Transcription
hello there, and good afternoon. Welcome to today's Ukraine Q&A with our very own Professor Michael Clark, our military analyst. Michael, it's really good to see you. How are you? How's the Wednesday going so far?
Uh, busy so far on a number of issues.
Absolutely. But one that's dominating a lot—I mean, I've had plenty of questions about—our main topic today, which is, I think, going to be China and their involvement potentially in the war. You can, of course, submit questions as we are going along, and we will welcome them uh, when they come in. Let's get started, Michael, with the questions that have come in previous to us beginning. And this first one comes from someone called Beggars' belief. It tells—it asks, "What are the serious ramifications of Chinese soldiers fighting for Russia against Ukraine, both internationally and for Ukraine itself?"
Of course, you would have seen in the news that there are reports of at least two Chinese nationals have been caught by Ukraine fighting for the Russians.
Yeah, I mean, we we know that the Ukrainians find themselves fighting a a small group of Chinese soldiers between the villages of Blharifka and Terasifka, which which are both on the front line in Donetsk. Um, and they captured two of them. We don't know what happened to the other four or five. Um, maybe they were injured, maybe they just withdrew, but they got hold of two of them, and they say that they um can prove from their personal effects that they were Chinese nationals. And I don't think there's any dispute about that now. From compared to last night, it was a claim, I think. Now it's been accepted, and the um the foreign minister in Beijing does seem to accept that these people are Chinese nationals. But what Beijing is saying is that they're not in any way official; they they were just there as individuals, which means they were mercenaries. And that is entirely plausible, since the Russians are using mercenaries from all over the world, and they're paying a great deal of money, giving them, you know, big sign-on bonuses, plus a lot of um, you know, very high rates of pay to fight for them. So it might be that the other two possibilities um are that they are there more officially, that they're part of a um an instructor's group or an advisor's group, but if that were the case, they wouldn't really be that close to the front lines; or that there's some part of a special forces detachment, in which case there would be more of them. And Zilinski, President Zilinski, is saying, "We know there are more of them than this little handful that we encountered." Well, he hasn't given us evidence of that yet, but they obviously think they can produce evidence, so I think the story will run for a while yet. It's at the very least this is embarrassing for Beijing. It's the Russians are saying nothing; they say nothing to do with us, although obviously it is. And even the State Department is saying that um we find this very disturbing. The State Department officially, the spokeswoman of the department was saying, you know, "we do find this disturbing," and that's interesting. I'm not sure the White House would have said that, but the State Department did, which is a way—that's the sort of State Department statement we would have expected a couple of months ago, but not necessarily these days.
So let's talk, Michael, about the location where they were found. We know that North Koreans—at least 10,000—are fighting for the Russians up in Kursk, or at least they were. Where were these Chinese uh, fighters found in?
Well, these are inets, which the Russians claim is their territory, but nobody, you know, that that claim has no legal basis to it. Just because the Russians claim that part of Ukraine really now belongs to them—um, it's where the Russians are fighting and where the uh, the militias, the Janet People's Republic militia, which a Russian-backed militia that's been there since 2014—it's where they fight um, but in—I mean, whereas the North Koreans are fighting inside Russia in Kursk, and so they're entitled to fight for an ally inside their own territory. Nothing wrong with that in in international law. In this case, if these were in any way official, if these were a special forces group, an advisors group, they had absolutely no business legally being in what is legally part of Ukraine. And the Ukrainians will be sure to make that point if they can prove that this group is in some way part of a bigger group that is in some way officially connected to the People's Liberation Army, to the PLA.
Just last thought on the location: is it a particular um, salient where they're trying to push through at the moment? Would they need—would the Russians need extra troops from allies? They do, but not not quite around Bilahhurka. They—I mean, where they need their troops is in Prosk, in Tourett, and Chazar, which is a bit further to the west of this, but the there is—there is fighting going on all along that line. I mean, although the front lines haven't moved very much at all, the fighting is is is very intense. I mean, the Russians are still losing well over a thousand troops a day to death and injury, and so yeah, it's all pretty intensive stuff. Um, this this isn't necessarily where the where the Russians would need a a great wadge of extra troops, right? And so the fact that these characters have turned up where they have is curious, put it that way.
Um, so these are soldiers that they've found now, but China has been involved in this war for for quite some time. Just talk us through the way that the Chinese uh, Communist Party have been involved in supporting—
Yeah, China said from the beginning that they're neutral and that they just—all they want is peace and so on, and they produced a peace plan, a 10-point peace plan, which nobody took particularly seriously at the time because it was very pro-Moscow. Um, but the Chinese, we know, have given a great deal of help. They've been buying um uh Russian goods; they've been buying Russian energy; um, they have been supporting the Russian currency uh in all sorts of ways, and they sort of admit that they've been doing that because they're an ally. But they've been responsible for dual-use goods. I mean, they've been supplying components and um 80% of all the dual-use goods that the Russians get—that is, goods which are civilian but can be used in military—to explain it, that's what dual-use is. So it's it's something which goes into a fridge, but it also goes into a missile warhead. Um, and 80% of all of Russia's dual-use goods come from China. Now, Chinese know exactly what they're doing; it's it's undoubtedly the case that Russia could not have continued this war in the way that it has without Chinese support. It would have run out of components for its high-level missiles and weapons long before this if China hadn't supported them. I mean, in general, we think that the Xi Jinping has taken the view that he cannot let Russia lose this war. Now, what losing means we can argue about, but he cannot see Russia as it were badly beaten on the battlefield, and he'll do whatever he he can do with this deniable um uh attitude that we're not really helping them, but we all know that they are. Yeah, and that he will do what they can to support the Russians to some sort of minimal victory, as we've discussed before. They call it a limitless partnership, don't they? They really feel like they're in this moment changing the world for the next hundred years.
Unlimited partnership. I mean, in fact, it's a it's a very limited partnership in lots of other ways. I mean, I mean, Russia is far and away the weaker of the two powers now. It never used to be the case, but it is now. It is these days. But the Chinese, I think, have this sense now that because, you know, American policy is is the way it is, the world is changing so quickly and so significantly that they absolutely cannot now let down their their partner in Moscow, even though their partner in Moscow is is getting them into some deep water.
Absolutely. We've got some questions coming in then, Michael. One's coming in from Stu.
Pointed western intelligence services will know whether these Chinese nationals are salaried people's uh, Republican—the people's liberation army—or or not. Why not just make that information public as they did for recent Russian operations on European soil? And then he quotes other open-source experts like Bellingcat who may well find out anyway.
Yeah, I when you say they must know, I'm not sure that's true—that they must—they mustn't necessarily know yet because these characters were captured very recently, and it takes time to process what they can get from them and so on. Um, and western intelligence will certainly be very, very interested in this, and and he mentions Bellingcat, who are a very excellent um, independent source run from a garage in Leicester originally—originally Elliot Higgins in Leicester. They do amazing work from his bedroom and then from his garage, and now Bellingcat is a very big organization of freelance individuals committed to trying to tell the truth out of what they can get online and and through um proper forensic identification of material. And uh, Bellingcat, I'm sure, will provide—if they take an interest in it, I suspect they will—they will provide some quite reliable material, but it will take a while. It won't be instant; it'll be a couple of weeks or so. But this issue will run.
Yes, you say it's going to run, isn't it? We're going to find out more detail. And of course, is it in the Ukrainian's interest as well to release as much detail as they find fit?
Absolutely, it is. I mean, one of the things that that um Zalinski will want to do is to try to use this issue to keep it on the agenda of the White House. I mean, as the White House agenda moves, you know, to the Middle East, it moves to the the tariff war, it will move to Iran; it is moving to Iran even as we speak. Um, the danger that that Ukraine is just dropping out of the agenda is actually quite a big danger for the Ukrainians, and Zilinski, and he'll want to use this issue to actually keep it in the minds of American policy makers. Even if he can't keep Trump locked onto it, he can keep other American policy makers locked onto the idea that, "Look what is going on in my country. Ukraine is actually a microcosm of a much bigger struggle in world politics in which you, the United States, are now the weaker party. You are weakening yourselves because you won't take seriously the world struggle which is going on on the front line in my country." That's his—that's his message really. I mean, if you can keep him focused on it—there's a question here from from David: Could the Chinese be there to learn Western military tactics with a view to defending a uh, a future attack on Taiwan or somewhere else? Um, when you answer that question as well, Michael, why don't you just tell us the last time that the Chinese army actually fought properly in—
The last time the Chinese army fought properly was the Korean War, um, December 1950, when the UN forces, United States forces, had had moved from the south from uh, down in um Busan right the way north to Inchan, right up to the Yalu River, to the border of China, and then the Chinese intervened, and the whole thing moved back again to the to the demilitarized zone where it's been ever since. So the Chinese fought a conventional war from December 1950 until February effectively 1953—70 years ago. Yeah, they fought another war briefly um against Vietnam in 1979; that was a punishment war. It was astonishing after having supported Vietnam all the way through the American Vietnam operation in the 60s and early 70s, the Chinese then invaded Vietnam in 1979, and some thousands of people were killed. And then there were there was an element of war in 1962 against India in the Himalayas. But the last major war was Korea. So two two incursions: India '62, Vietnam '69. Um, other than that, the last—the last war they fought that might look remotely like a war of the 21st century was in the 1950s. Hugely well equipped now, so seeing what's happening on the battlefield in Ukraine will be really useful to them. They they analyze it to the nth degree, which is my answer to the question really. They don't need people on the front line to find out. I mean, they are extremely interested; they have people in Moscow, and I wouldn't be surprised if there aren't Chinese individuals inside uh, Russian offensive units just to observe what's going on, but not—that's not on the front lines; I think that's probably in the headquarters areas. They are intensely interested in this, as everybody else is, because what's happening in Ukraine is the pointer to the way um full-scale war will evolve for the rest of this century. It's a place for them all to learn.
Philip Jay has a question as well, again on on Taiwan and Chinese involvement. With the US preoccupied, is this the perfect opportunity for China to push on Taiwan, and how would the world respond if so? There is some talk that they have already set a date—was it 2027—for when they potentially could launch an assault on Taiwan?
Yeah, I mean, the reason 2027 is is this date certainly—it's a date that means something in Washington—that that Xi Jinping got himself elected for three terms, and his third term in theory comes to an end in 2027, and he'd always said, "We must resolve the Taiwan issue—resolve whatever he means by that—before I leave office." Now, of course, it's entirely likely—I mean, it's almost a stone-cold certainty—that he'll he'll break all the conventions and he'll do four terms and even five terms. I mean, he's there for as long as he wants to be, or until somebody really does oust—But on the basis of what he has said, it has been assumed that he thinks of 2027 as some sort of deadline. He's never said that, but the Americans in particular have assumed that that maybe is a target date, and it could be. So if you look at the way the Chinese are increasing their their pressure on Taiwan, it's it's it's—I know we talked about this before—it's what I call the Anaconda strategy—is that they're strangling Taiwan by by setting up military um operations around the borders of Taiwan regularly. It's one just been going on recently—the Shandong, the aircraft carrier, their aircraft carriers at sea very close to Taiwan, first time it's got that close—and they're they're they're into Taiwanese airspace or very close to Taiwanese airspace all the time. And so the Chinese are putting a lot of pressure on Taiwan, and their message now to Taiwan—who of course been hit with tariffs by Washington—their message to Taiwan now is, "Look, you know, the Americans don't like you very much; the Americans are going to let you down; Trump will let you down. This is your best moment to make a peaceful resolution of our long-standing issue before it gets worse. Do a deal with us now while you still can, because in a few years' time we will have the capacity to just invade. We could do it now if we if we wanted to, but we don't, and we'd like to resolve this peacefully." So the the Chinese are getting a great opportunity in the tariff war that's now broken out to say to the Taiwanese, "You know, your your options aren't very good, so your best option now is go for a peaceful resolution of our long-standing problem, which goes back to 1949. Do a deal."
Yeah, well, you moves on to a question that we've had coming from John who's watching along with us. Thank you for this, John. It says, "Will Trump's pressure on China make them attack Taiwan sooner than anticipated? Could they bring it all forward because of what we are now with this tariff global trade war?"
I'm not sure if they will, but they could, yeah. Um, the the the way things are working so quickly and the fact that China has got lots of opportunities out of this uh, tariff war—I mean, ultimately, that the Chinese stand to come out of this tariff war better than the Americans for all sorts of reasons that we could talk about if we wanted to—but in the longer term, they will probably come out of it better, and it does give them opportunities. So more countries will will lean towards China now uh, because they'll have to if they can't trade. I mean, some countries like Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos—these countries have been hit with ridiculous levels of tariffs that they can't possibly sustain; their only market now is to go towards China. And the Chinese will probably open their markets to these countries even more than they had in the past. So China will will increase its power in Southeast Asia; it will quite likely feel that this is a moment when they could move against Taiwan. But having said all that, invading Taiwan from where they are—crossing 100 miles of sea—is not easy. I mean, amphibious operations, amphibious invasions are the hardest operation in any military playbook; always were, always will be because of the just the natural conditions. And so a Chinese operation to invade Taiwan is feasible, but it wouldn't be that easy if the Taiwanese fought back. I'm sure they would ultimately lose without American help, but they would actually, you know, give quite a good account of themselves, and it would be very nasty and very messy, but it could be done. Yeah, technically, yes.
Well, they're getting close to—we talked about this last week—there's some amazing pictures of these new landing ships that they're creating that connect one end to the other and can go way out to sea where they can start loading troops and material on.
Yeah, I mean, the Chinese have structured their forces for exactly the sort of operation that they might carry out against Taiwan at some time in the future. So it isn't just that they've got general-purpose forces that they could bend to it; they've got big general-purpose forces, but they've made sure that they've invested in all the sort of things they would need in order to invade Taiwan. And their their hope is that, well, "if we show we we are capable of doing it, we won't need to," and they may feel that they're entering into a period now where the Taiwanese are so caught between a relatively hostile Trump administration and a relatively hostile Beijing that they'll feel that, well, "maybe this is the moment now to cash in what we can and do a Hong Kong-style deal."
Well, Mike, we won't dwell on it much longer because we do want to talk about the war in Ukraine, of course, as well. But just give our viewers a little bit of a history lesson because it hasn't always been that the government in in Taiwan and Taipei is hostile to China. There there have been some closer relationships, haven't there, in recent years?
Yeah, I mean, Changai established it—the Generalissimo—who fought um, with the communists against the Japanese during the Second World War, and then when that Second World War turned into a civil war between 1945 and 1949, the nationalists led by Changai were were chased out of China, and they jumped onto Taiwan. Taipei—Taipei is the capital—Formosa it was called in those days—and renamed itself Taiwan, and that was their offshore island. And they've always said—and the nationalist, the KMT—they always said, "Look, we believe in one China, so it's one nation, two systems. We're all Chinese," and the communist party could live with that. They said, "Look, you're not trying to be anything other than us; you're not trying to be anything other than Chinese, so we agree; we are one people, but two systems, and we have one system; you have another system which we don't like and we don't think is feasible, and so ultimately we must unite because we are all one people." And they could—they've lived like that for many, many years, and they—there were a couple of offshore islands—Quemoy, Matsu—which are called Chinmen these days—which are within sight of the Chinese mainland. They used to bombard each other every every week—Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays, one would send missiles over, weapons over, and Tuesdays, Thursdays, Saturdays, the other ones would—they scheduled it.
Yeah, and they were scheduled, and they were leaflets, and I've—I've got lots of momentos; I've been there, and I've got lots of momentos from those islands, including some of the leaflets. So they used to bombard each other with propaganda everywhere.
Yeah, um, in ways that didn't do anybody any harm. They they—they lapsed into this arrangement, and the Beijing would live with that as long as the Taiwanese never declared independence, as long as they just said, "We're ambiguous, and we do what we—you know, we live the way we want to live." But Taiwan is now—it's it's rich; it is democratic, which is something that the Beijing really doesn't like, and it—it concludes the TSMC—the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing company—which produces the best semiconductors in the world, bar none, and everybody wants the TSMC. And so an invasion of Taiwan would actually disrupt that that supply chain; it would be a real problem. But also, of course, it's a great um, prize for whoever controls Taiwan. At the moment, the government of Taiwan controls Taiwan, but if somebody else controlled it—if Beijing controlled it—then at some point they'll get their hands on the TSMC as well.
Absolutely. All right, let's move on to the the war in Ukraine. Thank you very much for that uh, Michael. Um, question here from Carol. Um, NATO aside, would the US always come to the defense of the UK if it was attacked by Russia?
We always used to think that—I mean, well, there's a there's a a problem in the way the question's kind of posed by Carol. I know what she means, but the the assumption was always that the United Kingdom would never be attacked on its own—that the United Kingdom would not be singly attacked by Russia—um, that it would be part of the NATO alliance; it would be an attack against others, and the question would be, you know, "Is the United States going to come to the defense of its European allies?" And the answer was always yes, it would. In the in the case of a direct attack, the answer now is the realistic answer is it's not definitely no, despite the hostility of the Trump administration and um, the um, the members of the of the administration who were so rude about the Europeans. But the answer is not definitively no. I think the realistic answer is it would depend on the circumstances. So it's not unconditional. I mean, America's backing for Europe defending itself against Russia or or even Britain alone somehow defending itself against Russia—that backing is not unconditional; it would depend on the circumstances.
Right. Let's move on to another question about Russia's battlefield strategy at the moment. This comes from William, uh, and we'll do quick answers now; Michael's going to run short of time. So let's—Is is Russia's current battlefield strategy of brute force sustainable? I mean, they've got lots of men in the on the field at the moment.
Yeah, as long as they as long as they keep getting support in weapons from North Korea and Iran, and they can keep recruiting people from around the world, yes, it is sustainable, um, but it may not be politically sustainable because economically, if the Russians find themselves doing this by this time next year, then their economy will be in quite serious trouble.
Right. Well, and that's moving on to our next question as well, isn't it, Michael, about the uh, price of oil? Comes from uh, C portenev. And how low does the oil price have to go to seriously impact the Russian war effort? Where it is now, it's it's just hovering around just below $60 a barrel, right?
Yeah, once it goes below 60, then the Russians start to feel the pain. As with the gas price—gas price was it was 98p per therm. I checked this out actually last week; it was 98p per therm; it's now down to 80p per therm. Um, if the gas price came down to 60p per therm and the oil price fell of 50 to $55 a barrel, then the Russian—the Russians would be in real trouble. And the um, the C—the Russian central bank—the governor of the central bank, she has warned this week that the balance—their own payment system—will be under severe strain, and they're having to take um, some quite rapid measures to guard against a fall in the price of oil and the price of gas, both of which, because of the tariff war, is now entirely likely.
Yeah, aren't those um, commodities sanctioned though? They shouldn't have been gaining too much money from them anyway because of the sanctions that were brought—
No, that's right. The G7 put a a guide price of 60—$60 a barrel.
They said that they, they would not, um, allow any ships, um, to be insured if they were selling, uh, oil at above $60 a barrel. And that their policy was sensible on paper, but it didn't work because, in reality, they were selling oil at above that price. But $60 was always regarded as the price below which the Russians can't really sustain their economy. I mean, literally, it makes up over a third of all of their government revenues; is, is the oil and gas revenues. So maybe another fallout for, and Gazprom bank, Gazprom bank is in big trouble with gas prices falling; big trouble. So that's where some pressure could start to tell eventually, but it would take another 12 months or so.
All right, question here from Paul, uh, is the truth that Putin's real opinion of Trump is that he's a very useful idiot? Yeah, this phrase “useful idiot” used to go around in the, in the days of Marxism. Used to say that, you know, people in the West who were taken to Russia, um, and given the trip, the official trip, and they come back saying how wonderful the Soviet Union was and so on, and that they were regarded by Moscow as useful idiots. They, what you know, they were easily duped and so on, and that's how the phrase “useful idiot” used to come around. Um, is Trump a useful idiot to Putin? Some people think that for sure. We still don't know what Trump really thinks about the ceasefire talks and where he is. He does, we don't know if he thinks he's being manipulated. And I suspect he still hasn't said anything really, really critical about Russia or Putin to send them into office. Exactly, and they, they, they put tariffs on Ukraine, uh, but they didn't put any tariffs on Russia. And so the message to Putin is that you are a special friend. You know, I'm, I'm the reasoning being that they're already sanctioned so they don't do much trade. But I think the reporting is about, I mean Scott Bessant, the Treasury Secretary, when he was asked about this, he said, “Oh, we don't do any trade with Russia.” Wrong, Mr. Bess; your own department records the fact you do three and a half billion pound, billion dollars worth of trade a year, but he seemed to have forgotten. So, you know, Putin is entitled to believe that Trump will keep on bending over backwards to please him. So if that makes him a useful idiot, well, so be it.
Right, um, let's talk a little bit about the fighting on the ground and drone warfare. This is a question from Koko, um, big question: How has the drone warfare evolved since the conflict began? I mean, huge, tremendously. Yeah, the, the drones that we saw in 2022 were the, the Bayraktar, the Turkish drone, which is a bit like an aircraft, but it, the thing about the Bayraktar, it wasn't new or revolutionary; just that they had lots of them, and they turned out to be very effective if they used with proper reconnaissance, with, with a proper surveillance system. And then we saw the advent of FPVs, the first-person view drone, which are like little hobby drones, which are small enough to be controlled by a soldier on the ground, and they can drop one grenade or whatever. And that's been, been a, a tremendous advance just in terms of numbers, because it's a substitute for artillery. If you, if you haven't got enough artillery shells, but you've got a million drones, which the Ukrainians have now got, they're building well over a million drones a year themselves, and they're getting help, um. So drone warfare has been one of the technical advances of this war. It's not revolutionary; I mean, drones have been around since the, the V1, the doodle bugs of the Second World War of 1944. You call that, you call that a drone? It's a drone. Yeah, it's a pilotless aircraft, which is a one-way kamikaze drone, which, you know, used to run until its motor ran out, and then it would drop. And they were all directed at London, uh, so they're given just enough fuel to get them to London, and then they would drop somewhere in the London area, um, and that was a pretty effective drone at the time. Um, now drone warfare has become, it's part, it's the, it's the cutting edge of robotics. So we're on the verge of a robotic revolution; robotic tanks, robotic ships, robotic aircraft; they're all, they're already being built. It's not just a dream; they are now being built. But drones on the battlefield are now pretty fundamental; they're a fundamental part of modern warfare. And as I say, what's different about them, it's not, it's not that the technology of drones is revolutionary; it is the, the way they're used and the number that are used in conjunction with everything else. That's right, that they're killing more people by drone than they are by artillery or anything else. That's what the Ukrainians say. Yeah, they say that 60% of all the casualties that they inflict on the Russians are by drones. We, we can't check that out, but that sounds plausible for sure, which is a huge step change in warfare. I mean, when this war began in 2022, you guys probably weren't thinking that, or were you, that we're going to see the drone? We were thinking. Yeah, we were thinking of drones as surveillance assets, and we're thinking of drones as aircraft substitutes and aircraft without a pilot, which is always useful for all sorts of reasons. I don't think anybody had the idea, we didn't think the war would go on quite this long, um, or to this point. But I, we didn't, I think none of us thought that they would have such a dramatic effect on what actually happens on the ground, um, and as I say, it's individual first-person view drones that blow my mind. I mean, hobby drones; incredible targeting an individual soldier. And the Ukrainians have, have become the literally the world leaders in adapting drone technology; they're the best at it.
Here's a question from Rose, uh, the geopolitics that dominates the news, uh, so it's hard to get a sense sometimes of what is happening on the ground. What's the overview and who is winning in, quotation marks? Overview is that, uh, the Ukrainians are still doing very well in the Black Sea, and, um, that's, that's a strategic benefit for them. Um, in the air, they're still resisting Russian nightly attacks; the Russians are throwing over a thousand drones and missiles at them every week, which is, you know, 150, 120, 150 a night, and the Ukrainians are shooting down only about 50% of them now instead of 85, 90%, which is what they were doing, but they've come through another winter, and they're getting their energy system repaired quickly. So the Ukrainians have survived that. On the ground, not much has changed, but the Ukrainians are still holding on to this little sliver of land in Kursk, and a sliver of land they've taken, um, opposite Belgod in the Belgod district. And although they can't get anything out of that strategically, except it's pinning Russian troops down, and the Russians have still got some of their best forces, some of their airborne forces and their marines trying to push them out of those little two little slivers of land that they've taken. And while they're there doing that, they can't be round, round down in the south, which is where the Russians really want to make some gains around Prosk and Chazar. So on the ground, it's, there's a lot of, of fighting, a lot of dying is going on, um, and not much change on the, in the, uh, front lines. Are the Russians still grinding their way forward? Not much; they were, and they've slowed right down, and they failed to take the places that they, they clearly targeted; they were trying to, they take, trying to take Prosk, and they still haven't; they've got very close; they've moved around to the southwest of, of Prosk, and, and moved to the south and trying to encircle it; they still haven't managed that; they haven't got very far, much towards Nepro; their, their front line has slowed right down in the last month to six weeks. But as I keep saying, the weather is improving, and by the end of this month, the weather will be quite warm and pretty dry; the ground will dry up, and that, by and large, will favor the side that's taking the offensive. You know, it's easier to defend in the bad weather, and it's easier to be offensive in the good weather. The Ukrainians still being viable in the fight is that you wouldn't call it a win, but that is, that is a sign that there, you know, they're still there, and it's a victory of sorts, isn't it? They haven't been completely ridden over by this hugely overpowering army.
Yeah, that's right. And some people in Ukraine are, I wouldn't say they're optimistic, but they're surprisingly positive, and they say, "We, we are fighting; we can fight; we're still a big country; you know, we're a country; we, we're a country of 44 million; we're now effectively a country of about 32 million in the free Ukraine; and, um, we have manpower problems in terms of number of forces we can put together and so on. But the fact is, we're a big enough country to keep on fighting." A lot of people say that even though they want the war to end, they would, they would welcome a ceasefire if only to get a breath, you know, just take a breather, but they say, "Yeah, we, we, we're not, we're not going to be rolled over." And even if the Russians do roll over everything, say, east of the Neper River, then we'll fight a war of occupation; we'll make them pay dearly for occupying our cities; partisans, like a guerilla war. Yeah, which will be, which would be extraordinarily cruel and brutal, probably on both sides.
Final question then, please Michael, um, and you mentioned the word ceasefire there; we've talked about it a few times over the past few weeks. We're not anywhere closest to where we were; there's been a date put in by the Americans, I think the 21st of April, where they want some kind of agreement to, to be, to be signed off and agreed by all sides. Where are you, what's your thinking about whether we're going to get to see far? Is it drifting away? I mean, it is getting further away than it was before. Whether the Americans can impose a date now, make it stick, I do wonder. I mean, but in a way, it gives us a deadline to say, well, are you, are you ever going to get tough with the Russians, or are you just going to keep offering them inducements, being nice to them on the assumption that they will somehow reciprocate? We will see, but I mean, most of us in the analysis business believe that until, unless, or until you get tough, and you've not got much time left to do it now; you've left it very, very late. But unless you're prepared to do that, the chance of a ceasefire are diminishing daily.
Right, well, on that note, Michael, we will leave it there for another week. Do appreciate you, as always. Thank you very much for answering all those questions. Thank you all for submitting your questions, and as I say, we're going to do another one of these same time next week, Wednesday.