years, they thought that China would implode >> and they were waiting for it year by year. It didn't happen. And I think many now accept that China will become much bigger and become much more important to Japan. >> And the transformation of the tourism industry before COVID >> was dramatic. How even in many of the onsen >> the major market was Japanese were Chinese tourists. >> So you are a bit more optimistic about China Japan relations then? or China will in a sense facilitate it >> um on the war on war wartime memories so long as the Japanese don't go too far they accept it >> and their approach is well you may forget I will not forget >> so they've been building museums to the anti-Japanese war of resistance all over China >> well China will not forget >> it's turning now to Asia an a region that you know very well and you played a very critical role in the formation and development of ASEAN in your many years as the minister of trade industry and as the foreign minister. How do you think ASEAN will be impacted number one by this growing US China rivalry? How can China how can ASEAN protect his own interest and can play a helpful role? I mean, what would your advice be for ASEAN, a region that you know so well?
Well, ASEAN has been a remarkable success. I mean, it's kept the peace in the region for a long time. >> Yes, >> it's pretty good at balancing the major powers and it is Singapore's first circle of foreign policy. With ASEAN, we can do much more. Without ASEAN, we are frequently exposed >> to the co-wins of big power politics. >> Of course, ASEAN is um is a is a mly bunch. M >> I mean we we are very diverse. We have a lot of internal problems. >> We are never fully integrated. >> Uh I I would say we are a loosely held together jazz band rather than an orchestra. [laughter] And sometimes there are musical instruments which echo China's views and sometimes we echo the American views. So it's It it is not >> cacophony. >> It hangs together >> and we have made ourself very important almost indispensable >> to all the major powers. I was told by um Singapore negotiators >> that on the negotiation for RESAP, the regional comprehensive economic partnership, >> China was insistent that ASEAN take the lead. >> Because if China were to take the lead, >> the others would bristle. >> Mhm. >> ASEAN take the lead. No, they they like to patronize us. >> But they say ASEAN is in the lead. ASEAN is ASEAN centrality. us in the driver's seat. >> Sometimes we ourselves can't believe >> the compliment we receive. >> Why? Why us? Because they don't trust the others. >> Mhm. >> So better better us with thick lenses and poor psycho motor skills driving the car slowly and erratically than somebody else will drive in a different direction >> from the destination that they want. >> Yeah. >> So we have been able to play our weakness. M >> and turn it into a profound strength. >> But but there's historical basis for this >> because we are tana >> the winds in different parts of the year brought different influences, >> genetics, >> culture, and we're that mixture. We're open. >> We don't have an overly inflated view of ourselves. >> Not even Indonesia. But the interesting thing is the uh Chinese are able to understand that despite ASEAN's weakness, it actually has the capacity to to provide a platform that others trust. I'm surprised that the United States, which has access to much more information, has many more strategic think tanks, doesn't understand that ASEAN can actually be a huge asset for American policy in East Asia. As you know, American leaders consistently miss attending ASEAN meetings. So, how how do you explain to the American officials whom you know well that actually they should give greater uh emphasis to ASEAN in their policies? What would you say to the Americans?
I'm not surprised that this is American approach. >> They don't have a deep history of connection to the region. uh they themselves are young nation and for them the approach is a practical one. >> I remember once meeting a US cabinet secretary in Singapore. >> He was on his way to Azerbaijan because Azerbaijan is important uh for the US but even as he told me that he was visiting Azerbaijan >> he sneered at a country >> that you know it's like what kind of a country is this? and and I was shocked. >> I said I have no doubts when he visited Azerbaijan that he will be full of civility >> and kind words. >> Then I thought to myself if this is his approach to Azerbaijan >> is this also his approach to Singapore? >> Yes. >> That in front of us there's civility and great respect but behind us they sneer. >> Yeah. Now I'm not saying the Chinese don't sneer. >> Yeah. >> But the Chinese have the advantage of record keeping over centuries. >> Mhm. >> So when they look at Ma they knew how Ma presented their tributes to China to their own people in the Sajara Malayu. >> When they deal with India they go back to the monks who brought Buddhism to China. >> So when we deal with China it is with historical memory. See, Chuckman, our ambassador in Geneva years ago in the early 90s. >> Yeah. >> You see, I don't understand, minister, >> why is it when us and ambassadors meet the Chinese ambassador >> in Geneva, we're also respectful? >> But when we deal with the Americans or the European or Japanese, no, we gave them whatever they gave us. [laughter] I told ambassador C. I said, well, it's history. >> You don't likely make China an enemy. There's consequences. >> Yes. >> And sometimes it's better to have China at a certain distance because if it's too close, it can also be uncomfortable. >> Mhm.
Well, I mean, I'm really glad that you said that, Abasian. But this course is also not just about the past and present, but also over the future. and we've just uh witnessed the election of Joe Biden and if he takes office in uh January 2020 and if you had a chance to advise either him or his uh incoming secretary of state, what advice would you give to the Biden administration on the best policies that the US can take towards China in the next four years and beyond? What how would you advise the United States? What should they do in in dealing with China?
Biden's number one, number two, number three top priorities >> must be must be domestic. >> Yes. >> And China perhaps I should be giving my recommendation to China. China should make sure that Biden's priorities are where his minds are focused. So if anything, China should help Biden achieve his domestic priorities and not create new issues or distractions for Biden. >> How so? How how how can China help uh United States on his domestic issues? >> Not creating new problems for the Americans >> unless the impact on China's core interest. >> Uh Taiwan for instance can lead to war. M >> the Trump administration played with Taiwan >> as if it was just another card on the table. >> And the Chinese kept on signaling that no this will lead to war. >> Mhm. >> And they have an Iranian option >> that if you really move on Taiwan, we'll move on Iran. >> How how could they move Iran? What could they do? >> Well, since the Chinese will never say it, of course, but since the 90s, I've always observed that the the Chinese approach to Iran was have been linked to the American approach to Taiwan. >> I think the Americans know that there's this linkage, >> not the Trump administration, >> but I think the Biden administration will understand this. So on Taiwan is not wise to play it. >> On North Korea, China's help is very important >> and China to a certain extent shares the same objectives. on the South China Sea. It's very important that we Southeast Asia and China sign the code of conduct and find a way to compromise >> on the exploitation of fishery resources >> and hydrocarbons. >> Territorial claims no one can unilaterally give up because >> it's just not possible. So just set that aside. >> The Americans would try to pay the South China Sea. Mhm. >> It depends on us in ASEAN whether we allow the problems in the South China Sea to get out of control >> and how we deal with China. American interest is good for us. It strengthens our hand >> beyond a point is not us making use of the Americans >> but the Americans making use of us >> and that's not to our interest. Yes, [snorts] the there are also areas where there are clearly uh some common interests or converging interests within US and China. So I'll just mention two. One is of course COVID 19 where we right now the main priority of the world is dig itself out of the world COVID 19 and China has done a remarkable job amazing job in containing COVID 19 within China and in fact if the United States had the same amount of deaths uh per capita per uh relative to population United States would have less than 1,000 deaths instead of 240,000 deaths. So on issues like COVID 19, do you think it's possible for us and China to use that as an excuse to press the pause button on the geopolitical contest and say let's work together to kill COVID 19 before we do anything else? And that would of course help Biden's domestic agenda. Do you see that as any any possibility of that happening?
I had such a hope once. >> I don't have that hope now. Mhm. >> Uh when COVID first started, I thought like SARS, maybe the Chinese are genetically more prone to it. >> Mhm. >> And I was surprised when Kevin RD wrote in his piece in Foreign Affairs >> that in February, champagne bottles were being popped in Washington because finally China was on his back. Within two months, China was able to turn it around. >> Mhm. And in my mind I I thought so COVID is a common challenge to humanity. The way we are all simultaneously align asteroid were hurtling towards planet earth. >> It must unite us. The opposite happened. So I'm not optimistic at all that co can be a unifying force. Mhm. >> Maybe climate code could >> but not co >> I think actually on climate uh President Joe Biden seemed to be very very president-elect Joe Biden seemed to be very committed to the cause he's set up climate z uh John Kerry and of course at the same time on climate as you know China has amazingly announced a zerocarbon future by60. Do you see that as another another possible area of major convergence between US and China?
They'll work together but every country on climate acts as it own self-interest. >> China finds that it is its own self-interest uh to phase out the internal compassion engine >> and to phase out the use of coal. M >> but at the same time they're achieving very high positions in alternative energy and their companies are are becoming very big very important >> they've got very advanced technologies that in turn worries the west >> actually on this issue uh of clean energy and all one of the things that really surprised me about China is they're rather I must say amazingly inspiring goal of creating an ecological civilization. So maybe that's a good note to add on but end on. What what's your sense of the Chinese goals when they announce this ecological civilization that China will become? I've been involved in this from quite early when they established an annual conference in Guyang >> called in Chinese >> translated into English >> the annual forum for ecological civilization in >> uh in China when you say a forum it means thousands of people. >> Mhm. [laughter] There are trade shows, there are seminars and I'm a member of the advisory council >> which is ched by my old friend the former state counselor for foreign affairs typing gu >> the director general who used to be the mayor of Sut when we started the Suto project Jang Sing he's very active and we're in regular communications with each other >> they're very serious they even pull in the Vatican >> because the pope in his encyclical Lato se The words of Francis Aisi, >> praise be creation >> in church teaching on integral ecology >> and Chinese philosophy of ecological civilization >> there is huge overlap >> that human beings are part of nature and are almost custodians of creation >> and have that responsibility. So I think it's wonderful. It could it may well be a platform where all of us can find common cause not just in a practical way but in terms of our higher moral aspirations.
Well, that's a perfect note on which to end our discussions over these four weeks because given this all the doom and gloom that surrounds the US China relationship, I'm glad that we're able to uh inject one possible note of optimism in the future of USChina relations and we thank you very much George for your tremendous contributions to this cause. Thank you.
Thank you Kisha. I think the future is full of exciting possibilities and in some ways full of hope. >> Thank you. >> Thank you.