Transcription
Initially, it looked like the Trump administration had conceded the Iranian demand that the nuclear issue be put in the second set of negotiations. And what you're just reporting, Tom, from Haaretz moves the nuclear issue up. Now, let's assume that Trump sticks to his guns. If he does that, almost all of the issues have to be dealt with in the first round of negotiations. Once you move the nuclear issue up, for example, the whole question of the future of the Strait of Hormuz, whether Iran and Oman are going to control that together in the future, was initially left to the second round. 12 hours ago, it was going to be a second round issue along with the nuclear issue. But if you move the nuclear issue up front because of its importance to all of the parties in this agreement, everything else has to be brought into play. And once you do that, Tom, you're dealing with a lot of moving parts.
>> Well, on the Strait of Hormuz, the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, who's been in India in the last few days, he's made it very clear that there'll be no case for tolls, that Iran will not be able to impose toll levies on traffic. That could be a game changer, couldn't it?
>> Yes, it could be. And there are two other big game changers in there. One is the nuclear issue.
>> Yes.
>> And just to be clear for the sake of the audience, there are two issues at play when you talk about the nuclear issue. One issue is the question of what you do with those 440 [clears throat] plus kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The Americans and the Israelis want that highly enriched uranium removed from Iran, and the Iranians don't want to do that. The Iranians are willing to weaken it so that it's no longer highly enriched, but they don't want it moved out of the country. The second big issue is how much nuclear enrichment capability Iran is allowed to keep in place. The Americans and the Israelis would like to see all that nuclear enrichment capability in Iran wrecked. The Iranians, of course, say they have a right to keep that capability and don't want to see it wrecked.
>> Um, what distinguishes that from, say, the Obama nuclear deal that was negotiated in 2015 and which, of course, Donald Trump scrapped 3 years later?
>> Well, the fact is that the enriched uranium at the time was removed from Iran, and it was sent to Russia.
>> Russia, yeah.
>> However, the Iranians were allowed to keep their enrichment installations intact. They could not enrich uranium to a high level. That was very important for the United States and to a lesser extent for the Israelis, but they could still enrich, and the enrichment infrastructure was kept in place. Now we're talking about eliminating that enrichment infrastructure altogether, and the Iranians refuse to do that. So, that's another, you know, significant point of contention. So, you, Tom, brought up the issue of the Strait of Hormuz and what Marco Rubio's point is. I'm saying to you, you have a similar problem with regard to the nuclear issue, with regard to getting the material out of the country, and with regard to the enrichment facilities themselves. And then the third big issue, and it is a really important issue, is Lebanon because [clears throat] Iran says they want a ceasefire and then a peace agreement that means no more war in Lebanon forever, which means the Israelis can't go after Hezbollah. And it doesn't take a genius to realize that the Israelis are not going to be happy about that.
>> How do you square these circles? The nuclear issue, the Strait of Hormuz, and Lebanon? Big issues, but if broadly these reports are correct, John, we have a regional ceasefire, there's sanctions relief, and there are eventual negotiations over the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz. I mean, is all this a tacit acknowledgment by Trump that the costs of escalation had become unsustainable, that in effect, there was no viable military solution here?
>> Yes, Tom, that's absolutely correct. We could go into why there is no military solution if you would like, but before we get there, I would just point out that we really, we meaning the United States, we really have three options here. Uh, number one is a military attack.
>> [clears throat]
>> Uh, renewing the bombing campaign, in effect, and that's just not a viable option, as you were pointing out. The second thing that we can do is we can cut a deal along the lines that we were just talking about, where we were 12 hours ago. Uh, and that will probably work, but the problem is we would be conceding defeat to Iran. Lots of people understand that. That deal that people are talking about 12 hours ago is a deal that says, in effect, Iran won. That's option two. Option three is just to maintain the status quo, just to continue along the path that we are now moving down. And this means that we rely on the blockade instead of a bombing campaign against Iran. And the problem, Tom, there is that the international economy is increasingly feeling the pain. And lots of people are now beginning to say, and when I say lots of people, I'm talking about people who operate in the business world, economists, oil experts, and so forth, are saying that if this problem is not solved by the end of July and we move into August with the strait closed,
>> Mhm.
>> uh, the consequences are likely to be catastrophic. So, all of that is to say, even if you don't get an agreement now and you keep going on the path that we're now on with the blockade, it's going to have devastating consequences by late summer. This is why there's pressure on Trump now to shut this one down. You know, you want to ask yourself this question, Tom, why are we having this conversation, uh, tonight? What is [clears throat] it, uh, right here in Chicago, and, uh, in the morning in, uh, Australia? Why are we having this conversation? It's in large part because Trump feels compelled to try to shut it down right away because he knows that we are heading toward the precipice economically.
>> This is a very key point, John. So, a lot of this comes down to not just military realities, as I alluded to in my earlier question, but to economic reality. So, let's be clear, you've got the oil prices, um, the shipping disruptions, inflationary pressures, the debt markets. You've mentioned before on this program the fear of stagflation in the West. We have high inflation, high unemployment, the likes of which we haven't really seen since the 1970s. In other words, you could make the argument that it's markets now constraining American power in ways that the Washington elite still struggle to acknowledge. John.
>> I think there's no question that you're right. I think you identified all the major problems.
>> Yep.
>> Uh, and many people point to inflation as the key here. Because as inflation rises, and it's almost guaranteed to rise even more than it already has, uh, it's going to cause the Fed to increase interest rates, and that's going to slow down growth. And this is what leads to stagflation. Uh, and furthermore, as inflation begins to soar, uh, the bond yields go up, it becomes more difficult to service the debt, and so forth and so on. So, there are just all sorts of huge economic problems sitting out there that Donald Trump wants to head off at the pass, especially when you take into account that the midterm elections are coming up in November. And, uh, if we go off the precipice before then, and the Senate is dominated by Democrats and the House is dominated by Democrats, he may get impeached and this time convicted as well. So, the stakes for him were enormous.
>> So, if he doesn't do the military option, which seems implausible as we've discussed, and he does this deal where he more or less capitulates to Tehran's demands, if you like, or keeps the status quo, um, the reality is, John, it seems to the layperson that the regime, the Islamic Republic, will still stay in place. Um, the nuclear program's probably going to stay in place. [clears throat] Um, the ballistic missiles will stay in place. The regional proxies, you know, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels will still stay in place. And unlike pre-February 28th, Iran has more leverage with respect to the Strait of Hormuz and all of that traffic that accounts for 20% of global oil, um, and gas and fertilizers. How would Trump sell any kind of deal as a victory when the likes of his own party, I think of Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, the former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, whom you debated in Toronto just last week? I mean, they would be outraged if Trump does any kind of deal along the lines we've really discussed. John?
>> I think there's no question about it. He's going to be clobbered by the Israel lobby, by Israel itself, and by war hawks like Lindsey Graham and others. There's just no doubt about it. Mike Pompeo included, as you said. Uh, but this is Trump's problem. He's between a rock and a hard place. I mean, what is he going to do? Take the international economy off a cliff?
>> Yeah.
>> Does he really want to do that? And the answer, of course, is no. And that's why he's scrambling like crazy to try and come up with a solution. But there is no solution. And by the way, Tom, just to say a word or two about the military option, tie that to our discussion of the economic dimension. It's very important the viewers understand that if we actually go back to the bombing campaign, that will speed up our movement toward the precipice, right? Because if we start the bombing campaign again, the Iranians have made it clear that not only are they going to keep the Persian Gulf shut, they're going to shut down the Red Sea as well.
>> Through the Houthi rebels, yeah.
>> Yeah, and that will be disastrous. And furthermore, they're also talking about tearing up the cables, the under sea cables that run through the Persian Gulf. And this will have disastrous economic consequences.
>> Yep. But but but we should always acknowledge um the counter argument put forward by the critics. And they would say that, uh, together with the naval blockade, uh, escalation, military escalation would really put more pressure on them all as their economy is in dire straits, John. How would you respond to that argument?
>> I I don't see what the target sets are in an air campaign. The new target sets in an air campaign that act as a big force multiplier to [clears throat] the blockade. But let's assume I'm wrong, Tom. And let's assume that as a result of the bombing campaign coupled with the blockade, we really up the pressure or the punishment campaign against Iran. The question you have to ask yourself is, what are the Iranians going to do? Do you think they're going to throw up their hands? And the answer is no. They're not going to throw up their hands. They are facing an existential threat. They're facing two countries that have genocidal intentions towards them. All you have to do is listen to President Trump talk about bombing Iran back to the Stone Age.
>> Did Did it the other day, yeah.
>> Yeah, and and so they're not going to give up. They're going to fight to the death. But the other thing, Tom, you do not want to lose sight of is the Iranians think they're playing the strong hand here.
>> All right. So they have an incentive to move slowly as its leverage grows with time. That's your line.
>> Yes, it is. And I think if you listen to them talk, that's exactly how they talk. Right? President Trump, by the this morning here, Chicago time, um, 12 hours ago, he was talking about wrapping this one up quickly. He's now talking about going slowly because pressure has been brought to bear on him, and he is saying, President Trump is saying explicitly that time is on our side, on America's side, but I believe he's dead wrong. Time is not on our side. Time is on Iran's side. And if you're playing on Iran's side, what you want to do is string this out for a bit longer and bring more pressure to bear on Trump to cut a deal.
>> Yes, but the Israelis, presumably behind the scenes, are putting a lot of pressure on Trump to do precisely the opposite. Um, John, I just want to run this by you again. This is Haaretz, and um, they argue that uh, Israeli officials fear Trump is sidelining Netanyahu after a war that lasted longer and cost more politically and economically than Trump expected. Does that make sense?
>> Of course, because there's no way that Trump can get a deal if he works with Netanyahu because Netanyahu is adamantly opposed to a deal. Israel and the lobby will go to enormous lengths to undermine the deal. This is the problem that Trump faces. He's caught. He's caught between the pressure, this truly profound pressure from the international economy on one side, and Netanyahu, Israel, and the lobby on the other side.
>> This is perhaps a rhetorical question, but if this agreement proceeds more or less along the lines that have been leaked, would you characterize it as primarily a big strategic defeat for Israel?
>> Oh, it would be. This is a catastrophic defeat for Israel.
>> Yeah.
>> Right? They They
>> Because the original The original Israeli objective, let's just be clear for our audience, was not coexistence with a constrained Iran. It was about a permanent weakening of Iran's um nuclear and regional capabilities, correct? And ballistic missile capabilities, John.
>> Absolutely. It was similar to what we wanted to do to Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war. As you heard me say many times, we wanted to knock Russia out of the ranks of the great powers. I think in this particular case, what the Israelis really wanted to do, they talked about regime change, uh, and I think they would have settled for regime change, but what they really wanted was to do to Iran what's been done to Syria, which is break it into pieces, cause a serious revolution that greatly weakened the state.
>> So, what does all this mean for Netanyahu? He's presumably trapped politically because if he openly confronts Trump, I mean, couldn't he risk alienating a lot of Israeli voters who still strongly support Trump? And but if he remains quiet at the same time, he risks appearing to acquiesce in this deal that doesn't help Israel, John.
>> He's in deep trouble because no matter what happens with Trump, he lost the war against Iran. Iran's not giving. This is these are the points you made before. Iran's not giving up its missiles, right? Its nuclear enrichment capability is going to remain intact. It's not giving up its support for Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah, and Iran is getting all sorts of relief. Uh, so, uh, he loses in the war in Iran. The war against Hezbollah in Lebanon is going terribly, independent of the Iran issue.
>> Tell us more about that, cuz that's not getting much play in the mainstream media. Israel's war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Tell us more, John.
>> Well, first of all, the terrain in southern Lebanon is ideally suited for the defender, and the defender in this case is Hezbollah. And when the Israelis went in there in 2006, they got clobbered by Hezbollah because Hezbollah used the terrain in southern Lebanon to ambush Israeli armored and infantry forces. But what's changed since then that makes Hezbollah even more effective is the coming of drones because Hezbollah is using fiber optic drones. Those are drones that are very hard for the Israelis to jam to deadly effect. So, the Israelis have been suffering significant casualties in southern Lebanon. And the other dimension to this, Tom, is that Hezbollah is firing every day large numbers of rockets and missiles into northern Israel. You remember a number of months ago it looked like Hezbollah had been defeated. Israel had won a great victory.
>> Mhm.
>> The table has now turned, and Hezbollah is back on its feet and it's causing the Israelis huge problems not only inside southern Lebanon itself, but also in terms of bombing north Israel. So, if you look at the Lebanon war and just go to Hamas. I mean, there's no question that Hamas has been clobbered, and the Palestinians, of course, have undergone a genocide in Gaza. But the fact is that Hamas is still alive and still fighting. It would be too much to say Hamas is alive and well, but it's close to that point. So, they haven't defeated Hamas, they haven't defeated Hezbollah, they haven't defeated Iran, and they've done enormous damage. This is to the Israelis' reputation, not only around the world but in the United States. It's quite stunning the extent to which people in the United States are now critical of Israel in ways that were unthinkable.
>> But surely the security intelligence in Israel and Washington before February 28th knew about Iran and its proxies' ability to fight back.
>> Tom, I think on February 27th, when Netanyahu and company and Trump and company were thinking about going to war the next day, they thought that Hezbollah had effectively been defeated. They did not know that it would come back from the dead. Point number one. And point number two, they thought that they were going to win a quick and decisive victory. They thought a shock and awe air campaign, which had decapitation at the center of it, would produce a victory. And of course, as you remember, on February 28th, they did decapitate the regime in Iran. They succeeded. And furthermore, they did launch a shock and awe campaign that was quite shocking. But the problem is, it didn't work. And once that doesn't work, they're then in a long war. And then the whole question of the Strait of Hormuz being closed [clears throat] comes into play. You want to remember that beforehand, President Trump has said that he was warned about the Strait of Hormuz being closed. And he said, "No need to worry because we're going to win the war quickly, and it won't become an issue." Well, they didn't win the war quickly, it became an issue, and then to go back to Hezbollah, it came into the fight. Uh And furthermore, Tom, there's one other very important point that I want to make. Uh reports have come out from the intelligence community via the Washington Post, The New York Times that we, the United States, have suffered much greater damage to our military bases in the Persian Gulf than we realized, we and the public realized at first. But they're now telling us that our base structure really got clobbered. Now, you say to yourself when you hear this, if they were deadly effective against our bases, doesn't that mean that it's highly likely that their attacks against Israel were deadly effective? Well, you remember we knew nothing, virtually nothing, about how much damage was done inside Israel during the bombing campaign because the Israelis did a brilliant job of keeping information about the consequences of the bombings from the rest of us. But we're now getting lots of information that Israel really got clobbered by those Iranian missiles, just like the American military bases in the region really got clobbered. It makes perfect sense. So, you want to understand that Israel has paid a real price in terms of the damage that has been done by those Iranian missiles and drones that hit them.
>> And that's not to mention America's allies, the Sunni Gulf allies. You think of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar. Uh How are they feeling right now because this deal may well embolden Iran, their nemesis?
>> Well, it's very interesting on this point, Tom, is that virtually every one of the GCC states, the six Gulf states, uh including the UAE, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, who are mortal enemies these days, all six of them begged the United States not to restart the bombing campaign for exactly the reason that you're alluding to. They understand full well that Iran has a second strike capability, and they are in the crosshairs. And the Iranians, if enormous damage is done to Iran, the Iranians will do enormous damage to those six Gulf states, and they don't want that for all the obvious reasons.
>> John, let's conclude with where we're at. Um, it's still uncertain, of course, how diplomatic negotiations proceed. But we should remember that the administration and the Israelis started this mission on February 28th um with what's called maximalist objectives. So they wanted to destroy Iran's enrichment capability, um especially following the June attacks last year. They wanted to weaken the missile infrastructure, the ballistic missile infrastructure. They wanted to roll back the regional proxies. We mentioned them before, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels. And given that the regime is now likely to remain intact, and that enrichment capability, I know it's still a work in progress, but that may well be preserved, sanctions relief on the table. I mean, how do you think future historians are likely to view this episode in history? John.
>> Well, uh I'll make a couple points. One is the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, uh, a year or two ago, commissioned some diplomatic historians, American diplomatic historians, to assess what was the greatest foreign policy blunder that the United States has ever made. Uh, this is obviously before the Iran war. And they concluded that the Iraq war in 2003, which you and I know all about, uh, was the greatest blunder that the United States ever made.
>> Mhm.
>> Uh, I think this decision to attack Iran on February 28th will far outdistance the Iraq 2003 war as the greatest foreign policy blunder the United States ever made. Second point I'd make in support of this is you want to remember that Robert Kagan, who is a hard-nosed and very smart neo-conservative,
>> Mhm.
>> uh, an arch proponent of the 2003 Iraq war, has said that the decision to attack Iran on February 28th and involve the United States and Israel in this war was a catastrophic mistake. Uh, I think his view on how foolish this decision was, uh, is completely in line with my view and with your view. Uh, and all of this just tells you this, I think, will go down in the history books as a massive blunder.
>> Yeah, John, it's always great to see you. Thanks so much for joining.