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Actually, I don't really believe the numbers that are presented by the China government. Did the system, the communist system, control population in the kind of um way how a young country like the United States, with less than one quarter the population of China, only 250 years old, this young republic thought it could transform a 4,000-year civilization with four times the population? That was an absurd assumption, but everybody believed it. And what is even more shocking, that's why he wants strict control, more patriotism, and more studies of Marxist ideology. But don't you think that by this means he will weaken China in the long term, because it was reform and opening up what made China strong? Right now, you rather have the feeling that they're building a new Chinese wall.
I have some Singaporean businessman friends who actually got to know President Xi Jinping quite well when he was running Fujian Province. That's the first province he ran, by the way. And many of these Chinese Singaporean Chinese businessmen invested in Fujian and dealt directly with President Xi Jinping. And they said that President Xi Jinping was the most pro-investment governor they ever met.
Independence of Taiwan will remind China of the century of humiliation. As you know, Taiwan was separated and seized first by the Japanese in 1895 in the Sino-Japanese war. So, therefore, China cannot accept the independence of Taiwan because China cannot accept the independence of Taiwan. I guarantee you 100% China will declare war on Taiwan.
You, you try to explain your uh perspective of the world and how you try to approach this in a detached, objective fashion to try and understand Xi Jinping, to try and understand China. And I would say, in that sense, we are similar. Uh, I like you, I don't speak Chinese, and uh, I'm also trying to understand uh China in a detached, objective fashion. And as you that you're a child of the Enlightenment. I'm a child of the Enlightenment too. So to apply those values in terms of objectively trying to understand uh China. And the reason why I wrote this book, uh, "Has China Won?" It's for a very simple reason, uh, which is that the West is completely misunderstanding China, to put it very simply and bluntly. And only because the West has got used to 200, 100 years of domination of world history, and the West assumes that that 19th century and 20th century are the normal condition of the world, and what before that, 1800 years was abnormal. I see it the other way. I see the previous 800, 1800 years as the normal condition of the world, where China and India were the number one, number two economies in the world. The last 200 years have been an aberration. All aberrations come to a natural end. So you're seeing the perfectly the natural return of China and India, and the rest of Asia, by the way. And the problem that the West has is that it has a very fixed set of lenses, of glasses, that it uses to try to try to understand China. And of course, the Chinese reality will never ever become like Western reality. And by the way, you know, the West always looks very big. China is just one country. You add up the total population of the West, North America, Europe, you may get maybe 700, 800 million people. China is 1.4 billion people. And so the failure to understand that China must be understood on its own terms is a fundamental mistake, and also it leads to other fundamental misunderstandings.
Now, I can mention four or five, but let me just mention one as an example. The assumption of the West was that if China succeeded, it could only succeed by becoming a replica of a Western society. Now, I'm not making this up, okay? If you want proof, as you know, one of the most powerful policy makers in the Biden administration today is Kurt Campbell. Go read his essay in Foreign Affairs. And as Kurt Campbell says in his magazine, the essay in Foreign Affairs, "Hey, all of us Americans thought very simply, we'll open up China economically. After we open up China economically, China will open up politically. China will become a liberal democracy, and China and America will live happily ever after." That's a fairy tale. But it's a fairy tale that was believed by serious people. And I can tell you, when future historians look back at this Western assumption that China would become like the West, they'd be very puzzled how a young country like the United States, with less than one quarter the population of China, only 250 years old, this young republic thought it could transform a 4,000-year civilization with four times the population. That was an absurd assumption, but everybody believed it.
And what is even more shocking is just the simple failure to understand that after having the oldest continuous civilization in the world, the Chinese have worked out their own political history, their own political traditions, their own political culture, and they know what works for China and what doesn't work for China. And a divided two-party system, in their view, I'm not saying it's my view, doesn't work for China. And in the case of China, history of time, China teaches them that when you have strong leadership on top, the people benefit, the bottom 50% benefit. And when you have weakly divided leadership on top, the people suffer. Which is why, incidentally, there's a lot of support for strong leadership in China. And if you want truth, Harvard Kennedy School has come out with a study that shows support for the Chinese Communist Party has gone up from 86% in 2003 to uh 93% in 2016. Why? The Chinese have had the best 40 years of socioeconomic development in 4,000 years of Chinese history. At a time when the Chinese people feel strong and self-confident, the West is asking, "Why don't you change and become like us?" It's a question that seems perfectly natural to the Western mind. It seems absurd to the Chinese. So these are the sort of fundamental misunderstandings which I try to change uh in my writings, and that the goal at the end of the day is to promote better understanding. And I hope with this dialogue with you, Stefan, we will end up with achieving a better understanding.
Well, thank you, professor. Um, you mentioned the the idea of strong leadership and, you know, I mean, Stefan, obviously you've written a book about the most powerful man in the world, and it does seem to be the case with the recent historical resolution which puts the president on par with erade-defining Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Mao. What do you make of this development? I mean, what is what is he setting for China in the years ahead?
Stefan: >> I think is where you're muted. You're muted with a system of government >> that was previously thought control never be as productive as a capitalist democratic rule of law system as a one-party system that mixes communism and Confucianism has put China on top. And I agree with you. Historically, this is nothing new. For much of human history, China was the leading world power. It is the greatest comeback in history that we are currently witnessing. There is no discussion of economic policy that does not focus on China's victorious race to catch up back up. Figures from the trade war with the US to the takeover of innovative companies and vast swaths of land in Africa. But in Germany, especially, we thought mainly of China as being a communist country. And from our own history, we remember, we have in mind, we have been to go to West Berlin and look across the wall and see East Germany and see that this communist system just does not work. And what a lot of people did not understand yet is that China is mainly China. It's ruled by a communist party and its leader, but it's an economy that is very similar to a capitalist economy in the West, and they are very successful, and they are even more successful now than the Western states, as you can see uh in in different respects. So I think the the biggest fight we have with China is a fight against ourselves, that our system does not work as good anymore as it used to work after the war. And and I think we have to understand that, and we have to understand that we have to take our positions, but we have to respect the positions of China and the other countries in the world as well, otherwise there would be very big conflicts in the near and the future. So I think we have to concentrate our own work, and we have to compare how long it takes to build an airport in Berlin and how it functions, and how long they need in China to build a dozen.
>> Right. And professor, what do you make of this, you know, the recent developments, this consolidation of power and the argument in some Western countries that, you know, it's an anti-democratic move, or do you see that as a natural progression in in his thinking about how he wants to um, you know, prevent maybe internal chaos within the country ahead of the party congress next year?
>> Yeah. Well, I would say very simply on terms of what's going on in China, uh, there are two schools of thought. uh one I would call the Anglo-Saxon media school of thought, and then I would call the second, I guess, the Chinese school of thought. But just as an aside, by the way, Stefan, I completely agree with a key point you made that the real fight is the fight inside Western societies. It's how the West adapts and adjusts to China. That's the most critical thing. The fight is not with China. It's competition with China to produce results that are better than China. And I'm glad you used the airport example, because when it comes to building airports, fast trains, roads, I mean, you just, you can't compete with China. And by the way, and I explained in other areas too. So going back to your question about the, what is, what is basically, what is Xi Jinping doing with the common prosperity, right? Going after Jack Ma, Alibaba, Tencent, Didi, and beating them up. Capitalism is dead in China. Guess, and of course, I know some of my American friends. I get WhatsApp messages from my, what? One of my American friends. They're celebrating. "Hey, you know, we let Google, we let Facebook grow and thrive. China is killing its big tech. America is going to win." And by the way, it may happen. It may happen that America will win, and that uh America will do much better. The Chinese economic growth story is over. Goodbye. End of chapter. That's the Anglo-Saxon media uh perception of what's happening in China. But I think there is another view. And the other view is that the Chinese have actually carefully studied. What are the dysfunctional aspects of the American economic and political system? And they have decided that these dysfunctional aspects of the American economic and political system are going to hold America back, and China is going to kill those dysfunctional elements. And that's why in my book, uh, "Has China Won?", I devote an entire chapter to how the United States has functionally become a plutocracy. A plutocracy, just for your, you want a simple definition. Democracy is a government of the people, by the people, for the people. Plutocracy is the government of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%. Not just, I don't just say that. Paul Volcker, Martin Wolf, Joseph Stiglitz, all describe us as a plutocracy. And that's why the bottom 50% in America haven't seen an improvement in their standard of living for three decades. The Chinese have studied this and said, "This is not what we want." Which is why it's called common prosperity. Common prosperity means the bottom 50% must also benefit, and that way you get a system that is more viable and also potentially economically more competitive. Now, it's not Kishore Mahbubani saying this. One of the biggest experts on China is a gentleman called Lee Kai-fu. He's written a definitive book on artificial intelligence. He's a major investor in China. You can listen to the economics, the Economist podcast with Lee Kai-fu, and he'll tell you he's invested in a thousand companies in China. And he said, "In the past, when you invested in companies in China, when it started succeeding, Alibaba, Tencent, all the big guys would eat them up. They couldn't grow." He says, "Now I have a thousand companies. They can grow. They will not be eaten up anymore by the big uh elephants in the room." Therefore, Kai-fu is actually predicting a more competitive capitalist system, one that actually ensures that big tech doesn't dominate the game completely. Now, frankly, who will be proven right? We don't know. Let's wait and see 10 years from now. But I can tell you, on the basis of China's performance over the past 30 years, it's safer to overestimate what China may accomplish rather than to underestimate.
>> And on that note, um, you know, I mean, China's projected to become the world's largest economy sometime around 2030. Um, obviously there are fundamental differences between the US and China, but is there room to cooperate? I mean, you know, we've had the recent Bloomberg forum, you know, various world leaders making positive noises about um, you know, the dangers of decoupling and how collaboration is important. But do you see the US and China being able to cooperate, you know, beyond some of the initial agreements, you know, that they've come to such as on climate action?
Stefan: >> Well, we we have no dissent about the question that Asia is rising and the West is falling down. I also understand the motivations of Xi Jinping. He is afraid China could suffer the same destiny like the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. That's why he wants strict control, more patriotism and more studies of Marxist ideology. But don't you think that by this means we will weaken China in the long term, because it was reform and opening up what made China strong? Right now, you rather have the feeling that they're building a new Chinese wall. Is um Corona the only reason for that, or do you think that they are going back into their own country uh and opening less than before?
>> Well, I I I completely agree with you, Stefan. If indeed uh President Xi Jinping is moving away from Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic economic policies and going towards more rigid Soviet Union type Marxist-Leninist policies, then I agree with you that China is going to fail. I don't disagree with that assumption at all. But I can tell you that in a sense, one of the biggest difficulties in understanding China is the fact that China is run by the uh, what do you call it? Communist Party of China. And so you assume that, of course, the number one goal of the Chinese Communist Party is to promote communism, right? But actually, functionally, number one, the Communist Party of China, unlike the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, doesn't export communism to any country. In fact, over 40 years ago, when Mr. Deng Xiaoping came to Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew told him, "How can we become your friends if you're supporting a communist party that is undermining my political system?" For 40 years ago, they switched off support from all the communist parties in Southeast Asia. Now, why do they retain the name Communist Party? They retain the name Communist Party because that's the vehicle of legitimacy that they have. The Communist Party, at the end of the day, has delivered the results. It enjoys the support of the people, and therefore it carries on. But look at the policies of the Communist Party of China. And I can tell you that, you know, the I have some Singaporean businessman friends who actually got to know President Xi Jinping quite well when he was running Fujian Province. That's the first province he ran, by the way. And many of these Chinese Singaporean Chinese businessmen invested in Fujian and dealt directly with President Xi Jinping. And they said that President Xi Jinping was the most pro-investment governor they ever met. And I doubt that the Chinese are going to give up the free market system that has delivered so many goodies uh for for China. And if you want to get a sense of the the m into step into the mind of Xi Jinping on this subject, if you can go and read a speech that he gave in Davos in January 2017. I was in the room actually when he gave that speech, and there's one paragraph he says, he says, "Why did China succeed? China succeeded because it plunged into the ocean of globalization, and we opened up our economy. He said, we struggled to swim, but at the end of the day, after struggling to swim, we became stronger." So today, in terms of believers in free market theory, the policy makers in Beijing believe in the principles of free market theory, which is why China is ready to sign a free trade agreement with any country in the world. And that's why China has joined the world's largest free trade agreement, the RCEP. And that's why China has applied to join the CPTPP. Now, tell me, how many of you think that the United States can join any of these free trade agreements? So, if you, in terms of commitment to free market economic principles, no matter what they say, they may they may say they belong to the Chinese Communist Party, they have a greater belief in free market economics than Washington D.C. does.
>> Right. So you mentioned the commitment to principles. Okay. Sorry. Right now, China has is closed to the outside world. We referring to Corona. How long do you think can this hold or will this keep changing during the next months, or do you think that the Corona wall will last for next decades?
>> Um, I I I I don't know when, Stefan. I don't know when they will open up the Corona wall, but uh, as you know, the Chinese economy hasn't closed. And I don't have the data. You can all Google and get the data. China's despite Trump's trade war, uh, United States trade deficit with China has increased. And United States trade deficit with China has increased because there are more Chinese exports going to the United States. And by the way, the reason why the Port of LA is struggling is because too many Chinese exports are trying to come in. So I don't think China has closed its economy. It's closed its uh uh country to movement of peoples, but I don't think it has going to stop uh the the Chinese economy, close the Chinese economy in any way. And I actually predict that the Chinese economy will open up even more. And as you know, recently, in terms of the measures that they have done in terms of giving licenses to Western financial institutions like Goldman Sachs, to JP Morgan Chase, I think all those doors will be open more in China. On the one hand, I I agree to your point that the present rising of COVID cases in Germany and other European countries show the weakness of the West in fighting the pandemic. On the other hand, China's zero-COVID strategy brings a lot of harm. There is neither business nor tourist travel between China and the outside world anymore. Supply chains are disrupted. And nevertheless, zero-COVID countries like China, Australia, or New Zealand have COVID cases from time to time. Actually, I don't really believe the numbers that are presented by the China government. Isn't this an illness, an illness which never will disappear, and we have to learn to live with it? Did the system, the communist system, to control population in the kind of um way um one through COVID? I mean, we can see that in European countries as well, that that the government, you know, puts its hands on the people than it had before. So did COVID help a communist system to control the people?
>> Well, I mean, as you know, Stefan, there are two schools of thought on how to deal with COVID also. Uh, the Western school of thought is, okay, it's going to, this pandemic is going to be accepted as an endemic feature of our society. And then there's a Chinese school of thought, which is still trying to go to zero-COVID. Singapore, as you know, has joined the Western school of thought, and I'm actually happy that Singapore >> uh is now opening up because uh I was finally able to go to uh United States last I spent four weeks in the United States in October because it's opened up. Singapore has opened up, and the West has opened up. So I I I I prefer the the open school to the Chinese school, but we have to wait and see what the outcome will be.
>> Now, gentlemen, if I can just circle back to the question in the point you made earlier about the commitment to free market um principles. Well, there is also another school of thought which says that China might be doing it on its own terms. You know, so that, for example, you know, if you look at this part of the world, um, some would say that there is a trust deficit in China's intentions. Um, what would you say to that? Because clearly, there is a certain recognition on the part of the Chinese leadership as well that it has to do um some of that public, you know, image um updating, you know, I mean, earlier this year, they talked about creating a more lovable and respectable uh impression of China to the world, and what, what's your thoughts?
>> Okay, um, the interesting question is when you say there's a trust deficit in in China. I I think it's important to identify which countries you have in mind. Certainly, there's a trust deficit in China, in Australia, there's a trust deficit in China, in Japan, there's a trust deficit in China, in India, certainly, and that's how they set up the Quad. But if you go to the vast majority of countries in the world, and one indicator, one leading indicator of this is the Belt and Road Initiative. Uh, the Belt and Road Initiative, China has launched. Countries are free to join or not to join. And out of 193 member states in the UN, over 130 have joined. So where is the trust deficit? If 130 countries want to join the Belt and Road Initiative, and I can tell you, some of you may know this, I had a one-on-one interview with the with the president of Indonesia, Stefan, a few weeks ago. Uh, I published an article in Project Syndicate called "The Genius of Jokowi," and my conversation with him was printed in the Straits Times, by the way, the transcript. And I asked him a question, "Where does Indonesia stand on US-China relations?" And President Jokowi said to me, it's on record, he says, "Yes, we have good relations with China, and we want to have good relations with America too." And he said, "But when the American friends come to see me, I said, please, China is investing in Indonesia. As you know, the Jakarta-Bandung railway is being built by Chinese uh companies. So, it is why don't you Americans can also come and invest in in in in China?" And and more telling, in terms of when when COVID-19 began, and when Indonesia was looking for vaccines, uh, they got almost zero from the United States. China gave them 120 million, and President Jokowi, by the way, of Indonesia, took a Chinese vaccine. So where is the trust deficit?
>> And Stefan, um, your your thoughts on it? I mean, what's the view from Europe?
>> Yeah. They're muted again.
>> You know, we we concentrated uh we concentrated on the BioNTech-Pfizer vaccination, and now we can see that it holds only five or six months, at least. And the and the Chinese vaccination is not uh allowed in Europe. What do you think about that? How how is it in Singapore? Which are you concentrating on in Singapore?
>> Sorry.
>> No, he's you're asking whether or not the Chinese vaccines are allowed in Singapore.
>> Yes, they are.
>> Yeah.
>> Yes. But >> and does it hold longer than the European one?
>> Does it hold?
>> Well, I mean, I I you have a choice. You have freedom of choice, and you can choose. But the by the way, the majority of Singaporeans have taken Pfizer vaccine because it came first, was approved first, and so on and so forth. But that's that's freedom uh of choice. But anyway, that as you know, in the in the case of vaccines, that's where the good news is in the world. I think the Western countries managed to produce uh anti-COVID-19 vaccines in record time, you know, and and that was a positive contribution uh by the West to the. But Stefan, I wanted to kind of, you know, go back to, you know, the European, you know, view of China. Um, I mean, beyond the COVID vaccines, um, so for, for example, I mean, the investment, trade, and investment relationships, um, the gratification of, you know, the investment agreements. Um, there are clearly some, you know, major sticking points that remain. Do you see these hurdles being overcome, and how do you see the EU balancing that relationship between the US and China? Do you see it pulling closer to the US over time?
>> Um, actually, I I wouldn't say that it's a balance. uh Germany and Europe, uh, at least the the Western part of Europe, relied on the United States for the last um, half century. And so there is a very, very close connection between us and the Americans that has survived the Cold War. So I I don't think that it would be necessary or good for us to leave the combination, the friendship, the close relations to the United States. But in fact, uh, if you just look on the pure numbers, um, you you said that already. I mean, all over Europe, Russia, and the United States together have less population than China itself. So I think we have to live with the idea that China will become the most powerful, at least economically, the most powerful nation in the world. And uh, I think I heard it from you in one of one of the interviews, your speeches you held, that the Americans and the Europeans have to live with the fact that China will be number one in the world. Um, and as long as China is not sending troops to other countries or to islands nearby, um, I think we we can live it, and we should live with it, and we we should do so much work as we can, and as it was u known in Europe and the United States during the last decades after the war. But right now, sometimes I have the feeling we are concentrating more on um climate or other catastrophes um um in the in the near of future, except and and do not concentrate as much as what we should do on the development on our economic system, on our um university systems, the schools, and everything, and and the discipline of working. So I think it's really um not not a war, but it's um um um competition. It's competition, and we have to do a lot to keep up with this competition, and at the same time, we have to know that we are relying and dependent and dependent on uh our relationship to other countries, and one of the main countries we are depending on is China, by selling our cars or buying computers or whatsoever. So it's very, it's it's very important um that that we get along well with China. And I think um and I would like to know what what you think about the change in China itself, that um the head of the state and the party can be elected um until as long as he lives. Does this show something uh that has been changing in China during um the the the last years, and is that dangerous?
>> Okay, before before I >> go back into the >> Yeah. Uh, before I respond to your question about term limits, your last question, >> if you don't mind, I'm going to put forward an uh an alternative approach for Europe in in this US-China >> uh contest because I actually think, you know, you you said something by the way, which is unmentionable in the United States of America, right? Stefan just said, "China will become the number one economic power in the world." And if you're a betting man, you would bet on China becoming the number one economic power in the world. Simple mathematics, they keep growing at 6, 7%. Eventually, they'll become number one. Doesn't matter whether it's 10 years, 15 years, they'll get there. Now, in the United States of America, if any American politician says, "Hey, China is going to become number one. Let's get ready for it." That politician is dead. Finished. And by the way, having spent four weeks in the United States, I'm actually quite shocked at the level of the ferocity of the anti-China sentiment in the US because in the US, China is no longer regarded as a competitor. Competitors, you can compete, their rules, you can see who wins. China is regarded as the enemy. And so there's a powerful zero-sum game in in the United States. So I believe that a better role for Europe to play. Now, in some ways, maybe Europe can reciprocate the generosity that the United States showed towards Europe in the Cold War. United States defended Europe in the Cold War, defended it very well. And it's time now for Europe to reciprocate American generosity by guiding the United States towards a wiser policy towards China, which is to accept the reality that you cannot stop China, nor can you transform China. You just got to live with China. That's the reality. And that's what, by the way, most countries in one way or another are doing. They're adjusting to a new, more powerful China that is emerging. And I actually believe it will be in America's national interest to craft a policy towards China that is accepted by the majority of countries in the world, rather than a policy towards China that isolates the United States of America in the world, which is what the current policy is. Because the current policy is, you know, you're with China, you're with US or against US, and most countries don't want to choose. That's very clear. The majority of countries in the world don't want to take sides. So the wiser course for the United States to do, therefore, is to work out for a new international consensus that creates a set of rules whereby China can grow, US can grow, and all of us can grow. And frankly, that requires stronger global multilateral frameworks. And Europe, at the end of the day, is a champion of multilateralism. So Europe can take the lead in creating these sorts of global multilateral frameworks that create a level playing field for US, China, Europe, and the rest of the world. That's what I think Europe should be doing. And by the way, just as an aside, let me also mention as you may know, I I also suggest in my book that Europe will be torn with its head and its heart in dealing with China. Your heart is with the United States. Of course, that has to remain in the United States. But your head will also tell you that the number one long-term threat to Europe is no longer Russian tanks. It's migration flows. And if you're going to have this demographic explosion in Africa, where Africa's population in 1950 was half that of Europe, today Africa is more than double. By 2100, Africa's population will be 10 times the size of Europe. Migration is the challenge. If you're going to deal with migration, the answer is economic development of Africa, and China is your best partner for dealing in terms of economic development of Africa. So it's important for Europeans. Therefore, all I'm arguing, going back to your point about the values of the Enlightenment, what I learned about that from the Enlightenment is be very calm, cool, and rational in your analysis. And the United States is no longer calm, cool, and rational in its analysis of China. I think Europeans can can help the United States by giving calm, cool, rational analysis.
Now, going back to your question, let me answer quickly about uh term limits. Um, for for China, I I can tell you that as you know, uh in many countries, you have had leaders that have stayed more than 10 years who did a very good job, like Chancellor Angela Merkel. Indeed, I'm very sorry that she's stepping down, by the way. I wish that she could stay on. So in the case of >> you think we should have a rule like >> no no I mean you know in the case of >> in the case of Western democracies, I think Tony Blair stayed more than 10 years. Uh, I mean, United States, you cannot, of course, because of a two-term limit. Uh, but in the in in many Western societies, you can stay on. So in the case of China, I would say don't focus on the term limits. That's frankly irrelevant. The most important question to ask is, is China going to continue to have good governance or bad governance? Okay, that's the critical question. And I think that term limits is not a critical issue. And incidentally, uh, even though Deng Xiaoping was the man who introduced term limits, I want you to know when that when Deng Xiaoping was chairman of the Bridge Association of China, he was the most powerful man in China. Don't look at titles, look at the reality. >> China was not that important at that time. Was not that >> but look at but look at the reality that even if President Xi steps down, he will remain the number one man in China with or without term limits.
>> We didn't talk about one country yet, which is in a certain part a part part of Europe and a part of Asia um, which was um the one of the two biggest nations in the world. What do you think uh what kind of a role does Russia play, does Putin play in this big new game?
>> Actually, you you I think you know Russia better than I do, but I'll give you my answer, and I want you to please let me know whether you agree or disagree. I want you to know that my book, this "The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy," "Has China Won?" has just been published in China. In fact, it appeared in Germany and China at the same time in October uh this year, and the delay in publication in China was due for many reasons. They they had to cut out several parts of the book, of course, which is normal >> in China, but one part they had to cut out was a section on Russia because what I said in in this book, "Has China Won?" on Russia is that right now, there is a very close friendship between Russia and China, which is true, but in the long run, the country that has the most to worry about China's rise is the country which has the longest border with China, and the country with the longest border with China is Russia. So I say that if the if the West is wiser in the way it manages Russia, and and and I belong to the Henry Kissinger, Tom Friedman school of thought, which is that the expansion of NATO right up to the uh inside the former Soviet Union is a mistake, and that the West shouldn't have expanded NATO, should have actually tried to bring Russia into the European family rather than cut Russia out. Okay. But that strategic mistake made by the West has been a gift to China. But you can remedy that and turn it backwards. So I would say that frankly, logically speaking, geopolitics, by the way, is a 2,000-year-old game. Geopolitics is a combination of geography and politics. Geography is critical. So Russian, the current Russian-Chinese alliance is, I think, unnatural, and therefore more naturally the West and Russia will come together at some point in time. I don't know whether you agree or disagree with that.
>> Actually, I I totally agree. Um, I think there are a lot of um conflicts with Russia we should not have. In a certain way, we are driving them into the arms of the Chinese. And if you look uh at at the climate change, which I do not doubt, that means that uh during the next future, it will be easier to get gas with ships to and much faster to China than to send it um to the West. So I think u mainly when we are stopping to to burn coal, um we need gas, and so I think it's very important that our relationship to Russia is better than it is at the moment, otherwise they'll send their gas eastwards instead of westward.
>> Right. And um, you know, if we can sort of turn the lens away from let's say the US and the EU and Russia, um, towards somewhere closer to home, um, where where does India lie in all of this? Um, how does it place itself? I mean, clearly it has a missed opportunity in the form of the RCEP. Um, do you see it, you know, moving closer towards, you know, either country?
>> Why why does Stefan go first? Yes, that's >> I didn't quite get that. Sorry.
>> How >> and actually, you are the expert on India, not me. You know, we we did enough work to try to understand what's happening in China.
>> Yeah. Well, I uh I I cannot claim to be an expert on India, but I can claim to be Indian. So um, India is uh in a very interesting place in this uh US-China contest. Until June 2020, India was moving towards a position of trying to be very careful about maintaining good relations with both sides. Then there was an accident in June 2020. uh several Indian soldiers died in an uh in a clash at the border, and that completely changed Indian public opinion. So Indian public opinion today is very anti-China. And so before the June 2020 incident, the two leaders who had spent more time talking with each other face to face were Prime Minister Modi of India and President Xi Jinping of China, and they got along quite well with each other. But after June 2020, that's now uh 11 plus 6, 17 months, Xi Jinping and Modi have not been able to meet. So the question is whether or not India will completely join the United States side against China, which is possible, but I think it's unlikely because I think it's in India's natural interest, national interest, to try and keep its options open. So, for example, uh, to give you one example of complexity, there is the US Congress has passed legislation that says that any country that buys weapons from Russia, including S-400 missiles, will be subject to sanctions from the United States. India has bought S-400 missiles. So technically, the US government has to impose sanctions on India. So that's an example of how the Indians cannot completely put their uh eggs in one basket. And if you read the book that Jay Shankar, the foreign minister, wrote, which I reviewed for the South China Morning Post, you will see in that review I quote sentences from his book where he says, "Yes, India is a member of the Quad, but he's also a member of the uh BRICS, which has China. It's also a member of the India, sorry, I forget which comes first, India-China-Russia dialogue, which happens also." So India, I think, has a foot in many camps.
>> And Stefan, your views?
>> Well, actually, uh, do you think that the Chinese government cares about what, um, let's see, the feeling in other countries about the rising power of China? Are do they do they think we don't care what they think, or do do they see that for politics in um, Hong Kong um, raises the fear of um towards China in Western countries, so that you can do you think they they do not care about what the public opinion in other countries is?
>> Well um, my my response to that, I'm glad you mentioned Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a very typical example of how the misunderstanding arises uh between the West and China, and United States and China. Now, I want to go back to my point about there are 193 countries in the world, and of the countries that are concerned about Hong Kong, I guarantee you almost no African country is interested in Hong Kong. Right? I do not know of maybe except for Japan, uh, any other Asian country that speaks out on Hong Kong. Uh, in fact, you mentioned India. Uh, in this book, "Has China Won?", I tell a story of how I think in 1961 or 62, President John F. Kennedy of the United States and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the United Kingdom wrote a letter to the Anglo-Indian Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and said, "Hey, we understand you're going to invade Goa. Don't invade Goa. Please is let Portugal run Goa." I think within a week or two of receiving the letter, Nehru invaded Goa, took back Goa, and said, "Goa belongs to India, please." So in the same way as Nehru thinks that Goa belongs to India, Chinese think that Hong Kong belongs to China. And as far as I know, apart from the Western countries, in no other out of the 193 countries in the world, take out the Western countries, the remaining countries don't say anything about Hong Kong. And also this another important statistic: only 12% of the world's population lives in the West. 88% lives outside the West. So in terms of your point about does China listen to opinions, I think the Chinese pay attention to the 88% figure, and and I think that's what is missing in the Anglo-Saxon media and incapacity to understand that 88% the thinking of the 88%.
>> politic in Hong Kong. Do you understand that some people in the West have the feeling that this could happen to Taiwan as well? Is there a real danger?
>> Uh, well, the the danger, the danger of Taiwan, to put it very bluntly, is the danger of a nuclear war because we have had peace in the across the Taiwan Straits for 50 years, primarily because the United States reached an understanding with China called the One China Policy. It maintained official ties with Beijing, unofficial ties with Taiwan. That has kept the peace, right, for over 40, 50 years now. If you don't change that, there'll be no war on Taiwan. But if the United States pushes for independence of Taiwan, which is, by the way, what some people in the Trump administration tried to do there, they were crossing a red line. And you know, one one other thing I've done is to launch a MOOC, MOOC course on US-China relations, explaining China's century of humiliation. Independence of Taiwan will remind China of the century of humiliation, as you know, where Taiwan was separated and seized first by the Japanese in 1895 in the Sino-Japanese war. So, therefore, China cannot accept the independence of Taiwan. Because China cannot accept the independence of Taiwan, I guarantee you 100% China will declare war on Taiwan.
>> >> And if China invades Taiwan, >> you get a nuclear war >> or something like that, will that be the moment of war as well?
>> Well, I think that's what states say we can't do anything. >> I I think that even I can assure you that people in the United States also do not have the answer uh to that question. I think the Biden administration has been very good on one point. The Biden administration has consistently said since it came into office that it it believes in the One China Policy, and you know, even recently, when Kamala Harris came to Singapore, and u uh Lloyd Austin, the Secretary of Defense, came to Singapore, he both he, they all reiterated the One China Policy. So for those of us who don't want to die, by the way, in a nuclear war, we also die. Don't think that you're safe. Uh, when you get a nuclear winter, it affects all of us all over the world. So we therefore have a vested interest in preventing a war over Taiwan, and we therefore have a vested interest in speaking out and retaining the One China Policy. Don't change it, then you avoid a war.
>> >> Right. And on that mother, >> don't you think that? >> Yeah. be because of the the the strong connections, economic connections between China and the Western world, it could help to prevent a war because everybody knows before some tanks roll, we'll have an economic crisis in the world as big as it has ever been.
>> Well, I think you know the you know, I spoke about the Enlightenment and being a rational actor. China is in many ways the most rational actor on the world stage today. I mean, China calculates its national interest very, very carefully and works it out and tries to over time. It doesn't get results. It has setbacks all the time. It has had setbacks with India, setbacks with Australia, setbacks with Japan, but overall, decade by decade, they keep moving forward. So they are rational actors on all issues except one. On Taiwan, China is not a rational actor. China is an emotional actor, and China will pay a massive economic and military price to secure Taiwan, and if it's 10 years of recession in China, China will accept it.
>> Mhm.
>> Right. So now we've actually covered the EU, we've covered Russia, we've covered India, Taiwan. Now we bring the circle back to Southeast Asia. What does the future hold for this region? I mean, we saw this morning the US-China special summit. Um, where that relationship, you know, will be upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Um, but at the same time, there have also been concerns. I mean, you mentioned the BRI earlier. um but also ESG concerns over the BRI, um concerns over possible, you know, influence operations in the region.
Um, so various things which kind of are at the back of, you know, Southeast Asians' minds, you know, when they deal with China. Um, what's your recommendation on the way forward?
Yeah, I think you should ask Stefan more questions too. Uh, I don't know whether his book covers Saudis or not, but, uh, let me. Okay. Anyway, you know, Southeast Asia clearly is in the front line in this US-China contest. Let's be very clear. Okay. So, how Southeast Asia goes is going to be a key, uh, bellwether indicator of where the world is going. And I think the consensus in Southeast Asia, of course, some countries in Southeast Asia are closer to China, like Laos and Cambodia. Some countries in Southeast Asia are closer to the United States, like Vietnam, right? But I would say almost all the 10 agree that they want to have good ties with China and they want to have good ties with the United States. Nobody wants to be forced to choose one or the other. And the preference of the United, of the Southeast Asian countries, therefore, is to see a stronger presence of the US in this region. But not, not, not, not a stronger US presence that says, "Keep China out," but actually engages, uh, Southeast Asia economically. That's why I quoted President Jokowi earlier telling the Americans, "China is investing in Indonesia. Why don't you please invest, uh, in Indonesia too?" But you see, at the end of the day, the priority of the Southeast Asian countries, all 10 of us, is economic development. And you look at the data. Okay, this is the most important piece of data you should know on the triangle between US, China, Southeast Asia. In the year 2000, United States trade with Southeast Asia was $135 billion. China's trade was $40 billion. Right? Less than one-third in 2000, China's trade with Southeast Asia. 20 years later, 2020, while the United States is busy fighting wars in the Middle East, wasting $5 trillion in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, everywhere. Right? China's trade with Southeast Asia, US trade with Southeast Asia goes from $135 billion to $300 billion, an increase of two and a half times. China's trade with Southeast Asia goes from $40 billion to $650 billion. So China's trade with Southeast Asia, which was one-third that of the United States in the year 2000, is now more than double. And by 2030, by the way, the gap will be much bigger. So the game, the big geopolitical game in Southeast Asia is economic. And if the United States wants to play the economic game, the United States should join, rejoin the CPTPP. That's the answer. But the United States doesn't have an economic strategy in the region. It is going to lose the game to China. So that's why everybody is telling the United States, "Come back with an economic game plan."
What we just revisited was a deep conversation about the future of China. It took place in November 2021. On one side of the dialogue is the renowned Singaporean diplomat and scholar, Kishore Mahbubani. The guest speaking with him is Stefan Aust in Germany. And across the European media landscape, Aust is a highly influential senior journalist. He served as the editor-in-chief of Der Spiegel. Later, he became a key figure in the publishing team at Die Zeit. He is truly a representative figure in German-language media. In Western public opinion, Aust belongs to the rational and pragmatic camp. He acknowledges China's economic achievements. He also opposes decoupling from China. But this is exactly why this dialogue is so significant. We can see that he is a Western elite willing to engage with reality. Yet, when he looks at China, he is still trapped in a binary mindset. He sees the world as democracy versus autocracy. He still tries to interpret a 4,000-year-old civilization using political standards that evolved in the West over just the last few centuries. Mahbubani offers a completely different perspective in this hour. He did not simply defend China. Instead, he presented the Western audience with cold and hard realist logic. Let us review the most critical arguments from the video.
First, let's look at political systems. While the West worries about centralization in China, Mahbubani reveals the structural crisis in the American system. He bluntly points out that the United States functionally operates as a plutocracy. This is a system serving the top 1%. This explains why the standard of living for the bottom 50% of Americans has stagnated for 30 years. It also explains why the Chinese government pursues common prosperity. It is not just an economic goal. It is a political necessity to maintain the social contract.
Second is the issue of Taiwan. Mahbubani issued a necessary strategic warning. Western politicians often try to test the red lines, but Mahbubani made it clear: on other issues, China is rational, but on Taiwan, China is emotional. To maintain unity, China is willing to pay any economic price. This respect for historical red lines is missing among many Western observers.
Third is strategic efficiency. Mahbubani presented a striking contrast in data. The United States wasted $5 trillion on wars in the Middle East. Meanwhile, China built a massive trade network in Southeast Asia. This is not just a difference in numbers. It is a clash of two grand strategies. This strongly explains why most countries in the Global South still choose to deepen cooperation with China despite Western lobbying.
Now we stand in December 2025. Looking back at this dialogue from four years ago, Mahbubani's analysis has stood the test of time. The flaws in the Western system that he pointed out are even more obvious today. We see many Western nations deep in the mud of social division and governance failure. Political polarization has paralyzed decision-making. The West once tried to lecture the world. Now it faces a severe crisis of legitimacy at home. In contrast, China has maintained social stability and resilience despite external pressure. As Mahbubani said, for ordinary people, legitimacy does not come from a specific form of election. It comes from the ability to continuously improve people's lives. This dialogue reminds us of a simple truth: we cannot understand China through wishful thinking or ideology. We must understand its history, culture, and hard power. The West must accept this multipolar reality to find a way to live peacefully with Asia.
We are eager to hear your thoughts in the comments below. If you found this video valuable, please like, share, and subscribe to our channel. Thank you for watching.