Geopolitics: An Unfolding Story

Good morning. Welcome to the panel, "Geopolitics: An Unfolding Story." So, as the title of this session suggests, this is an ever-changing story. It is changing by the week, it is changing by the hour, it is changing by the day, especially in the past week, as we see what is unfolding in the Middle East. So that makes this morning's discussion even more pertinent than ever. And I'm so glad to have such an esteemed panel of superstars to help us figure out where this world is heading.

So we have, um, Ram Ellison, um, from the Harvard Kennedy School. I think he needs very little introduction. Um, Zinkari, economist from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Monica Toaft of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. And Happy Jacob of the Council for Strategic Defense and Defense Research in India, and a specialist in nuclear disarmament.

So I'm going to start by asking each of you very quickly, what is the one geopolitical event that you're watching the most carefully today? Tough question, I know, but a quick lightning round. Graham, would you like to start?

Uh, so briefly, it's, I think, the US-China relationship, which is, I think, generally appreciated to be the fulcrum of global, uh, politics and security. I think, point one, uh, uh, Thucydides got it right. This is a rapidly rising power threatening to displace the colossal ruling power. We've seen this movie before, and I think if asked, if several people asked me, well, here, what would Thucydides say now? I would say he would say, "Right on script, almost perfect for the rising power, almost perfect for the ruling power, accelerating towards what he anticipates would be the greatest collision of all times." I think that's the big point one. And I think if we have to bet it in terms of structure, that would be the outcome. My old, uh, mentor, Henry Kissinger, in the last couple of years of his life, every month we would do a phone call or a meeting, and he would say, "Grant, I'm hearing louder and louder the echoes of 1914." So, business as usual, diplomacy as usual, we should predict history as usual.

Then point two, though, briefly, I, not to be so pessimistic, I'd say three-quarters likelihood. That's the story. And, uh, but there's agency. And Thucydides was very interesting. He wasn't like the playwrights who thought we're all in the hands of the gods. He thought human beings could make choices that could take a different path. And he says, in fact, in his wonderful book on the history of the Peloponnesian War, "I'm taking the trouble to write this book because look at the mistakes that were made. People could have made different choices that if they had, it would have had a different outcome." So this is not inevitable.

And I think, um, the most surprising thing about the current international environment is that for all the things President Trump is not, and there's a long list, and for strange as he appears and is, and he is strange, and he does appear to be to be strange. Uh, one, he is not a China hawk. If you look at the campaign last year, there were a thousand people running for office in a country in which 80% of the people have a negative view of China. Only one person had positive things to say about China. This was Donald Trump. See, secondly, he says repeatedly, and has said to President Xi, uh, "China and the US working together can solve most of the problems of the world." So I believe he believes that. And third, finally, he, uh, is determined to be, in his own way, a great dealmaker and a great peacemaker. And if he's going to succeed in that mission, the opportunity for Xi to surprise us on the upside, I think, is enough to be hopeful.

Right. Donald Trump, a peacemaker. We will get more into that in a bit. Professor Ting, um, you know, as, as Graham has just said, you know, the US-China relationship is going to be the defining question of our time. And it's not about trade. It's about Chinese aspirations. It's about the Chinese development model. And most importantly, it's about technology competition. And DeepSeek is just only the beginning. So we're going to see a whole spectrum of US-China tech competition where dual-use technology was once, even 40 years ago, 15% roughly. Now it's something like 70%. So that will be the key geopolitical, uh, question in my view, and that's what I follow.

Thank you. Thank you, Monica.

Yeah, thank you. So I would broaden it just a little bit from what's been said, which is spheres of influence. I think what we're seeing is a realignment globally, and actually regionally as well. What's happened in Israel and Iran, and I think we're going to touch about that a little bit. There's been a return of spheres of influence where there's been an unsettling of the balance of power regionally, and then of course globally. The United States was a global hegemon for about 10, 15 years, depending upon how we we count that. But now, with China rising, um, it's being, uh, competed against, particularly in Asia. Uh, and then we see Russia is still a player, and in part because it has nuclear weapons. It's a formidable power. It's got a lot of geography, a lot of resources, and Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to remain a player. Uh, whether that happens, I don't know. But I agree, the key competition is between China and the United States. We're seeing multilateralism being challenged. We're seeing bilateral relations, minilateralisms, uh, regional organizations emerging. Um, and we see increasing strategic competition. And at this point, the competition is economic, but as Graham points out in his book, the Thucydides Trap, it can easily slip into military competition, and let's hope that that does not happen. And of course, there's political competition.

What's different about this sphere of influence than in the 19th century and during the Cold War is it's largely about resources and territoriality and making sure that sea lines of communication, uh, buffer states, buffer zones are, are, are opened. And, uh, and unfortunately, as a result, you're from Singapore, uh, smaller states may have to sort of reorient and figure out how to balance between these different spheres that are emerging. So, as Prime Minister Lawrence Wong said yesterday, always a question he gets. Yes. Exactly. And so, so medium and smaller states, Iran's a medium state. Guess what? Is trying to figure out what its role is. Um, medium and smaller states are going to have to figure out what their role and their agency. They're going to have some agency. Let's not deny that. Uh, but with this great power competition, with these spheres of influence and this reestablishment, it's going to be a challenging, uh, I think, next decade, two decades.

Right. Okay. And to you.

Thank you. I think I'm going to resonate some of what, uh, Monica said. I think what's really top of my mind is the unraveling of the rules-based international order. Now, I don't agree with any of those words. The rules-based, it wasn't. Um, internationally, it wasn't order. It wasn't. But, um, I think where I come from, we have conflicting views about it. Uh, we do need an order. Um, however imperfect that order is, a world order is important. On the other hand, if there is consensus between great powers, great power consensus also means that the medium-sized countries or smaller countries get caught in between, and they have absolutely no agency. So if there is a certain amount of disorder, we don't mind that because that actually gives us an opportunity to develop our own agency and to sort of assert ourselves on the international arena. So I think we are caught between these two, um, schools in some ways. While we don't agree with the, um, the, the, this sort of, uh, current world order and the philosophy guiding the current world order, we want a world order, I think. What emerges from the ashes of the unraveling of the current world order is what we are really looking at carefully from where I come from, which is the global South.

Right. Okay. So we have US-China technology competition and spheres of influence, a global disorder. So quite a bit to get into in the next 35 minutes or so. So we'll do that, and then I'll invite the audience to ask their questions. So perhaps we should start with the Iran-Israel war, which has been very much top of mind, um, for many of us. Um, so Jacob, if I, sorry, if I could ask you, our war has become a more dangerous place than it was on June 13th, and especially since four days ago, when the US joined the fray with its strikes on the three nuclear sites in Iran. Would you agree with that? And I think some would say, um, North Korea will feel, uh, vindicated that it, you know, moved early to weaponization, and, um, in fact, it could well now be doubling down on, um, building a second-strike capability. Um, how do you see others viewing what has happened and calculating what it means for their nuclear aspirations?

You know, I do, um, look at the Israel-Iran war and the American intervention, the middle of that war, as a violation of international law in some ways. Um, it's very clear, um, whichever way you look at it, the international law does not support it. We can get into the nitty-gritties of international law, which I don't want to at this point of time. So, we've seen this, uh, movie before. I mean, in 2003, the Iraq intervention, Libya for that matter. But I think what is striking at this point of time is the nuclear angle in some ways. And I, I'll tell you what I mean by the nuclear angle here. Um, when I look at the history of arms control and disarmament in the last, uh, uh, from 1964 onwards, which is the last 60 years, '64 is when China detonated nuclear weapons. In the last 60 years, I don't think there has been ever an opportune time or a time when there existed geopolitical permissibility for states to go nuclear. Uh, today, you go to Ukraine, the Ukrainians will say, "We made a mistake in giving up our nuclear weapons." You go to Russia, I go to both places, to Ukraine and Russia, and the Russians will tell you that, "We have nuclear weapons, thousands of them. There is no way we're going to be defeated in this war." You talk to South Koreans, the South Koreans will say, "Wait a minute, maybe we should start thinking about nuclear weapons." Um, Israel has nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, which are not, of course, recognized by the NPT. Um, now, the reason why Donald Trump is going after the Iranian nuclear weapons, quote unquote, is not because they are developing nuclear weapons, but because Israel and the United States don't necessarily get along with with the Iranians. Um, let's flip the argument and say, if South Korea were to develop nuclear weapons, would the United States go after South Korea? Perhaps not. So, this age, this era, in some ways, allows for friendly proliferation. So I think the, the, the manner in which the non-proliferation regime has crumbled in the last 10 to 20 years, I think that really is bothersome. I think that's one key takeaway that I have from this particular, the conflict between Israel and Iran, apart from the legal implications, of international legal implications of that, or the regional geopolitical aspects of that.

Can, can I sort of agree and disagree? I think the main point, I agree. But I think the, uh, the most amazing, or if you said, what has happened in the last 80 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki? So here we're at that anniversary, and I think one of the most remarkable things that's happened in the geopolitical order is that there are only nine nuclear weapon states. Why would a state not have nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are its most, uh, golden or platinum security blanket? Absolutely. And 90 states or more could have nuclear weapons in a year. Nuclear weapons is an old technology. If North Korea can make nuclear weapons, sorry, who couldn't? Okay, so, uh, how did this happen? This was one of these extraordinary instances of great statecraft, sustained over a very long period of time, but it's still very unnatural. Why would I, if I were South Korea, or if I were Ukraine, or if I were Iran, not have a nuclear arsenal to protect me, if if nuclear weapons, if an arsenal, if a reliable arsenal provides protection? Well, because what? Why? Hey, it's unnatural. I mean, so I think the unnatural achievement, we failed to appreciate what a remarkable thing that was. And, and just your point about allowing it to erode in the ways that we do, uh, and the, the achievement is a combination of an, a sense of international order, a set of rules, instruct, uh, with the IAEA and commitments, a respect for that set of rules, for the most part, even though at the margin, extended deterrence where there's been guarantees. So there's a lot of components of what we call the non-proliferation regime. But for just us as ordinary citizens, thinking if you lived in a world with 90 states with nuclear weapons, there would be nuclear wars from time to time. That was John F. Kennedy's nightmare after the Cuban Missile Crisis that led to the set of initiatives. And I think we've now kind of taken it for granted as if somehow this was, you know, tied, a boat on it, as done. No, in fact, just as I think was said, it's eroding. Yeah.

And could I come in on that? So, because I, I agree with what's being said, and what I say is, it's too soon to tell. I mean, the big question mark is, the nuclear taboo dead? Yes. And we don't know that. So when, and it was interesting because China, when Russian President Vladimir Putin started nuclear saber-rattling, uh, a year ago or two years ago, in October, it was China that said, "Knock it off." Right? We don't want a nuclear confrontation here. Uh, and so the big question, back to when, uh, uh, Happy was starting, is about the United States. There's been far less sort of, um, uh, uh, screaming at the United States for targeting Iran, for violating its sovereignty, in part because I think the international community accepts that this has been a far and, and long hard-achieved to only have so few nuclear-armed states. And what Israel and the United States are doing is to try to prevent that proliferation. We don't want nuclear weapons. We understand that Israel is a non-declared state. Um, but, but we don't want nuclear proliferation. And so, although it does appear that the United States violated international law, it wasn't an imminent threat. It was a preventative, um, action. States in the region, at least, seem to accept that that was okay to use those bunker busters to possibly go out and degrade, if not annihilate. It looks like we possibly didn't even degrade the possibility of nuclear proliferation in Iran. So the question is, is the degree to which the nuclear taboo is still alive? And there is a sense that it still is, that we understand that qualitatively these weapons are different, um, and that it's not just a quantitative explosion, um, and, and, you know, we'll see the aftermath of this in the next six months to a year about whether it's the case that Iran can prevent the IAEA from going in, and then how the international community responds to that, whether they pressure Iran to say, "Yes, you absolutely have to have these inspections because we want to be guaranteed that there's no further proliferation."

I'm curious to know what you think, um, how will the Muslim world view this, uh, latest development? So, of course, we know that, um, Pakistan is right now the only Muslim country to have nuclear weapons, but many other Muslim nations, Saudi Arabia, UAE, they have nuclear civil nuclear programs. Would they be tempted to go the weapons route? Maybe you want to jump.

No, I think, I think I totally agree with what Monica has said, which is, I'm not so sure the neighbors of Iran want to have a nuclear Iran. Personally, sitting in India, I don't want a nuclear Iran. I'm very clear about that. But that, that is besides the point. The point really is that Iran would not have enriched its uranium to 60% from 20% had Trump not withdrawn from the JCPOA. So the American government will have to take responsibility for that. Um, on the nuclear taboo question, I, I agree with you. The, the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons continues to be very strong, but I'm, I, I get a feeling that the taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons may be, um, you know, collapsing quite a bit. And, and on, on the question that Graham made, um, again, totally, this is a treaty, the NPT regime has managed to ensure that more states do not develop nuclear weapons, but in the last 10 to 15 years, we're seeing an unraveling of that regime too. The NPT review conferences don't reach, anyway, the nuclear security summits are no more held. The IAEA does not have any money. Um, you know, and, and, and, and the contributions have become lesser and lesser. Um, so in some ways, we are looking at a certain nuclear disorder. That's my worry. On the question of whether other states are going to be tempted and persuaded about developing nuclear weapons, I don't, I, I can't speak authoritatively about the Muslim world, but I'll tell you, um, there are, there are rumblings in various parts of the world, um, some of which I just mentioned, just to give you an example, in the, the Ukrainians will say that when the Soviet Union conducted nuclear weapon tests, some of those tests were conducted on Ukrainian territory, and therefore, under the NPT, Ukraine has a right to have nuclear weapons, which is a debatable argument, but they do make that argument in official forums. So you're looking at, you know, countries inching towards crossing that Rubicon in some ways.

Mhm. Okay. So, I'm now going to turn to, uh, uh, Curry. Um, you know, you and to talk about this US-China relationship, and you have stressed the need for a global architecture that spells out clearer rules around technology competition, as opposed to an all-out, um, tech decoupling, which is what we seem to be seeing today. But at the same time, the Trump administration clearly feels that, you know, tech from EVs to AI is a key arena of competition and is almost existential. So, in view of this environment, um, you know, when everything is viewed through security lenses, what can be the pathway forward?

There are national security issues that both countries will have to respect, right? But I do not agree with the view that they are in a new Cold War. If you think about this, they could be politically opposite, but economically competitive, but most importantly, global public goods collaborative, and that is essential. And there is space to collaborate, whether it's on AI risk, climate, data transparency, and so forth. Just a little bit, first of all, on the parameters of the trade, because I think it lays out, um, possibilities for future competition but collaboration going forward. Um, uh, there, there is a no-go area for China, but there are plenty of, there's plenty of room to work together on, right, if it's just about, you know, opening up more markets, financial services in a limited way, buying, purchasing more US goods, but most importantly, on data transparency, you know, regulatory things around AI, or, uh, e-commerce, and so forth. There is a huge amount of, you know, there's scope to collaborate. The principle, the core principal guideline for China, just to understand a little bit of China's, uh, uh, uh, view about the trade war, is equivalence, reciprocity, and realism. You know, China's not going to lower tariffs unless the US does. It has to be realistic. Uh, Phase One last time around didn't work because it was not realistic, and it could be used as a bargaining tool or a leverage of the US, and also it has to be, um, kind of reciprocal and equivalent. So, no-go zones. And coming back to geopolitics, do not conflate political matters, geopolitical matters with economic matters. This is not political tribute, it's mutual commerce. So all the other aspects, you know, Taiwan, and, and so forth, do not conflate that with these trade issues. But so this is, this is, you know, delineating the scope of, of, uh, collaboration. But on the tech, look, you know, if we think about technology, there's invention, production, and diffusion. US totally dominates in the invention part, but guess what? China is very, very competitive on the latter too. If you're talking about the combination of AI plus programs and scale and manufacturing capacity, which country has that all of that in one, one, one package? That is China. And diffusion, the ability to diffuse technology like AI and, uh, the new, new, you know, new energy, and that, that diffusion part is equally important. So I see the US and China, uh, competition not as totally neck-to-neck and head-on-head, but as possibly also, uh, complementary and they can figure out that scope because, you know, for the majority part of the world, the, it is about adopting accessible, uh, and, uh, uh, cost-effective technology. That is most important.

Mhm. So that reminds me of what, um, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said the other day, when he said that China would become a consumption, uh, powerhouse, not just a production powerhouse, and that is where, you know, it will be useful to others, you know, as a market. I think the question here is, how are we going to get there, right? I mean, domestic consumption has been something that has been, uh, talked about so much, and I'm curious to know what you think might be, again, the way forward for this, you know, a few years ago, especially after the Trump trade, 2018, the first, the start of the wave of US export controls and bans and so forth, China was in an existential crisis of being cut off from critical, uh, technologies. I can confidently say it is no longer in that position. Perhaps thanks to Biden's continued export controls. Have you seen this huge wave? Again, you know, we talk about DeepSeek. By the way, DeepSeek did not happen in times of comfort. It happened in times of crisis. This is called crisis innovation. A lot of the technological breakthroughs happen in times of crisis. If you look at today, talking about the tech, I think that even if trade and, uh, investment can come back to some sort of normality between US and China, there's no, no, um, no certainty that on technology is going to happen in parallel. But very critically, pivotal countries like Japan and Korea, especially if you talk about semiconductors, are not just siding with the US. They want to be in both camps because they see China's growing autonomous technology chain as an economic opportunity, but also increasing US unreliability as a major risk factor. So they want to be in both. So as we're talking about geopolitics, my view is it is all multifaceted. It's not with us or against that us kind of view. You can be economically more dependent on China, perhaps more security aligned with the US, and technologically, you can be in both camps.

Graham, do you want to jump in on that? I see a lot of, and, uh, at the be, beginning of the, uh, in 2021, '22, at Harvard, we did four studies following up on the Thucydides Trap book on the so-called great rivalry, or even one version of it is the greatest of all times rivalry. The greatest of all times rivalry. And there's a one, one report on the great economic rivalry, one on the great technology rivalry, one on the great military rivalry, and one on the great diplomacy rivalry, starting from the proposition that these will be the two fiercest, Thucydides and rivals at all times. That's my kind of baseline. Then the rest is sort of, you know, details. In the technology arena, what's been most striking is the speed at which China, I mean, we, what, what the report does is start with the year 2000, and that, you know, up to today, and we have a version up to 2025 now, and you see a country, the bottom line takeaway is that, uh, a country that the US could not find in its rearview mirror at the beginning of the 20th century, you cannot find in its rearview mirror today because it's either side by side or even slightly ahead. So, across the advanced technologies, China is now a full-spectrum peer competitor. And I think Jin's point about AI is a fascinating example. So, uh, uh, this time last year, we would have been thinking, well, there's these, there's ChatGPT, there's these American, uh, Goliaths, America is dominating AI, AI may dominate the world. Then somebody from nowhere, with a small group of people, focused mainly by using brains rather than, uh, than chips, comes up with DeepSeek. DeepSeek then makes a bet on open, where's all the other American Goliaths are closed. Well, if there's 8 billion people, and if a few billion of them are active in this space, and you're open versus closed. So, whereas this time last year, somebody like Eric Schmidt, who's one of the people whom I, whose views I track on this, would have said, "Closed looks like the way to go," particularly because the company can capture the benefits, has now flipped his view. He said, "Open will end up winning this race," and that therefore the DeepSeek strategy in that space is more attractive. So I would say this will be a, a rivalry that will go on, that we'll see continuously for the rest of the world. It'll be complicated because there's two that are so far ahead of everybody else that then that's sort of a, you know, that's a more complicated. But I think the, the, I think Jen's main point is that we'll see this rivalry go step by step, back and forth. There'll be attempts to constrain each other in ways, then they will have to be balanced by some sort of conversation. So I think the way in which the tariff war became export control items, and in which the fact that the US is dependent on China for probably 60 or 70 items, like for example, just magnets, without which a Ford Motor Company's car cannot come off the line, or an F-35 can't come off the line. Well, that's a pretty tight point of choke. Okay. And if that's the case, the conversation about what I'm going to constrain, as opposed to what you're going to constrain, will have to be resolved by bargaining. So that's what's going on now. My, my impression is that the two parties, the two countries are so deeply entangled, especially through their supply chains, that sensible people sitting down will notice that we have to make a deal. And I think that's what percent has been trying to do with the, uh, and I believe that's likely to, I mean, I would bet that's that's likely to happen, though you can always see ways in which it gets disrupted, right? So one,

Oh, sorry. Yeah. So, I think that's a critical difference between the Cold War. We've been here before, with a bipolar rivalry, right? Two strong powers emerging. And the critical difference this time around is we have this economic interdependence. During the Cold War, we had the Warsaw Pact. They had their own economic system, and then there was the Western, and then we had our liberal capitalist system, right? Based on sort of issues of democracy and, and, and norms about human rights. And so this is a critical feature. And the question is, is can we, right, manage this so that China now has leverage with the United States? It has something that it can exchange to put pressure on the United States. Uh, and similarly, the United States, obviously, can put pressure on to China. So it's a really, really critical difference, uh, this technology and this trade, uh, sort of dimensions, moving forward. And the other good news about history is that we've had a Cold War, and it was scary. There was threat of thermonuclear war. Uh, and we understand that it's back to the nuclear taboo issue. Uh, and so hopefully, sound minds emerge, and that we can have sound policy and good diplomacy, right? So we've got the economic, we have the military, which we're trying to keep at bay, but then we have really sound diplomacy in order to sort of unravel the more intractable bits between, uh, China and the United States moving forward. So there are some glimmerings of hope here that we're talking about in terms of how the relationship could proceed. But, um, what I wonder about is also the domestic conditions in both countries. So, as you know, one of the best things about my job as a journalist is I get to speak with really smart people. So, aside from the panel here, um, I've spoken to, uh, people like, uh, Annen from John Hopkins, and also Denny Qua from the LKY School. And if I could just sort of pull together certain threads of what they have been saying, um, you know, the reason why the relationship between the US and China has been so intractable is because of the domestic conditions on both sides, where you know, you can, um, you know, milk so much political capital out of entrenching narratives about the other side. You know, the US is a, is a bully, China is aggressive and ambitious. So, and, and what Danny has also said is, what, where, where is the truth-telling in all of this? Is there any incentive for the media, the politicians to really tell what is really going on with the other side? So, in such a toxic environment, again, what can that, what kind of pathways can there be? What can, what makes you optimistic about how this could proceed?

Well, good. It's a good question. And I think that a, a country like Singapore, that can watch both parties and and understand them with fairly clear eyes, maybe even has some thoughts of maybe you should contribute. I, I would, I would say that, uh, um, again, that sounds like a broken record, but in a normal Thucydides and rivalry, you have the seesaw that shifts. And as the seesaw shifts, I'm been accustomed to being the heavy, so I'm in control of things. You're on the other side of a seesaw in a playground, and I can jiggle you, and whatever you're like, you know, you're just mercy. You get heavier and heavier, and the seesaw starts moving. Pretty soon, I'm feeling my feet coming off the ground, thinking, "What the hell is going on here? This is very unnatural. I'm used to being in control. Now I'm feeling less in control. My perception is now at a different angle. I'm used to looking down on you. Now I'm looking like this. Now maybe looking like this." So this multiplies misperceptions and miscalculations. And in that story, you see increasing, uh, hostility, increasing suspicion, increasing hostility, increasing even demonization. So that almost everything that bad happens, I have a good excuse. Yes. Okay. So I think that's very, very hard to to counter. And that's why I think it's crucial that sensible people try to describe what the, what the natural problem is, and then ask, how can this can be possibly managed? And I think that's why it's particularly interesting that if you have, for the moment, a person like Trump, who does say, I mean, he admires Xi Jinping. He thinks Xi Jinping is a great man. I mean, I wrote a piece in the Post called "The China Hawk," if you want to read the set of quotes. The things that he said about Xi are hard to believe, but that he says that in private, he says that in public, that's what he thinks. Xi is a great man. He then says, "The US and China, Xi and I working together can solve almost any problem." So he's wanting to have some kind of a different relationship. Maybe even a relationship in which partnership would be a more important word than strategic competition. Now, can that make sense? Can it be managed? Could it be managed with the government that he has? And could it be managed with the populations, given the changing attitudes? You know, I would say, stay tuned, but I think something, something interesting is going to happen in this space.

And what does Xi Jinping think of Trump? I think Graham pointed out the, the critical word here. It's managed, right? It's management. Managed rivalry, managed camp competition, managed, you know, uh, uh, security. It's all going to be that. But I think there's some misunderstandings on both sides about each other. Yes. Um, first of all, I think the view that China's sole goal is to displace the US in the world is, is really not what China is on, China's mind. But China believes that it is a universal right and its own right to pedal its way to prosperity, and that there is no country that can stop in its way. Um, and I think that whereas the post-world, um, post-war world was defined by American universal, American moral universality, I think what has happened recently with Trump has basically, you know, taken that stage away. So that moral compass, uh, towards China is no longer there. Um, uh, but I think that we should also, you know, in this context of, that you're talking about the domestic conditions, that's another difference, right? Uh, China is often a political issue for both parties in the US, but China's internal, China's primary challenge is still internal. It's not about the external pressures from trade and trade wars and technology. It's still internal. But China is still not going to use these external factors as a way to distract. Although Trump has helped a little bit in saying, well, you know, look at the economic situation recently, we can blame it on somebody. But to say that China is going to use the external foreign geopolitical issues to kind of deflect away from internal economic issues, that's not going to work because China, Chinese people still today care about the really pragmatic issues of whether their children can go to the right school and have an apartment to have, you know, children appropriate, and, and all that. So I think we, we cannot, uh, confound that. But I just also want to raise one other point, which is that geoeconomics, right? The rise of geoeconomics is very real, and we're seeing that in the data. The third countries, the so-called non-aligned countries, are, you know, there's a fascinating kind of new patterns going on where the two rivalry blocks are working actually closer with the non-aligned. If you look at FDI, you know, China's FDI has come down, US and so forth, but it's going with the non-aligned countries and trade, uh, as well. So these middle powers have become ever more, uh, uh, uh, important. And we're talking about leverage. It's not just that US leverage on others or China has leverage on others. These middle powers also have gained substantial traction. Yeah.

And I'd like to add about the United States, um, because I agree with what's been said, and similarly, the United States, we have serious domestic constraints. Most Americans do not care about foreign policy. So Donald Trump is in actually an enviable position right now. We have a, he's sort of a, we're in a period right now in global politics with personalistic regimes, very strong leaders who happen to be male, uh, and who have relationships with one another. They talk to one another. They respect one another. They admire one another. It could be an extraordinary period for humanity if it's the case that they can figure out a way to collaborate and coordinate on certain issues. Donald Trump has a lot of leeway. The Supreme Court is not really doing its job, or it's doing his job, bidding. Congress is absent. Executive orders are the way of the day. And if President Trump decided that he can figure out a way to align interests a little bit more with China, not give away the the store here, um, that he has the prerogative and the opportunity to be able to do that. Uh, so it's a real opportunity potentially, uh, uh, for, uh, the United States and China to develop their relationships, um, uh, given the nature of the political systems in both countries. The United States. Look, it's democratic backsliding right now. And it, the big question is, in the midterms, will we see a correction with Congress, right? With the American populace saying, "No, we want a Congress that's not completely, uh, inept and not doing its job. It's given up its job." Um, and then the Supreme Court, we'll see what happens. The current justice said he didn't want a politicized court. It appears we have a politicized court. So, a lot of play. And because the domestic political situation, it could potentially be an opportunity if both leaders are enlightened enough to recognize that let's not run rashly on human rights here, but maybe we can make some economic transactional deals that are good for both countries. Right.

Happy to jump in here. Yeah. You know, very quickly, I think I do get the point that when you have two great powers, um, in, in some ways in conflict with each other, it also provides certain amount of, um, leverage to the middle powers and the sort of non-aligned powers. But I think the sharper the competition becomes, the more difficult it is going to be for the smaller powers, um, to sort of make, to sort of make up their mind on which direction to take. Um, you know, in some ways, trade creates vulnerabilities, and, and trade creates more vulnerabilities in a, um, in, in, in a failing multilateral order, in some ways. Now, you are looking at the failure of multilateralism today, and the, the reality is that in a world like this, you get into trade, and there are geopolitical realities that you're going to deal with. Energy trade, or tech trade, the reality is that you buy a certain kind of technology from a certain country, and you're worried about the security implications of that, uh, payment mechanisms. For example, um, you've been sort of used to buying, say, India has been buying oil from, um, Russia, and suddenly the Americans say, "Don't buy, and we're going to sort of stop the, um, the Swiss, the SWIFT payment mechanism. We're going to have secondary, um, sanctions on you guys." So the sharper the competition gets, it's going to be more difficult for us. But I think the reality is, in, in, at least the way I see it, is that geopolitics is going to have a definitive impact on geoeconomics, and in some ways, there's going to be a, the, the reverse causality is going to be also correct. Geoeconomics is going to have an impact on geopolitics. Just to give you a very quick example, um, you know, because the Indians are concerned about the technology that comes from China, etcetera, etcetera. We've been now looking at, um, South Korea, Japan, the United States, etcetera, etcetera. Um, now, because of that geoeconomic decision, um, you're also going to see a lot more geopolitical convergence, strategic convergence between the United States, India, Japan, India and South Korea, India. So which means geoeconomics is having an impact on geopolitical decisions as well. I just want to sort of, um, create that closer circle in some ways.

And just one last question to Monica, you know, you talked about the reemergence of the spheres of influence, and for me, coming from a place like Singapore, is something that's very much top of mind, right? The fact that, um, as Prime Minister Lawrence Wong said yesterday, um, you know, Southeast Asia was an arena for wars during proxy wars during the Cold War. So, could it now happen again? So, in view of what is going on right now, can you tell us what does this mean for global peace and, and stability, and also how far will the US go in trying to secure, uh, places like regions like Southeast Asia as a sphere of influence?

Well, I think under the current administration, it's a question mark. Look, Donald Trump coming off the plane to the NATO summit was ambivalent about Article 5. I mean, this is a treaty that we've signed with allies that we've had in place for decades. Uh, and he says, "They're our friends. We'll take care of them," but we don't know what that means. So, I actually think it's a question mark. And so, if I were Asia, I was in London actually, before the House of Lords, a couple of weeks ago. Hedge your bets. I think because he's mercurial. He's a mercurial leader. And, you know, supposedly the first, the last person he's talked to in the room manages to change his mind. And, you know, that's sad, right? This is a man who's abrogated treaties. He pulled us out of the Peace, Paris Accords. He, the JCPOA. He doesn't have respect for these international mechanisms that, of course, our partners and allies hang their hats on. They, that is what they're relying on. Um, and he seems to like, uh, the idea of tossing everything up, see what happens, and then maybe he'll make a final determination. But that too can change. So my sense is, you've got to hedge your bets, talk to your regional partners, um, and, and, and speak with the United States. Don't isolate it. Could potentially, Trump could come around and say, "Yes, yes, we're going to back you on a particular aspect." Um, but I, I, I honestly, in this climate, he is so mercurial. He, we've all seen it. Twitter. He wakes up at 3 in the morning, and all of a sudden we have a new policy. I guess I should say X. Sorry, Musk. Um, but in any event, um, but, but so I, I think hedging your bets, you know, and actually, in international relations theory, that is a strategy. And small states throughout history have had to hedge, precisely because they cannot rely on the major powers to counteract their own interests, right? In order to provide public goods at all times, and that sort of thing. Um, so hedge your bets.

Let me, uh, I agree completely with Monica about how, uh, complex Trump is, and I, I've been studying him for, you know, about a year and a half. I don't claim to have any great insights, but I think what, uh, you have, you certainly have to take him seriously, but not literally. So that's a big insight. And recognize that he speaks not like normal language, in hyperbole. No, he doesn't speak like normal. He speaks in hyperbole, which is a combination of his own particular weaving combination of fact, fiction, and fantasy. And what components or what in his own mind, hard to tell. But when you hear, uh, things, hear patterns coming up repeatedly, looking between the lines and around those, I think are clues. So I would, if I could take just one second, suggest that if you haven't read his Riyadh speech, it's a very interesting set of insights into the way that I think he sees international relations, which is essentially realist and pragmatic. So he says here in the speech, "I'm different than a lot of people think." He's giving a speech. He says, "I've never believed in having permanent enemies. As I've shown, I'm willing to end past conflicts and forge new partnerships for a better and more stable world, even if our differences may be very profound." And obviously they are. In the case of Iran, he was talking, he says, uh, "In recent years, far too many American presidents have been afflicted with the notion that it's our job to look into the souls of foreign leaders and use US policy to to dispense justice for their sins." He then says, "Before, we used to tell people how they should do things, and, you know, how they should behave, as if they had no idea how to do the things for themselves. Peace, prosperity, and progress ultimately comes not from a radical rejection of your heritage, but rather from embracing your national traditions and embracing the same heritage you love so dearly, and that you could only do well." Excuse me. I think Xi Jinping has been talking for a long time about mutual respect. I think this is the first president, likely, if he embraces, if this works, to basically embrace a leader about whom he has no problem being communist, no problem being authoritarian, no problem about his human rights activity. So all of the American policy, no American president previously has been prepared to engage China in similar terms. Now, you can say what's better and worse about that. I'm just trying to describe. Yeah.

Right. And on that note, I'm going to now invite the audience to ask their questions. Um, thank you very much. My name is Nour Ley from, uh, South Africa. I would like each of the panelists to share with us, um, how they would tackle an assignment wave, I, they were engaged by the European Union. You could pick a country, Germany, France, if you think that's an easier analytical, um, theater to to talk about, and advise them how to play the chessboard at this time. You see, you've, you've spoken as if Europe doesn't exist. And, uh, I heard Monica talk about hedging their bets. Is that it? Um, in the interest of time, I'm going to ask you to just pick one panelist to answer your question. Whoever wants, who wants to take this up?

I say, follow Ra. The former Dutch prime minister, now has understood this perfectly. First, you grovel, call him, pay respect, then you flatter, but keeping in mind your interest. And I think if you watch and see what happened yesterday at NATO, he was very successful.

Mhm. Okay. Very quickly. I, I just very quickly say that states have to be realistic.

Don't believe in your own rhetoric. Rhetoric is good for rhetorical purposes, but don't end up believing in them. I think that applies for applies for countries like Germany. Like it's it's good to be, you know, preaching values to the rest of the world, but realize that the world is far more, um, very different from the way you want it to be. So get realistic and don't believe in rhetoric. I think that will be my play on the chessboard. Okay, one question. There usually my question is quite similar, as in, because when we talk about geopolitics, it's always talking about China and the US, but really, you, we have another big continental Europe. And, uh, I want to hear your perspective in terms of what do you think if the crisis is deep enough so that actually Europe will, um, get together and we may have a kind of a three circulation, a final stage? Or do you think in the foreseeable future, we'll still be a kind of two polar with Europe being the key swing states?

I think on that one, uh, the Draghi report that was prepared by the, uh, former, uh, Italian and and then the ECB president, uh, that explains why Europe has basically been fading away, is brilliant. And I think if if Brussels could execute the Draghi report, the the recommendations in it, you could imagine Europe becoming a, you know, a more serious player. Secondly, I think Trump's argument to Europe that there's something pathetic about a a continent, a and a and a community that has, uh, 10 times the GDP of Russia, four times the population of Russia, and is dependent on somebody else to play the primary role in providing their security from Russia. There's something odd about that. So the argument that Europe should be become more serious about its own defense, which it's actually now becoming as a result of of this set of experiences. So I think it would be a much better world if Europe were a player in the, you know, in the in the setting, and I'm always kind of hopeful about Europe, but then I'm always disappointed.

Yeah. No, and I'd like to respond to that because it's true. I mean, their their politics are based on consensus, and it's hard to get consensus across dozens of nations who have their own political systems. Uh, Brexit happened because the Brits were worried about not being democratically represented by the European Parliament. I mean, it was really a democratic vote, and, uh, and then of course, they wanted to control their borders, which is sort of a tragedy for the United States because we're giving up an ally in a sense. If it's the case that we abandon. In the first Trump administration, it felt as if he wanted to. It's not clear anymore. I think Trump is now realizing, particularly with Putin not playing ball with him to get peace in Ukraine. He's getting frustrated with him. Um, because the United States, one of its its superpowers has always been that it has allies. It has allies in Europe and it has allies in Asia. And the question is, is Trump going to wake up and recognize that, oh my gosh, that's going to help us, right, in order to stay strong, not only militarily, but of course economically, right? And and and he's a smart man, and he might just wake up. He does in some ways seem to have tempered himself with respect to Europe. We'll see. Again, it's early days. Uh, but the recognition of this alliance and this friendship, um, hopefully the United States re-engages with that, and then the Europeans, I don't think they're ever going to get their act together. Look at Spain yesterday. No, we're not doing it. Right. Just keep your mouth shut. Talk about that in the back room. Right. But but but the idea that they're going to come together, on the other hand, that's their strength. That's what democracy is about. They have differences of opinion, but it makes it very difficult to consensus and then agreement on economic policy and military policy, security policy. So, that's a good reminder. It's too early days. It's been just six months, but it just feels far longer than that. It does.

The questions. Um, thank you for the speakers. Uh, Wenzo from University of New South Wales in Sydney. Um, I just wanted to get the panel to speak a little more about one of the perhaps largest counties of the geopolitical potential, which is the World Trade Organization, global trading order. Um, there has been lots of discussions about, uh, the US needs to withdraw from the WTO, and, uh, EU and China needs to take the leadership jointly to to actually support, uh, the ongoing missions of the world organization. So I was wondering, from any of the panels, your views about, uh, not really about whether the US should withdraw from the WTO, because we know what's what's the reality at the moment and won't it won't actually happen in in near term, but to imagine that if the US withdraws from the WTO, would the system still be attractive enough for the EU and China, other countries to come together to support it? So I was wondering, because every, uh, Professor King Jin talked about, uh, cooperation between US and China, but if US is no longer in the system, when WT remains the foreign for cooperation? So, uh, any views on that would be very appreciated. Thank you.

The WTO is in deep need of reform, and the world is not going to wait for these international organizations, including IMF, World Bank, etc., to to reform. Um, but, uh, you know, I think the trend that we're going to see is a lot more regionalization. So, regional region-led based intern, you know, organizations, and has to be, you know, truly adapting to the new model that that old playbook post Bretton Woods is of course no longer describing today's, today's situation. So, um, I think they are evolving, but very, very too slowly. Now, if US withdraws, that is too bad for the US. Where we see walls being erected in Washington D.C., actually China is actively trying to lower it with lots of opening up policies, unilateral, you know, zero tariffs, release developing countries. Of course, it's going to take on the banner and assert more global leadership in that space. But we have to be realistic that geoeconomics is a real thing, and there will be a lot more localized production, regionalized scale-based technological leadership and production. Um, so is the world going to wait for the WTO? I don't think so.

Okay, so very quickly, I think I think I totally agree with what, uh, Jin said. You can't wait for a new world order to come into existence, um, for the rest of us to sort of jump on the bandwagon and make it all lovely and nice. It took the First World War to create a world order. It took another world war to create the second world order. Um, we can't wait for a third world war to create a new order. So I think therefore the regional answers are the best answers. You go to sort of find regional solutions to regional common goods, regional public goods, and regional even security issues for that matter. So I think let's not wait for that go to come. Um, I I think that there has to be regional solutions to these questions. I I think I agree completely. But I think just on your question, the advantages of trade are so overwhelming that this is going to happen in various forms, whatever the predicament structures. So I my one-liner of beta would be, if there's decoupling, you could conceive of the US decoupling from the global economy easier than you can understand the decoupling of all the other components. I think TPP, RESAP, the EU arrangements between them, free trade agreements. I think as somebody mentioned yesterday, they're now 600, uh, versions of local and regional agreements for promoting trade because the benefits are just overwhelming, whatever, uh, somebody may think. Yeah. So that will move on. Yeah. Irregardless. Okay. Sorry.

Hi. Uh, hi distinguished guest. I'm Lisa from Shenzhen Television Station. So I especially have a question for Professor Allison because everybody's care about the trade talks between China and US now because they are the two biggest economy in the world, right? But after the Geneva and London talks, it seems we don't have a very clear like stain or structure of how does the trade talk goes. So what is the way out for this two countries to, uh, to, uh, get a negotiation and got a a final statement of this, um, to get a settle of this trade war?

Well, again, we're all sitting on our seats or on the edge of our seats waiting to see what comes out of the ongoing conversations between the two governments, but you can be sure they're very intense currently. So I would be surprised if in the next week or so we don't see aouou coming out of the discussions that's been going on between Basant and, uh, and H and their teams in the in the in the intermediate period. And I think that, uh, there's a wonderful thing about Mr. Market. Okay, he's totally, uh, uh, unsympathetic. He just behaves on the basis of his own interests. And I think when the extreme tariffs like an embargo, uh, were installed, and pretty soon you look and see what happens in the real world, that's unsustainable, and so reality imposes itself. I think with respect to the export control competition, again, the two parties discover that, wait a minute, my Ford motor car is going to come off the line, and your aircraft is not going to be coming off the line. So we got to find a way to. So these are these are business problems that serious business people know how to solve, and I'm I'm thinking they're going to stabilize this, I believe, but we'll see. I mean, we're also coming up very quickly to the end of this first 90 days on the global, uh, tariff war, and which there's now many, many other countries that are. What's going to happen? And again, I have no crystal ball there. It seems to be very unlikely that somehow in the last few minutes all those deals get done because they're extremely complicated. So maybe it gets extended again. Uh, I don't know. I I think that, uh, uh, Elon Musk's summary of the, uh, u conception of tariffs by at least some people in the Trump administration as quote moronic, uh, is a good summary in my view.

So we are out of time here now, but one last lightning round of question, which is going back to the title of the session, geopolitics an unfolding story. What do you think will be the title of the final chapter? One, okay. First, uh, post-global world. Ironically, the two countries that have benefited the most from the postwar liberal order was US and China, and I don't understand why they're trying to take it down. Right, Monica? Uh, I think hold on. We're in for the ride of our life. Right. I will do that. It's easy to destroy an existing order. It's difficult to create a new one. Very good. And Graham, I guess Monica's the British have the line. Be calm and carry on. Okay. Thank you very much for that. Can we please thank the panelists for this fascinating discussion?