Transcription
Hey everybody, it's me Sam Stein, managing editor at the Bullwork. I'm joined by Baxani of Semaphore and JVL here to talk about the, I don't know how you would describe it. Decimation, murder, bludgeoning of the Washington Post happened today.
I'm going to give a quick overview of some of the gruesome stats, uh, that we know of as of the time of this taping. It's about 12:15. One-third of Washington Post Post employees were laid off today. Uh, Will Lewis, who, uh, effectively runs the paper, did not attend the meeting, uh, when they announced. Neither did Jeff Bezos, who owns the paper. Uh, the announcements were instead made on a Zoom call at 8:30 a.m. by editor Matt Murray.
Among the sections that were restructured, which is just corporate speak for eliminated, uh, were the metro desks, uh, the entirety of the sports department, book section, the canceling of the daily post reports, podcasts, uh, and a dramatic shrinking of the paper's presence around the world. Every reporter covering the Middle East was laid off. Jerusalem and Ukraine bureau chiefs were laid off. There is a war currently in Ukraine still happening. The Ukraine correspondent Lindseay Johnson tweeted, "I was just laid off by the Washington Post in the middle of a war zone. I have no words. I am devastated." It goes on and on and on from there. But needless to say, it's, it's horrifying.
Uh, I'm not nostalgic for it. Um, because, uh, we've been seeing this happening for a while now. I'm mad. Like, I'm legitimately mad at what happened. We're going to talk about this. Um, but I want to talk about it in the big picture. And, um, I want to start off with a, basically, uh, sort of large general question for you JVL and then for you Max. Did this have to happen? Why did the Post fail?
>> No, this didn't have to happen. Look, it has been a long time since Jeff Bezos had to do something right. It's the guy's worth 250 billion with a B dollars. Um, he gets to live in a universe in which he is constrained only by his own desires. And, uh, so no, this didn't need to happen. The Post lost, uh, I think we, I believe we believe people suspect it is more than a hundred million, probably around like $150 million in 2025. Uh, Jeff Bezos lost, when all is said and done, $60 million last weekend on the Melania documentary. Like, this is not, you know, he, he spent, he spent $40 million building a clock inside a mountain in Texas.
>> That's going to tell time for 10,000 years. And spoiler, >> if it stops telling time in 50 years, Jeff Bezos won't know. He'll be dead. >> So, you know, no, this didn't have to happen. This only happened because Jeff Bezos wanted it to.
>> Okay, Max, do you agree? I mean, it's hard to argue with the idea that the one of the richest people in the world, the richest person in the world, uh, you know, depending on the year, uh, couldn't, uh, shell out a little bit more to, uh, to save, uh, some of these journalism jobs. Of course, when he joined, that was part of the mission. When he bought the paper, that was part of the mission. He wanted to kind of, uh, bring the Post into the new era. So, I mean, it's hard to say that it, it, it couldn't have been avoided. I mean, there are plenty of caveats here and I think that there is a lot of blame to go around beyond just Bezos. I think that this is the, this is the result of years of mismanagement, uh, and incompetence and, uh, short-term bets and poor planning for, uh, rapidly changing media ecosystem and we can get into that. Uh, but of course, you know, as JVL said, Bezos has a lot of money. If he wanted to do something about this, he could have. Of course, one, one big part of this, and I'm sure we'll get to it, is the fact that, uh, Bezos has responsibility because he set the Post, uh, further down in the spiral, uh, by alienating a very large number of its subscribers, uh, in 2024 with the decision not to endorse, uh, Kamala Harris.
>> Yeah. And when I, when I say, you know, Bezos wanted, like he is the ultimate decider, but like the [ __ ] in all this is the publisher Will Lewis. And I just think that we should all sort of dispense with the fiction that there's any difference between Will Lewis and Jeff Bezos because Will Lewis would not be doing anything unless Bezos approved of it. Right? And so a thing that is happening that Will Lewis does means that Bezos wanted it to happen. And it's like, I, I just don't want, I don't want to let Bezos off the hook just because it's his incompetent, uh, hatchet man doing the stuff.
>> Max, what, let's chisel down a little bit. What were the missteps that you think really stood out and caused us to get to this point?
>> I think it should be pointed out that some of this is, and, and to, to give them some, uh, level of, of credit here or at least to, to set the scene, uh, plenty of this, uh, is envir, is partially due to environmental factors or environmental factors made it a lot worse. Right. I think the Post was riding really high during the first Trump administration, uh, by in part covering that administration, uh, very aggressively. Uh, they gained, uh, a large number of subscribers, millions of paying subscribers, and a lot of that changed during the Biden years when, uh, there was a major shift in audience attention away from political news that had fueled much of that growth. And I think that that set some of the stage for the Post's decline. People were just less interested and the Post began losing subscribers. Uh, they didn't, the paper didn't really know what to do. It had built itself for growth and it wasn't really prepared for, uh, this, this decline in interest. It did not pivot itself particularly well. The then editor Sally Busby kind of tried to get it more into lifestyle coverage, which was just a total kind of mistake. So there were some editorial missteps, uh, that kind of happened along the way. Uh, and then of course, Bezos decided, uh, to not endorse Kamala Harris, which alienated a very large portion of its subscriber base that had come under the pretenses, uh, that the paper believed in this kind of democracy dies in darkness, and, uh, you know, a lot of these people, uh, who subscribed felt that the paper was, uh, was betraying, uh, that, that mission. Uh, you know, this, this slogan was really aimed particularly at, uh, you know, the crowd of folks who were, uh, who were not fans of Donald Trump. This is not necessarily a huge surprise. So I think that those things, Yeah. Right. Those things happen and it also should be said, it also should be said that this happened around the same time too that Facebook decided to stop, uh, sending massive gobs of traffic to news publishers. So all of these things are converging all into one and it just kind of creates this, uh, this disastrous scenario. Meanwhile, there's a lot of independent media people such as, uh, as the Bullwork, The Atlantic, uh, which is not independent, but, uh, but of course is, uh, kind of a smaller organization which, uh, which were kind of growing and could absorb, uh, some of this, uh, audience.
>> Let's talk about that because there's a couple different elements here and this is where JVL's going to be great. Um, cuz what was the business model of the Post? Was it subscription or was it search or was it a combination, right? Like what was the actual foundations for the Post's business?
I mean, for a long time it was test prep.
>> Yeah. Well, Kaplan, fine. Put us right. So, so the one, no, but this is, I'm serious about this, right? So, you look at these these companies and what is the business model of the New York Times right now? The business model of the New York Times is Wordle, right? It's a mobile gaming platform that publishes a really good newspaper. Um, these things are all choices, right? And and as Max said at the very top, the utter incompetence of the leadership making business decisions, uh, for the institution of the Washington Post has been stunning. So, uh, it starts with the purchase of the Post in which Bezos didn't take Kaplan, right? I mean, imagine you are, you are getting into the media business and the first thing you do is on your point of sale you say, yeah, I don't want to diversify my holdings. I don't need this other thing that's a real business that generates revenue in a predictable recurring way. I just want the media part of it. What the [ __ ]?
>> Um, this is, they, uh, do you remember when they were going to be a platform vendor, Max? They were standing up their own, their own, uh, CMS. We have a CMS and we're going to be the CM, we're going to be a CMS tech company that publishes a newspaper. Insane. Uh, they spent $5 million on a Super Bowl ad in 2019. What?
>> $5 million.
>> I don't remember that one. Now, forgot about that.
>> Listen again.
>> When you advertise, right, you, you are looking to find the highest concentration possible of your total addressable market. And when you are a newspaper, I can speak from experience here. Your total addressable market is actually quite small relative to the world because most people don't read newspapers, right? And so spending money on, and it's not even like GoDaddy where you could say, "Oh, well, they were, they spent the $5 million because they really needed to raise brand awareness." Everybody already [ __ ] knows what the Washington Post is. It's the second most famous media company in America. Um, they, uh, they spent a ton of resources going in on Alexa. I don't know if you guys remember this, but they were they were making all their reporters record voice versions of things because Bezos wanted to listen to it on Alexa. Uh, Will Lewis was going to start a third newsroom that that wound up poured resources into this and then died on launchpad. Never even got off the ground.
>> Well, no, hold on. When he said third newsroom, he meant he's cutting a third of the news.
>> What would you say?
>> Too soon. I was like, what? You have a series of terrible decisions made by people which I, I mean, just look, yes, we had a challenging moment, but I'm sorry, like, I am in this business as well and I didn't get [ __ ] by Facebook because I always knew that Facebook could turn off that thing anytime they wanted to.
>> Right. Right. Right.
>> So there was a, there was a line in the Murray memo that stuck out to me, um, where he said organic search has fallen by nearly half.
>> Ah, who could possibly.
>> Last three years.
>> And that seems, you know, if your entire business model, or not, I shouldn't say entire because JV just outlined the entirety of it, but if a substantial portion of your business model is predicated on people coming to you through third-party platforms, you're [ __ ].
>> Yes.
>> You're just [ __ ].
>> Yes. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, this is.
>> Yeah, this is. Sorry, go ahead. I'll stop filing.
>> No, no, no. It's okay. It's your, uh, it's you guys' show. Uh, but, uh, I'm, I'm happy. I'm just happy to be here. Um, I think that there's a major shift going on, uh, away from the kind of scale, uh, that the, that the Post was kind of chasing with social traffic, uh, and with, uh, and with search traffic, uh, as well. That's a, that's a real problem in a kind of fragmented media ecosystem and a fragmented media space. It's hard to reach, uh, really, really large numbers of people, large enough to sustain a newsroom, uh, as big as the Post. And I think, uh, what the Post needs to do going forward very clearly, uh, is figure out who its audience is, uh, and kind of continue to focus on those people and grow those niches. This was something actually, this is why it was such a big mistake, uh, for the Post not, uh, to endorse Harris, because so many of its subscribers, uh, were people who, uh, wanted to see the paper do that, and it wasn't totally out of the norm either, right? Like the Post has endorsed Democratic candidates, uh, for for years and years, particularly of course in elections, uh, with with Trump on the other end.
>> I guess I'm sort of perplexed and I put this out on Twitter, but it really is confounding to me. Whatever you think of Donald Trump, like he's good for the news business. I'm just, let's just be very candid about it. He's good for the news business. And to not be able to take advantage of this news climate with a predominantly political news industry, uh, uh, product is, is just baffling to me. I don't understand how you can fumble the ball like that.
>> Well, I think that there's two things going on. I think one is is what we've already discussed, which is they blew themselves up on the launchpad. The timing, of course, was terrible. They decided to do this right before two weeks before Trump was elected. If they decided to do this a year before, they might have given themselves a little bit more runway. That was that was kind of the first thing. The second thing I do think speaks to a point which might be a little bit there, there might be a little bit more truth, which is the Post has taken a slightly more old-school approach to its coverage, leaning into, you know, articles and the kind of print product. It's allowed itself to be outflanked by, uh, a lot of people who either are approaching reporting with fair reporting with a little bit of a viewpoint. I mean, the folks that you guys have, uh, in your newsroom are excellent. Some of them literally from the Post, uh, and those people were just on the shelf not being used, uh, properly. Uh, I think we, some, we may know who some of those people are. Uh, hi Will. And also, yes, Will, Will, their inability to use Will, uh, properly is truly, uh, insane.
>> Um,
>> They parked Will Summer in style. Are you [ __ ] kidding me?
>> Yeah, it was, it was complete misunderstanding of what he was writing about and what, what he was good at. So, that, that was that, that's that's also something that's that falls on kind of the editorial, um, the editorial staff. And they also allowed themselves to be outflanked by the kind of, uh, insider Washington publications that have built businesses around this kind of like high-level intelligence for decision makers, right? The Politicos of the world, the Axios of the world. That's, I mean, partially what Semaphore is trying to do. And so I think that they missed the boat on, on both of those styles of journalism which have kind of outflanked them and kind of made the product feel a little stale. It is not the case that everything the Post has done editorially has been smart. They have huge organizational problems just in terms of how the, and I, you know, I interviewed, I wrote about this five months ago. I interviewed for a fairly high-level position there once and, uh, I, I mean, just looking at the legacy structures within how the institution, I was like, how the [ __ ] do you guys get anything done here? Like, it just, you know, too many different lines of communication, the whole org chart needed to be just thrown out and redrawn from scratch. So it is not the case like, oh, they were doing everything perfectly, but on the baseline, were they producing compelling journalism that should have been able to be productized by an intelligent and competent business staff? Like, I think the answer is absolutely yes. And so the, the primary failing here,
>> is management, not editorial. And the extent to which management had no idea how to, how to own the relationship between the audience and the Post and leverage their products, the products which had the most value into long-term relationships. Fact, they were still chasing Facebook traffic and SEO instead of just going full hog into like audience and subscriptions and recur. I mean, because I'm sorry, like, when you are pulling in, uh, referral traffic, referral traffic is not meaningful except for serving ads. You know, the referral traffic does not stick around. Those people do not become loyal people. They're, they're not your real audience, otherwise they would have discovered you organically.
Let me ask you, because we've been talking nuts and bolts and I think this is valid. Um, Max makes a compelling case for why they failed. I want to talk sort of spiritual a little bit and I, and you can slap me down if this seems totally stupid and naive, but there is, and I guess this is just, I'm doing this from the vantage point of someone that works at a publication that is very much community-oriented and mission-oriented, but I do think that in the modern media age, to recruit audiences, JVL says you need to have some sort of understandable, compelling mission to you. And I, you know, Post in Trump 1.0, know, was that it was like, democracy dies in the darkness. We are going to be shedding a light on this, you know, administration in ways that you will be, you know, compelled to buy a subscription. Early days Politico, very similar. It's like, we are going to be hyper-competitive at all times, in the morning, at the evening, you're going to get, you, if you're just obsessed about this stuff, that's us, that's us too. And like, you could sort of, uh, empathize or sympathize with it. You know, I, obviously, we have our own mission. And it just seemed like, um, maybe it was in the process of trying to experiment with 15 different ideas and products and, you know, pulling the endorsement, like they just didn't, they had good journalism, but I didn't really know what the paper kind of stood for. And that's not something you want to necessarily like, oh, I got to be part of that, right? Like the Atlantic, you know what it stands for.
>> Totally.
>> The Times, you know what it stands for. So that, that to me, I think is.
>> It's hard to, it's hard to say, oh, that's why it failed because it's so conceptual. But Max, I don't know if that makes sense to you.
>> It's totally, I think that that's totally right. I think that's a, I think that's a really fair point. I think that we've basically seen that with the exception of the New York Times, which still has a, you could argue has a clear point of view and you kind of know what you're getting most of the time from the New York Times, there aren't that many general interest publications left, uh, anymore, uh, that kind of stand for very little except for, uh, kind of their own existence. I mean, if you go down the list of the publications that are the biggest and most impactful or have the biggest businesses or the largest followings in the US, most of them have a pretty clear point of view. I mean, Fox, of course, uh, embodies that. Uh, the Wall Street Journal, uh, embodies that. It's very obvious, you know, if you're opening up a Wall Street Journal editorial, generally, you know, the spectrum of opinions you're going to get or the types of stories that you're going to get from the newsroom side. And I do think that the Post did have a very clear identity in Trump 1.0. Uh, they were covering Washington, uh, aggressively, covering Trump's Washington aggressively, and I think that that's why they leaned into the democracy dies in darkness. That part really worked. I think that they started to stumble when that model really fell apart after Trump exited the stage briefly for an intermission. Uh, and, uh, they didn't know how to pivot to being a, they tried to pivot to being a broad general interest publication in the way that the New York Times had done, but the Times had already done that years and years earlier, uh, and they've done it better and they were bigger. They're in New York. Um, and so I think that they, I think that the, the Post fumbled this and this is where the Bezos, uh, this is where the Bezos non-endorsement, I think, really, really, really killed them.
>> Well, I mean, the fundamental problem I think the Post had was that they couldn't reconcile whether they were a national or a local paper, right? And I mean, you look at, you know, they had the sports section, which is now gone. Fantastic sports section. Uh, I think probably the best sports section in America, but it was still a local sports section, right? It wasn't, you know, they were covering local stuff. It was, you know, to read about the Wizards and the Redskins and the Capitals and whatnot. And I don't know, they put out, I think it was last year, they're like, "We're going to go from 2 million subscribers to 25 million or 200 million." I don't know what the number, but this insane like, well, hold on. That means you want to be a national or international paper. Like, what are you talking? And then you go and like cut all this stuff and now you're basically now they're neither. Now they're basically townhall.com. They're, you know, they're an op-ed section with a handful of great national reporters still there. Uh, but no Metro, no sports, no international. You're like, so what you're again, it's neither fish nor fowl, right? And I, again, all of this blame goes to the people at the top and not the product. At the Washington Post, the raw product has always been pretty good and at times excellent, and it just, I [ __ ] hate it. I hate this. One of the things I hate so much about capitalism. Boo capitalism is that the people who [ __ ] things up actually never pay the consequence. Will Lewis isn't gonna lose his job, which is amazing because this guy has like an unbroken string of failures. You look at it, you're like, hold on, he's been there for three years and all he's done is [ __ ] up over and over and over and over again, but he's not laid off. That makes no sense to me. Makes me angry.
>> That makes me angry, too. Let's close that then with the forward-looking, uh, question because you've now slashed a third of the newsroom. You've closed specific sections. You don't really have international coverage anymore. You have a staff that remains that can't possibly be anything other than completely deflated, if not looking for the exits. Um, they're going to produce some work, but, you know, it's, it's hard to imagine how you now write the ship, which is ironic because, you know, they, this is ostensibly done to write the ship, right?
>> Well, you notice there's no, there's no vision communicated with this.
>> Zero. Zero.
>> Right? There's no like, hey, we know this is all bad, but look, here's the plan. We're going to do XYZ, right? Here's how we're going to execute. Here's what the audience is. Here's how we're going to rebuild the business.
>> So, what do you do? Yeah. What do you do, Max? Like, it's impossible to me to like figure out how to orient it at this juncture. Like, what the hell would you do here?
>> I think it's a really tough challenge. And we've seen this with a lot of media companies. This happens with companies in general, but this particularly happens with media companies where reputation is really important, uh, to both the business side in terms of getting people to subscribe or sell ads, and also to the editorial side where it makes it easier to recruit if you have people who are excited to be there. Uh, it, it feels like the classic death spiral that we've seen at a lot of media organizations where the business starts to falter, the editorial get, get kind of, uh, wind of it and kind of leave, and it just gets caught in a negative, uh, downward spin. I think that that is, is really concerning and I'm concerned that that could happen, uh, with the Post right now. But I, I will say, you know, I think it still is, uh, as JVL pointed out, the second most famous, uh, well-known, uh, brand in America. It still does, despite all of the kind of nicks and dings and whatnot. Like, even as of this yesterday, this morning, they were still producing great, uh, journalism and reporting. I, I guess the optimist's case, uh, would be that they run lean. They're much more, they're much less ambitious, uh, on the editorial side about, uh, what they, uh, what they want to do, and they focus on what they do well. The hope is maybe that they're able to kind of like take some of this Washington insidery stuff back from the Politicos or the Axios, or even, you know, kind of come for us, uh, a little bit, uh, in terms of, in terms of the business. That's pretty much the, I would say that that's kind of the optimist case. Maybe build some more kind of like tailored products, newsletters that are appealing to people, podcasts that people want to listen to that are more kind of highly tailored and specific.
>> Just cut the podcast people. I, I know. Well, they cut, they, I will say they cut their, I, I mean, you know, for what it's, and no disrespect to this podcast at all, but they cut the podcast that they have that was supposed to be their version of The Daily. It's kind of hard to compete with The Daily when there's The Daily, there's Up First, there's all these other, uh.
>> Yeah, I mean, but you guys do, you guys have a, you guys have a point of view, which is I think that the real other problem, right, is they need a real point of view, a definitive point of view that people are buying into. And I don't really know if they have that right now with their, with the free markets, free expression.
>> That that would be a total brand remake.
>> Yeah.
>> Oh, they just put Adam O'Neal front and center. I mean, put slap that guy's face on a podcast icon and, you know, people are going to line up. No, look, we're thinking about this all wrong because, you know, we're talking about like, you know, how do you save it? This is the Jeff Bezos saved version of the Post. Again, like, it gets back to where this is what he wants. And this idea that like, oh, we're in a spiral. We're in the spiral that he created. If, if he was concerned about pulling out of the spiral, then he would have reversed course after the endorsement insanity, and he would have fired Will Lewis after Will Lewis publicly lied. Right? Again, this is the idea that a publisher can say in public things which turn out to be verifiably untrue. You can't, no news institution can survive that, right? You cannot have the top of a newspaper, a guy who has lied to the public, even once. And, uh, but we didn't get any of that because this is what Bezos wanted. And so we're like talking about this in good faith terms of like, well, if I was running the paper, how would I get it to a place where it could be financially sustainable? And what, and that's again, they've lost more money in 2025 than they did in 2024 because they're making the moves that Bezos wants.
>> Yeah. Well, it's a really sad day. It's an angry. I mean, like I said up top, I'm angry about it. It's, it's a tragedy what this man.
>> I'm the only one who sounds like a crazy angry person. You guys are like the other, you know, you're like Mr. Spock, you know, all vulgar, you know, I would like to analyze this.
>> Well, I want to say, I, I want to say.
>> As you do, JVL.
>> No, there's one other outcome here that that I, that we, we neglected to mention. And I was thinking about it while JVL was was talking here, which is, of course, that Bezos sells the Post to somebody who wants.
>> He's going to.
>> I, I've seen no indication that he wants to.
>> Um, it seems like they.
>> Talk about selling low. Jesus.
>> Yeah, they would be selling low, but I'm sure they could find someone to pay a lot of money. It's.
>> It is the, it is the paper of.
>> Yeah, maybe there's people who are interested. That's for sure. Nobody with the resources to, you know, buying the, I don't know if you guys remember this, the Pontiac Silver Dome was sold for a million dollars, this is like 15 years ago. And, uh, I, I remember when it went on sale, I was like, I called 20 of my buddies and we sat and we thought through, could we buy the Silver Dome? Like, if we all pulled our money, could we do it? And then like, we could just go there once a year on Thanksgiving Day and play flag football in the [ __ ] Silver Dome. It'll be amazing. But the problem is the carrying costs, right? The carrying costs are incredibly high. The carrying costs of the Post are really, really high, right? It's not the purchase price. You know, I bet, I bet that thing could be had for $250 million. Um, but the carrying costs in its current configuration are really high. And the problem is the type of people who could afford to to bear that right now, if they were going to save the Post, mean like make it antagonistic towards the authoritarian regime, um, they would be making themselves economically vulnerable. And so until we return to something like regular America where the executive branch isn't controlled by a guy who will sue his own government for $10 billion and extort the, you know, people who are hoping to have mergers before the FTC. Uh, I think it's going to be very, very hard to find somebody with pockets that deep enough who who isn't also really vulnerable.
>> I think that that certainly, uh, makes it a less appealing target for some, for some buyers. But I do think that there are buyers, there are people out there who have a lot of money, uh, who are interested in media, who don't like Donald Trump, uh, who could definitely, uh, who would definitely be interested if they knew, uh, that it was for sale. Uh, one of those, if you are one of those people, you should. Well, I don't know if that's their perspective, perspective. I, he would love to buy the Post for what it's worth, I'm sure. Um, but, uh, although he's, he, he doesn't like, he has a complicated thing with news newspapers. Um, Mathias, their CEO. Um, but I will say that there are definitely some people who would love to buy it if it was for sale. I think really what it is is, uh, Bezos hasn't expressed any desire to sell it. This is, as you pointed out, uh, JVL, this is his vision for what he wants the Post to be. Um, so.
>> Max, would you expect him to actually ever do any public interfacing around the Post? He's done none. He's, he's on occasion, he's pop, he pops up in the newsroom and he seems a little bit more engaged and obviously he was engaged with some of their opinion re-focusing last year towards free expression and free markets, but he doesn't really talk about it. He doesn't really do many public interviews at all unless it was, it's about like entrepreneurship or something like that. Uh, so he's, he, he doesn't, I don't expect it anytime soon. Uh, he has usually responded to this.
>> It's hard to say. I mean, at various points he's been really engaged and at various points he's seemed disengaged. The people who really, uh, interfaced with him and know his point of view. It's a very, very, very small group of people, which is why the news doesn't leak out very much. I have tried to figure that out. Uh, all we know at the moment, uh, is that it's not really for sale. I think part of it too is, uh, he, he bought this for as part of, uh, his image, I guess, and maybe his image has taken a ding with some people. Maybe he thinks that it's improved, uh, with some other people he wants to, uh, favor with right now. We don't, I, to be clear, that's not my reporting, that's just speculation because we don't really know.
>> He literally was meeting with Pete Hegseth yesterday. So I don't think we have to jump through many hoops to get to that conclusion. All right, we're going to leave it there. JVL, Max, thank you so much. For those who are watching, thank you for doing that. Uh, look, subscribe to the Bullwork. Uh, we aren't doing this [ __ ]. We'll leave it at that. Talk to you guys later.