Transcription
Hello and welcome. I'm Tom Switzer. Always great to have your company.
While tensions have flared again between the United States and Iran, the US has struck Iranian military targets in and around the Strait of Hormuz. And Iran has responded by firing ballistic missiles at US bases in Q8 and Bahrain. So the question today is, is this simply another round of brinkmanship or is there a genuine risk that the ceasefire could unravel altogether?
We have a terrific panel. Doug Bandal was a former senior adviser to President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and over the last 40 years he's been a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, the leading libertarian think tank in Washington. Good day, Bob. Doug, good day. >> It's lovely to have you with us. And John Mishimer, of course, is no stranger to Switzerland. Uh John is professor of political science at the University of Chicago. Hi there, John. >> Hi, Tom. Hi, Doug. >> Hey, John. >> John. Um, we've seen breaches of ceasefires before. How serious is the latest escalation?
Well, you want to remember we had a tit-for-tat like the one that has taken place over the past three days uh between June 9th and June 11th. Remember the memorandum of understanding uh was signed on June 17th. What I'm telling you is between the 9th and 11th, there was a tit-for-tat just like this one uh involved both the Iranians uh and the Americans taking shots at each other two different times uh back on the in the June 9th to June 11th window. You remember an Apache helicopter was shot down. The Americans responded. The Iranians then responded. The Americans responded again and the Iranians responded. And the same thing has happened here. It's not an Apache helicopter. It's a tanker and a cargo ship that the Iranians took pot shots at in the uh Strait of Hormuz. And that's led to uh the United States taking a shot at Iran, Iran taking a shot at Iran, at uh Iran, Iran taking shot at the United States, and then one more round. So, it's the same basic story. And a lot of people are saying, "Oh, this means we're on the threat of escalation." We're not on the threat of escalation. Uh we're just trying to decide here who controls uh the Strait of Hormuz. That's the issue at play. And in fact, uh, it's just been announced that we're going to sit down with the Iranians and try and work this out and put an end to this tit-for-tat, just as we put an end for the previous tit-for-tat by signing the memorandum of understanding. And by the way, once an agreement is reached, it will be clear that Iran completely controls the Strait of Hormuz.
You say that um but and of course this is in keeping with what you've said time and again John that you know Iran's essentially won the war uh which is why Trump has signed this memorandum of understanding a surrender document if you like and that the US has no way out of this situation that's your line but let me put this to you this is Mike Pence the former US vice president who carries no brief for President Trump he says The Iranian regime is on its heels. Its military capabilities have been seriously degraded. Its terror proxies have been weakened. Its economy remains under severe pressure. For the first time in many years, the momentum is with the US and our ally Israel. That's Mike Pence. John, >> Then why did we sign the memorandum of understanding which is a surrender agreement?
Almost everybody who's looked at that agreement uh recognizes that people on the hawkish side of the political spectrum are beside themselves given that President Trump signed the MOU on June 17th. Uh but President Trump signed it for one very good reason. He had no choice. Uh Mike Pence is operating in a different universe than the rest of us are and somebody ought to try to bring him back down to earth and feed him some facts and teach him a little basic logic. Uh and then he might see the light. I'm not sure but uh let's hope that uh he's not a lost cause, which he appears to be when he makes foolish statements like that.
Well, the consensus among the hawks remains pretty adamant that, you know, Washington must go to great lengths to still dismantle the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program, end the militia proxies and restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. They say that Trump still has a lot of leverage and if Iran does not conform, especially on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran will face the full force of the American military again.
John >> Tom, let me take a minute or two just to lay out the big picture here, which will show you that that line of argument makes no sense. The war started on February 28th, and on April 8th, the air war part of it ended. So from February 28 to April 8, we had a 40-day air war. We have not gone back to that air war or even hinted that we would go back to that air war for the past two months and three weeks. And the reason is very simple. The air war does not provide a war strategy. And in fact, if we started the air war again, it would be Iran that benefited from it. So there's no air war option. Unsurprisingly, on April 13th, remember the air war ends on April 8th. On April 13th, President Trump switches gears and he puts into place the blockade. We go from naval power. We go from air power to naval power. The blockade is on from April 13th to June 17th. That's a little more than two months. What happens on June 17th? On June 17th, President Trump signs the memorandum of understanding, which is a surrender document. That basically means that the blockade didn't work. Because if the blockade had worked, he wouldn't have signed a surrender document. He signed it because the blockade didn't work. So, here we are. We've tried air power. It didn't work. And nobody's talking about going back to that. We tried a blockade or naval power. That didn't work which again is why we signed the memorandum of understanding. The third option is land power and I have not heard anybody make a serious argument that we should put boots on the ground. So the question you want to ask yourself today Tom is what are we going to do to up the ante? These people were talking about going up the escalation ladder and teaching the Iranians a lesson or using all of our coercive leverage to get them to play by our rules. I'd like to know where is the coercive leverage come from. I just told you what all the options are and the answer is there is no option.
>> Yeah. But but they would say to you, John, that given the state of Iran's economy that Iran could now be overplaying its hand in the Strait of Hormuz. I mean, doesn't sanctions relief provide Washington with equally important leverage, John?
>> No. The point is that Iran faces an existential threat from the United States. The United States and Israel are an existential threat to Iran. And when you face an existential threat, you'll eat grass if that's what's necessary to survive. The idea that the Iranians are suddenly going to throw up their hands and concede defeat to the United States and to Israel, there is zero evidence that that was a possibility up to now. Where's the evidence that we were on the verge of seeing that outcome? I see no evidence whatsoever. The point is lots of people who don't like this agreement and can't accept the fact that we lost are constantly talking about getting tough, but they never get beyond saying we should get tough and describe exactly what we do and how it produces the victory they desire.
Well, no one expected it to be diplomatic plain sailing, so to speak. Let's bring in Doug Bandau here. Doug, how do you see this latest standoff playing out?
Look, the problem is, you know, the president has already announced he doesn't want to be Herbert Hoover to restart the war. He's Herbert Hoover.
>> And just to clarify here, Herbert Hoover was the United States president from 1929 to 1933 whose tariffs started the global depression.
Yep. Don't want that.
>> So, so you know, Herbert Hoover forever has been known, whether you can argue whether correctly or not, but he's been known as the man who took the United States and ultimately the world into the Great Depression. Donald Trump was warned. You know, international energy markets were a disaster. Asian countries in particular, but others as well, desperately needed fuel. The economies of a lot of countries were in great trouble. The uh, you know, Iran had been very effective at blowing up energy facilities in the Gulf, going after the Gulf Kingdoms. They don't want to be targeted again. American bases throughout the region have been wrecked. There have been multiple stories on that. So the problem is the hawks you kind of ignore all of that and seem to assume that we get to shoot at the Iranians and then nothing else happens. But they've already demonstrated extraordinary leverage. I think that what we've seen this is part of the negotiating process. The Iranians are reminding the United States that they really control the strait. You know the president can announce that we control it. It's free passage etc. What the Iranians are saying is no, no, no. You come to us. You let us decide. We we decide on the route. And I think as John indicated, you know, we're seeing a tit-for-tat. Both sides are playing this game a bit.
>> I think both sides want, you know, to have an agreement and I think that agreement is going to be along the lines of the MOU and that means Iran has done very well, much better than the hawks all wanted. And I they just don't have the leverage they seem to think.
What about the point I put to John Minishima that Iran desperately needs sanctions relief and a path back into the global economy? So, doesn't the US then have some leverage, Doug?
>> Well, yes. I mean, the the whole point if you look at the MOU is we're going to make sure they get money and we're talking about sanctions relief and this investment fund. There's a lot of uh, you know, kind of positives in there and that's why I think there will be a deal that ultimately I mean again nothing's guaranteed here. Things can blow up. I believe the Iranians do want a deal but they are expecting a lot and they are the they have the whip hand. It strikes me they are the ones who can turn Trump into Herbert Hoover. He can't turn them into that. Iran has suffered eight years of war with Iraq back in the 1980s. They survived that. They survived the 12-day war last year. They survived the huge bombing by the United States decapitation of their leadership. So, I just don't see them as giving in. They're playing very tough and the US doesn't have a way to get through that.
>> Yeah. But Trump still has to deal with his critics at home. And they're not just the neoconservatives and Republican lawmakers. They also include some Democrats. and John, they would argue that this deal, which means new revenue, a lot of revenue going to Iran that will simply finance their ballistic missiles, their militia proxies, um they're going to spend it on that rather than reconstruction, and the regime, if you like, will invest every penny it receives to uh furthering its goal of u of fighting Israel. Uh John,
>> I think they're basically right. I wouldn't use the categorical or extreme language you use to describe it. I'd use a bit more qualified language. But as I said at the top of the show, yes, Iran won. You're exactly right. And the hawks are beside themselves. Remember, the hawks said that this was going to turn into a great victory for the United States and Israel. We're going to do all these wonderful things, achieve all these objectives. We've not only achieved none of our stated objectives, uh, we've also lost on a number of other issues. Uh, and they're beside themselves. They don't know what to do. And the fact is there's nothing we can do about it. Iran won.
Yeah. But at what point does official Washington recognize your point? Because at this stage, they seem to be giving Trump a hard time for giving too much away. John,
>> Well, they are giving Trump a hard time. And Trump feels like he's between a rock and a hard place. He has all those hawks in Washington plus the Israelis on one side and then he has a lot of uh people, I think, like JD Vance, uh, and probably Steve Bannon on the other side telling him that he's just got to cut a deal. And Trump is sophisticated enough to realize he has no choice here. Uh Trump didn't sign that memorandum of understanding because he's a pussycat. He signed it because he felt he had no choice. I mean Doug hit the nail on the head. He doesn't want to be Herbert Hoover. He President Trump said explicitly that we're facing a potential economic catastrophe. Uh he understands that he had no choice. And uh and all Trump is doing here is delaying the inevitable. At some point he has to cut a deal. And by the way, Tom, you want to understand what's lurking in the background and we haven't even talked about it at all. But what really matters and what many people think was the principal reason we went to war against Iran is the nuclear issue. We haven't even talked about the nuclear issue yet. And you have to understand that once we get to that, uh, the Iranians are going to have a lot of leverage and they're going to make it very difficult for us to get a good deal. So, this situation only gets worse for us. I mean, the idea that it improves over time and we gain more and more leverage.
>> Sorry, I just don't see that happen.
>> Yeah. Well, Doug, um, be I mean, before the Americans get to the nuclear issue with the Iranians, they still have to work out the Strait of Hormuz. And, you know, Iran has made it very clear this weekend. The foreign minister, the Iranian foreign minister was in Iraq and he made it very clear that Iran has the right to determine how and when commercial shipping moves through the Strait of Hormuz. And the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, uh, says this is just not going to happen. The Americans are determined to ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. How do you see that playing out?
>> Well, Trump has shown a great ability to backtrack on objectives. You know, we were once told that we had to get all the nuclear dust and now he says, "Well, maybe that's not so important." You know, he once told us we had to get rid of all their missiles and then he told us, "Well, they need them for defense. I mean, if Saudi Arabia can have missiles, why not Iran?"
>> And I think we're going to see in terms of the Strait well yes there will be freedom of navigation of course I mean Iran is not going to prevent countries from sending car you know tankers through the Strait but there undoubtedly will be some fees I mean you know we have to worry about the environment and of course it takes time and money to have shipping lanes and I mean I suspect we're going to see something perhaps in conjunction with the Omanis so it's not just an Iranian initiative they'll come up with some another term. This won't be a toll and the US is going to have to accept it.
>> Even even though it's against international law, Doug, and uh traders will have to pay extra to get their products, oil, gas, fertilizers through the Strait.
>> Well, and they and they can thank Donald Trump for that. I mean, until until now, you know, that was not happening. I mean, Iran was aware of the potential. Everyone was aware of the potential. The Pentagon is war-gamed. This this is none of this is new. But I think it was one of those things everybody was very nervous. The Iranians weren't quite willing to pull the trigger and now they have and they discovered all the power they have. There is going to be something there and I think it's not going to be the old world. We've moved beyond that and again this is a way creative negotiation and my hope is the president has some people who are good at negotiation in this and not just you his son-in-law that you know this is one you you figure up ways to camouflage things. you come up with new terms, you know, so you can pretend that you won and Trump will get through it. I mean, who in Washington is going to stop him on this? The hawks are complaining, but what are they going to do? He's the commander-in-chief. You know, Democrats are going to use this to bash him over the head, but they don't want the war to go on. They don't want to be Herbert Hoover. So, he's going to be able to declare victory. And his hope is that by the time we get to know
>> How can he declare victory if the Strait of Hormuz is under Iranian control?
>> Well, it'll be open again. Tankers will be going through. He won't be hurt.
>> On their terms. This I mean can you I mean gets back to a point that John we talked about this two months ago and you quite rightly predicted that Trump will have to eat crow. Do you remember when you said that? Eat crow. Yes.
>> Eating crow means acknowledging you were wrong. Can you imagine the American foreign policy establishment conceding defeat on these issues?
>> But there's a difference between the foreign policy establishment and President Trump. And if you listen to Doug carefully, he was talking about President Trump.
>> Sure.
>> And I think Doug is on the money. There's nothing he said that I disagree with. Uh the the Strait will be open. There's no question there'll be a toll booth there. Uh and I think that the Omanis and the uh Iranians who control both sides of the Strait will work out an arrangement. Uh, by the way, the problem that exists today, uh, Tom, is that the ships, the tankers and the cargo ships that are leaving the Gulf, for the most part, are going along the Omani coast.
>> To what the Omanis think is Omani territorial waters.
>> And this is what is enraging the Iranians. And the Iranians are saying any ship that goes through the Strait, whether you go through Omani territorial waters or you go through Iranian territorial waters, has to have our permission, which is another way of saying we control the Strait, the entire Strait. This is not to say a deal won't be worked out with the Omanis over time, but at this point in time, uh, as Arachi said, the foreign minister of Iran, we control the entire Strait.
Doug, as I mentioned in my introduction, you're an adviser to President Ronald Reagan during the 1980s. But ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire 35 years ago, you've distinguished yourself as one of Washington's leading critics of the notion of a Pax Americana, a new American century, a global benign hegemon, uh the indispensable nation, as Madeleine Albright put it in the 1990s. You you've been consistently critical uh of America's overextension in the world as you see it. Do you think this debacle and Iran and it's now widely regarded as a debacle as you've both predicted and made clear today. Do you think that this Iran drama could be a watershed moment in that it rec that the American foreign policy establishment both Republicans and Democrats alike recognize America can't be the global policeman?
Doug, >> Well, it will certainly cause some people to recognize that. Now the establishment has proved to be pretty impervious to a lot of evidence of that. I mean, we think about the, you know, Iraq war in 20 years in Afghanistan. And we think about kind of Europe, you know, claiming it can't defend itself after 80 80 years after World War II. You know, consistent resistance to spending more until recently, you know. So, I think the glo, you know, the Washington establishment is still going to pursue the notion that America should have a dominant role. I think it's going to come a bit from the other side. The Europeans not only worry about Vladimir Putin, they worry about Donald Trump. And they're not convinced that whoever comes after Donald Trump will change things. And they're not convinced that Americans aren't going to want change in the future. So, I think we're going to be seeing movement elsewhere that will help move this process along. I think the Middle East that this debacle will have a major impact. Even this administration's talking about US bases that today have been wrecked. I mean, the US government had to move its personnel off of its bases into civilian hotels to try to protect them from Iranian missiles.
>> That now we're supposed to be the superpower that dominates the globe and we are admitting we cannot protect our personnel on bases that were supposed to be vital to protect other countries and we couldn't protect them.
>> I think that we're going to see a real push to get the US back out of the Middle East and that will help. and the the question of armaments and defense industrial base. All of these are going to raise issues of how the US is going to be able to try to fund global domination at a time where it runs $2 trillion annual deficits. We spend a trillion dollars on interest alone.
>> Yes.
>> And we you don't have enough missiles. We suddenly find out that in you know just six weeks we used up most of our missiles or a lot of them. Well, if there is a Taiwan contingency, what would we do? Are we prepared to try to go to war with China without, you know, so I think we budgets and other countries, I think, are going to push this along. I think this is an important moment. You know, the Council on Foreign Relations and others, a lot of those people will still want the US to have a dominant role, but I think reality is going to intrude very seriously.
>> Okay.
>> An important moment in the trajectory of American foreign policy. John, your thoughts?
>> Yeah, just a slightly different way of coming at it. Uh, I think that rhetoric regarding Pax Americana was appropriate during the unipolar moment when we were the only great power on the planet. Then you could think in those terms.
>> So, this is the 1990s and the the first uh 15 years of the of this century.
>> Yeah, I think that that's right. Of course, both Doug and I and you, Tom, were not in favor of that uh attempt to, you know, implement Pax Americana, but you could talk about it at the time, but what happened in my opinion around 2017 is that we moved into a multipolar world.
>> And we're dealing with China, we're dealing with Russia, and then we're dealing with the Middle East, the war in Iran. That's a sort of additional contingency that matters enormously. Excuse me. But if you think about what's going on in East Asia, you think about the Ukraine war, you think about the Middle East, we do not have a lot of influence uh in any one of those three areas. In fact, you know, we've not had a lot of success in shutting down the Ukraine war. Uh, and with regard to East Asia, we're doing everything we can to keep things peaceful in East Asia because we know we're up to our eyeballs in alligators in Ukraine and in the Middle East. So, this notion of Pax Americana where we lead the world and everybody follows, uh, that's long gone in my opinion.
>> Yeah. And Doug, you and John are alike in the sense that you both believe that America should reorder its strategic priorities, particularly away from Europe and away from the Persian Gulf. Where you disagree is on the question of Asia. John has been a leading proponent of the notion of containment of China. So reorder priorities away from Europe and the Persian Gulf. Focus more on East Asia to contain the only major peer competitor of the United States that can threaten US global primacy because it's the far more powerful of the two rival great powers, Russia and China. What's your response to that?
>> Well, I think China is the major foreign policy challenge that we face. I tend to think that it's probably a greater challenge on economics, on technology, who controls the commanding heights of major technologies, uh, as opposed to a security threat in the sense of any direct threat to the United States. I do worry about, you know, Chinese influence in the region. I just think that it's very hard to imagine we can over the long term contain China 100 miles off of its coast, which is where Taiwan is. So, I'm more interested in finding ways to essentially constrain China and empower our allies there. I think Taiwan in terms of it needs a lot of anti-ship missiles. I'm not particularly against proliferation among friendly countries that frankly a a Japanese nuclear weapon might be the best way to constrain China. Uh the question of South Korea and North Korea, you know, so I think we need to think creatively about that. So, I see China as a serious challenge. I'd probably focus more on the economics and I'd much prefer to offload uh you know the primary containment you know off to our friends there and empower them.
>> Hasn't Iran though demonstrated to US allies in Asia that America is somewhat unreliable? John,
>> Well, I think there is an element of truth in that. Uh you also just in this context want to remember that starting in roughly 2011 when Hillary Clinton who was then Secretary of State talked about the pivot to Asia.
>> Began to pay a lot of attention to increasing our deterrence capability in East Asia and that started big time under President Trump's first term starting in 2017. It was then continued by President Biden in 2021 to 2025. So, we have been pivoting to Asia until the Iran war. And now we're pivoting away from Asia. Uh we pulled uh THAAD batteries and Patriot batteries. These are air defense batteries out of Japan and South Korea. We moved the Marine Expeditionary Unit out of Japan uh to the Middle East. and their East Asian allies were deeply concerned about that and that includes the Australians as well. Uh, and uh and I think people were beginning to wonder about how reliable the United States was. In other words, was the United States going to be there for its East Asian allies? Then there's another dimension, which is the one that you're getting at, Tom, which is that we performed pretty poorly in the war against Iran. Uh we basically ran out of weaponry uh or we had drawn down our weapons base to the point where we really couldn't continue the war. I mean, you want to understand that one of the principal reasons that we don't want to start the air war is we do not have sufficient munitions uh to conduct that air war. Uh, and all of this tells you if a war were to break out in East Asia at this point in time, I think the United States from a purely military point of view, uh, would be in a, uh, would be in real trouble. It's not to say we'd lose because the Chinese military has all sorts of problems, but you do not want to underestimate the extent to which we have weakened ourselves by fighting this war against Iran. Uh so things do not look good in East Asia. And by the way, Tom, one thing I've been predicting, uh, and this is based on my experience during the Vietnam War, and I'm sure Doug remembers these years very well, but once we lost the war in Vietnam, once it was really all over with in 1975, the United States never wanted to think again about getting involved in in a war in Southeast Asia or in a place like Vietnam. So what we did after 1975 for probably a good decade was we focused laser-like on Europe.
>> Europe. Yeah.
>> NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I would imagine that once this war in the Middle East is over with, the last thing we're going to want to think about is fighting another war against Iran or reconstructing our highly vulnerable military bases in those Gulf States. And I wouldn't be surprised given all the emphasis we've had on the pivot to Asia since 2011 and given that China is the pacing threat as people in the Pentagon like to say I wouldn't be surprised if we focus laser-like on East Asia the way we after the war in the Middle East the way we focused laser-like on Europe after Vietnam.
Doug, you'd be well aware Irving Kristol, the founding father of American neoconservatism, once uh defined the neocon as a quote liberal mugged by reality. Is this a mugged by reality moment in Washington in the sense that they recognize they need to move away from Europe and the Persian Gulf and focus more on Asia post Iran as John suggests?
Doug, >> I think there are a lot. Elbridge Colby is an obvious, >> you know, person.
>> Colby is a senior figure in the Pentagon.
>> That's right. You know, responsible really for planning for the national security strategy. He's long been one who has basically said, "Forget these ridiculous wars where they don't matter. China is the the place we have to be concerned about."
>> And and I think we see a bit of the the mugging even of Bill Kristol. Bill Kristol has been very strongly against the Iran war.
>> I mean, Bill Kristol, you know, longtime neoconservative interventionist support in the past,
>> but he's been out there saying this is a complete disaster.
>> As has Bob Kagan, he's collaborator in the 2000s. Yeah.
>> Extraordinary being run by reality. Doug,
>> I know you really I start pinching myself wondering what's going on. Did do you guys know whether either Bill Kristol or Bob Kagan opposed the Iran war beforehand?
>> That's a very good question. I don't know the answer to that, Doug.
>> Actually, I don't know the answer as well. Uh I I think that's a my sense from the way at least the way Bill Kristol has talked about it, it sounded like he did, but I haven't gone back to check and see if that's the case.
>> Yeah. Extraordinary talking of even looking back at Iraq and some of the other things suggesting you know Afghanistan these things were a real mess which suggests a rethink on the part of someone who's really been one of the major proponents of Pax Americana.
>> Well, you do wonder Doug given all of our wars since 1991 the last war that we won in any meaningful way.
>> Anyone who is in favor of all those crazy wars we have fought since then, you know, Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Iran, uh, isn't thinking seriously about whether their judgment was correct in the past.
>> Well, I think Doug, you wrote a book called Foreign Follies uh, several years ago, correct? On this subject.
Yeah.
>> But I mean, there is powerful interest groups in Washington as well. I mean, John all too often talks about the Israel lobby, but there are also defense contractors who have interests in NATO expansion in Europe, for example. Um, so I mean, I guess back to the the question I posed to both of you. To what extent do you think that the Iran debacle could mark a watershed moment in Washington in the sense that policy planners, both among Democrats and Republicans, will redefine America's role in the world. Less emphasis on the Persian Gulf, less emphasis on Europe, and more focus on Asia.
>> Well, I would just say there's also just another way of coming at this, Tom. One of the lessons that I hope people learn from this conflict and the previous failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, just to name two, is the limits of military power. This is a different issue than how you prioritize uh your interests around the world. The issue that you're raising, which is terribly important. I don't mean to take away from that.
>> Ends and means.
>> Yeah, that's the ends. That's exactly right. You you were talking about the ends. I hadn't thought of it that way. And I was talking about the means. What has struck me over the years, and I'm sure this is true with Doug as well, is the extent to which hawks in the United States believe that the military provides this magic weapon for winning wars quickly and easily and doing social engineering here, there, and everywhere. I mean, the thing I learned early in life, maybe it was because I spent 10 years of my life in the military,
>> is that the military is a blunt instrument and uh it doesn't always succeed in achieving the goals that's assigned to it. Uh but if you listen to a lot of hawks uh in the United States over time, over the past few decades, they seem to be wildly optimistic about what you can do uh if you turn the American military loose. So that's the means part of the story. And I actually do think that people will now sit back and think long and hard about what you could do with military force. And by the way, Tom, some of that will have to do with the fact that we've used such a large part of our inventory of missiles and bombs and other weapons and therefore we don't have a lot of weapons to fight a war. But also I think people uh have come to realize that military force has limits. But with regard to ends, as I said to you before, I think the focus will be more uh on uh East Asia than it has been for the past few years. However, I don't foresee us really abandoning uh the Middle East, mainly because of the lobby uh and the fact that it will go to great lengths to make sure we stay there at least in good part to protect Israel. and I don't see us leaving Europe. Trump has done a lot to turn over the Ukraine portfolio to the Europeans, but he still and the United States still remains quite tied to Ukraine. So, I don't see us leaving Europe in a big way anytime soon.
>> Okay. The power of habit. Doug, your concluding thoughts, Doug.
Yep.
>> Yeah. I think this is going to be a process over time. Rebuilding bases. I think you're going to get a lot of resistance. Where do we get the billions of dollars to do that? The fact that distaste for Israeli behavior is rising. I think that we're going to see the lobby's power is going to it's going to be harder for them and there's going to be less public support for staying. And I think that the specter of China is going to loom larger. It's going to be easier for policymakers to say, well, maybe we don't have to be in Europe. But I think it's a process. The establishment in Washington has been committed to this for a very long time. But it's hard for any of them not to uh, you know, claim, you know, not to recognize that Iran has been a disaster and is going to require some response. And as I mentioned earlier, I do think finances and politics will play a role. The US is effectively bankrupt. We're at 100% of GDP in terms of debt. We're at the record basic close to the record set after World War II. How do we finance that? Is the, you know, is a future president going to be prepared to say we've got to defend the world. So, so much, you know, forget Social Security. We're going to cut Medicare. You know, I think that, you know, aging population. I think there's a lot of reality there that's going to come crashing down at some point. I'm not sure when and it could be very messy, but I think we're being pushed in that direction and Washington will you'll have to follow along even though there's going to be a major struggle along the way. And the other factor to to bear in mind both of you is the attitudes of younger Americans both Democrats and Republicans uh if they're not non they may but they may not only be non-interventionist on foreign policy but they're very critical of Israel to the extent those attitudes prevail that will significantly change things.
Doug John you've been intellectual bellwethers on this subject. Let's do it again. Thank you so much.
>> Thank you.
>> Thank you for having us Tom.
>> Yeah, it's been good fun.