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That Iran needs now. Needs now. Nuclear weapons. And this is, in fact, in line with my, my, my thinking as well. In about a, I was thinking again, it would be about a year or a year and a half after the starting of the assassin, you know, the regime change bombing. You would have Iran truly develop nuclear weapons. And but look, I, I predicted the regime change bombing would happen a year or two after Fordow, when it was eight months sooner than I said. Here, you could get the same thing. You could get Iranian nuclear weapons sooner than I'm suggesting. But I don't think you're seeing it happening later than I'm suggesting. And what that would be is an incredible embarrassment to President Trump. This would totally turn President Trump into, I mean, domestically, if Iran were to test nuclear weapons, Trump's power would be, would almost be over. He could lash out, do whatever he wanted, but even if he lashes out, everybody would know he is just, he's got nothing to offer anymore. And so this would be immediately looking to JD and and Rubio as like the actual de facto, you know, leader here. And so what you would see is Trump would, if he gets an inkling of this coming, and we're likely have all the surveillance, Trump's telling you, we got all the eyes and ears looking for exactly this. I think this could be why we still keep those Marines. So, notice we didn't pull the Marines out. Okay, we, we still have those ground forces there. Ready to go. In a few days' notice at most, in order to go in somewhere like Esfahan or wherever. Pickaxe Mountain, wherever you got to go. And I think they're there in part, maybe they have multiple, you know, scenarios. But in case they get an inkling of a test. And that is not something I would just completely dismiss. So, so I think that this idea that this whole thing is over has just missed what this is all been about in the first place.
And it's true that America doesn't have good military options. People have been saying, I was saying that for decades. This is not like we suddenly thought we had military options. But that's not how, if, if that were so true, Mario, World War I would not have been four years. The Russian-Ukraine war would already be over by now. I mean, if it were the case that this was so easy to understand, the bottom line is wars disrupt the balance of power, often in big ways. And then they end when the major combatants agree on the new balance of power. And right now, they're not agreeing. Iran is not satisfied. They're not done growing their power yet. America is not happy. It's now more and more dissatisfied with every change. And Israel is in a full-out panic, as far as I can tell. Not just being rational, but incredibly emotional here. As, as I think you would expect. I, I, I'd find it if October 7th happened here in, in Chicago, I'm pretty sure you would see that kind of an emotional response by the city of Chicago. So, I, I am, I'm, I, that's what I see. And I think that what you said about the 50%. If those ground forces aren't going to be used, let's just pull them back. Let's pull them back.
>> You'd want to keep them as pressure during negotiations as well. So it's difficult to tell. Are they there for practical reasons of what you've explained, or are they there to keep pressure on Iran, keep that fear within Iran as a deal is being negotiated?
>> I think that this is not, yeah, there's a little bit of strategic ambiguity going on here, Mario. But this is underwriting. As happens with strategic ambiguity, I would say in Taiwan, that this is not just an easy out, an excuse where it's all bluff. See, what people mean by strategic ambiguity is it's all just a bluff. It's not really going to happen. So, therefore, their presence there is not real. It doesn't really have a probability on the, you know, a coefficient on the variable. I, I just think that this is not quite right. Strategic ambiguity here was not really about that. With Taiwan, it was, it was a velvet glove. It's so, there's realism, and then there's with the mailed fist, and then there's the velvet glove over the mailed fist, which makes it a little bit easier to deal with. Those 5,000 Marines here, I think are just different. I think they're there as a backup plan for Iran testing. And a good question for President Trump by a journalist would be, if you saw Iran testing, would you send in the Marines? Just directly ask him and let him say I can't say or whatever, but these are the actual scenarios that we should be pressing the president on. But, it's hard because, you know, everybody wants does the current news, which is important, but there is core underlying scenarios here. Are there? Who's going to control Hormuz with fees or not? And then number two, is Iran really going to have the ability to test within a couple weeks or not? And that is what this has always been about. Or the first, the latter, and now Hormuz, the second.
>> And, and you've mentioned Israel as well. We haven't talked enough about the Israel also in the a with former Prime Minister Bennett, Naftali Bennett, earlier today and his, I was going through his policy to understand how different he is to Netanyahu. Very, very little difference, especially when it comes to Iran. If anything, he's in some ways more hawkish towards Iran. Um, so, even if Trump decides to walk away, you've got Israel as another wild card.
>> Yes, but it's, I think a wild card means it is, um, 50/50 which way Israel will go. I don't think that's right, Mario. It's, I think it's directional. And what I think is it's, um, coming from number one, uh, so or three places, really. Of course, the, the, the hawkish side in, uh, in Israel has always wanted the expansion for decades. So, that part, number, number one. Number two, October 7th has moved the public, uh, in that direction. Basically disappeared or virtually disappeared after October 7th, and you see that in the 70 to 80% of the Israeli public, uh, in the most recent opinion polls over the last few months. They all say they want to go full bore into, uh, into Lebanon. Uh, half the public apparently is willing, in Israel is willing to do that, even if it means losing American support. So, this is the public's really quite traumatized here, as, uh, in addition to what the leaders are. And that, of course, reinforces the leaders. But there's a third thing, Mario. So, this is on again, Substack analysis, military analysis of what is the next war against Hezbollah really look like, Mario. So, I did a big, uh, uh, 1,800-word analysis on the Substack on this, and I call it closing Israel. So, apply not just the idea, we know Hezbollah hates Israel. We know it wants to hurt Israel. And we know it has drones. But right now, those first-person view drones are really just being used directly against the front-line Israeli forces in either southern Lebanon or just on the other side of the border in northern Israel. But just simply extend the logic of the, I mean, the operational strategic logic of what drones are doing in Hormuz, as we just spent the first 30 minutes discussing, hitting ships and also the Houthis. And you're telling me more, I got to go now spend more time after this go around what's going on with the Houthis. But apply that to Hezbollah. And notice Israel is effectively 55% of its trade, of its GNP comes from trade, comes from seaborn trade. And that's coming in through Haifa, it's coming in through just a handful of ports. So, if you look at Israel, Israel's effectively an island when it comes to trade. And Lebanon, those, the distance between the Beqaa Valley, which is where you would build your drones and arsenals and so forth to build drone swarms, and Haifa is 80 miles. 80 miles. And if you, and I just did a big briefing on this last week for my, when I did, I've done in-person people, I've invited people to some in-person events. So, I'm showing them what it would, how easy it would be to target those big cargo vessels in Haifa with drones. And again, you can launch a dozen drones or 20 drones, only one or two hit, and you've done your work. Israel's, uh, knocked down 90% of them. But what that means is Israel is going to face, uh, with, with Hezbollah in Lebanon, um, a much more severe threat, a real threat, not just a made-up threat, uh, than it does today. And I'm not telling you I justify what Israel's doing. I still think if I were Israel, I'd play the hand that they should work with the United States to get us out of the escalation trap. So, so, if I were advising the people you're interviewing, um, I would, I would not tell them to go down this road. However, I would start with the reality of what I think they're seeing rather than dismiss it as, "Oh, you're just a wacko. Let me tell you why you shouldn't do what you're No, that doesn't persuade decision makers, Mario." I spent, uh, from 2001 to 2024, I advised every West Wing in, uh, in the White House. And it doesn't work. You walk in here, cuz usually I have to be invited. I'm just a professor. It doesn't work to walk in and say, "Yeah, you're just a bunch of nincompoops. So, thank goodness I'm here." No, this doesn't work. You've got to understand things from what they're seeing and then say, either this is unrealistic what you're seeing, or it is realistic, and then from there, start to create a better course of action. If you just keep assaulting them as morally decrepit and idiots, uh, this is not, you're not going to save any lives. No, assaulting Israel is morally, uh, decrepit, hasn't saved what? 4,000 people are now dead in southern Lebanon, right? I mean, think of that.