Transcription
You've got a bunch of great guests. I love that guy. Was it Jeff Curry? And you got Traita. So, Jeff, Jeff is good. Treat is a regular. He's, he's on every couple of days, every two or three days. Jeff is really good. He's a...
Yeah, I love that guy. An economist. You know him from before?
No, I just came across, you know, I sort of, you know, trolling social media. I started listening to him and you know, you sort of, it's like the 80/20 rule, you know, after a while, you sort of, you sift through a lot of stuff and you find a number of people who you just, just always seek out. There's like, uh, Hamidra Aziz, uh, Danny Satrinowitz, um, Saul for maritime shipping, uh, Curry for commodities, you know, you just, you know, Ali Voyz, you just find people who you're like, "Okay, what does this person think?"
Ali Voyz is on my show.
No, I'm just saying in general. These are the people I...
Okay. All the names you've mentioned, I've had on my show except Ali. Aizia was on my show. The U...
He was on my show a few times. He's Iranian. Correct?
Yeah. But he's, he's Marshall Fund.
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I had him on the show for the first time a few days ago. I'm sure I'll have him back. He was a great discussion. Yeah. We have, um, the team does a great job in getting incredible guests. That's why I always wonder why you always pop up on the calendar. Like, there's, there's an exception. I'm joking.
They can't all be home runs. You know, every now and then, just...
Progression from the mean in statistics.
Exactly. But no, I, I love having you on for obvious reasons, but one of the best parts is, um, just seeing you disappointed by how this is going. It's like you spent your life doing something incredible.
Actually, actually satisfied. Satisfied because now we appreciate the work you did. Satisfied.
I'll tell you why I'm satisfied because I've been wrong about Iran for 40 years. You know, in the sense that, you know, you always think, well, this will probably happen and it doesn't. Iran always sort of goes pear-shaped. It always goes sideways. But this one has been like tic-tac-toe. It's been so easy to call that it has fed into my megalomania. I'm like, "Wow, I'm really good because I say this will happen and it happens." So, to use a British term, I'm quite chuffed because this is like the first time I've been consistently right. But that's because again, it's been so easy, not because I've gotten smarter. Also, it's, um, you know, there's a new level of appreciation for the work you've done with the JCPOA, seeing how difficult it is here to even come up with an MOU and abide by an MOU. So, um...
Well, that's again...
We're going to get a, a JCPOA 2, you know, we're going to get a JCPOA 2.2, 2.0, just, uh, more friendly towards Iran, obviously, because we have no choice.
We're not going to get that far. We're not even going to get a bad agreement.
Event. I mean, eventually. I'm not saying now. Maybe in five years or so.
Yeah. Next administration, perhaps. Yeah. If you get a competent administration back in power and I don't say that in a partisan manner. I just started reading this latest book, Regime Change, by, was it those about the Trump?
Maggie? Yeah. You know, it's about the first year of the Trump administration.
The new book that came out. Yeah.
Yeah. Yeah. And it's pretty much again, you know, things are usually what they seem, you know. Um, let's, um, I'm actually really excited to talk to you. I'm always excited, but today more so because of the, what's happening in the state of Hormuz. So, a lot of people are reading the MOU. They're like, "It says this, but they're breaching it because of that. Like, it says this, but it means this, not that." But I tell people, like, the MOU is not really, you know, try and go by it word by word. It's a framework because it's created vague for a reason because, you know, they need time to get to specifics. So when you look at what's happened in the Strait of Hormuz, a lot of people, me included, are like, "Hey, Iran is breaching it because it says it will do its best effort to allow for the safe passage." And then someone's like, "No, but it mentions that and they have 30 days before allowing for the safe passage." Or when it comes to Lebanon, the MOU says, "Respect the sovereignty of Lebanese territory." But then someone else is like, "Yes, but they are respecting the sovereignty of Lebanon because Lebanon as a state just did an agreement with Israel and the US is is respecting that." So we complained about, not complained, but we recognized that the MOU was vague and that's going to become a problem and now we are going through the problem. Um, so my first question for you is, um, instead of looking at the MOU and nitpicking bit by bit, I want to ask you more pragmatically speaking, what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz? Is Iran doesn't want Oman, the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz to be open for everyone, freedom of navigation, like it once was, even if it's Omani territorial waters? Iran doesn't want that because of the war they've been through. And the US doesn't want to, doesn't want to, you know, status quo in the Strait of Hormuz that is controlled by Iran. And what we're seeing right now is each side trying to assert what they want in the straits. Iran doing it by striking ships that go through the strait or the Omani side, and the US striking Iran whenever Iran strikes a ship on the Omani side. Um, so maybe before getting into specific questions, I'd love to get your analysis of the current status quo.
I think you're exactly right. But, you know, I would say the MOU isn't even a framework. The MOU is an invitation to talk. It says, "Let's stop fighting for the time being and let's talk about these topics." And sure, it provides a putative framework, but here's the key fact: there is no international law. There's no judge, you know, with a wig and a gavel who's going to pound and go, "Hey, Iran, you're not living up to the MOU," or "Hey, United States, you just violated the MOU." Okay? So the MOU has served its utility. Okay? And you know, protestations that, "Oh, President Trump violated Article 1 by threatening Iran," or "Iran violated Article 5 by firing on ships in Omani territorial waters." Doesn't matter. We're in this Hobbesian world right now where we had this complex system in the Persian Gulf. The US and Israel broke it, and now people are setting the bones of this body. And Iran thinks it's vital for its ongoing existence because it's still on a war footing and it still sees diplomacy. You know, Clausewitz said war is diplomacy by other means. Iran is saying diplomacy is war by other means. So it is insisting that it retain control over the strait and it's willing to risk everything for that. So you're right, that is now the fulcrum of attention, but these, you know, kinetic back-and-forths, that's part of diplomacy. That's not in contradistinction to diplomacy.
I love these analogies. Um, so what's this one again? So what Clausewitz says is that war is diplomacy by other means.
Yeah.
And Iran's saying diplomacy... No, diplomacy is war by other means. Yeah.
Yeah. Yeah. Because again...
That's a good one.
People like JD Vance go, "Oh, you know, I've talked to the IRGC. They, you know, like the US and they want to be like us when they grow up or whatever." That's nonsense. You know, Iran right now, the people running Iran see the US and Israel, which they see as logically equivalent, as dedicated to their destruction. So, yeah, the bombs have stopped for the time being, but in their minds, the US and Israel will continue trying to topple the Islamic Republic. So what it has to do is find strategic deterrence. Okay? Which is why, even though Hezbollah really is, you know, the juice isn't worth the squeeze at this point because there's only so much they can do, but they have this new form of strategic deterrence, which is control of the strait. They're not going to let that go. Okay.
Okay. So, two points here. Something you mentioned that surprised me that's interesting. "The juice is not worth the squeeze." Number two is, um, I'm writing the notes so I don't forget. "The juice is not worth..."
Okay. The second point, because I want to address the second point you said about Iran doesn't want to give up their control of the strait to Hormuz. What does that mean? Because them allowing ships to go through the Omani side doesn't mean they've given up control in the sense that they can close it at any time. They've given up the legal control, being able to charge a fee, but they can still close the Strait of Hormuz whenever they feel threatened or something happens that they don't agree with. They still have the ability. So why are they adamant at ensuring ships pay them? Is that to ensure legal control, not just military control? Um, or is that because they need the money that comes out of it? Do you know what I mean with the question?
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No, I, and that's a great question because you're right. Ultimately, Iran's power comes from the ability to close the traffic through the strait, right? And they can do that because they've got missiles and drones. And given the, you know, the tremors in the international insurance market, especially these days, that suffices. However, they want administrative, operational, day-to-day control. You know, they want all ships coordinating with the PGSA because, as a practical matter, that's an easier form of control to maintain than bombing a ship every time it goes through, you know, hugging the Omani coastline, right? And plus, this is, you know, what's happening now is a power dynamic between the US and Iran. And by the US saying, "You can go through the Omani waters, we got you," it's an either-or situation. So Iran wants to show both the Gulf countries and everyone else that ships go through the strait only by Iranian sufferance. And yes, they could show that by allowing ships to go through Omani waters, but again, if they go through Omani waters, they're not coordinating with Iran. And it's not the money now because they're perfectly willing to to charge no tolls, no service fees for 60 days. What they want is full operational control of maritime traffic. And you saw today, there was a piece in Bloomberg where one of the Omani officials was saying, "Yeah, you know, this might be the new normal." You know, between a rock and a hard place. So...
Ultimately, just to, you know, repeat myself, you are right. As long as Iran maintains the ability to shut down the strait kinetically, that's, that checks part of the bill. But what is far preferable is this PGSA is Iran, you know, with this new insurance agency selling wartime insurance to ships passing through, which, as Sal pointed out, you know, is like such a protection racket. You know, that's what they want. And I think that's what the US will have to accept because, at the end of the day, that's not going to add too much to the price of oil or oil derivatives. The Gulf countries will have to pay the brunt of that. And...
You know, if that's the price President Trump has to pay to extricate himself from this morass,
I think he'll do it.
Yeah. The Bloomberg piece you're talking about, let me read a quote from it. "Oman has told European officials there's no way of going back to the pre-war status quo with the Strait of Hormuz and transiting ships may have to be charged some fees. While Omani officials said they will always abide by international maritime law, they added that there could be fees for services related to depolluting the strait or helping ships navigate it. It's unclear if Oman said all these fees will be obligatory." Um...
Yeah.
Yeah. But so, so why, why, uh, why is the US striking Iran every time Iran strikes those ships? Is it just to degrade Iran's, is the US trying to take advantage of this situation to degrade Iran's ability to control the Strait of Hormuz by destroying radars and the, and the fast attack boats? Or is it genuinely trying to, um, um, dissuade Iran from wanting to control the Strait of? Like, do they, do they really think there's a possibility where Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz? Is that, is that actually a possibility? Like, we're acting like it's a given. We're acting like it's a given. Is it really a given that Iran will control it?
I think it's, you know, essentially flailing. You're right. You know, it's like there's positions in the end game in chess where, you know, you can see five moves ahead and you know that this piece is going to, you know, the king is going to be checkmated. I think that the US has found out it cannot keep open the strait by military means alone. Okay. It can, it was trying to carve out this, this, you know, constricted passage through the Omani coastline and establish that as, as a beachhead on which to build, um, but Iran correctly assessed that, no, that dog won't hunt, and attacked. And why did the US retaliate? You're saying again, what other options does it have? You know, it's in a tough strategic situation. It's not going to say, "Okay, we tried and we failed. So have at it, Iran." I think it's still trying to, to find a way to preclude this from happening. You know, there's a, there's a good saying in Persian, they say, "In..." which means that from this column to that column, there is, you know, salvation. And it's about this guy who is tied to a post who is going to be executed, and he said, "Well, wait a second, can you move me to that post instead of this post?" And the executioner's like, "Yeah, okay, whatever." And between the time he was moved, like some important person passed by, and this guy shouted out a plea, and his life was saved. You know, so that's the saying. It's like, you know, from this post to that post, there could be, you know, why not risk it? The Persians have another good saying. They say, "The stone is free, the sparrow is free." Like, you know, pick up a rock from the ground, throw it at the bird, you might hit it. So, again, this is not part of a well-thought-out strategy by the United States. President Trump is improvisational, okay? He tries stuff, and if it doesn't work, you know, he'll try something else. It's too early in the game for the US to fully acquiesce to Iranian control of the strait, I think. You know...
Yeah.
And I think they realize they can't significantly attenuate Iran's coastal capabilities, especially because, as reporting is showing, Iran is quickly reconstituting it. But what other option do you have?
Also, could it be symbolic? Just to show the Gulf, like, "Hey, we're trying to show American..."
That's a great point. I hadn't thought of that.
Yeah. I mean, look at Rubio's trip. You know, all this is the back. Rubio's trip to the GCC countries. They submit, you know, they put out that testosterone-laden final statement that irritates, you know, Iran tremendously, right? So, yeah, I think that President Trump and this administration are not willing to be seen as throwing the whole GCC under the bus, you know, this early in the game. They're going to need them, if for no other reason, for this, you know, ridiculous $300 billion investment fund. So, yeah, that's a very good point. I hadn't thought of...
Maria? Testosterone-laden statement from the GCC. Um, it did piss off the Iranians, by the way. Um, so...
What do you make of the Lebanese agreement? How, how do we make sense of that along with the Iranian one? Like, I spoke to two experts in Middle East negotiations, Daniel Levy, Israeli negotiator, and Aaron David Miller, State Department. Both of them significant experience.
I spoke to them both yesterday about this.
And, um, they had completely different takes. They perceived the Lebanese, Lebanese agreement in completely different ways. One believes it was a horrible agreement that kneecaps a better agreement that the Iranians are trying to enforce, and the other believes it's a, it's a great agreement, the best they could do. Um, and while he doesn't believe it could be actualized for obvious reasons, he does believe that it's a pretty good agreement. Um, so where do you stand on this, and how do you... It's just such a weird, bizarre situation. Which agreement takes precedent? How do the two fit in together? The Iranian MOU and the, uh, the Lebanon, Lebanon agreement, which both don't have as a signatory to either of them.
You know, I think...
And they're both, and they're both about, they both relate to...
Hasn't signed any of them.
No, they're not signatories. They said this will not happen. You know, so...
Yeah, for the Lebanese one, yeah.
I think it's a sop that Israel is giving to the United States, right? To show that it plays well with others. But to be realistic, it's not going to change anything. You know, the Lebanese armed forces are not going to be able to disarm, um, Hezbollah.
You know, and these, you know, there's one or two, what, pilot zones? Sure, Israel can, you know, evacuate one or two pilot zones and the LAF can go in, but as a practical matter, at least per Israeli officials, they're not leaving southern Lebanon and they're not going to outsource their security to the LAF. So you could have signing ceremonies, you know, that's great. Um, but it doesn't change the underlying dynamic, which is the Lebanese government is unable to disarm and control Hezbollah.
Okay. And Hezbollah is not going to disarm unilaterally. And Israel is not going to withdraw from southern Lebanon as long as Hezbollah is there. So that's the reality. So Lebanon is pretty doomed.
Well, I mean, Jesus. And what, what's your timeframe? You know, I mean, yeah. I mean, Lebanon...
I mean, all the Middle East. If you take the fact that what is it? It's 50 degrees Celsius right now in southern Iran. So, you know, for a variety of reasons.
Celsius. 50 degrees Celsius. Holy...
Exactly.
How much is that? How much is that Fahrenheit for our American audience?
I have no idea. But...
Hold on. You're American, man. What do you have? You have no idea.
Yeah, but...
It's 120, 122 degrees Fahrenheit.
President Carter in 1976 issued this statement that we have to go metric. I listened to him. So...
No, but I mean, Lebanon is doomed because...
Yeah. Unless...
Because Lebanon cannot function with, uh, there, a state within a state. Israel won't accept, uh, there. Iran won't give up on. But unless, let's go to through the other point. Lucky, I almost forgot it. Hezbollah, the juice is not worth the squeeze. I mean, for the time being, look, Hezbollah has been an ally of Iran, the Islamic Republic, since the foundation of the Islamic Republic. But in terms of, of what it gives and what it gets right now, Hezbollah is weaker than it's been for a long time. But that doesn't mean Iran's going to throw it under the bus. You know, Iran still believes in this forward defense strategy of empowering proxies so they don't have to fight their enemies on Iranian soil. Now, that that didn't work in the last two wars, you know, starting in early 2025, but still, Hezbollah is an essential component of Iran's extended defense. And this is why they've tried so hard to include Hezbollah in this regional ceasefire. And again, unlike the United States, which really operates in a time frame between the news cycle, the daily news cycle, and, you know, every two-year election cycle, Iran tends to see longer term. Iran can think strategically. Iran doesn't change its strategic outlook every four years because of an election, right? So, Iran says, "Hezbollah has worked for us before, they'll work for us again." So even though we now have this new cool form of strategic deterrence, control of the strait, you know...
But that doesn't, that might not work as well against Israel because Israel doesn't need the strait. That's why it's so important.
You know, redundancy is a good thing. So, yeah, I'm, yeah. To me, again, there are two things Iran's not going to back down on. Well, many things. Two of which are Lebanon and the Strait. You know, when you go to the nuclear portfolio, they're not going to give up indigenous enrichment, though they'll be willing to suspend for a while. They're not going to send all their HOU to the US, but the US is no longer uranium.
Yeah. Highly.
Yeah.
Um, and the threat of Hormuz. You said they won't give up on them. There is nothing the Americans can do for Iran to give up either of those. The right amount of sanctions lifted, the right amount of assets unfrozen. Let's say we lift the sanctions and gradually over five years, you fund, you reduce, you disarm Hezbollah gradually. So after five years of Iran being part of the global economy, or 10 years, then it's really hard to kind of revert that. It becomes the norm. And that's like, and then Iran would slowly fold as part of that deal. It's good for Iran. It's welcome to the global economy. The people do better, no more sanctions. None of that. It's better for Lebanon, no state within a state. It's better for Israel, no threat. And of course, part of the deal will have to include what was included in the Lebanon agreement, which is the rearmament of the Lebanese military to act as a deterrent against Israel. And and and no, this seems like I'm, I'm, I'm kind of this, this idea is a dream rather than reality. We're far from it. But just in theory, it just sounds like a, a, a win-win-win deal. Iran wins, back to the global economy. Lebanon wins, one military. And Israel wins.
Iran doesn't want to be a part of the global economy because it sees it as US controlled. Right? Better paradise lost, banner, better to reign in hell than serve in heaven, is what El, is what Satan said. You know, so the...
What did Satan say? Ellen.
Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven. Right.
John Milton, didn't you?
That's a hard slogan. Didn't read it. Go ahead.
But here's the point. The IRGC is doing fine, right? They're making money off of sanctions, right? You know, the Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff model is, if you wave enough money, you know, billions and billions of dollars under people, they will do what you want them to, right? That doesn't hold with Iran, okay? Because if Iran fully, you know, if there's a McDonald's on every street corner, if there, if the US presence is back in Iran, that's death to the Islamic Republic. You know, back before the before the revolution, there was a very famous book in Iran called "Gharbzadegi" or "Westoxication" by a guy, I think it was Ahmad, I forget the author, but his thesis was, and this is back in the '70s, I think he wrote it in the late '60s, was that Iranian culture and strength was being weakened by this slavish devotion and subservience to the West. You know, this was one of the causes of the, of the revolution in 1979. They didn't want to be, you know, the servant of the West. So saying to Iran, "We'll let you be a part of the global economy that we control, where we're global hegemons, you know, when you can be the country we strip mine so that we can, you know, keep, you know, living in luxury or whatever." That doesn't sing to the people running Iran. I, I, I just...
China's part of the global economy. Russia was part of the global economy. Japan is, Europe is, India is. I, I, it's not... You're making it seem like being part of the global economy makes you almost like a colonial state, but that's just not a fair characterization.
It is for Iran. You know, Iran's whole thing.
No, but econom... Look at China. It could be still aligned with China economically while still being part of the global economy. The global economy is is heavily influenced, uh, by by by the US, but I wouldn't say controlled. The US does not really control China. Some would even argue the opposite is the case. So it could still be part of the global economy, but be more aligned with the China bloc, the BRICS bloc, China, Brazil, whatever.
And that's another component, which is that the Iran thinks that time is on their side. They think that the US has reached its apogee of global power and is on the wane. So, you know, they can join a global economy, but not one that the US dictates the rules for. They can align with China, with the BRICS countries, you know, forget Europe, forget the US, you know, they're on the, sort of, on the ebbing tide of history. And they again, they say in Arabic, you know, "Patience is the key to to blessing." You know, so they have patience. You know, first of all, they're...
They're going to write out to him. What?
No. Can you say, like, just use an English one? Like, "Patience is a what is it?" "Patience is a virtue."
"Patience is a virtue." Yeah. Yeah.
Speak our language, Dan. Speak our language. We haven't read 6,000 books.
Yeah. Well, it's a great phrase. You know, this is a, you tell you, you learn these languages and you start thinking in these axioms. You know, it's like, are these figures of speech or these lines from poems? Yeah.
They believe in patience.
You know so much about so much. I want to start asking you about what's happening in Mali, to be honest, and Ethiopia, right now. The, the war in Ethiopia. Probably have an answer for that.
Please know. Yeah.
Um, so then, then what, what happens next? Where are we at right now?
We're at, you know, again, it's a, it's not a personality thing. It's not an Iran versus US thing. It's a broken complex system finding a new normal. You know, resetting itself. Okay, we broke the Persian Gulf with this war. And now, over a period of months and years, it needs to find the new normal. We're in the process of that. You know, the US will be less important in the Persian Gulf than it was before because we've shown that the big stick we had doesn't work. Okay? And the GCC countries will do different things based on this knowledge. Um, and again, you know, people talk about Iran emerges from this war stronger. In some ways, yes. In many ways, no. Economically, you know, you talk about countries being doomed. Iran is doomed. Okay. In the sense that it has always been the case that the people running Iran, not always, but the Islamic Republic, were not predominantly focused on delivering essential goods and services to the Iranian people. You know, like all oligarchies, they want to stay in power and enrich themselves. That's going to be harder to do now, you know, after this ceasefire because, first of all, they have $300 billion worth of damage. They have to reconstitute their defense industrial base because they know the war will return. The US and Israel are not going to go away and give up and say, "We lost, you won." In their minds. So, it's going to be harder to run the economy. And the people running Iran right now have shown that they're both uninterested and unable to run a modern economy. So, what's happening next? Iran is going to be more dangerous because it will be weaker and more bellicose. It'll be a militaristic state run by an IRGC elite who are going to, you know, it's like that, remember in the 2008 financial crisis? I forget who it was. It was Jamie Dimon or someone who said, "We all knew that, you know, the, the collapse was coming, but as long as the music is playing, you keep dancing." You know. So...
And the music has stopped now.
Yeah. So, the IRGC just wants to hold on as long as it can. Okay. That's what's going to happen. And, you know, the Middle East, you know, "doomed" is too facile a word. But, you know, you've got this bellicose, militaristic Israel who, partially due to the trauma of, of, uh, you know, the Hamas attacks, is still trying to, as JD Vance said, "kill its way out of all security threats," which it can't do. You've got an Iran that's going to be more militarized, has control of the strait. Uh, the six GCC countries, each of which will have to figure out a new way of of living with Iran because, as the foreign minister said at Davos, "Unless Iran has security, no one in the Persian Gulf will have security." You've got a US who's going to be so traumatized by the war that they just want to get out of there, right? They didn't want to be there in the first place. You look at the November national security statement of 2025, and it says, essentially, "Middle East not that important. We need to focus on China, which is the pacing threat." Right now, we've made the Chinese putative Chinese threat a lot more exigent because we've wasted all of our armaments.
Yeah.
Which years to reconstitute. So it's a transitional time, and transitional times are very dangerous.
That's such an good overview. That is an incredible overview. I think you've done a really good job at summarizing where answering my question. Where are we right now?
Yeah. Yeah. We're in transition.
Yeah.
It is. So, you agree with what many Iranians believe, that the, many people around the world, but Iranians in this case, believe that the American empire has peaked?
Yeah. But we had a good run. Yeah.
Hell of a run. Yeah.
Yeah. I mean, I think it peaked. You know, look, this is 4% of the world controlling 25% of its resources. You know, well done. You know, it was like the British rule over India. I'm amazed they did it that well with, you know, with so few people. But yeah, it's, it's done because for a variety of reasons. But yeah, I think that, you know...
You know, I'll tell you one thing, and I'll, you know, you know, Pete Hegseth said the other day, "We are producing more armaments, or we're spending more money on weapons than we ever have before." You know, as if that's a good thing.
You know, we're going to have... He wants a $1.5 trillion dollar defense budget at a time when, you know, there's no healthcare, public education in America is is going down the tubes. Uh, we can't provide essential goods and services. I forget the percentage of children in poverty, but it's freakishly high. So, yeah, of course, America's, you know, on the wane. It could, we could reverse it, you know, but, you know, the current dynamics are are not positive.
Have I, um, have I asked you, maybe in our first conversation, did I ask you why you think the war started? Why Trump decided to attack Iran? Have I ever asked you that question?
I don't think so. I think it's, you know, pretty much what I think. It's, he wasn't constitutionally predisposed to not do it. He likes the military. He was feeling bucked by his victory in Venezuela and by...
What was he trying, what was he trying to achieve? Some people say it's Israel's behest. Others believe it's the nuclear program. People like me believe it's a mix of many things, but mainly the control of the Strait of Hormuz, the energy choke point, to have leverage over China. There's all these various theories on why he did it.
I think it was some for his legacy, sorry, as well.
Yeah, I think it was, part legacy. You know, he wanted, due to the hat trick of Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba. I think a lot of it was Netanyahu did the same tired pitch he had done to all the other presidents and said, "Iran is weaker than ever," which was true. You could do a quick strike with, you know, shock and awe. Uh, we decapitate the leadership, the Iranian people rise up and finish the job in out in a couple of weeks, and you've done what no other American president since the revolution could do. And so, again, he's not the first world leader to, you know, engage in magical thinking about a quick war. Saddam Hussein did it in 1980. Vladimir Putin did it with Ukraine. Donald Trump is just the last, the most recent president or world leader to do it.
Most wars, most, most wars are expected to be a very short war.
It's very rare for a war to, someone to get into a war expecting a prolonged quagmire.
Exactly. Exactly. You know, we're not good at...
I, I read books too, Alan. I read books too.
My god, you're talk, you're an incredibly smart guy and you're talking to incredibly smart people every day. So, look, you know, I'm like, I've got like, I'm a one-trick pony. You know, you talk to me about Iran, I'll sound impressive, but you're talking to people about this whole spectrum of issues, you know, and not just sitting there going, "Huh? Huh? What's that mean?" So, no, my hats off to you. Plus, you're in your...
Okay, too many compliments. I'm starting to blush. Um, okay. So, let's, let's, uh, smart me is going to ask you another question to try to understand what you say. Um, so we talked about, oh, Lebanon. I, I made a joke that Lebanon is doomed, and I think I explained why because Iran will keep, etc.
What do you think? What happens then in Lebanon? Is it going to be just a, is there going to be a power struggle there between Israel and Iran? Israel will try to get rid of Hezbollah. Iran will try to keep Hezbollah. And Lebanon will be, try to keep its own identity. They're putting posters now. They're removing Hezbollah posters and putting "Lebanon First" posters across the highways in Lebanon. I saw it, uh, two days ago on the news. So, poor Lebanon. They have no, no, uh, and there's also the idea of Trump to send Al-Shara to help get rid of Hezbollah. We got to put that in the mix as well. So...
Oh, man. Um, so what would you speculate would happen there?
You know, I don't know because again, the underlying reality is these are complex systems. And even though you could see some immediate, like, if-then chains, I have no idea. And not only do I have no idea, no one has an idea. There's too many variables. You know, you've got Hezbollah, you've got, you know, the, the current Lebanese government, which is very anti-Hezbollah. You have an incredibly dynamic, unstable Israel. You know, to me, the, the bellicosity and the trauma and the reaction to the trauma of Israel, that's the independent variable that's driving a lot of this because after October 7th, you know, Israel said, "The way we've been handling threats is all wrong. We now have to eliminate them." And they're in the process of finding out that that's not going to work, but they're not there yet. And so that dynamic still has to be played out. You know, much like global war on terror, right? After 9/11, okay, the US is traumatized. And so we're like, "Global War on Terror." We passed the bill that creates DHS in like three days. No one reads it, right? But we got to do something, you know? So I don't know how it's going to, I don't know what's going to happen in Lebanon. I don't know what's happen... strikes right now in Lebanon. So as we're speaking...
You know, it's, it's all, I know is the far greater instability because we had, again, not stability, but a relatively low level of of sta, of stability, right? And, you know, but it wasn't sustainable. We saw that with the Hamas attack, October 7th. We're seeing it now. We'll see it again. You know, so, you know, things usually are what they seem. The Middle East, for a variety of reasons, has always been relatively unstable. It's not a cohesive economic region at all, which is part of its problem. You know, there's no economic interdependencies between among the various Gulf countries. They all just export to the West, to Europe, to China, to Russia, right? So that makes things, you know, it's like it's like shallow roots, you know, it's makes it less stable because they're not fighting with each other.
Interesting. That's a good point because I was, my next question. You said that the Middle East has been unstable for such a long period of time. Um, I was going to ask you why, and you're saying one of the reasons, one of the main reasons, sectarian divisions is one, but you're saying another reason, there's lack of interdependency. There's sectarian divisions in other areas in the world, but they still managed to prosper. In India, for God's sakes. You know, I was in Nigeria, you know, my first tour, there's like 220 different ethnicities there, you know, there's just, or 400. I mean...
But, you know, it's, it achieves a balance. It's homeostasis. But yeah, the Middle East, again, you got all these countries, they don't have, you know, yeah. I mean, other than the obvious ones like Saudi and Bahrain, because Saudi, to an extent, controls a lot of what goes on in Bahrain, and, you know, they have tiny little country, I don't think it counts.
Yeah. You know, and Israel's been the outlier since '48. That, you know, and to give President Trump credit, the Abraham Accords were a great thing, you know, but were they, were the Abraham Accords a great thing considering they haven't solved the Palestinian issue? Like, I spoke, I spoke to, had an, so I like to talk to people I strongly either disagree with, I just cannot understand.
And obviously one of the people I've been critical of for so long is Ben. Every time he puts out a statement, it's on my list to discuss with various guests how crazy it is and how insane it is. Um, and today I had a guest, his name is Yishai Fleischer. There it is. I'm looking at his video now. It's my first interview of the day, and he's someone who supports Ben and his policies, most of them. And just having that conversation, it, it lasted an hour and a half. It's my second conversation with him.
But just having that discussion just made me realize, and I've had similar conversations with people from the IRGC as well, not as probably as I should probably have more of them, but it's like impossible to imagine peace with that mentality.
That's a great point. And that mentality has just been ingrained in those people. People like me and you, but they've just been, there's just so much has happened in the Middle East, especially since the establishment of the state of Israel, but even before that. It's like what the foreign ministers of Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi, I think, mentioned in the summit on the day of the day one of the negotiations in Switzerland. There was a summit in Egypt, I think it was, of all of this, these Sunni countries, and they put out a statement that essentially said that peace in the Middle East would not exist until the Palestinian issue resolved. And in a way, everything goes back to the Palestinian issue because what Iranians are saying they're fighting for is the Palestinian issue. Um, Israelis, they don't believe in a two-state solution. But then what is the alternative? Each one has their own theory. Then you speak to the Lebanese people, they want, they empathize with the Lebanese, the Palestinians, but they want to take care of their own country. But then you have Hezbollah that supports Iran, but that also fights for the Palestinian cause. It, I feel like everything does at the end of the day go back to the state of, or the state of Israel and Palestine.
Well, it's like, it's like that guy who, who wrote Sapiens, Yuval Harari, you know.
Yeah. My bad. Yeah.
Yeah. Yeah. It's, you know, everyone has these narratives and these, these myths. And these myths help cooperation among strangers, you know, because you all believe the same myth. You see yourself as part of a group as opposed to another group, and that helps, you know, larger and larger societies get by because, you know, the primate brain is sort of wired to deal with 150 people. You know, anything beyond that, you need these enabling mythologies and narratives. You know, I tell you, if I were in charge of the world, there was an initiative that Bill Gates did like 20 years ago called Big History, which, you know, is history from the start of the universe, or at least the known start of the universe, 13.5 billion years ago till now. You know, and it's just the scientific outlook. And, you know, everyone's fighting over, you know, dirt, or, you know, "my God is better than your God," or, you know, "you did this to us in 1953." "Well, you did this to us in 1979." And it's, you know, it's understandable again, based on our, the history of us as a species. But at this point, where we face global challenges that are that are just, you know, even now, what's the temperature in Europe, right? So, you know, climate change and all the other destabilizing, you know, for the Holocene, which started roughly 13,000 years ago till now, you had 14 degrees Celsius as a global temperature with a 1-degree Celsius variation plus or minus for the last 13,000 years. That's what has enabled society as we know it. We've now pushed ourselves out of that, right? So all this fighting between Israel and Palestine, Iran and the US, that's small potatoes. We've got real...
Man, like I'm just waiting for a day an alien comes to Earth so we all come together and say, "Holy, we have another common enemy now, and that's a species from another planet," and we get peace at least between us as a species. Um, but yeah, like if you think...
It's not a common enemy, it's us.
But have you ever mentioned this to anyone when you were in the conducting the JCPOA negotiations? Have you ever mentioned that to anyone on the Iranian side that believes in the eradication of the state of Israel? Have you ever had that discussion with them? But I don't think you could have because you were... Oh, you have friends in Iran. So, is there anyone in Iran that you're friends with that is, there's many in Iran that don't believe in the state of Israel. Have you spoken to anyone like this and had that conversation with them like, "Hey, you know, you've, you've got to just stop fighting about, you know, this happened then, that happened then. Got to open a new page. Israel's here to stay. We got to figure out a solution for the Palestinian issue that also respects Israel's state." What have you ever had that pragmatic conversation with someone from Iran?
Again, before these two wars, you know, Iran was the most pro-Israel, you know, and wrote about this in his first book, I forget the title, about it. But, you know, Iranians are not anti-Israeli. The Iranian regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran regime, is anti-Israeli, is anti-Zionist. But Iranian people, and I, I don't like generalizations, but as a rule, yeah, they don't care. You know, they have no beef against Israel, the state of Israel. Again, this is all before the two most recent wars. And yeah, in a similar vein, the Iranian leadership was more pro-Palestinian than almost any Arab country because they were using both of these as a vehicle to enhance and to put forward essentially nationalistic goals. You know, certainly after Khomeini died, as Iran became a more and more nationalist country and less and less of this pan-Islamic, you know, drive toward that that Ayatollah envisioned when he came back to Iran. He wasn't a nationalist. He didn't care. Pan-Arabism is just bringing all Arab countries together like...
Islamic, I would say pan-Islamic, you know, for it was, you know, the Islamic people together, right? And, you know, they were Ashari, they were 12 or Shia. But, yeah, I mean, I think that, I mean, again, Iran and Israel can get along, have historically gotten along just fine.
You know, contemporary in times.
And there's no reason.
Crazy how things can flip so quickly. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
Um, last question for you, Alan, is, um, the, the, the rhetoric between Turkey and Israel that's heating up, both of them...
Speaking very aggressively about the other.
Is that just political talk just to get support domestically, or it's starting to get worrying?
Uh, it's starting to get worrying. Again, I won't say the original Persian. There's a good saying though. They say in Persian, "10 dervishes can live on a carpet, but two kings cannot live in a kingdom." You know, this is just real politics. You know, I think Israel, there's a unifying power to an enemy, right? Iran has served that for Israel for a long time. And you can argue that I think many in Israel do see Iran as an existential threat. You know, you've got a country that says, "We have to eradicate Israel from the pages of history," right? Though that really hasn't been a policy that Iran has sought to do for a variety of reasons, but still, yeah, existential antipathy toward Israel from the Islamic Republic is a given, and that concerns Israel. That concerns Netanyahu. So, they've had to act accordingly. But Turkey also, you know, I don't need to tell you, is a historic regional hegemon, right? And to the extent that its strategic interests don't line up with Israel's, there's going to be a clash. So, yeah, I'm very concerned by it.
Alan, pleasure. Thank you so much for jumping on again. I appreciate it on a weekend.
Always a pleasure. I'm retired. Every day is a weekend for me, so look...
I'm just trying to be nice. Yeah. Yeah.
Thank you.
Pleasure is mine. Thank you so much. All right, guys. I'll be, I'll be live again in 15 minutes with, um, I haven't checked yet. Um, Alex Christophorou, um, to discuss the, uh, developments in Iran and also what's happening in Ukraine as well. Get his thoughts on the latest developments there. I'll see you guys in 15. Bye.